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FOREWORD
We welcome the publication of Mine Action Review’s Clearing 
the Mines 2019 in this important year of the Oslo Review 
Conference, where the mine action community is taking stock 
of progress made and setting the agenda for the next fi ve 
years. In positive developments, since last year’s report Jordan 
has completed clearance of the remaining mined areas that 
required verifi cation and Palau has determined that it does 
not have any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. It is 
always preferable to report good news, but the reason we came 
together as Advisory Board members to support this project 
was to ask the diffi cult questions, even when we don’t like the 
answers. This is how we improve programme performance. 
We believe that Mine Action Review has changed the mine 
action narrative since it was launched at the Third Review 
Conference in 2014. Many states have shown great maturity 
by engaging positively with the project and continue to do so, 
even when this means openly discussing the challenges and 
not just the progress. The Mine Action Review works best 
where it has provoked debate and discussion. In-country 
coalitions which bring together the national authority, 
implementing partners, and donors, can use the annual 
report to pull together towards completion, despite operators 
working in a sector in which competition is hardwired in 
national and international frameworks. Impressively, some of 
the closest intra and inter-sector cooperation has happened in 
the most challenging environments, where recent confl ict has 
led to new contamination – and new victims. 
In around 20 of the total 34 affected states parties, there has 
been progress in Article 5 implementation and we congratulate 
them. But this progress is fragile and should not be taken for 
granted, especially where long-standing programmes dealing 
with legacy contamination risk being at the mercy of changing 
political priorities of governments. States and mine action 
programmes that do the right things in the right way need to 
be supported and rewarded. This also means that national 
governments need to allocate more of their own resources to 
mine action, even if they’re not able to meet the donors half way.
More has happened in some of the most highly complex 
environments, such as South Sudan and Afghanistan, than 
in a number of wealthier and more stable states parties. 
States with huge resources at their disposal have absolutely 
no excuse for inaction. But as the report illustrates, in 
some countries there is an unwillingness to apply good 
practice in land release or worse still, inaction in survey and 
clearance. Sadly, in a minority of countries and contexts even 
the good faith application of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention that international law demands is being called 
into question. The time has come for such inaction in Article 5 
implementation to be addressed as a compliance issue.
Completion of clearance is of course of fundamental 
importance, but how we get there is also a measure of success. 
This year, for the fi rst time, the Mine Action Review asked basic 
questions of mine action programmes on how they address 
gender and diversity. There was not just a paucity of data but 
an absence of understanding in far too many. Now that we know 
how bad the problem is, we need to act to address it.
Looking ahead, the new landmine emergency in states such 
as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has shown the value of our 
work as a key protection issue. As NGOs, we are there to save 
lives and safeguard livelihoods. We need to build on this and 
ensure our work is fi rmly embedded in the wider humanitarian 
response in the face of increasingly complex confl ict. Where 
mine contamination is less of a humanitarian imperative and 
more of a disarmament and developmental endeavour, we need 
to be relevant to development agendas and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), and to help address the impact on 
mine action of the environmental crisis facing our planet.
All of us in the mine action sector need to commit to not 
repeat errors of years ago, as we have no time to waste. It is 
utterly unacceptable to be wasting time and money clearing 
uncontaminated land. In addition, it does not matter under 
the Treaty how anti-personnel mines were produced: all 
improvised, as well as more conventionally manufactured 
mines designed to be detonated by a person are covered and 
banned. All must be cleared, destroyed, and reported on. 
We also need to plan for completion and the management 
of residual risk, link our work to assistance to victims, 
meaningfully mainstream gender and diversity, coordinate 
our efforts, and actively engage in the transparent and open 
discussions which need to be had. 
So in Oslo, let us look forward to the next fi ve years and 
accelerate the pace of change in our sector as we push on 
towards 2025. If we are not being bold, we are not doing 
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■ In the 20 years since the entry into force of the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 
1 March 1999, a total of at least 2,880 square 
kilometres of mined area has been cleared. This 
equates to an area greater than the size of Nairobi, 
New York City, and Rome combined. Operations have 
destroyed more than 4.6 million anti-personnel mines.
■ In 2018 alone, a global total of more than 155 square 
kilometres was cleared of anti-personnel mines; with 
more than 96% of recorded clearance in states parties 
to the APMBC. This represents a 16% increase on the 
2017 total (almost 134 square kilometres). The true 
total area of clearance is probably considerably greater, 
but data recording and reporting problems, especially 
in Iraq, prevent accurate reporting of a higher fi gure, 
in addition to a lack of transparency by several states 
not party.
■ Clearance operations in 2018 destroyed more than 
146,200 anti-personnel mines while “spot tasks” 
destroyed a further 7,600. In total, more than 153,800 
emplaced anti-personnel mines were destroyed during 
clearance and explosive ordnance disposal operations 
(EOD), compared to 181,600 in 2017. In addition, over 
38,500 anti-vehicle mines were also destroyed during 
clearance of mined areas in 2018, signifi cantly higher 
than the 7,500 destroyed in 2017.
■ Two states fulfi lled their APMBC Article 5 obligations 
to survey and clear all mined areas containing 
anti-personnel mines in 2018: Jordan and Palau. 
Jordan completed verifi cation of mined area that 
had not been cleared to humanitarian standards, 
while Palau confi rmed that survey of potentially 
contaminated areas was complete and that no mined 
areas had been identifi ed.
■ However, several affected states parties to the APMBC, 
including Eritrea, Niger, and Senegal, seemingly 
released no mined area in areas under their jurisdiction 
or control in 2018, putting their compliance with the 
duty in Article 5 to complete clearance “as soon as 
possible” into very serious question.
■ As at 1 October 2019, 56 states and 3 other areas were 
confi rmed or suspected to have anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control.1
Of the 56 states, 34 are party to the APMBC. These 
include Cameroon and Nigeria, both of which have mined 
area under their jurisdiction or control as a result of the 
use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature by 
Boko Haram, but which have yet to request an extension 
to their respective Article 5 deadline.
■ In the last 20 years, 33 states (all states parties to the 
APMBC, except for Nepal) and 1 other area (Taiwan), 
have completed mine clearance.2
■ Although all estimates should be treated with caution 
– and the picture is complicated by the addition 
of signifi cant amounts of new contamination from 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature in a 
relatively small number of countries – Mine Action 
Review estimates that global contamination from 
anti-personnel mines covers no more than 2,000 
square kilometres in total. 
■ Based on Mine Action Review’s assessment of the 
extent of contamination in affected states parties, 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq are massively 
contaminated (defi ned as covering more than 100km2
of land), while heavy contamination (covering more 
than 20km2) exists in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. In other affected states, 
the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination is 
medium or light.
■ For operations in 2018, six states parties had demining 
programmes Mine Action Review rated as good: 
Afghanistan, Jordan (which has now fulfi lled its Article 
5 obligations), Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom, 
and Zimbabwe. A further 11 states parties had 
demining programmes rated as average: Angola, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Oman, 
Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. 
Colombia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Peru, 
Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen attained only a rating of 
“poor”, while Chad, Eritrea, Niger, and Senegal all rated 
“very poor”.
 1 Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States parties to the APMBC are in bold. Other areas are 
in italics. 
 2 States Parties: Albania, Algeria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Rep. of Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, France, The Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Malawi, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Republic of North Macedonia, Palau, Rwanda, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zambia; State not Party: Nepal; and “other area” Taiwan. States parties in italics are those that reported mined 
areas under the APMBC, and which have subsequently reported completion under the APMBC. 
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OVERVIEW
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) entered into force as binding 
international law on 1 March 1999. Its implementation has 
encompassed sustained action to rid the world of millions 
upon millions of emplaced anti-personnel mines. Demining 
programmes over the past 20 years in some 90 countries 
worldwide have cleared a total of at least 2,880 square 
kilometres of mined area, with the destruction of more than 
4.6 million anti-personnel mines. Tens of thousands of lives 
have undoubtedly been saved as a direct result of mine 
action, and demining’s broader contribution to development 
has been huge. This herculean effort been supported by 
more than US$10 billion of combined national funding and 
international aid. 
From the fi rst 40 states that ratifi ed the Convention, 
triggering its entry into force, the APMBC has grown to boast 
a membership of 164 parties. It is the most widely ratifi ed 
conventional disarmament treaty in history, with only 33 
states still to adhere, one of which is a treaty signatory. 
Traditionally, disarmament treaties were preventive 
instruments of international law, seeking to remove weapons 
from the hands of states before they could be used, or used 
widely. The APMBC differs in that it also addresses the harm 
that has been infl icted by use of the weapons it prohibits. Its 
provisions do sustain a preventive approach, requiring its 
states parties to destroy all but a handful of anti-personnel 
mines that can be lawfully retained for training in mine 
clearance. But, signifi cantly, a duty is also imposed to clear 
all anti-personnel mines on the territory of a state party 
(irrespective of whoever laid them) as well as on any areas 
its forces occupy abroad. It also sets a time-bound deadline 
for this clearance. Under Article 5 of the Convention, each 
state is obligated to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
all mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon 
as possible, but not later than ten years after becoming a 
state party to the Convention. This duty of clearance is a 
remarkable innovation in international law.
And where gaps in the legal framework for this clearance 
have become clear, states parties have acted to fi ll them. 
The APMBC did not address the legal ramifi cations of a 
state party fi nding anti-personnel mine contamination after 
its ten-year deadline had expired. But this occurred during 
implementation of the Convention.1 Accordingly, in 2012 
the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties agreed that such a 
state should either clear and report (if the contamination 
was minimal) or seek a new deadline for clearance. Niger, 
which discovered colonial-era minefi elds laid by France 
on its north-eastern border in 2012, submitted an Article 5 
deadline extension request in June 2013. This procedure is 
also relevant for both Cameroon and Nigeria, part of whose 
territory has been contaminated with anti-personnel mines 
of an improvised nature laid by Boko Haram, and whose 
original 10-year clearance deadlines have already expired. 
However, as at 1 October 2019, neither Cameroon nor Nigeria 
had sought a new Article 5 deadline for clearance, which they 
must both do as soon as possible to ensure compliance with 
the Convention. 
During the negotiation of the APMBC, the issue arose of what 
would happen to those states whose contamination was so 
signifi cant that ten years would not be suffi cient to complete 
clearance. The suggestion was made to adapt and apply 
the approach from the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, 
which allowed states parties that were unable to complete 
stockpile destruction within the allotted period to seek a 
(single) extension to the deadline. States negotiating the 
APMBC agreed to allow heavily affected states parties to 
seek multiple extensions, but each may be for no more than 
ten years. Subsequently, states parties have also shown 
fl exibility in allowing extensions purely for survey, to enable 
an affected state party to better understand the extent of 
contamination. As discussed below, high-quality survey is 
integral to an effective and effi cient mine action programme. 
Unfortunately, the extension process has also allowed states 
to drag their feet on clearance. Currently, almost every 
state party, whether their contamination is great or small, is 
subject to an extended deadline. Only recent adherents Oman, 
Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka are facing 
their initial Article 5 deadline, and of these only Sri Lanka is 
currently on course to meet it. Worse, a number of states 
have failed to request extensions to their deadlines, putting 
them in serious violation of the Convention. Eritrea was, as 
of writing, the latest state to fi nd itself in such a position, 
having failed to submit an Article 5 deadline extension 
request as at 1 October 2019. It joins Ethiopia, Jordan, and 
Ukraine on the list of those who have been in violation for 
lack of an extended deadline, but each subsequently returned 
to compliance: Ethiopia and Ukraine through requesting and 
gaining approval of new Article 5 deadlines, and Jordan by 
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MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
AFFECTED COUNTRIES
In 1999, when the APMBC entered into force, it was suspected 
that as many as 91 states and 4 “other areas” were mine- or 
UXO-affected. Over time, fi ve further states were found to 
have confi rmed or suspected mined area, three as a result 
of new information,2 and two as a result of existing states 
allowing part of the sovereign territory to secede and become 
a new state,3 while seven states were found to be affected 
only by UXO. Since 1999 and through 1 October 2019, a total 
of 33 states have completed mine clearance; all but one of 
these states (Nepal) are party to the APMBC (see Table 1). 
In 2018, two states parties fulfi lled their Article 5 demining 
obligations: Jordan and Palau.
Taiwan completed mine clearance several years ago, 
leaving Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara 
as mine-affected “other areas”.
Table 1: Completion of Demining of Anti-Personnel Mined Area Since 1997*
State
Albania** France** Malawi** Rwanda** 
Algeria** The Gambia** Mauritania** Suriname**
Bhutan** Germany** Montenegro Swaziland**
Bulgaria** Greece** Mozambique** & *** Tunisia**
Burundi** Guatemala** Nepal Uganda**
Rep. of Congo** Guinea-Bissau** Nicaragua** Venezuela**
Costa Rica** Honduras** North Macedonia** 
(previously known as the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
Zambia**
Denmark** Hungary** Palau Other area
Djibouti** Jordan** Taiwan
Total 33 states and 1 other area
* States parties to the APMBC are in bold. The sole other area (Taiwan) is in italics.
** States parties which reported mined areas under the APMBC and subsequently reported completion.
 *** Mozambique has four very small suspected mined areas that remain underwater. These areas, which were declared by Mozambique to the other APMBC states parties, 
 must be released as soon as possible. 
Table 2: Global Anti-Personnel Mine Contamination (at 1 October 2019)
States parties States not party
Afghanistan Nigeria** Armenia Lebanon
Angola Oman Azerbaijan Libya
Argentina* Palestine China Morocco
Bosnia and Herzegovina Peru Cuba Myanmar
Cambodia Senegal Egypt North Korea
Cameroon** Serbia Georgia Pakistan
Chad Somalia India Russia
Chile South Sudan Iran South Korea
Colombia Sri Lanka Israel Syria
Croatia Sudan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan
Cyprus Tajikistan Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Vietnam
DR Congo Thailand 22 states not party
Ecuador Turkey
Eritrea Ukraine Other areas
Ethiopia United Kingdom Kosovo
Iraq Yemen Nagorno-Karabakh
Niger Zimbabwe Western Sahara
34 states parties 3 other areas
* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. 
 The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.
** Have not yet submitted a request to extend their Article 5 deadline. 
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Table 3 below summarises what is known or reasonably 
believed about the extent of contamination in affected states 
parties. It is therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review 
of the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination based on 
available evidence, as opposed to the claims of governments 
or mine action programmes, some of which do not stand up 
to scrutiny.
In nearly three quarters of affected states parties, the extent 
of anti-personnel mine contamination is believed to be 
medium or light. In these states, the necessary survey and 
clearance could be completed within a few years with the 
necessary approach and commitment.
Over the coming 18 months, both Chile and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DR Congo) are expected to complete mine 
clearance on their respective territory. Chile has an Article 
5 deadline of 1 March 2020 while DR Congo is obligated to 
complete mine clearance by 1 January 2021. If, however, by 
November 2019, Chile is not fi rmly on course to complete 
clearance in time, at the Fourth Review Conference it should 
request a short extension period (of no more than one year) 
in order to fulfi l its Article 5 obligations in a treaty-compliant 
manner. Sri Lanka may complete mine clearance in the 
course of 2021, which would make it one of the most heavily 
affected states yet to do so. 
Other welcome news has come from Cyprus and Angola. 
A series of confi dence-building measures agreed upon 
in February 2019 by the President of Cyprus, Nicos 
Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci, 
included survey and clearance of 18 suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs), nine on each side of the buffer zone. It is 
expected that this work will be completed by February 2020. 
Cyprus could be made a mine-free island in short order if all 
the parties agreed to facilitate the United Nations and their 
contractors in this endeavour, something they have not thus 
far agreed to do. In Angola, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
reported completing clearance of all known and registered 
tasks in Malanje province in 2018, putting the province on 
track to become Angola’s fi rst to be declared free of the 
threat of mines.
Table 3: Extent of Anti-Personnel Mined Areas in Affected States Parties (at 1 October 2019)
Massive (>100km2) Heavy (>20km2) Medium (2–20km2) Light (<2km2) or extent 
of contamination unclear
Afghanistan Angola Argentina* Cameroon**
Cambodia Bosnia and Herzegovina Chad Cyprus














* Argentina is considered mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. 
 The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.
** Has not yet submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline. 
NEW CONTAMINATION AND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES OF AN IMPROVISED NATURE
But new contamination is still being added to the global 
problem, largely at the hands of non-state armed groups. 
Use of mines of an improvised nature, predominantly by 
Islamic State, has added huge swathes of new contamination 
to an already huge problem in Iraq and created one in 
Syria. Anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature pose 
the biggest humanitarian threat in Afghanistan (despite a 
signifi cant threat coming also from anti-vehicle mines), with 
contamination continuing to expand as a result of persistent 
confl ict. In Yemen, huge quantities of anti-personnel mines of 
an improvised nature have been laid by Houthi forces over 
the past three years. In Colombia, new mines have been laid 
in recent times, often to protect coca production, but also as a 
result of a rise in the resurgence of non-state armed groups.
These improvised munitions are both captured by and 
prohibited under the APMBC whenever they are designed 
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person. It does not matter under the APMBC how these 
weapons were produced or employed, nor by whom they 
were laid; if they fall within the jurisdiction or control of a 
state party, all of the Convention’s provisions apply, including 
obligations to clear and report under Article 5 and Article 7, 
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The APMBC text and the travaux préparatoires of the 
Convention make that clear. This has also been highlighted 
by the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation in 
its “Refl ections and understandings on the implementation 
and completion of Article 5 mine clearance obligations”;4
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
in its non-paper, “Views and Recommendations on 
Improvised Explosive Devices Falling Within the Scope of 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention”; in the UN General 
Assembly 73/67 Resolution of December 2018; and in the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) glossary. Mine 
Action Review hopes that the issue of whether anti-personnel 
mines of an improvised nature fall under the APMBC – which 
should not have been open to debate in the fi rst instance – is 
fi nally put to bed at the Fourth Review Conference.
Accordingly, in states parties affected by victim-activated 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the defi nition 
of an anti-personnel mine, all relevant stakeholders should 
support the national authorities to correctly record and 
report this type of mine contamination under the APMBC, 
along with the requisite efforts to survey and clear it. This 
requires the use of reporting forms and establishment 
of information management systems that are able to 
disaggregate victim-activated IEDs that meet the treaty 
defi nition of an anti-personnel mine, from time delay-, 
command detonated-, or suicide borne-IEDs, all of which do 
not. Recording and reporting by APMBC states parties of 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature only under 
the catch-all term “IED” is legally incorrect and should be 
treated as a compliance issue.
Unfortunately, to date, the United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) has, in a number of key countries, impeded 
compliance with the APMBC in this regard. It has done so 
by declining to require that demining actors report victim-
activated devices of an improvised nature as anti-personnel 
mines, which would help ensure that states parties recognise 
and comply with the full extent of their APMBC obligations 
under international law. In Iraq, for instance, where UNMAS 
is the main channel for international mine action funding, it 
does not disaggregate results of clearance by operators it 
contracts to report anti-personnel mines of an improvised 
nature even though this is required by the APMBC. In 
Afghanistan, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), acting on advice from UNMAS, reports on the 
protection of civilians describing all anti-personnel mines 
using the term IED. 
CLEARANCE IN 2018
Globally, clearance in 2018 covered more than 155 square kilometres of mined area. This was a 16% increase on clearance in 
2017, but still amounted to the third lowest output in more than a decade, in part a refl ection of continuing economic pressures 
on the mine action sector. The number of anti-personnel mines destroyed in demining programmes dropped signifi cantly in 
2018, down to just over 153,800 from more than 181,000 the previous year, raising concerns about the targeting of clearance. 
However, the number of emplaced anti-vehicle mines destroyed in 2018 was over 38,500, a marked increase from the 7,500 
in 2017. Table 4 summarises clearance output in major mine action programmes globally in 2018 and describes changes in 
recorded clearance compared to 2017.










Croatia 48.8 984 + 18.4 The huge increase in clearance output for 2018 
over the previous year is in part because of a 
change in the recording of clearance output 
(now only upon offi cial certifi cation). In addition, 
realisation of major funds for demining in forests 
was delayed to 2018.
Cambodia 41.0 11,718 + 13.3 Overall land release output in Cambodia fell 
slightly in 2018 compared to the previous year 
even though clearance increased signifi cantly. To 
reach its ambitious targets tor 2025, Cambodia 
will need to secure additional funding and extra 
capacity and gain access to the non-demarcated 
border areas with Thailand.
Afghanistan 30.9 8,818 + 2.7 The mine action programme has maintained 
anti-personnel mine clearance at a consistent level 
in the face of funding and insecurity constraints, 
but in 2018 was still elaborating its strategy for 
dealing with mines of an improvised nature.
Iraq 8.4** 9,112 - 14.9 Iraq achieved very signifi cant destruction of 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature 
in 2018, but the inability or unwillingness of the 
authorities to disaggregate the destruction of 
mines from that of remotely detonated IEDs has 
prevented accurate reporting.
Sri Lanka 3.5 31,323 0.3 Sri Lanka has set a highly ambitious goal of 
completing clearance of all mines and by end 
2020. It did not, however, meet its national mine 
action strategy target for land release in 2018 and 
the 2020 goal is entirely dependent on increasing 
clearance resources.












2.4 37 + 2.1 In 2018, according to UNMAS, a total of just over 
2.38km2 of mined area was cleared, but with the 
destruction of only 37 anti-personnel mines.
Zimbabwe 2.1 22,013 + 0.4 A total of nearly 9.4km2 of land was released in 
2018, surpassing Zimbabwe’s 2018 target for land 
release under its national mine action strategy.
South Sudan 2.1 1,163 + 0.4 While South Sudan will not meet its current Article 
5 deadline of 2021, its remarkable progress in 
land release output and obtaining a more realistic 
picture of remaining contamination in 2018 place it 
in a much better situation as it prepares its second 
Article 5 deadline extension request, with a much 
more achievable problem to tackle.
Somalia 1.6 220 + 0.7 Of the total clearance in 2018, 0.03km2 was cleared 
in Somalia (no AP mines destroyed), 1.49km2 in 
Somaliland (219 AP mines destroyed), and 0.08km2 
in disputed area (1 AP mine destroyed). Land 
release outputs remained limited in 2018, primarily 
due to ongoing armed confl ict, new security threats, 
and a lack of resources and operational capacity.
United 
Kingdom
1.5 588 + 0.4 The United Kingdom released nearly 1.5km2 
of mined area in 2018 and conducted technical 
survey of the eight mined areas which will remain 
as at the end of the current phase of demining in 
March 2020.
Turkey 1.2 22,220 + 0.4 Turkey increased its clearance output in 2018, and 
also cancelled a signifi cant amount of mined area 
on the Syrian border.
Ethiopia 1.1 582 +0.7 With a poor track record for clearance in recent 
years, it is encouraging that Ethiopia reported 
clearing 1.1km2 in 2018, with the destruction of 
582 anti-personnel mines. In addition, there was 
also signifi cant cancellation through non-technical 
survey.
Angola 1.0 1,646 - 0.2 Funding constraints are impeding progress 
in Angola, especially since the US decision to 
withdraw its support for mine action there. 
Collectively, the resources of the three largest 
operators in Angola, HALO Trust, Mines Advisory 
Group, and Norwegian People’s Aid, have declined 
by nearly 90% over the past decade.
Sudan 1.0 31 + 0.3 Despite increased clearance in 2018, only 31 
anti-personnel mines were destroyed, raising 
questions about the targeting of demining efforts.
Chile 1.0 3,908 + 0.1 It is unclear whether Chile is on track to meet its 
impending Article 5 deadline as the small increase 
in clearance output in 2018 may not be enough to 
enable it to meet its legal target.
Colombia 1.0 322 +0.5 Colombia is not on track to meet its current Article 
5 deadline and has already stated it will request a 
second extension in 2020.
Jordan 1.0 6 - 0.4 Jordan completed clearance/verifi cation in 2018, 
which explains the drop in area cleared and the 
small number of anti-personnel mines destroyed.
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
0.9 2,101 + 0.2 The amount of land released through clearance 
and cancelled through non-technical survey in 
2018 was a slight increase on 2017, while technical 
survey output decreased slightly. Efforts in the 
latter half of 2018 were put into the “country 
assessment” project, to set a new baseline for 


















Tajikistan 0.6 4,998 + 0.0 Tajikistan cleared nearly 0.6km2 of mined area 
in 2018, less than it had planned to clear and 
substantially less than the amount foreseen in its 
deadline extension request.
Thailand 0.5 7,392 + 0.1 Land release output in 2018 was on a par with 
2017. Its land release targets are ambitious and 
require sustained funding, extra capacity, and a 
resolution of border demarcation issues that affect 
responsibility for mined areas.
North Korea 0.3 636 +0.3 In 2018, clearance took place of a Joint Security 
Area by North and South Korea, in which North 
Korea cleared 636 mines. North Korea also 









* APMBC states parties are in bold. Other areas are in italics. Clearance fi gures are rounded to the nearest decimal point. 
** As compared to 2017 estimate. 2018 data excludes items recorded only as IEDs and not disaggregated.
The disparity in density of contamination is obvious from Table 4. But while some contaminated areas will certainly be very 
much more heavily mined than others, fi gures of 37 anti-personnel mines cleared from 2.4km2 of mined area in Western 
Sahara and 31 anti-personnel mines cleared from 1km2 of mined area in Sudan raise serious questions about the quality 
of survey.
CLEARANCE SINCE 1999
In the past 20 years of clearance through the end of 2018, a 
total of more than 2,880 square kilometres of mined area has 
been cleared. This equates to an area greater than the size 
of Nairobi, New York City, and Rome combined. Operations 
have destroyed more than 4.6 million anti-personnel mines. 
Of the total global clearance since the entry into force of the 
APMBC, 1,780 square kilometres were cleared in the last 
decade, as Figure 1 illustrates.
This suggests that at current rates of clearance, most 
countries would be cleared of mine contamination by 
2030, the deadline for the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), leaving just a small number of 
confl ict-affected regions to be addressed in the 2030s. SDG 
16.1 seeks a signifi cant reduction in all forms of violence 
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Figure 1: Clearance in 2009-2018
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
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COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS
The impressive overall progress achieved under the auspices 
of the APMBC has, however, not been either smooth or 
consistent across states parties. Many have been too slow 
to initiate and conduct mine clearance; a few, notably the 
United Kingdom, failed to clear a single mined area during 
the 10 years originally allotted under the Convention for 
clearance to be completed (it is, however, now making solid 
progress towards completion). In more recent times, Chad, 
Ecuador, Eritrea, Niger, Peru, and Senegal have carried out 
little or no clearance of mined areas over the past fi ve years, 
putting their compliance with the duty in Article 5 to complete 
clearance “as soon as possible” into very serious question. In 
Ecuador, as of writing, due to the lack of budget for demining, 
only two days of clearance operations were planned for 
the whole of 2019. This simply does not comply with the 
requirements of the APMBC. Other states parties have 
resisted clearing mines laid in sensitive areas, such as along 
national borders or around military facilities. Such inaction is 
not permitted by the Convention. 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND COMPLIANCE
Two states parties, Jordan and Palau, fulfi lled their Article 
5 obligations in 2018. That leaves 34 states parties with 
outstanding Article 5 obligations of survey and clearance. 
Table 5 summarises the situation in these 34 states parties 
and identifi es key implementation priorities. Of these 34 
states parties, only 5 – DR Congo, Serbia, Sri Lanka, the 
United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe – were on track to meet 
their respective Article 5 deadlines as at 1 October 2019. 
The position in Chile was unclear, even though its Article 5 
deadline expires on 1 March 2020.













Renew earlier offer to the United Kingdom to support demining of the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands.




Accelerate clearance of dense anti-personnel mined areas and 
only clear land with fi rm evidence of contamination. Conclude early 
agreements with Thailand on border demining and commence 
pilot-project clearance without delay.




Complete national non-technical survey as soon as possible and 
restart clearance operations.
Eritrea 1 February 
2020
Not on track and no 
extension requested 
as of writing
An extension must be requested and granted by the Fourth Review 
Conference if Eritrea is not to be in serious violation of the APMBC. 
Eritrea should report on progress in demining as required by the 
Convention and respect its international legal duty to clear mined 
areas as soon as possible.
Chile 1 March 
2020
Unclear whether 
on track and no 
extension requested 
as of writing
Accelerate clearance in order to meet the Article 5 deadline (or 
request a one-year extension to fi nish the job, for consideration 
and approval at the Fourth Review Conference).




Conduct a nationwide survey to generate a baseline of mine 
contamination, and strengthen coordination, national standards, 
and information management.
Tajikistan 1 April 2020 Five-year, 
nine-month 
extension requested
Complete survey of all mined areas and secure the additional funding 
needed to expand capacity in line with its Article 5 extension request 
projections.
Ethiopia 1 June 2020 Five-year, seven-
month extension 
requested
Seek additional capacity and resources needed to implement its 
Article 5 deadline extension request projections and cooperate in 
cross-border mine action activities with Eritrea.
Niger 31 December 
2020
Not on track Submit a detailed workplan and accelerate demining to complete 
clearance within no more than two years.
DR Congo 1 January 
2021
On track Submit a detailed workplan and complete clearance as soon as 
possible, but no later than 1 January 2021. 
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
1 March 2021 Interim extension 
granted in 2018 for 
new national survey 
Complete its “country assessment” project on schedule and prepare 
its upcoming Article 5 deadline extension request based on realistic 
planning and concrete milestones.
Colombia 1 March 2021 Not on track Conduct national baseline survey of contamination and signifi cantly 
strengthen the effectiveness of its management and coordination of 
mine action.
Senegal 1 March 2021 Not on track Complete non-technical survey and clear all mined areas with firm 

















Ukraine 1 June 2021 Not on track Ensure no use of anti-personnel mines by its forces and formally 
establish a national mine action centre to facilitate better coordination, 
elaboration of a national strategy, and reporting under the APMBC.
South 
Sudan
9 July 2021 Not on track Set concrete and realistic annual targets for completing survey and 
clearance in its forthcoming Article 5 deadline extension request. 
Turkey 1 March 
2022
Not on track Approve and publish its national strategic mine action plan for 2019-21 
as soon as possible and move forward, without delay, to expand 
large-scale survey and clearance of border and non-border areas.
Cyprus 1 July 2022 Not on track Cyprus and Turkey to facilitate clearance of all mined areas inside and 
outside the Buffer Zone.
Somalia 1 October 
2022
Not on track Conduct a national survey to elaborate a baseline of mine 
contamination.
Ecuador 31 December 
2022
Not on track Accelerate demining to complete clearance as soon as possible, but no 
later than the end of 2022.
Afghanistan 1 March 
2023
Not on track Incorporate in reporting data on contamination and clearance of all anti-
personnel mines of an improvised nature to comply with the APMBC. 
Present revised milestones for clearance that refl ect reduced funding 
and clarify the implications for meeting its Article 5 deadline.
Serbia 1 March 
2023




Fully apply land release methodologies including non-technical and 
technical survey, to improve operational effi ciency.
Sudan 1 April 
2023
Not on track Clarify plans for demining in Western Kordofan state and Abyei. 




Accelerate non-technical survey and clearance to achieve its extension 
request land release milestones and conclude early agreements with 






On track to meet 
extended deadline 
granted in 2018
Provide an update on the results of technical survey of the remaining 
eight mined areas in Yorke Bay and on the planned timeline for 
contracting and completing clearance of this fi nal phase of demining.




Consider using mine detection dogs or other technical survey methods 
to speed up land release in the Condor mountain range.




Continue to release mined areas with a view to completion as 
soon as possible and no later than 1 February 2015. Seek to apply 
non-technical and technical survey, to confi rm contamination prior 
to clearance, whenever possible. 
Angola 31 December 
2025
Not on track Strengthen coordination, improve its national mine action database, 
and complete a comprehensive review of its national mine action 
standards.
Zimbabwe 31 December 
2025
On track Continue to accelerate clearance with a view to completion as soon as 
possible, but no later than the end of 2025.
Croatia 1 March 
2026
Unclear whether 
on track to meet 
extended deadline 
granted in 2018
Enhance use of non-technical and technical survey to improve land 
release effi ciency.
Iraq 1 February 
2028
Not on track Incorporate in its reporting data on contamination and clearance of 
all anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature (instead of reporting 
them within the catch-all category of IEDs) to comply with the APMBC.
Palestine 1 June 2028 Not on track Report accurately and consistently on the extent of mined area and 
annual clearance output.
Sri Lanka 1 June 2028 On track Complete clearance as soon as possible, with the aim to fulfi l Article 5 
obligations by 2021.
States parties without a future deadline 
Cameroon 1 March 2013 Needs extension Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey 
in Extrême-Nord (Far North) region.
Nigeria 1 March 2012 Needs extension Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey 
in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.
10   Clearing the Mines 2019 
Demining security continues to be a challenge in certain 
confl ict-affected states parties, including Afghanistan, 
Cameroon, Chad, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, DR Congo, Colombia, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen, further impeding 
Article 5 compliance. Afghanistan’s increasingly volatile 
security environment poses a major challenge to operators. 
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) recorded 
29 security incidents in 2018 in which 6 deminers were killed 
and a further 18 injured. In Senegal in 2019, fi ve deminers were 
kidnapped for a day by a non-state armed group in Casamance.
In 2019, Afghanistan became the fi rst country programme 
to release a national standard for tackling mines of an 
improvised nature. AMAS 06.10: Abandoned Improvised Mine 
Clearance was released in March 2019. As its title makes clear, 
and to protect the neutrality of humanitarian mine action, 
the Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) in the 
Afghan government permits clearance only of items that are 
not subject to areas of active hostilities. Under international 
humanitarian law, direct participation in hostilities (which 
includes mine clearance in contested areas without the 
consent of all the parties to the confl ict) makes a person a 
lawful target of lethal force by a party to an armed confl ict.
THE 2025 ASPIRATION
In 2014, at the Third Review Conference of APMBC, states 
parties affi rmed that they would intensify efforts to complete 
their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency 
that the completion work requires and aspired to meet 
these goals to the fullest extent possible by 2025. After a 
decade of repeated Article 5 extension requests being the 
norm, this marked a commitment to draw a line in the sand 
and set an end date for completion of clearance by affected 
states parties. While some states parties, such as Sri Lanka, 
United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe, are rising to the challenge, 
implementing requisite action plans, applying an effi cient 
land release methodology, and securing funding to ensure 
suffi cient capacity to fi nish clearance as soon as possible and 
before 2025; others are not. 
Mine Action Review has provided a rough assessment of the 
likelihood of each of the 34 affected states parties fulfi lling 
their Article 5 obligations by end of 2025, based on current 
progress, and which can be found in each country-specifi c 
report. Worryingly, more than half of affected states parties 
are currently not on track to meet the 2025 aspiration.
It is, however, not too late to improve this trajectory. With the 
exception of the most contaminated countries, or those with 
ongoing confl ict or access issues, most states parties could 
still complete by 2025 if national authorities, operators, and 
donors were to employ the right resources in the right way. 
But this is a big ‘if’, which will require stronger leadership 
and commitment from all, sustained funding, and adoption 
of the most effi cient and effective land release possible.
TWENTY YEARS OF THE APMBC: 
KEY LESSONS FOR MINE ACTION
LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION
It is self-evident that clearing areas that actually contain 
mines is the basis of an effective mine action programme. 
Understanding and localising the mine threat at an early stage 
is therefore the launching pad for success. Indeed, one of the 
largest impediments to achieving Article 5 compliance quickly 
and cheaply, once demining programmes are underway, 
has been the widespread poor quality of survey. Even today, 
surveyors without technical expertise continue to hamper the 
elaboration of a robust baseline of contamination, reporting 
vast mined areas where they do not exist, and fi lling the 
national database with incorrect or infl ated polygons. 
Historically, perhaps the greatest culprit has been the 
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), now defunct as a survey 
methodology, but once the darling of the donors. The 
LIS was conceived in the late 1990s with the very best of 
intentions: to identify all the mined areas and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW)-affected areas in a country, as well 
as to determine their impact on nearby communities. But 
instead of generating a robust baseline of contamination for 
the purpose of Article 5 implementation, the LIS led to many 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) being entered in the 
national mine action database that would prove to contain 
no contamination at all, while the size of those SHAs that 
actually contained contamination was often vastly infl ated. 
Its fundamental fl aw was its perception-based methodology: 
using surveyors without technical expertise to ask members 
of local communities whether and where they thought mines 
were present. Community participation in mine action is 
of critical importance, but what was actually needed for 
such methods to work was also supporting evidence and 
validation. As the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) make clear, a suspicion of the presence of mines 
must be “reasonable”. 
Globally mine action has paid the price of these early 
mistakes in survey, with greatly exaggerated estimates of the 
problem, and ultimately demands for re-survey to remedy the 
misdemeanours wrought on the sector by the LIS and other 
like surveys. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, one of 
those countries in which a LIS was conducted (in 2003), still 
does not have an accurate picture of baseline contamination 
more than 20 years after becoming a state party to the 
APMBC. A nationwide survey, termed a “country assessment” 
is now underway with a view to enabling a far more accurate 
baseline to be established. Efforts to gain greater clarity on 
the extent of mine contamination are welcome, but in truth 
are long overdue. In total, in Angola more than 90% of SHAs 
recorded as a result of infl ated estimates from a 2004–07 LIS 
were cancelled during re-survey, now almost complete. In 
Thailand, precious time is similarly being used up correcting 
problems from the LIS conducted there in 2001. The Thailand 
Mine Action Centre (TMAC) has forecasted that up to 80% of 
existing SHAs can be cancelled or reduced through survey 
so will be focusing their efforts in 2019–20 on cancelling land 
through non-technical survey before moving on to technical 
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It is essential that as a sector we learn from lessons and 
apply best practice as standard across the board, ensuring 
high-quality evidence-based survey to identify tightly 
delineated SHAs and CHAs. These principles must also be 
applied to all mined areas, including new contamination 
from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, whether 
in rural or urban areas, in order to avoid unnecessary 
complications and costs further down the line caused by 
hugely inaccurate sizes and locations of hazardous areas. 
According to analysis by Mine Action Review, only 12 states 
parties have established their national baseline of anti-
personnel mine contamination to a reasonable degree of 
accuracy.6 The remaining affected states parties still need 
to conduct further survey to more accurately identify the 
location and extent of mined area, confi rming contamination 
where direct evidence exists and releasing SHAs found not 
to be contaminated.
LAND RELEASE METHODOLOGY
Hand in hand with high-quality non-technical and technical 
survey goes an effi cient land release methodology based on 
the planned assessment of risk. No mine action is risk free, 
but wasting resources clearing SHAs also has signifi cant 
implications for truly affected communities.
The notion of land release did not exist when the APMBC was 
being drafted and it remains subject to differing application, 
but is now the backbone – and mainstream – of demining 
methodology. It is based on a risk management approach 
that is implemented through evidence-based survey rather 
than a mere fear of the presence of mines. Unfortunately, 
some states parties continue to fully clear too many mined 
areas in which no anti-personnel mines are found, typically 
at considerable time and cost. Better targeting of clearance, 
enabled by high-quality evidence-based survey, would help 
avoid clearance of areas with no contamination and must 
be implemented routinely by all stakeholders in all affected 
states parties, without exception.
Astonishingly, Colombia, which has had a mine action 
programme for more than 15 years, does not yet have a 
national standard for land release that has been approved 
and implemented by the national authority, Descontamina 
Colombia. Operators are not allowed to call for cancellation 
of an area being cleared before at least 50% of it has been 
cleared, even if all the indications are that no explosive 
items will be found. This is an unforgivable waste of precious 
clearance resources. In Serbia, where the national mine 
action centre continues to express a preference for full 
clearance of SHAs over technical survey, it did reduce some 
mined area through technical survey in 2017 and 2018, 
demonstrating a greater willingness to adopt more effi cient 
land release practices.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
The Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) has become the de facto standard database for mine 
action programmes. Of 34 affected states parties with Article 
5 obligations, 24 use IMSMA. Zimbabwe fully transitioned to 
IMSMA in 2018. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia do not 
yet use IMSMA (though Bosnia is in the process of switching 
to IMSMA Core and Serbia has previously discussed 
the possibility of IMSMA installation with the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD).7
Other states parties not using IMSMA are Cameroon, Croatia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, and the United Kingdom. The situation 
in Eritrea is unclear. Argentina claims sovereignty over the 
Malvinas/Falklands but does not have control of territory 
that would enable it to conduct mine action.
A sophisticated database does not, though, mean that data is 
accurate and up to date. “Rubbish in, rubbish out” may be a 
cliché, but it holds true for national mine action databases. In 
Chad, for example, the national mine action centre does use 
IMSMA, but many records of past survey have been “lost” 
from the database. Colombia continues to collect and report 
on “events” (including media reports) related to anti-personnel 
mines and other ordnance, with this data serving as the main 
indicator of contamination and the basis of demining planning 
and prioritisation. Operators, though, report that these IMSMA 
“events” are beset with errors, including duplications and 
inaccuracies. For example, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) found 
that more than three quarters of the anti-personnel mines 
found in each assigned task in 2018 did not correspond to the 
respective IMSMA events.
Reporting under the APMBC continues to disappoint. Only a 
handful of states parties reported accurately on progress in 
demining in 2018 in their respective Article 7 transparency 
reports, and the reporting of the vast majority of states 
parties contained inaccuracies or inconsistencies. Either this 
was due to different fi gures to those included in the report 
being submitted to Mine Action Review, or as a result of 
errors and inconsistencies within the Article 7 report itself. 
Some states parties simply do not report at all, even though 
this is a legal requirement under the APMBC. Eritrea’s failure 
to submit any Article 7 report over the past fi ve years is a 
persistent and ongoing violation of the Convention. 
As previously mentioned, anti-personnel mines of an 
improvised nature must be recorded and reported under the 
APMBC. Unfortunately, for some affected states parties, three 
years of discussion to confi rm what was already agreed and 
clear (i.e. that victim-activated IEDs that meet the defi nition 
of an anti-personnel mine must be reported as such under 
the APMBC), has led to three years of data which now must 
to be cleaned. This must not continue. Correct reporting 
on anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature must be 
applied by all affected states parties and implementing 
partners, without exception.
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INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS (IMAS)
The International Mine Action Standards have ensured that 
demining programmes can attain an acceptable standard of 
competence, effi ciency, and safety. These standards, which 
have been developed collaboratively, continue to evolve, and 
promote minimum good practice – most recently in Minimum 
Data Requirements – which will become an appendix to the 
IMAS on Information Management. An increasing number 
of states parties have incorporated latest developments 
and best practice from IMAS into their national mine action 
standards and standing operating procedures. We encourage 
all states to make use of this valuable resource.
RESIDUAL RISK
Article 5 obligations are fulfi lled when an affected state party 
has completed clearance of all confi rmed and suspected 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. However, this 
does not mean that every mine (much less every items of 
unexploded or abandoned explosive ordnance) will have 
been found and destroyed. In states which were once heavily 
contaminated, munitions will be found post-completion. 
Affected states must plan for this and establish sustainable 
national capacity to address contamination discovered post 
completion, and this must be commenced well in advance 
of completion. The majority of states parties with Article 5 
obligations should already be taking measures to plan for 
capacity to address residual risk, assessing where such 
capacity is best placed (be it with the armed forces, police, 
or civil protection, or other appropriate entity) and where 
the all-important information management system will be 
housed. Failure to do so could result in signifi cant cost, such 
as unnecessarily requiring international clearance operators 
to address what should be dealt with nationally and creating 
a problem which is both predictable and avoidable.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY IN DEMINING
It is not only important that states parties duly fulfil 
their Article 5 obligations, it is also important how they 
achieve completion. The mine action community has been 
increasingly seeking to strengthen performance in areas not 
adequately covered in the Convention drafted twenty years 
ago, in particular the importance of ensuring gender- and 
diversity-sensitive mine action. Thus, states parties agreed 
in the 2014 Maputo Action Plan that they would implement 
the commitments in a “gender-sensitive manner”, building on 
the Cartagena Action Plan and the Nairobi Action Plan. This 
represented a step forward towards integration of gender 
perspectives in mine action, but there is still signifi cant room 
for improvement in practice.
As mentioned below, Mine Action Review has introduced 
a new criteria on gender (see Table 7 overleaf), as part of 
the assessment of mine action programme performance 
by states parties. Findings from the new criterion have 
shown that, despite progress, the mine action community 
has signifi cant work still to do to improve its understanding 
of and approach to gender along with properly integrating 
gender and diversity considerations in mine action. This 
demands the removal of barriers to the full, equal, and 
meaningful participation of women.
For a sector that in some countries is the largest private 
employer, mine action has had a pretty dreadful record in 
promoting gender equality. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the 
national mine action centre’s 171 employees, only 42 were 
women (less than a quarter). Moreover, of its 107 operations 
staff in the fi eld, only 10 were women (less than one in ten). 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported that, as at April 2019, 
the overall gender split of its own mine action staff in Bosnia 
was 98 men (91%) and 10 women (9%), which also leaves 
signifi cant room for improvement. 
The promotion of gender equality in mine action has, though, 
been improving in recent years in a number of countries. 
In Afghanistan, for example, the national mine action 
programme (MAPA) drafted a policy on gender in 2016 after 
consultation with the GICHD and the Gender and Mine Action 
Programme (GMAP, now part of the GICHD). The MAPA 
included mainstreaming gender as one of the four goals of 
its 2016−20 strategic plan though it is still in the process of 
developing steps and capacity for implementing it within 
the constraints of Afghan society. In 2018, Danish Demining 
Group (DDG) deployed the fi rst all-women mine clearance 
team in Bamyan province. Further clearance by an expanded 
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Where survey and community liaison teams are inclusive and 
gender balanced, this facilitates access and participation by 
all groups, including women and children. Consulting women 
as well as girls and boys during non-technical survey can 
lead to a more accurate picture of mine contamination and, 
therefore, more effi cient and effective land release. Mine action 
NGOs have started to include gender-focused objectives in 
organizational strategies, and are increasingly conducting 
gender analysis and disaggregating data by sex and age. But 
despite the increased collection of disaggregated data in the 
sector, weaknesses remain around the operationalisation of 
such data in prioritization and programming. 
If gender remains work in progress, diversity is work yet 
to start. Mine Action Review postponed plans to assess 
diversity in mine action given the paucity of practice in 
mine action programmes. The problem – and lack of action 
– is particularly disappointing in countries in which ethnic 
minorities have suffered during earlier confl icts. A few 
programmes have, though, made a start. As at July 2019, 
NPA Colombia was in the process of developing a gender 
and diversity policy and has made diversity the focus of 
one of its key performance indicators. Women and people 
from indigenous communities were targeted during a recent 
recruitment drive where of 32 new staff, 11 were female 
(34%), 2 were persons with disability (6%), and 4 were from 
indigenous communities (13%).
COUNTRY-FOCUSED APPROACHES
Since the Third APMBC Review Conference in 2014, there has 
been a growing appreciation of the importance of adopting 
a country-focused approach to Article 5 implementation. 
Country-focused initiatives enable national authorities 
and implementing partners in-country to collectively and 
constructively discuss local progress and challenges to 
Article 5 implementation. Only through open and transparent 
dialogue can obstacles to effi cient and effective land release 
be identifi ed and overcome and improvements and greater 
progress made.
Initiatives, such as the “Individualised Approach” and 
the European Union-funded National Stakeholder 
Dialogue workshops, have provided useful platforms for 
country-focused approaches. However, to yield meaningful 
results and sustained outcomes, such initiatives must 
be translated into regular in-country workshops that 
bring together relevant stakeholders, present progress 
reports and updates on Article 5 implementation, improve 
coordination, and demonstrate strong national ownership 
and political commitment to completion. There is a common 
misconception that such forums already exist in most 
affected states parties; they do not. Whether called “National 
Mine Action Platforms” (NMAPs), as most recently proposed 
under the APMBC, or Country Coalitions, as promoted under 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, such forums should be 
established in all affected states parties.
DEMINING PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN STATES PARTIES
To help affected states parties and their partners focus their 
capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of 
weakness, and to improve the effi ciency and effectiveness of 
survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring 
system is used by Mine Action Review. As part of a fi ve-year 
review of the Mine Action Review project and in view of the 
Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2019, Mine Action 
Review overhauled its programme performance criteria and 
scoring system this year. 
The seven new criteria were developed in consultation with 
the Mine Action Review’s Advisory Board Members (The 
HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA), and with input from the GICHD, 
including GMAP. The new and improved set of criteria have 
been used to assess 2018 performance in all affected states 
parties (with the exception of those not assessed due to issues 
relating to jurisdiction or control of mined areas or insuffi cient 
information), resulting in a re-ranking. Comparisons with 
previous years’ assessments by Mine Action Review of 
programme performance are not meaningful.
Table 7 overleaf explains the new programme performance 
criteria and key factors in detail. Comments are welcome 
from states, international mine action organisations, and 
other stakeholders on both the criteria and the factors.
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(20% of overall score)
 ■ Has a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination been established and is it up to date 
and accurate?
 ■ If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or re-survey 
being conducted or is it planned?
 ■ Are anti-personnel mined areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive ordnance 
(e.g. anti-vehicle mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW))?
 ■ Is contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature included in the national 
baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination?
 ■ Is anti-personnel mine contamination classifi ed into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and 
confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of 
emplaced anti-personnel mines respectively? 





(10% of overall score)
 ■ Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action? 
 ■ Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations? 
 ■ Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national programme?
 ■ Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled?
 ■ Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes?
 ■ Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin the mine 
action programme?
 ■ Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action?
 ■ Has the government facilitated the receipt and effi cient use of international assistance?
 ■ Is there political will for timely and effi cient implementation of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC)?
 ■ Does the affected state contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action centre 
and/or survey and clearance of anti-personnel mined areas?
 ■ Does the affected state have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for Article 5 implementation?
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
 ■ Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan? 
Do the main mine action operators have one? 
 ■ Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action standards? 
 ■ Are all groups affected by anti-personnel mine contamination, including women and children, 
consulted during survey and community liaison activities?
 ■ Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access and 
participation by all groups, including women and children?
 ■ Are relevant mine action data disaggregated by sex and age? 
 ■ Is gender taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance 
activities?
 ■ Is there equal access to employment for qualifi ed women and men in survey and clearance teams, 




(10% of overall score)
 ■ Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data 
accurate and reliable?
 ■ Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data?
 ■ Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination and 
method of land release? 
 ■ Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators?
 ■ Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine action database?
 ■ Does the affected state party to the CCM submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports on 
Article 5 progress?
 ■ Are Article 5 extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner?
 ■ Is the reported survey and clearance data accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination 
(i.e. anti-personnel mines from other mines or explosive ordnance) and method of land release?
 ■ Does the affected state party report on progress in Article 5 implementation at the intersessional 













(10% of overall score)
■ Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for
land release?
■ Is there a realistic annual workplan in place for land release?
■ Are there agreed and specifi ed criteria for prioritisation of tasks? 
■ Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation?
■ Is clearance of anti-personnel mines tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation?
■ Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner?




(20% of overall score)
■ Does the affected state have national mine action standards in place for land release? 
■ Do the standards enable or impede effi cient evidence-based survey and clearance?
■ Are national standards refl ected in standing operating procedures (SoPs)?
■ Are standards and SoPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice, 
in consultation with clearance operators?
■ Is there an effective and effi cient: i) non-technical survey capacity, ii) technical survey capacity, 
iii) clearance capacity in the programme? Does this include national capacity?
■ Are areas being cleared that prove to have no anti-personnel mines?
■ Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address 
anti-personnel mines discovered after the release of anti-personnel mine-contaminated 
areas or post completion?
■ Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection 
systems) integrated into land release operations?
■ Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations?
■ Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme was there an effective 





(20% of overall score)
■ Is the affected state seeking to clear all anti-personnel mine contamination from territory 
under its jurisdiction or control, including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, 
border minefi elds, anti-personnel mine contamination in and around military installations, 
hard to access minefi elds etc.?
■ Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of anti-personnel mine 
clearance and is this within the state party’s Article 5 deadline? 
■ Is the target date for completion realistic based on existing capacity?
■ Is the target date suffi ciently ambitious?
■ What were the outputs of survey and clearance of anti-personnel mine-contaminated area 
in 2018, and were they greater or lesser than the previous year and why?
■ Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 5 obligations?
■ Is the affected state on track to meet its Article 5 deadline (or its target completion date, 
if earlier)?
The country-specifi c assessments of the seven criteria, which 
should be viewed alongside the Recommendations for Action, 
are intended as an implementation tool, offered in the spirit of 
openness and constructive dialogue, to assist states parties 
to identify and overcome challenges and fulfi l their Article 5 
obligations as effi ciently and effectively as possible. A score 
of between 0 and 10 is accorded for each of the seven criteria 
(three of which carry a higher weighting) and an average 
performance score calculated. Average scores of 8.0 or 
above are considered “very good”, 7.0–7.9 is ranked “good”, 
5.0–6.9 is ranked “average”, 4.0–4.9 is ranked “poor”, while 
0–3.9 ranks as “very poor”. The obligations under Article 5 
apply equally to all states parties and the same set of criteria 
are applied by Mine Action Review to assess the performance 
of all affected states parties with Article 5 obligations, 
irrespective of the extent of mined area or factors such as 
national gross domestic product (GDP). That said, there is a 
big disparity in wealth between the affected states parties 
and their national fi nancial capacity for land release varies.
More detail is provided to explain the scoring for each state 
and the criteria are refl ected directly in the subsections 
used in each country profi le. Table 8 below summarises the 
scoring for 2018 for all affected states parties with an Article 
5 obligation, with the exception of Argentina, Cyprus, and 
Palestine (not assessed due to issues relating to jurisdiction 
or control of mined areas), and Cameroon and Nigeria (not 
assessed due to insuffi cient information available to assess 
performance in 2018). 
Six states parties had demining programmes rated as 
good: Afghanistan, Jordan (which has fulfi lled its Article 
5 obligations), Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom, 
and Zimbabwe. A further 11 states parties had demining 
programmes rated as average: Angola, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Oman, Serbia, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. Colombia, DR Congo, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Peru, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen 
attained only a rating of “poor”, while Chad, Eritrea, Niger, 
and Senegal all rated “very poor”.
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Table 8: Mine Action Programme Performance in States Parties to the APMBC
State party Average performance score for 2018 Classifi cation of national programme
Zimbabwe 7.8 Good
Jordan 7.7 Good
Sri Lanka 7.4 Good











Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.0 Average
Serbia 6.0 Average
Oman 5.0 Average









Chad 3.9 Very Poor
Senegal 3.9 Very Poor
Niger 3.7 Very Poor
Eritrea 2.7 Very Poor
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As the APMBC enters its third decade of operation it is in 
strong health. While some major military powers remain 
outside its purview (most notably China, India, Pakistan, 
Russia, and the United States), use of this inhumane weapon 
is largely restricted to groups that use terror as a method 
of warfare. In less than 25 years, a once indispensable and 
ubiquitous weapon of war has come to be perceived as a 
cold-blooded killer of civilians. 
But amid the self-congratulation that should legitimately 
form part of the Convention’s Fourth Review Conference in 
Oslo, delegates should spare a thought for the words and 
wisdom of Paulo Coelho. “The challenge will not wait. Life 
does not look back. A week is more than enough time for us 
to decide whether or not to accept our destiny.” Decisions 
taken and implemented in Oslo will shape the destiny of the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
 1 In 2011, Germany reported that a former Soviet military training facility in the former East Germany might contain anti-personnel mines. It submitted an Article 5 
deadline extension request in April 2013, but later discounted the presence of anti-personnel mines following survey. 
 2 Bhutan, Cameroon, and Palau. 
 3 Montenegro and South Sudan. 
 4 APLC/MSP.17/2018/10 https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fi leadmin/APMBC/MSP/17MSP/Refl ections-Art.5-en.pdf .
 5 See: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16. 
 6 Angola, Chile, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. 
 7 Ethiopia continues to report problems with IMSMA installation. Although a version of the IMSMA database software was installed and customised before 2015, 
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Improved donor funding enabled the Mine Action Programme 
of Afghanistan (MAPA) to increase annual clearance of anti-
personnel mined area to 30.9km2 in 2018. The Department 
of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) introduced a national 
standard for clearing mines of an improvised nature (called 
“Abandoned Improvised Mines” (AIMs) nationally) in March 
2019, the fi rst national programme to do so. Clearance capacity 
operating to the national standard had been deployed by 
The HALO Trust already in November 2018. DMAC also 
established a technical working group to address survey 
and clearance of these improvised mines. Danish Demining 
Group (DDG) deployed the fi rst all-woman demining team in 
Bamyan province in 2018. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
 ■ Afghanistan should revise and update its Article 5 deadline extension request to provide a timeline to take 
account of lower levels of donor funding and the additional challenge of AIMs. 
 ■ The Afghan government should provide funding to mine action, particularly in areas where survey and 
clearance facilitate priority national development projects.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
AFGHANISTAN
MASSIVE, 
AT LEAST 200KM2 
30.90KM2 8,865
(including 47 destroyed 
during spot tasks)
(ESTIMATED) 
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(20% of overall score)
7 The MAPA has an advanced understanding of its anti-personnel mine problem but is still 
getting to grips with the extent of contamination by improvised mines, which now account 





(10% of overall score)
8 DMAC manages and coordinates mine action and completed its transition to full national 
ownership in June 2018 but the government does not provide signifi cant funding, leaving 
it dependent on international donors.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 Gender policies are in the process of development and subject to regional cultural 
practices. DDG pioneered deployment of an all-women demining team in Bamyan 
province, but the extent to which national organisations pursue gender issues is 




(10% of overall score)
8 DMAC has an experienced information management team working with an Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation database that provides 
extensive, disaggregated data although operators say data entry sometimes lags. 
Afghanistan submits Article 7 transparency reports annually but sometimes late. 
Most national operators did not respond to requests for information.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request was among the most comprehensive 
and DMAC produces annual workplans. Implementation has been hampered by funding 
shortfalls and insecurity. 
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 The MAPA has updated national standards compliant with the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). It introduced new standards for clearance of mines of an 
improvised nature in March 2019 and has also set out an environmental policy and set 
of standing operating procedures (SoPs). DMAC and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) were reviewing land release standards with a view to 





(20% of overall score)
7 The MAPA has maintained anti-personnel mine clearance at a consistent level in the 
face of funding and insecurity constraints, but in 2018 was still developing a strategy 
for dealing with mines of an improvised nature. 
Average Score 7.0 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ Afghan National Disaster Management Authority
■ Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
■ Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation 
in Afghanistan (AREA)
■ Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
■ Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
■ Mine Detection Centre (MDC)
■ Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation 
(OMAR)
■ 15 commercial companies accredited, one reported active 
in anti-personnel mine clearance in 2018
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
■ The HALO Trust (HALO)
OTHER ACTORS
■ UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION
Afghanistan estimated that 177.8km2 of confi rmed and suspected anti-personnel mined area remained at the end of 2018 
(see Table 1). Added to this is massive contamination from mines of an improvised nature (anti-personnel and anti-vehicle) 
that is still being defi ned, but which signifi cantly exceeds the 32km2 reported so far (see Table 2).1 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018)2
Region CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Central 467 25,563,554 49 5,871,852 31,435,406
East 100 7,033,558 7 2,535,350 9,568,908
North 234 10,371,079 10 2,446,660 12,817,739
North-East 654 43,652,720 27 11,898,665 55,551,385
South 62 10,178,628 64 12,315,425 22,494,053
South-East 137 10,763,889 50 7,498,419 18,262,308
West 15 2,362,615 45 25,319,308 27,681,923
Total 1,669 109,926,043 252 67,885,679 177,811,722
Afghanistan’s mine contamination resulted from the 
decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet 
invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed confl ict, and the 
1996−2001 fi ghting between the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance. The intervention of the United States (US)-led 
coalition in late 2001 added considerable quantities of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). Continuing confl ict between 
the government, the Taliban and other armed groups is still 
adding contamination, particularly by mines of an improvised 
nature, which have overtaken legacy mined areas as the 
biggest humanitarian threat.3
Estimated anti-personnel mine contamination fell for the third 
successive year in 2018 to 178km2 despite the continuing 
addition of previously unrecorded hazards to the database as 
a result of survey. By contrast, the threat from anti-vehicle 
mines has risen every year for the last fi ve years and now 
exceeds anti-personnel mined area (see Table 2). DMAC 
recorded 98km2 of additional mine and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) contamination in 2018, of which just short of 
17km2 were anti-personnel mine and mixed anti-personnel 
mine/anti-vehicle mined areas.4 
In addition to the challenge from landmines, Afghanistan 
contends with huge areas of ERW. DMAC reported total mine 
and ERW contamination of 1,762km2 at the end of March 2019. 
Estimates of anti-vehicle mined area are still rising and pose 
a challenge to current land release methods. Afghanistan 
also has North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fi ring 
ranges covering 630km2 remaining to be cleared.5
Table 2: Mined areas (at end 2018)6
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 1,669 109,926,043 252 67,885,679
Anti-vehicle mines 783 129,114,092 382 190,510,163
Improvised mines* 61 11,705,330 21 20,730,871
Total 2,513 250,745,465 655 279,126,713
CHAs = Confi rmed hazardous areas   SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas
* It is not known what percentage is of anti-personnel mines and what percentage is of anti-vehicle mines.
NEW CONTAMINATION
Mines of an improvised nature pose the biggest humanitarian 
threat in Afghanistan and contamination continues to expand 
as a result of persistent confl ict.7 The 32km2 presented 
in offi cial statistics for 2018 represent only a fraction 
of suspected hazards. At the end of March 2018, DMAC 
estimated that pressure-plate mines of an improvised nature 
affected an area of 248km2.8 Little more than a year later, 
DMAC said an area of 465km2 may be affected by AIMs.9
Clearance of abandoned improvised mines by The HALO Trust 
in Helmand province found stacked devices triggered by 
pressure plates with a high metal signal and main charges of 
between 0.5kg and 16kg. The devices were placed in routes 
and locations that were expected to be used by security forces 
when moving towards armed opposition group positions.10
A rapid assessment of 22 provinces conducted by DMAC’s 
implementing partners (IPs) at the end of 2016 reported 
fi ve as inaccessible for security reasons (Baghdis, Ghor, 
Laghman, Sar e Pul, and Zabul) and in the other seventeen, 
they identifi ed a total of 270 areas affected by post-2001 
mine and ERW contamination covering an estimated 421km2. 
Anti-personnel mines accounted for 5.3km2 while improvised 
devices, including pressure-plate mines of an improvised 
nature, affected 228km2. This included almost 55km2 
classifi ed as high risk, mostly in Helmand, Kandahar, and 
Uruzgan provinces, as well as 3.5km2 of medium risk and 
170km2 as low risk. Anti-vehicle mines affected 90,000m2 
and ERW nearly 188km2.11 












NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Afghanistan’s mine action programme, originally established 
in 1989, is led by DMAC, which comes under the Afghan 
National Disaster Management Authority. DMAC fulfi ls the 
role of a national mine action centre. From its headquarters 
in Kabul and seven regional offi ces, DMAC manages 
and coordinates the work of national and international 
implementing partners. DMAC provides strategic planning 
and annual workplans, sets priorities and standards, 
accredits operators, conducts quality assurance (QA) and 
quality control (QC), manages the mine action database, and 
conducts resource mobilisation. It coordinates closely with 
operators through a technical working group and in 2018 set 
up a separate technical working group to deal with AIMs.12
Since 2012, the MAPA has transitioned from being a 
project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to national 
management, a process formally completed with the transfer 
of the last positions from UNMAS to DMAC in June 2018. 
However, the Afghan government does not provide a budget 
for mine action, which continues to depend on international 
donor funding channelled bilaterally through UNMAS and the 
ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF). Although management 
now rests entirely with DMAC, 91 of DMAC’s 143 staff are paid 
through UNMAS funding, 35 are paid through the ITF, and 
17 are on Afghan civil servant salaries. The MAPA’s 2016–20 
strategic plan sets out the intention to gain recognition 
that “its services are demanded, and paid for, by national 
government agencies, internationally supported development 
projects and other programmes.”13
UNMAS, with fi ve international and thirty-fi ve national staff, 
has continued to support the MAPA and DMAC, providing a 
channel for donor funding through the Voluntary Trust Fund 
for Mine Action (VTF), which handled approximately one-
third of total donor funding for the MAPA in 2018. UNMAS 
also focused on promoting humanitarian access for IPs to 
areas outside effective government control, working through 
established UN channels for engagement with the Taliban 
representative offi ce in Doha, Qatar. UNMAS supported 
DMAC organising an emergency response by IPs to clearance 
and risk education needs in Ghazni in August 2018 after 
heavy fi ghting between government forces and the Taliban. 
Additionally, UNMAS was active in advocacy with local 
authorities in Bamyan province for the fi rst ever deployment of 
women deminers in 2018 and was preparing in 2019 to explore 
the possible use of women deminers in northern provinces.14
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) operates with a staff of 
18, including 6 internationals, who provide third-party 
monitoring and oversight of all US Department of 
State-funded conventional weapons disposal projects.15
International donor contracts awarded for a fi xed term 
primarily on the basis of square metre costs have become 
increasingly challenging for IPs facing increasingly volatile 
security conditions. Deminer safety requires close contact 
with local communities, with access to confl icted districts 
sometimes taking weeks to negotiate. Threats to security 
forced demining teams to stand down 18 times in the year 
to mid-2019, sometimes for a period of days, and on some 
occasions causing IPs to move work sites or redeploy 
deminers to different districts and tasks, causing delays, 
raising costs, and making it diffi cult to achieve targets.16
Armed opposition groups in some areas demand IPs pay 
a “tax”.
GENDER 
The MAPA drafted a policy on gender in 2016 after 
consultation with the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Gender and Mine 
Action Programme (GMAP, now part of the GICHD). The MAPA 
included mainstreaming gender as one of the four goals 
of its 2016−20 strategic plan but it is still in the process of 
developing steps and capacity for implementing it within the 
constraints of Afghanistan’s deeply conservative society. The 
Strategic Plan observes that “achievable targets, refl ecting 
prevailing circumstances and conditions, will be adopted to 
support and encourage progress wherever possible”.17
The gender strategy called for participation of women and girls 
as well as boys and men in non-technical survey, community 
liaison, and pre- and post-clearance impact assessments and 
for equal access to employment. It called for IPs to recruit 
more gender-balanced risk education teams, identify forums 
in which to access under-represented groups, including 
women and girls, for direct risk education (RE), and to ensure 
data collection and reporting was disaggregated for gender 
and age.18
In 2018, DDG deployed the fi rst all-women mine clearance 
team with eight deminers in Bamyan province. Further 
clearance by an expanded all-women team followed in 2019. 
DDG employed 53 women out of a total staff of 550, of whom 
41 were working in the fi eld, conducting demining, risk 
education, or armed violence reduction.19 The HALO Trust 
employed women in the fi eld (for livelihoods surveys and risk 
education) and in the offi ce (information, donor support, and 
fi nance). Survey teams included at least one woman to ensure 
access to women and children.20
Among national IPs, performance appears to be uneven, 
partly refl ective of varying social norms in different regions. 
The conditions that permit all-female demining teams to 
work in Bamyan would not apply in the south. MCPA hired 13 
couples for a 2017 risk education project to provide 13 male 
and 13 female trainers. Community liaison projects undertake 
detailed interviews with all sections of the community and 
focal points are appointed to ensure project results reach 
women and the impact of their inclusion is communicated to 
community elders.21
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
DMAC operates an IMSMA NG database but in 2018 started 
preparations for an upgrade to IMSMA Core. DMAC was still 
in the process of migrating legacy data to IMSMA; as part 
of a continuous effort to increase effi ciency the database 
eliminated some duplicates of historical data.22 Operators 
endorse the accessibility and accuracy of data but reported 
signifi cant delays in DMAC uploading completion reports into 
the database.23 
DMAC worked with the GICHD in 2018 to improve data quality, 
removing duplicate records from IMSMA and updating the 
IMSMA template.24 In 2019, it planned to develop a mobile 
application to monitor fi eld activity using geotag photos and 
geolocation data. It was also developing a cloud-based data 
warehouse to back up information.25 
Afghanistan submits comprehensive Article 7 reports, and 
provides regular updates on the progress of survey and 
clearance at intersessional meetings and meetings of states 
parties. Afghanistan’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request in 2012, 
prepared in consultation with, and endorsed by, Afghan 
implementing partners, was regarded as a model providing a 
comprehensive overview of all aspects of the country’s threat 
from explosive devices. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request set out 
a timeline for completing clearance of all known mine and 
ERW contamination by 2023 but as a result of reduced 
funding it soon fell behind those targets. The request also 
did not take account of heavy contamination from mines 
of an improvised nature. 
The national strategic plan for 2016−20 reaffi rms 
Afghanistan’s broad commitment to the APMBC and its 
Article 5 obligations, but concentrates on four broad goals: 
facilitating development; engaging with other sectors and 
government departments to have them include mine action 
in their development plans; preventive action to reduce the 
impact of mines and ERW, including by enhanced resource 
mobilisation, completing survey of all communities and 
keeping its extension request workplan on track; and gender 
and diversity mainstreaming.26 
DMAC’s annual workplans set more specifi c targets. For 
Afghan year 1398 (1 April 2019 – 30 March 2020), targets 
included calling for release of 44.7km2 of pre-2001 mine and 
ERW contamination, non-technical survey of 29 districts, 
post-demining impact assessments in 85 contaminated areas, 
along with 12 livelihood surveys.27
In its Article 5 deadline extension request, MAPA split 
hazards into projects to facilitate resource mobilisation and 
monitoring.28 IPs are tasked for survey and clearance through 
a process of competitive bidding for projects. Non-technical 
survey tasks are also assigned by DMAC on the basis of 
requests received from its regional offi ces, government 
departments, or local communities.29 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The MAPA has comprehensive national mine action standards 
that DMAC reviews annually and amends in consultation 
with IPs. DMAC and GICHD started to review land release 
standards in 2019 and were expected to undertake revisions 
to strengthen non-technical survey and increase operational 
effi ciency. In 2018, DMAC introduced a new policy and 
standing operating procedures (SoPs) for environmental 
protection in mine action. Afghanistan became the fi rst 
country programme to release a standard for tackling mines 
of an improvised nature. AMAS 06.10, Abandoned Improvised 
Mine Clearance, was released in March 2019. As its title 
makes clear, and to protect the neutrality of humanitarian 
mine action, DMAC permits clearance only of items that are 
not part of active hostilities. 
The standard requires operators to get prior written consent 
from local authorities and other “key local stakeholders”, 
including armed opposition groups, and confi rmation by the 
party that laid devices that they are abandoned and that 
clearance may proceed. It stipulates clearance should take place 
only in a rural or semi-rural setting. All action to neutralise AIMs 
should be conducted remotely or semi-remotely, and where 
possible devices should be destroyed in situ.30 
OPERATORS 
DMAC reported a total of 44 organisations accredited for 
mine action at the end of 2018 of which 23 humanitarian 
IPs had total personnel of 6,873. It expected the number of 
their employees to increase in 2019. DMAC mine clearance 
data, however, shows only nine organisations conducted 
anti-personnel mine clearance in 2018, including fi ve national 
humanitarian IPs, one national commercial company, and 
three international NGOs.31 
Afghanistan’s fi ve longstanding national IPs collectively 
accounted for about 40% of mined area clearance in 2018 
(see Table 4). ATC (550 staff), MCPA (489 personnel), and 
OMAR (650 staff) conducted clearance mainly in central 
and north-eastern provinces.32 MCPA, whose staff included 
384 deminers, added mechanical capacity in the form of a 
cultivator and ripper to boost clearance productivity and 
increasingly sought to link mine clearance work to wider 
development initiatives.33 MDC (750 staff), the biggest of the 
fi ve, has conducted little mine clearance in the last two years. 












DAFA (350 staff), was the main operator engaged in cluster 
munition clearance in 2018 (see Clearing Cluster Munitions 
Remnants 2019) but has strong links to the south and has 
previously conducted clearance of abandoned improvised 
mines around Kajaki in Helmand province. In 2019, DAFA 
had eight teams trained by The HALO Trust in non-technical 
survey of areas containing mines of an improvised nature.34
The HALO Trust remained much the biggest operator with 
2,519 deminers in a total staff of 3,497 at the end of 2018, 
more than all of the national humanitarian IPs combined. 
HALO started working in the southern province of Kandahar 
in 2017 and increased capacity there in 2018 as well as 
resuming operations in Logar province. The award of several 
new contracts and the extension of others saw HALO Trust’s 
capacity increase around 20% in 2018 but the likely reduction 
in bilateral United Kingdom funding and delays in the start 
of other projects in 2019 was expected to result in lower 
staffi ng levels. 
The HALO Trust took a lead in developing the response to 
mines of an improvised nature. It established an improvised 
mine training area open to use by other IPs to develop 
survey and clearance techniques and developed courses in 
AIM-focused non-technical survey (three weeks), explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) (four weeks), and manual clearance 
(six weeks). It also provided two-day AIM awareness training 
for all teams working in areas affected by these devices. The 
HALO Trust deployed two fi ve-person manual clearance teams 
and a non-technical survey team as a pilot project to address 
contamination by mines of an improvised nature. It also set up 
an AIM operations room, where staff monitor all AIM-related 
activities in real time. From July 2019, HALO Trust expected to 
expand its improvised mine capacity to two manual clearance 
teams and two dedicated non-technical survey teams. 
HALO was also worked closely with and tasked eight teams 
combining DAFA and HALO Trust personnel and trained by 
HALO Trust for improvised mine non-technical survey.35
DDG, benefi tting from improved funding, added 28 clearance 
teams in 2018 and tripled the number of deminers from 90 
at the end of 2017 to 270 deminers, a total staff of 552 at the 
end of 2018. A US Department of State/WRA contract that 
supported signifi cant additional capacity was due to expire 
in mid 2019, leaving the possibility that DDG would reduce 
capacity in the course of the year. DDG deployed a team of 10 
women deminers in Bamyan province in 2018, who cleared 
one task releasing 51,520m2. The team was expanded to 16 
women deminers in 2019.36
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) continued 
to operate in Kunduz province working with four 
demining teams with 66 deminers in 2018 in areas heavily 
contaminated with Soviet-era “butterfl y” PFM-1 mines. 
Staffi ng levels in 2019 were dependent on the outcome of 
discussions with donors. The project’s remote operating 
area is accessible through Tajikistan and to circumvent the 
complications of obtaining visas for DMAC QA/QC staff, FSD’s 
activities are quality assured by the Tajikistan National Mine 
Action Centre.37
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Manual clearance continues to account for most 
anti-personnel mine clearance but to boost productivity 
most demining IPs employed a range of tools, including 
increased use of mechanical assets, with capacity varying 
from MCPA deploying four mechanical teams, to HALO Trust 
with 22 teams at the start of 2019 and around 60 armoured 
machines.38 The annual workplan for 1398 (2019–20) intended 
to “search for the proper utilisation of mine detection dogs” 
but there was no report of IPs using dogs in mine action 
in 2018. 
DMAC and IPs were still in the process of developing their 
response to improvised mines in 2018. HALO Trust was 
trialling a range of specialist detectors capable of fi nding 
hard-to-detect switches such as carbon rod and bare wire 
switches. From mid 2019, HALO Trust planned to deploy 
armoured mechanical assets designed specifi cally to address 
the different threat posed by improvised mines compared 
with other ordnance and was also testing a range of different 
personal protection equipment for comfort, mobility and 
protection. The HALO Trust had one excavator armoured in 
the UK in 2019 according to a design tailored to the specifi c 
threat of improvised mines it expected to encounter and 
was buying a second excavator in Afghanistan and having it 
armoured to a similar design.39
DEMINER SAFETY
Three demining incidents occurred in 2018 resulting in 
injuries to three deminers,40 a signifi cant downturn in 
demining casualties from previous years when the MAPA 
sustained numerous fatalities. In one 2018 incident, a 
HALO deminer injured his hand, losing two fi ngers. HALO’s 
investigation suggested it was not an accident but an act of 
self-harm intended to obtain an insurance pay-out.41
Afghanistan’s increasingly volatile security environment 
posed a major challenge to operators. The MAPA recorded 29 
security incidents in 2018 in which six deminers were killed 
and eighteen injured. IPs also suffered loss of equipment, 
including 23 Minelab detectors, digital cameras, and personal 
protection equipment.42 IPs depend on contact with local 
communities to facilitate survey and clearance but still faced 
interruptions and delays from insecurity that required teams 
to stop work for a period of time or completely withdraw from 
tasks and move to different locations.
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Afghanistan reported to Mine Action Review that it released a total of 35.05km2 of anti-personnel mined area in 2018 through 
survey and clearance. Clearance accounted for 30.9km2 while 2.2km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey and 0.95km2 
was reduced through technical survey.43 Afghanistan’s Article 7 Report for 2018 recorded total land release of 32.89km2, of 
which 30.05km2 was through full clearance, 1.9km2 was cancelled and 0.95km2 was reduced.44
SURVEY IN 2018
Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request foresaw 
a nationwide Mine/ERW Impact Free Community Survey 
(MEIFCS). Six years later, the survey has completed 290 of 
400 districts and it remains a MAPA aspiration but no further 
survey was conducted under this programme in 2018 due to 
lack of funding.45 
Additional survey conducted by IPs in 2018 added 185 
previously unrecorded anti-personnel mined areas 
covering a total of 16.57km2 and three areas containing 
mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and affecting 
421,643m2. At the same time, non-technical survey, mainly 
by The HALO Trust and MCPA, led to cancellation of 
1,895,176m2 (see Table 3). DMAC reported that no IPs 
conducted stand-alone technical survey in 2018 but reduced 
some area (0.95km2) in the course of technical survey 
conducted as part of mine clearance operations.46 
Survey in 2018 also produced some preliminary fi ndings 
on improvised mine tasks. The HALO Trust deployed an 
improvised mine survey team to central Helmand province 
which worked on 30 areas containing mines of an improvised 
nature in Lashkar Gah, Nad Ali, and Nawa-I Barakzai 
districts. The teams deployed in November and as of the 
start of February 2019 had lifted four devices. The tasks 
were in semi-rural areas, defi ned by smaller agricultural 
plots mixed with compounds and small villages. Tasks are 
considerably smaller than conventional mine clearance 
tasks, with a mean size of about 27,000m² and a median size 
of 6,000–12,000m² and were expected to contain about four 
items per hazardous area (~1 improvised mine per 2,000m²), 
refl ecting the different use of improvised mines compared 
with conventional mines.47
Table 3: Cancellation of anti-personnel mined area through non-technical survey48
Operator Region Area cancelled (m2)
HALO Trust Central, South, South East, West 1,029,990




The amount of anti-personnel mined area cleared in 2018, as 
reported to Mine Action Review, amounted to 30.9km2 in 2018, 
almost 10% more than the area of clearance DMAC recorded 
in 2017. The six Afghan IPs accounted for 12.82km2 of the 
total, an increase of about one third in terms of area cleared 
compared with the previous year made possible by increased 
donor funding, which also pushed their share of total 
anti-personnel mine clearance from 35% in 2017 to 41% in 
2018.49 HALO Trust cleared 7% less anti-personnel mined area 
and 25% fewer anti-personnel mines than the previous year, 
but it also cleared close to 10km2 of anti-vehicle mined area 
in 2018, which pushed its total mine clearance for the year 
above the previous year’s level.50
With the progress of clearance in recent years, IPs have 
deployed on more remote and less densely contaminated 
minefi elds, a factor refl ected in a signifi cant drop in the 
number of mines destroyed from 14,492 in 2017 to 8,818 in 
2018. A further 47 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in 
the course of spot tasks.51












Table 4: Mine clearance in 201852
Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m2) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Area 12 788,958 270 0 60
ATC 60 4,084,228 989 11 2,582
DAFA 2 524,360 76 0 1
DDG 26 1,507,947 154 0 295
FSD 0 182,831 1,948 0 848
HALO Trust53 153 16,321,433 4,457 17 2,690
MCPA 34 3,934,542 339 0 634
MDC 1 31,252 5 0 236
OMAR 45 3,458,673 580 0 2,779
TDC 3 67,499 0 0 0
Totals 336 30,901,723 8,818 28 10,125
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
 APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2003
 ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
10-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), 
Afghanistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Afghanistan will 
not meet this deadline.
The MAPA has cleared more than 120km2 of anti-personnel 
mined area since the Maputo conference (see Table 5) and 
continuously looked for ways to improve performance 
quality and productivity with a view to fulfi lling its Article 
5 commitments. These included the goal of completing 
clearance of all known mine and ERW contamination by 
2023, subject to the availability of funds. 
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Three main factors have combined to put that objective 
beyond the MAPA’s reach:
Funding shortfalls: donor funding increased from $40 
million in Year 1396 (2016–17) to $51.4 million in 1397 but 
that represented little more than half the funding needed to 
achieve clearance targets set out in the extension request.54
The Afghan government has not yet committed funding to 
the sector. 
Insecurity: more areas appear to be inaccessible as a result 
of confl ict but even in areas where operators continue to 
work access is becoming more challenging requiring lengthy 
negotiation with local communities and armed opposition 
groups active in those areas and slowing progress. 
New contamination: the MAPA has continued to identify 
signifi cant amounts of suspected anti-personnel mined area 
– close to 200km2 in the past fi ve years – slowing progress 
towards completion. The rate of new discoveries of mined 
areas appears, though, to be slowing and the net level of 
new contamination has fallen every year for the last three 
years. Afghanistan’s Article 7 report for 2018 estimates its 
remaining Article 5 obligation as 210.25km2 but this includes 
only 32.48km2 of contamination by mines of an improvised 
nature.55 However, the MAPA has also pointed to areas 
suspected to contain mines of an improvised nature in excess 
of 465km2 much of which will need to be addressed as part of 
its Article 5 obligation.56
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Funding for mine action operations carried out by international 
NGO operators remained critically low for much of 2018, with 
serious gaps in funding resulting in the reduction of capacity 
and threatening the closure of international mine action 
operations altogether in Angola. The situation improved 
signifi cantly with the securing of the United Kingdom (UK) 
Department for International Development (DFID) funding 
in September 2018 through a partnership grant to Angola’s 
three largest international operators, The HALO Trust, Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). 
A nationwide re-survey of contamination was nearly complete 
by the end of the year, with only one province remaining 
in 2019. As a result, Angola has a far better estimate of its 
remaining mine contamination and a much more realistic 
picture of the resources needed to meet it. With support 
from a dedicated capacity development advisor, the National 
Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian 
Assistance (CNIDAH) was able to realign the national database 
with operators’ records, resulting in a shared and accurate 
understanding remaining contamination.1
NPA completed clearance of all known and registered tasks 
in Malanje province in May 2018, putting the province on track 
to become Angola’s fi rst to be declared free of the threat 
of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). An offi cial 
declaration was awaited from CNIDAH as of writing.2 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Angola should continue to work closely with operators to improve the national mine action database and to 
reconcile data held by CNIDAH with that of other national mine action entities. Particular efforts should be 
made to ensure demining data is disaggregated from verifi cation data. Dedicated and sustained assistance for 
information management capacity to these ends should be provided to CNIDAH. 
 ■ Angola should complete a comprehensive review of its National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).
 ■ Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national programme, including the roles 
and responsibilities and funding of the two mine action entities. The future of CNIDAH and its responsibility for 
mine action should be clearly established and resourced from the national budget.
 ■ Angola should increase its national funding to mine action in order to accelerate clearance and demonstrate 
national commitment to respect its Article 5 obligations. It should implement its resource mobilisation 
strategy, increasing its international advocacy to attract new and former donors.
(including 90 destroyed 
during spot tasks)
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 DECEMBER 2025
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 ■ Angola should ensure that no taxes are imposed on equipment imported by international operators to carry 
out mine action operations. 
 ■ Angola should ensure that an adequate quality control (QC) capacity exists for timely handover and reporting 
on released land as soon as possible after clearance is completed.
 ■ As soon as possible, Angola should develop a plan at the national and provincial level for tackling any 
contamination that is found once clearance of mined areas has been completed. 






(20% of overall score)
 8 For the fi rst time since mine action began decades ago, Angola was able to present a 
reasonable estimate of its remaining mine contamination problem, largely in part to the 
near completion of a nationwide re-survey, which resulted in cancellation of almost 90% 





(10% of overall score)
4 The outlook for the National Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian 
Assistance (CNIDAH) was uncertain in 2018 after the expiration of its mandate and a 
delayed, and as yet, unresolved government decision as to its future. Government austerity 
cuts saw a signifi cant reduction in its funding and ability to carry out core functions. 
Angola’s national mine action programme has since its outset struggled with competing 
tensions between government entities responsible for mine action and a lack of clarity in 
responsibility. The government has allocated signifi cant funding for mine action, but only 
for infrastructure development channelled through private commercial operators.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
5 Gender is not referenced in Angola’s 2019–25 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) mine action workplan, nor in Angola’s national mine action standards in place 
in 2018. CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review in 2019 that gender mainstreaming will be 




(10% of overall score)
6 The mine action programme has been plagued with diffi culties in information management for 
more than a decade. Operators have persistently raised concerns about inaccurate data and 
lengthy delays in updating the database. However, a dedicated capacity development advisor 
embedded with CNIDAH throughout 2018 was able to make signifi cant progress in reconciling 
the database with operators’ records and improving the accuracy of the database.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 In November 2018, Angola submitted a detailed annual workplan for 2019–25 with a view 
to meeting its extended APMBC Article 5 deadline. CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review 
in June 2019 that its annual projections are not achievable with the existing demining 
capacity and that planning is signifi cantly hampered by ongoing fi nancial uncertainty and 
reduction in operational capacity. 
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 National Mine Action Standards exist but do not cover all key areas necessary for a well-
functioning national mine action programme. Efforts to review the standards are ongoing, 





(20% of overall score)
7 Angola was not on track to meet its 2025 deadline as at 2019. Meeting the deadline will not be 
possible without a substantial and sustained increase in funding. Collectively, the resources of 
the three largest operators, HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian People’s Aid 
declined by nearly 90% in the past decade, making Article 5 implementation signifi cantly more 
diffi cult. At the same time, despite many serious challenges, Angola was able to meet its land 
release target for 2019, of nearly 17.5km2 released through survey and clearance.
Average Score 6.3 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de 
Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária)
 ■ Executive Commission for Demining 
(Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ National Demining Institute 
(Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD)
 ■ Angolan Armed Forces, 
 ■ Military Offi ce of the President 
 ■ Police Border Guard (under the CED)
 ■ The Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS) (NGO)
 ■ Various commercial operators
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ APOPO
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)








UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at December 2018, according to CNIDAH, a total of 1,260 
mined areas with a size of just over 122km2 remained to be 
addressed. This included 1,120 areas with a size of just over 
108km2 of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and 140 areas 
with a size of close to 14km2 of confi rmed hazardous area 
(CHA).3 A major step forward was achieved at the end of the 
year, with every province, with the exception of Cabinda, 
having been fully re-surveyed. Following this nationwide 
re-survey, and as a result of the considerable efforts to 
improve the quality of the national mine action database, 
Angola has a much clearer assessment of the remaining 
challenge to be completed.
As at May 2019, CNIDAH reported that the remaining estimate 
of contamination had decreased to 1,216 hazardous areas with 
a total size of just over 104km2.4 This was down from fi gures 
reported by CNIDAH in Angola’s latest Article 7 transparency 
report, which indicated that as at April 2019, a total of 1,220 
areas with a size of just over 105km2 remained.5 This is a 
sizeable decrease of more than 43km2 from fi gures reported 
by CNIDAH the previous year, in April 2018, when it stated that 
a total of 1,220 mined areas remained covering 147.6km2.6 This, 
however, is not consistent with the approx. 17.5km2 of mined 
area reported as released by CNIDAH during 2018.7 CNIDAH 
also reported that a total of approx. 6km2 of mined area was 
added to the national database in 2018.8
In November 2018, MAG completed re-survey of Lunda 
Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, while The HALO Trust was 
scheduled to completed re-survey of Cabinda province by the 
end of August 2019, which would complete the re-survey of 
all of Angola’s 18 provinces.9 In total, more than 90% of SHAs 
recorded as a result of infl ated estimates from a 2004–07 
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) were cancelled during the 
re-survey. NPA also reported completing clearance of all 
known and registered tasks in Malanje province as at 
end-May 2018, the fi rst and only province in Angola no longer 
reported to contain mined areas.10
Overall, Angola’s progress in land cancelled and reduced 
through the re-survey has resulted in huge land release, with 
close to 274km2 of land released in just two years. 
Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years 
of internal armed confl ict that ended in 2002, during which a 
range of national and foreign armed movements and groups 
laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most 
affected provinces have been those with the fi ercest and 
most prolonged fi ghting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, 
and Moxico. 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2018)11
Province CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHA/CHA Total area (m2)
Bengo 55 3,440,820 4 0 59 3,440,820
Benguela 67 3,442,333 0 0 67 3,442,333
Bié 122 5,683,552 0 0 122 5,683,552
Cabinda 2 49,500 34 7,643,567 36 7,693,067
Huambo 1 12,890 0 0 1 12,890
Huila 36 3,219,680 0 0 36 3,219,680
Kuando Kubango 282 34,440,313 0 0 282 34,440,313
Kunene 35 2,575,367 9 0 44 2,575,367
Kwanza Norte 44 9,814,101 0 0 44 9,814,101
Kwanza Sul 136 9,407,241 1 35,000 137 9,442,241
Luanda 9 1,121,211 0 0 9 1,121,211
Lunda Norte 18 903,558 22 2,022,089 40 2,925,647
Lunda Sul 46 7,569,410 22 1,138,474 68 8,707,884
Malanje 0 0 0 0 0 0
Moxico 202 12,143,087 44 1,269,359 246 13,412,446
Namibe 3 253,750 1 0 4 253,750
Uige 41 4,158,551 3 1,860,000 44 6,018,551
Zaire 21 9,828,847 0 0 21 9,828,847
Totals 1,120 108,064,211 140 13,968,489 1,260 122,032,700
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
Angola also has a signifi cant problem of ERW, especially unexploded ordnance (UXO), and very limited contamination 
from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Angola 
for further information).12
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by 
two mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national 
mine action authority. It reports to the Council of Ministers 
or, in effect, to the Presidency of the Republic. The other 
coordination body, the Executive Commission for Demining 
(CED), reports to the Ministry of Social Action, Family, and 
Women’s Promotion (MASFAMU, formerly the Ministry 
of Social Assistance and Reintegration, or MINARS). In 
2002, in order to separate coordination and operational 
responsibilities, Angola established the National Demining 
Institute (INAD), which is responsible, under the auspices of 
the CED and MASFAMU for demining operations and training.
Tensions between these entities and a lack of clarity in 
responsibilities has negatively affected Angola’s mine action 
programme for decades, with a lack of coordination and 
information sharing between the national demining entities, 
the CED, INAD, and CNIDAH. A primary fall-out has been the 
quality of the national database, held by CNIDAH, which does 
not contain data from the CED and commercial companies, 
making it diffi cult for Angola to describe in detail and with 
any degree of accuracy the extent of land released over 
the years. 
In 2018, NPA initiated a capacity development project to assist 
CNIDAH to better manage the national mine action programme, 
including in key areas such as information and quality 
management. The project, which is scheduled to run through 
March 2020, was initiated with funding from UK DFID, as part 
of a contract with The HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA.
In 2019, CNIDAH reported that the fi nancial challenges 
affecting Angola continued to negatively affect the national 
mine action programme. Government austerity measures 
resulted in reduced funding, which CNIDAH said seriously 
impeded its ability to monitor and coordinate mine action.13 
Operators confi rmed that CNIDAH’s severe shortage of 
resources in 2018, including a lack of vehicles or resources 
for fuel and expenses greatly limited its ability to conduct 
mine action activities, most importantly in relation to quality 
management and processing of minefi eld completion reports 
from operators. As a result, there were lengthy delays in 
the sign-off of completed tasks, preventing them from being 
handed over to local communities.14
Positively, a draft resource mobilisation strategy had 
been developed and was waiting for formal approval from 
CNIDAH’s management. It was hoped that the fi nal draft 
would be ready for distribution in June 2019 at a planned 
donor coordination meeting in Luanda.15 However, as at 
August 2019, it was reported that the draft was undergoing 
further review.16
International mine action operators also continued to 
report lengthy bureaucratic obstacles in securing visas 
for expatriate personnel, compounded by a new tax law 
that entered into force in August 2018 and which added 
further tariffs to those already applied to the importation 
of equipment.17 A joint meeting was held at the end of the 
year with IPROCAC, the government entity responsible for 
coordination of humanitarian activities, in which NPA, MAG, 
and The HALO Trust expressed their concerns in relation 
to the implementation of the new law and its impact on 
humanitarian activities.18
GENDER 
Gender and diversity are not referenced in Angola’s 2019–25 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) mine action 
workplan, nor are they included in Angola’s national mine 
action standards in place in 2018. 
CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review in 2019 that while it 
did not have a gender and diversity policy, provisions on 
gender mainstreaming will be incorporated into its new 
National Mine Action Strategy to be developed with support 
from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) and NPA’s capacity development project 
in August 2019. Sex- and age-disaggregated data collection 
requirements had been integrated into all relevant standing 
operating procedures, data collection forms, and other 
tools. All operators ensure that survey and community 
liaison teams are gender-balanced, and CNIDAH reported 
that, in 2018, a total of 23% of all deminers across the 
national programme were women. While men continued to 
dominate the sector, all operators were endeavouring to 
provide opportunities for fair female representation in their 
respective teams, CNIDAH said. Two of nine heads of 
department within CNIDAH were also held by women 
in 2018.19
International NGO operators confi rmed that gender, age, and 
diversity-related concerns are taken into account during 
survey and clearance to ensure that the views and needs of 
different age and gender groups are refl ected in the conduct 
of demining operations. They further reported taking into 
consideration gender balance in the hiring of staff in mine 
action operations, ensuring that a mix of male and female 
staff were employed in operational roles in the fi eld, as well 
as in managerial positions.20
The HALO Trust was continuing its “100 Women in Demining 
in Angola” project introduced in 2017, with the aim of 
empowering 100 women through recruitment, training, and 
employment across a range of mine action roles. It reported 
that the number of female staff had increased dramatically in 
two years, and the project would be an ongoing focus for its 
operations in Benguela province, while seeking its expansion 
in 2019 and beyond.21








INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Angola’s mine action programme has long suffered from 
signifi cant problems with information management, including 
the poor quality of the CNIDAH national database. This is 
exacerbated by the lack of integration of mine action data 
held by the CED. As noted above, during the year, an NPA 
Capacity Development Adviser was embedded in the CNIDAH 
team and focused on establishing an up-to-date and more 
accurate database, with assistance from operators. NPA 
reported that, as a result, discrepancies between operator 
reports from the fi eld and the records contained in the 
national database were being addressed and consequently, 
the accuracy of the data recorded in the database and 
reporting began to improve as well.22
A monthly data-sharing mechanism was established between 
CNIDAH and all operators in-country in 2018 as part of mine 
action and information management coordination meetings. 
CNIDAH reported that progress in integrating data held by the 
CED was hampered by fi nancial constraints that prevented the 
CED from being fully operational during the year.23
PLANNING AND TASKING
In November 2018, Angola submitted a detailed annual 
workplan for 2019–25 to meet its extended APMBC Article 
5 deadline. According to the plan, in 2019, operations in the 
provinces of Kuando Kubango, Uige, Moxico, Kwanza Sul, 
Huambo, and Cabinda would be prioritised.24 It foresaw a 
total of close to 17.2km2 of land release per year.25 In June 
2019, however, CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review that the 
annual projections are not achievable with existing demining 
capacity. Almost all operators were working at a reduced 
capacity due to limited funding.26
In June 2019, CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review that it 
was already in the process of considering the formalisation 
of plans for residual contamination management capacity. 
Discussions, however, were in their infancy and no concrete 
decisions had yet been made.27
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no specifi c national mine action legislation in 
Angola.28
National mine action standards were in place in Angola in 
2018. However, CNIDAH informed Mine Action Review that 
they did not cover all key areas considered necessary for 
a well-functioning national mine action programme. This 
resulted in a lack of standardisation for activities, and 
consequently, operators were relying on their own standing 
operating procedures.29
Positively, CNIDAH reported that national standards on 
quality and information management were reviewed and 
updated with support from NPA’s capacity development 
project in 2018. It stated that implementation of the revised 
standards had begun following internal training in 2019.30
Further signifi cant revisions were expected to be made with 
assistance from the GICHD in 2019.31
CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality 
assurance (QA) and QC of mine action activities, including 
QC of all completed tasks prior to handover of land to 
benefi ciaries. Under the NPA capacity development project’s 
support for quality management (QM), CNIDAH reported that 
QM trainings had been initiated in 2018 and were continuing 
in 2019. As of June 2019, CNIDAH reported that fi ve of its 
QA offi cers had received explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) Level 1 training, and 10 QA offi cers had completed a 
comprehensive quality management course.32
Despite these much needed improvements, operators 
continue to report that CNIDAH lacked the resources and 
logistics to carry out QA/QC properly and continued to 
rely on operators to fund their transport and, if necessary, 
accommodation and per diem. This allowed CNIDAH to 
produce completion reports and remove completed tasks 
from the IMSMA database.33 CNIDAH also acknowledged in its 
Article 5 deadline extension request that while improvements 
in its own and the CED’s QC teams had been made in previous 
years, more remained to be done requiring “special measures 
in relation to this challenge”.34
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OPERATORS 
Four international NGOs conducted demining for 
humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2018: APOPO, The HALO 
Trust, MAG, and NPA.35
 
The CED’s four operators – the Armed Forces, the Military 
Offi ce of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard 
– were operational across Angola. They are tasked by the 
government to clear or verify areas prioritised by national 
infrastructure development plans.36 A number of national 
commercial companies have been accredited by CNIDAH 
and previously were mostly employed by the state or 
other private companies. However, CNIDAH reported that 
no commercial operators were conducting mine action in 
2018–19. Only one national operator, APACOMINAS, was 
operational in 2018, which was tasked to complete ongoing 
tasks in Kwanza Sul province.37
At its peak, NPA deployed seven manual demining teams, 
and one mine detection rat team, in a partnership with 
APOPO, which reduced to three manual teams and the 
mine detection rat team, as a result of the completion of a 
donor-funded project and subsequent termination of funding. 
However, the deployment of two additional manual teams in 
September 2018 was made possible by new funding under 
the DFID grant.38 APOPO reported deploying one six-person 
manual demining team and one mine detection rat team of 
six handlers and 15 mine detection rats during the year.39 
APOPO’s partnership with NPA ended in 2018, however, and 
in 2019, it reported directly to CNIDAH as an independent 
operator.40 MAG deployed three manual demining teams, 
one rapid response team with an EOD capacity, and three 
mechanical assets in 2018, a slight increase resulting from 
additional funding. The HALO Trust reported deploying a 
total of 19 manual teams, 2 survey/community liaison teams, 
and 2 weapons and ammunition disposal teams.41
The impact of the severe decline in funding for mine action 
in Angola in recent years cannot be overstated. This trend 
continued in 2018, reaching a nadir in April when the United 
States (US), one of Angola’s biggest and long-term mine 
action donors, decided not to continue funding for future 
mine action operations. 
As reported above, in September 2018, DFID pledged to fund 
mine action in Angola over a two-year period from July 2018 
as part of £46 million of support for mine action programmes 
globally. This injected critically needed funding to sustain 
mine action operations in Angola, with a joint grant to the 
three largest operators. However, the continuing decline 
and gap in funding experienced by all operators negatively 
affected operations in 2018.
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Operational tools in use in demining activities in Angola 
in 2018 included one MineWolf machine, two mechanical 
excavators (MAG), one brush cutter (NPA), 16 mine detection 
rats (APOPO), and one mechanical digger (HALO Trust).42
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of more than 17.5km2 of mine contamination was 
released in 2018, including just over 1km2 through clearance, 
close to 2.7km2 through technical survey, and over 13.8km2 
through non-technical survey.43
SURVEY IN 2018
CNIDAH reported that international operators released a 
total of nearly 16.52km2 through survey in 2018: cancelling 
13.85km2 through non-technical survey in 2018, and reducing 
a further 2.67km2 through technical survey.44
This is a signifi cant decrease from 2017, when international 
operators reported cancelling more than 138km2 of SHA 
through non-technical survey and reducing a further 2.4km2 
through technical survey.45 This was due to the fact that the 
nationwide re-survey, which accounted for huge cancellation, 
was largely concluded by the end of 2018.46
Table 2: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical 
survey in 201847
Province Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Benguela HALO Trust 356,964
Kuando Kubango HALO Trust 1,340,072
Kwanza Sul HALO Trust 111,000
Lunda Norte MAG 5,458,008




Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201848














According to CNIDAH, international NGO operators cleared a total of 1.04km2 of mined area in 2018, destroying in the 
process 1,646 anti-personnel mines, 25 anti-vehicle mines, and 517 ERW.49 In 2017, NGO operators reported clearing 
a total of over 1.18km2 of mined area, destroying 3,480 anti-personnel mines, 114 anti-vehicle mines, and 2,201 ERW.50
While the amount of area cleared remained fairly consistent, the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed 
in 2018 fell by over 1,800, compared with 2017.












Benguela HALO Trust 10 241,703 176 3 84
Huambo HALO Trust 10 111,518 56 9 153
Kuando Kubango HALO Trust 5 225,693 370 0 80
Kwanza Sul HALO Trust 3 5,833 18 0 0
Malanje NPA 4 16,998 692 0 15
Moxico MAG 13 370,348 333 11 29
Uíge NPA 10 71,319 1 2 156
Totals 55 1,043,412 1,646 25 517
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
The HALO Trust also reported destroying an additional 59 
anti-personnel mines, MAG 27 anti-personnel mines, and NPA 
4 anti-personnel mines as a result of EOD spot tasks.52
The HALO Trust said its decrease in clearance output in 2018 
was due to a reduction of funding and subsequent reduction 
in the number of teams deployed in Huambo province.53 In 
contrast, MAG reported increased clearance in 2018, owing 
to its mechanical clearance teams and ground preparation 
team working in combination with manual teams.54 NPA stated 
that despite the numbers of anti-personnel mines destroyed 
during the year, its completed tasks in Uíge province proved 
to be more heavily contaminated with ERW than mines.55
Following completion of re-survey in 2017, NPA reported 
completing clearance of all known and registered tasks 
in Malanje province as at end-May 2018, marking a highly 
signifi cant milestone of the fi rst province to be declared free 
of the threat of mines in Angola, following offi cial declaration 
by CNIDAH.56 As at August 2019, however, CNIDAH had yet to 
make any such declaration and discussions as to when and 
how Malanje will be declared mine free were ongoing. The 
HALO Trust was also close to completing clearance of Huambo 
province, which will be another milestone achievement for 
mine action in Angola. It is hoped that with these two provinces 
declared completed, renewed momentum and additional 
resources can be secured to enable further progress in a 
province-by-province approach to completion.
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ANGOLA: 1 JANUARY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018 
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
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Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2017), 
Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is not on 
track to meet this deadline.
Operators and CNIDAH maintain that with the requisite 
funding, Angola could still meet its 2025 Article 5 deadline. 
However, there was consensus that in 2018–19, the level of 
funding outlined as necessary to complete clearance by this 
time was simply not in place.57 Collectively in the past decade, 
the resources of the three largest operators, HALO Trust, 
MAG, and NPA declined by nearly 90%.58 
On the margins of the 16th Meeting of States Parties to the 
APMBC in November 2018, Angola, with assistance from the 
APMBC’s Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation 
and Assistance, convened a joint meeting for relevant 
stakeholders and potential donors, under the Committee’s 
“individualised approach” framework. At that meeting, 
CNIDAH stated that $374 million would be needed to complete 
clearance by 2025. However, CNIDAH and operators have 
previously set the estimate of funding required signifi cantly 
lower, at US$275 million.59
CNIDAH reported in June 2019 that it would be ambitious to 
think that Angola will achieve its 2025 Article 5 deadline.60 
Nonetheless, Angola managed to meet its Article 5 workplan 
target for land release in 2018, with nearly 17.5km2 of 
contaminated area released through survey and clearance. 
News that clearance of two provinces, Malanje and Huambo, 
were being reported complete is also highly encouraging. 
Completion of clearance in these provinces will be major 
steps forward for Angola’s mine action. 
With a nationwide re-survey of all contamination nearly 
complete, Angola is on the verge of having a comprehensive 
estimate of remaining contamination. But without substantial 
new funding, Angola will not complete clearance by its Article 
5 deadline and Maputo political declaration goal of end 2025.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Argentina should work with the United Kingdom to reach an agreement on the joint clearance of the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands. 
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION 
Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.1 On ratifying 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Argentina submitted a declaration reaffi rming “its rights of sovereignty 
over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the 
territory.”2 It reiterated this declaration most recently at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties and the May 2019 APMBC 
Intersessional Meetings.3 
The islands were mined, mostly by Argentinian forces, during its armed confl ict with the United Kingdom in 1982. Argentina 
has reported that no other territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected.4
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo Desminado Humanitario) established by a Ministry 
of Defence Resolution, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is invited, and a Humanitarian Demining Training Centre 
(Centro de Entrenamiento de Desminado Humanitario).5
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Argentina has stated that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the Malvinas due to 
the “illegal occupation” by the United Kingdom. It did, however, make an offer more than a decade ago to support demining of 
the islands. In November 2018, Argentina reiterated its claim of sovereignty over the islands and declared that if the United 
Kingdom entered into negotiations over sovereignty an agreement on demining could be reached between the two states.6
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009 by the Second Review Conference, 
Argentina is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but 
not later than 1 January 2020. In March 2019, Argentina formally submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline until 1 March 
2023. In the request, Argentina has indicated its predisposition to elaborate a new provisional agreement on the basis of a form of 
joint sovereignty that would permit the clearance of anti-personnel mines with the United Kingdom.7
In 2018, the United Kingdom submitted and was granted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline by an additional fi ve years 
until 1 March 2024, which includes a plan to complete the demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.8
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2020
THREE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 MARCH 2023
ARGENTINA
(MALVINAS)
 1 Article 7 Report (for 2009), Form A.  
 2 Article 7 Report (for 1999), Form A. 
 3 Statement of Argentina, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2018; and Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019. 
 4 Statement of Argentina, 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017. 
 5 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form A. 
 6 Statement of Argentina, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2018. 
 7 Argentina 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2JBbkAM. 
 8 United Kingdom 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) fi nalised a new national mine 
action strategy for 2018–25 in 2018, which was adopted by 
the Council of Ministers in January 2019. In 2018, BiH began 
a European Union (EU)-funded country assessment project 
to help determine a more accurate baseline of anti-personnel 
mine contamination for realistic planning and to support the 
preparation of what is hoped will be its last Article 5 deadline 
extension request, due to be submitted before the end of 
March 2020.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ BiH should adopt, without further delay, the amended demining law drafted in 2017.
 ■ BiH should implement the recommendations of both the 2015 United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment, and the 2016 performance audit report of 
the Audit Offi ce of the Institutions of BiH.1 In particular, BiH should continue reforming and strengthening 
the governance and management of the mine action programme.
 ■ BHMAC should strive to ensure that all implementing partners are conducting evidence-based survey and 
clearance, to more accurately identify and delineate areas of contamination, in line with the National Mine 
Action Standards (NMAS) and Standing Operating Procedures (SoPs).
 ■ BHMAC should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination, 
including using the classifi cation of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and confi rmed hazardous area (CHA) 
in a manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
 ■ BHMAC should strive to improve gender balance in the sector, at the least by meeting the target of 40% female 
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(20% of overall score)
5 BiH’s current baseline of mined area is not accurate, with infl ated SHAs. The “country 
assessment” project, currently underway, should help to determine a more accurate 





(10% of overall score)
5 National ownership of mine action in BiH falls under the responsibility of the Demining 
Commission and BHMAC, and the BiH mine action strategy for 2018–25 has been 
adopted. Governance and management of the mine action programme could be 
strengthened and reformed. As at June 2019, the amended demining law was still 
awaiting parliamentary adoption.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
5 The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 supports the 2003 Law on Gender Equality. 
BHMAC has stated that, under its leadership, relevant actors will include gender in all 
phases of all mine action activities. However, of BHMAC’s own 107 operations staff in the 




(10% of overall score)
6 There is considerable scope to improve the accuracy and consistency of BHMAC’s mine 
action data and information management system, which should also be made consistent 




(10% of overall score)
6 BiH adopted its National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 in January 2019. It is hoped that 
the results of the EU-funded “country assessment” project, expected to be completed at 
the end of 2019, will assist planning and the realisation of the new National Strategy.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 BiH has NMAS and SoPs in place for the effi cient release of mined areas through 
evidence-based survey (including technical survey with targeted investigation) and 





(20% of overall score)
6 The amount of land released through clearance and cancelled through non-technical 
survey in 2018 was a slight increase on 2017, while technical survey output decreased 
slightly. Efforts in the latter half of 2018 were put into the “country assessment” project, 
to set a new baseline for realistic Article 5 implementation planning.
Average Score 6.0 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ The Demining Commission (representatives from three 
ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence) elected 
to represent BiH’s three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs))
■ Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Armed Forces of BiH
■ BHMAC
■ Civil Protection Administration of Republic of Srpska




■ Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) 
■ Pro Vita
■ Stop Mines
■ Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez”
■ WBE
■ Commercial demining companies:
■ Detektor
■ N&N Ivsa
■ In Demining N.H.O
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
BiH is heavily contaminated with mines, primarily as a 
result of the 1992–95 confl ict related to the break-up of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All warring 
factions in BiH laid mines, primarily between confrontation 
lines.2 Nearly twenty-four years after the end of the confl ict, 
BiH is still the most heavily mined country in Europe. BIH is 
also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), 
including cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report 
on BiH for further information). 
In its latest Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
Article 7 transparency report, BiH claimed a total of 
1,018km2 of mined area, across 8,525 locations, but did not 
disaggregate SHA and CHA.3 This represents a decrease of 
43km2 compared to the 1,061km2 of mined area as at the end 
of 2017.4 The difference in fi gures between mined area as at 
the end of 2017 and 2018 cannot be satisfactorily reconciled 
based on the land released through survey and clearance 
in 2018.
Mined area reported to Mine Action Review (see Table 1) 
also totalled 1,018km2 (as per BiH’s Article 7 report), but 
was reported to be across a total of 8,948 mined areas 
(8,141 SHAs and 807 CHAs).5 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by canton (at end 2018)6
Canton “Known” mined areas Area (km2) Suspected mined areas Area (km2)
Unsko-Sanki 132 3.00 640 98.70
Posavski 6 0.37 174 17.39
Tuzlanski 57 1.39 704 78.43
Zanicko-Dobojski 52 1.79 665 115.83
Bosansko-Podrinjski 19 1.14 222 44.18
Srednje-Bosanski 100 3.23 761 119.52
Hercegovacko-Neret 68 3.00 1,225 147.00
Zapadno-Hercegovacki 3 0.23 10 0.08
Sarajevo 29 1.02 285 67.84
Canton 10 36 1.07 475 74.20
Subtotal BiH Federation 502 16.24 5,161 763.17
Republika Srpska 303 5.79 2,834 218.12
Brčko district 2 0.05 146 14.64
Totals 807 22.08 8,141 995.93
A 2016 national audit offi ce report on the effi ciency of the 
demining system in BiH concluded that: “Twenty years 
after the war ended, the Mine Action Centre still does not 
have complete information on the locations of landmines 
in BiH, which is to say it does not know the total suspected 
hazardous area.”7 Similarly, a 2015 UNDP evaluation reported 
that the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) 
is aware that not all of the SHA is actually mined, but 
“without more effi cient non-technical survey and technical 
survey procedures the exact extent of the problem cannot 
be quantifi ed.”8 
During 2017, plans were formalised between BHMAC, 
clearance operators, and the EU for a country assessment to 
establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and 
improve the effi ciency of clearance operations.9 The resultant 
18-month project, “Country assessment of mine-suspected 
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018–2019” (hereafter, 
the “country assessment” project), was signed in August 
and was planned to be completed by February 2020 (see 
the Land Release System section of this report for further 
information).10 If this leads to very signifi cant reduction of SHA 
and identifi cation of truly mined area, this will make a major 
contribution to improving programme performance.
Minefi elds in BiH generally contain relatively small numbers 
of mines, which are typically either “in groups or randomly 
laid”. The quality of approximately 30% of minefi eld 
records was not suffi ciently accurate for the identifi cation 
of the precise minefi eld location and shape. Furthermore, 
approximately 40% of minefi eld records were reportedly 
never made or handed over, and records were often 
destroyed or lost for several reasons, such as the death 
or emigration of the persons who created the minefi eld 
records.11 Physical changes to mined areas (such as in 
vegetation), and a lack of witnesses to the laying of the 
mines, pose additional challenges.12




















NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, supervises the state-wide BHMAC and represents 
BiH in its relations with the international community on 
mine-related issues.13 The Demining Commission is composed 
of representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs, 
Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH’s three main 
ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Whereas the 
Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for 
mine action, the Demining Commission is the strategic body 
responsible for setting mine action policy, and it proposes 
the appointment of BHMAC senior staff, for approval by the 
Council of Ministers.14 The existing Demining Commission 
representatives were re-elected for a further two years 
(October 2017 to October 2019).15
One problem posed by the structure of the Demining 
Commission is that each of the three represented ministries 
has separate portfolios in their respective ministries; and 
their work on the Demining Commission is only part-time 
in addition to their other responsibilities.16 Furthermore, 
according to the 2016 audit offi ce report, “The Commission 
has not developed a methodology on how to monitor the work 
of the BHMAC”.17
BHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the Council of 
Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action and 
implementing BiH’s demining plan, including accreditation 
of all mine action organisations.18 BHMAC operates from its 
headquarters in Sarajevo, and two main offi ces in Sarajevo 
and Banja Luka, and eight regional offi ces (Banja Luka, Bihac, 
Brčko, Mostar, Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla).19
Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine 
action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable 
platform for mine action funding by the government and local 
authorities. BiH demining authorities are following the 2015 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers to amend the 
existing law, instead of adopting a new law,20 and a working 
group which consisted of representatives from the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs, the Demining Commission, BHMAC, the Armed 
Forces, and the entity Civil Protections, created a fi rst draft 
of the amended demining law.21 However, as at June 2019 the 
amended text from 2017 was still awaiting parliamentary 
adoption. Clearer legislation on liabilities related to mine 
action activities would be benefi cial to all mine action 
stakeholders in BiH.
After a 10-year hiatus, Board of Donor meetings resumed in 
September 2015.22 As at April 2019, however, the last Board 
of Donor meeting had taken place in Sarajevo in November 
2017.23 BiH’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 
specifi es that at least two such meetings should be organised 
every year.24 In October 2016, expert working groups (EWGs), 
which used to meet until 2009, were reinitiated and continue 
to meet.25
BiH’s second goal, in its National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2025, is that the “Mine action programme in BH is 
promoted on both national and international level to increase 
its visibility and improve liability, commitment and support 
of the state”, and the strategy includes operational goals 
linked to this strategic goal.26 As committed to in its national 
mine action strategy, BiH published a separate fi nancial 
plan for implementation of the BiH mine action strategy for 
2018–25. The plan sees BiH commit a national budget of 4.5 
million BAM (over US$2.5 million) per annum for the Armed 
Forces and 5.945 million BAM (US$3.4 million) per annum for 
BHMAC, for 2019 and 2020; which is forecast to increase to 
a total of 21.55 million BAM (over US$12.3 million, at current 
exchange rates) per annum in 2021–25.27 This national funding 
is in additional to forecast international funding, which is also 
budgeted in BiH’s fi nancial plan.28
BHMAC is funded by the common institutions of BiH and 
other institutions at state level.29 BiH has calculated that 
the required cost to fulfi l BiH’s plans during its two-year 
interim extension period is almost 80 million BAM (US$46 
million), of which 50% will be national funding and 50% 
donor funding. Funds for non‐technical survey activities 
by BHMAC will be ensured from the budgets of BiH 
institutions and implemented through operational activities 
of BHMAC. Budgets of BiH institutions will also ensure funds 
for technical survey and mine clearance activities to be 
implemented by Armed Forces. Entity governments’ budgets 
will ensure funds for technical survey and mine clearance 
operations, to be implemented by entity civilian protections. 
Other funding resources from BiH include: Brč ko District 
budget, budgets of cantons and municipalities, and budgets 
of public and private companies.30
GENDER
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 specifi es 
that “Under the leadership of BHMAC, relevant actors will 
include gender and diversity into all phases of planning, 
realisation and follow-up of all mine activities”.31 The mine 
action strategy considered and supported the 2003 Law on 
Gender Equality in BiH, which includes equal treatment of the 
genders and equality of opportunity, and prohibits direct and 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of gender. The Law 
on Gender Equality determines that equal representation 
of men and women exists when the percentage of either 
gender in bodies at all levels in BiH (state, entity, cantonal, 
and municipality level) is at least 40%. BiH’s national mine 
action strategy also considered the 2017 Gender Equality 
Action Plan.32 However, as at April 2019, out of BHMAC’s 171 
employees, only 42 were women (25%). Of BHMAC’s 107 
operations staff in the fi eld, 10 were women (9%).33
BHMAC reported that it has a gender and diversity policy 
and that BHMAC upholds the Law on Gender Equality 
and routinely includes it in the development of strategies 
and standards.34
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has a gender policy and equal 
employment opportunities for suitably qualifi ed females and 
males. However, as at August 2019 MAG’s programme in 
BiH had never received applications from women for vacant 
operational roles, and of its 62 operational staff in BiH, only 
two medic positions were held by women, in addition to a 
female operations assistant. MAG does not have dedicated 
community liaison in BiH, but it reported that its survey and 
clearance teams seek to talk to all women and men living 
near the survey area to obtain as much data as possible. Of 
MAG’s management team, the country director was female 
in 2018, along with a support services offi cer.35
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Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported that it promotes 
gender equality in all aspects of its programme activities in 
BiH. Mixed gender representation is an obligation for NPA 
teams conducting community liaison and risk education.36 
NPA reported that the overall gender split of its staff as at 
April 2019 was 98 male employees and 10 female (9%).37 NPA 
reported that it is driving to achieve a gender balance, and 
that the programme encourages the employment of women, 
including into managerial and operational staff positions. 
Four managerial positions in the NPA BiH programme are 
held by women.38 
All groups affected by mines, including women and children, 
are reported to be consulted during survey and community 
liaison activities by both BHMAC and NPA, and survey 
and community liaison teams are inclusive with a view to 
facilitating this. BHMAC and NPA also reported that relevant 
mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age.39 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at April 2019, BHMAC was using its own information 
management system, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine 
Action Information System (BHMAIS).40 However, BHMAC does 
not report accurately or consistently on mine contamination 
by SHAs and CHAs, in a manner consistent with IMAS. In 
addition, there are frequent inaccuracies in BHMAC reporting 
on land release.
Information in BHMAC’s information management system 
is made available to clearance operators,41 but at present 
this is restricted to data for the specifi c tasks on which the 
operators are engaged.42 
BHMAC, with the support of UNDP and fi nancing from the 
EU, plans to create a new web-based database to replace the 
existing system and increase accessibility and transparency 
of mine action data. The project aims “to infl uence policy and 
build the capacity to instil greater organisational openness 
and adaptability to new methodologies”.43 According to the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), the UNDP-supported project to improve information 
management through the development of a web-based 
database will improve the accessibility and transparency 
of data.44 The joint development of the database (IMSMA 
Core) began in 2019 and was ongoing as at June 2019; it was 
expected to be completed by 2020.45
PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2017, BiH developed a new national mine action strategy 
for 2018–25, with support from the GICHD, which addresses 
all mine and cluster munition remnant contamination. The 
strategy was formally adopted in January 2019.46
The BiH previous Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19, adopted 
by the Council of Ministers in 2008,47 set the target of the 
country becoming free of mines by 2019. BHMAC conducted 
the fi rst of three planned revisions of the strategy in 2012–1348 
(the other two were due in 2015 and 2017, respectively).49 
In 2016, BHMAC, in consultation with the GICHD, started the 
third revision process. This time, BiH, with support from 
the GICHD, and participation from government ministries, 
clearance operators, and other stakeholders, produced an 
entirely new national mine action strategy for the period 
through to projected completion of mine and cluster munition 
remnant clearance (2018–25).
The new National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025, which 
was only adopted in January 2019, contains a general plan 
and timeframe for the completion of mine clearance, as well 
as for cluster munition remnants. It is due to be revised 
in 2020 and 2023, to consider progress and adjust for any 
changes in context.50 The strategy also includes a section on 
management of residual contamination, which specifi es that 
BiH is obliged to create a strategy for the management of 
residual contamination by 2022.51 
BiH’s annual operational mine action plan for 2019, in 
accordance with Article 16 of the Demining Law, has been 
adopted by the Demining Commission.52
The EU-funded “country assessment” of the size and impact 
of mine and ERW contamination, was signed on 15 August 
2018, with an implementation period of 18 months.53 The 
assessment aims to determine a more accurate baseline 
of mine contamination and provide a new foundation for 
meaningful planning. Results of the assessment will enable 
BiH to plan for the implementation of its new National 
Strategy and prepare its fi nal Article 5 extension through to 
completion.54 Under the project, non-technical survey will be 
conducted by BHMAC (nine non-technical survey teams), the 
BiH Armed Forces (two non-technical survey teams), and NPA 
(three non-technical survey teams), with €1.1 million (approx. 
US$1.25 million) of EU funding. 
As part of the “country assessment” project, 1,030km2 of 
remaining mined area is expected to be subdivided into about 
500 MSAs (mine-suspected areas) requiring further survey 
and clearance, while 30km2 is expected to be cancelled.55 
The MSA polygons will be made up of SHAs and CHAs that 
encompass one or more impacted communities and which, 
due to economic, cultural, geographical or other reasons, 
form a logical geographical area on which comprehensive 
survey and clearance will be undertaken.56 It is envisaged 
that the creation of MSAs will enable mine action operations 
to better respond to the needs of the community through 
strengthening community liaison and ensuring that the 
community needs are prioritised and addressed. It is also 
intended to simplify the tasking procedure by assigning 
specifi c organisations a larger geographical area in which 
to carry out operations.57 Local administrations and BHMAC 
will together agree on the size and priority of MSAs in 
accordance with humanitarian, developmental, and safety 
needs of municipality and local communities.58 The MSAs 
will be categorised into three categories: high, medium, and 
low risk, based on available general assessment data. MSAs 
with a higher probability of containing PROM mines, large 
confi rmed minefi elds, and high-/medium-impact MSAs based 
on general assessment, will be categorised as high- and 
medium-risk MSAs within one municipality. All other MSAs 
will be categorised as low risk.59





















STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Results of mine action in BiH show that the applied land 
release model was effi cient in the period 2005–09, and 
prior to 2009, BHMAC cancelled signifi cant amounts of land 
annually through non-technical survey.60 Since then, however, 
non-technical survey output has declined, but there remains 
signifi cant potential for further reduction in the size of the SHA.
In December 2012, having recognised the need for more 
effi cient land release in BiH, the EU, with pre-accession 
funding, started a pilot “land release” project with BHMAC.61
The resulting “IPA 2011 Land Release” was implemented from 
2013 to 2016, with EU funding.62 The project enabled effi cient 
tasking of systematic technical survey and technical survey 
with targeted investigation, helping ensure clearance assets 
were only directed into CHAs.63 Results from six completed 
tasks in the EU pilot project revealed that 91% of the total 
land released was cancelled through non-technical survey, 
8.5% was reduced through technical survey, and 0.5% was 
cleared.64 Assuming the six tasks are representative of much 
of BiH’s remaining SHAs, BHMAC predicts that only a minor 
proportion of the remaining SHAs contain contamination 
and deployment of clearance assets will therefore only be 
required for relatively small areas.65 This has been factored 
into the new National Mine Action Strategy, and it is hoped 
that the new land release concept will greatly speed up 
release of suspected mined area.66
The application of technical survey with targeted 
investigation was also piloted by NPA in 2015, and has 
subsequently been expanded and implemented by other 
operators and state bodies, including the BiH Armed Forces 
and civil protection entities. As part of the process, BHMAC 
and NPA identifi ed new sources of information, including 
former soldiers and commanders. Several methodologies 
can then be applied as part of technical survey to locate 
contamination, including manual clearance lane(s) towards 
a specifi c target, MDDs to search for a specifi c target, or to 
help identify a specifi c target. Selection of techniques for 
each target is guided by several factors, including analysis 
of the characteristics of indirect evidence examined and 
environmental conditions (including the type of terrain 
and density of vegetation).67 Further promotion of national 
ownership by BHMAC and the Demining Commission, 
including the adoption of a clear defi nition of “all reasonable 
effort” and an appropriate division of liabilities would 
enhance effi cient and effective land release process in BiH.
In 2016, in collaboration with the GICHD and UNDP, BHMAC 
held a workshop on “standards and SOP revisions”.68 Efforts 
focused on ensuring the standards and SoPs allow for the 
optimal release of land through evidence-based survey, 
including through technical survey.69 The BiH Demining 
Commission has adopted three chapters of the standards so 
far: one on non-technical survey, one on technical survey, and 
one on the opening and monitoring of tasks.70 In addition, a 
specifi c SoP was approved by the Demining Commission for 
the new 18-month “country assessment” project.71
There is broad agreement among operators and experts 
that technical survey with targeted investigation could 
signifi cantly improve the effi ciency of land release in BiH. This 
could more accurately defi ne CHAs, potentially reducing the 
area released through clearance to between 1% and 3% of the 
original SHA.72
The Federal Administration of Civil Protection, however, 
reported that it had suggested a number of suggested 
proposals for the improvement of current standards on mine 
clearance and UXO removal, non-technical survey, technical 
survey, and land release, but without signifi cant results, 
which it attributed to a lack of readiness for dialogue from 
BHMAC leadership.73
OPERATORS 
As at September 2018, 26 organisations were accredited for 
mine action in BiH: four government organisations (Armed 
Forces of BiH, Federal Administration of Civil Protection, 
Civil Protection Administration of Republic of Srpska, and 
Brčko District Civil Protection), the Red Cross Society of BiH; 
seven commercial organizations (all national); 7 commercial 
organizations, and 14 non‐government organizations 
(NGOs) (11 national and 3 international).74 Overall demining 
capacity totalled 1,200 persons in accredited organisations, 
comprising 900 deminers and 300 others (including team 
leaders, site leader, operational offi cers, QA offi cers, and dog 
trainers). The accredited organisations also have at their 
disposal a total of 37 accredited machines (for vegetation 
removal, ground disturbance, and removal of debris), 1,257 
metal detectors, and 63 accredited explosive detection dogs. 
In addition, BHMAC has at its disposal 44 surveyors (i.e. 
22 survey teams for non‐technical survey and emergency 
marking), 8 offi cers for planning non‐technical survey 
operations, 12 inspectors and 28 senior clerks for QC/
technical supervision/inspection.75
During 2018, technical survey and/or clearance of anti-
personnel mines was conducted by the BiH Armed Forces, 
the Federal Administration of Civil Protection, the Civil 
Protection Administration of Republic of Srpska, and twelve 
other clearance organisations, comprising nine NGOs 
(Association UEM, DEMIRA, Mine Detection Dog Centre 
(MDDC), MAG, NPA, Pro Vita, Stop Mines, Udruga “Pazi 
Mine Vitez”, and WBE) and three commercial organisations 
(Detektor, N&N Ivsa, and In Demining N.H.O).76 BHMAC did not 
expect any major changes to demining capacity in 2019.77
The BiH Armed Forces’ survey and clearance operations, 
which include use of machinery and explosive detection dogs, 
are fully engaged from March to November, and with reduced 
activity, predominantly in southern BiH, from December 
to February.78 Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused 
on building the capacity of the Army’s Demining Battalion. 
This involves transfer of knowledge through operational 
planning of clearance and technical survey operations; direct 
operational support; and provision of mine detection dogs 
(MDDs) and equipment, among other things.79 The BiH Armed 
Forces require ongoing support to secure personal protective 
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equipment, batteries for detectors, and fuel for demining 
machinery, since the Army’s own complex procurement 
system often cannot deliver such items in suffi cient time.80 
The Demining Battalion also receives support from Austria, 
France, Italy, and the United States, as well as EUFOR, which 
alone provides 90% of support.81
The state operators, the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining 
Battalion and Civil Protection, are both good partners and 
have effective capacities, but have suffered from logistical 
challenges and equipment defi cits, which can prevent them 
from working at full capacity.82 Deminers in the BiH Armed 
Forces, however, are forced to stop demining at the age of 38 
(this upper limit, until recently, had been 35). This results in 
experienced deminers being forced to retire at a very early 
age and results in a high turnover of personnel.83 
In the opinion of a UNDP expert, the BiH Armed Forces have 
suffi cient demining equipment, but could benefi t from stronger 
management and better oversight of demining operations.84
Federal administration of civil protection teams are spatially 
distributed to cover the entire territory of the Federation 
of BiH and are located in Bihac, Busovaca, Gorazde, Livno, 
Mostar, Orasje, Sarajevo, Travnik, Tuzla, and Zepce. Capacity 
includes 11 demining teams with 95 employees, 8 UXO teams 
with a total of 27 employees (solely responsible for removing 
UXOs in the Federation of BiH following reports from citizens 
and institutions), 4 MDD handlers with 4 dogs, a mechanical 
debris removal team that has one armoured excavator and two 
armoured trucks to remove UXO contaminated debris, and a 
demining team with two demining machines and 4 operators.85 
The teams of the Federal administration of civil protection 
are trained in fast response to remove injured persons (both 
civilians and deminers) from mine-contaminated areas. The 
Federal administration of civil protection believes that accident 
and incident investigation, which is currently only conducted by 
BHMAC staff, should be expanded to include representatives 
from the wider demining community, such as the entities civil 
protection authorities, the Armed Forces, and EUFOR, to help 
improve the safety and quality of operations.86
The Civil Protection of Brčko District only conducts removal 
and destruction of ERW, and not demining.
NPA is, according to the 2015 UNDP evaluation, well 
respected in BiH and is treated almost like a national asset, 
even though it is international and independently donor 
funded.87 Both machines and dogs are integrated into NPA 
demining operations in BiH. NPA uses MDD and special 
detection dogs (SDDs) for clearance and technical survey 
tasks, including targeted technical survey.88 In 2018, NPA 
had 8 manual clearance/technical survey teams with a 
total of 53 deminers, 6 MDD handlers and 9 dogs, and 4 
machine operators and machines. In addition, NPA had one 
three-strong non-technical survey team in 2018. In 2019, this 
increased to three non-technical survey teams, as part of 
the EU-funded “country assessment” project.89 As mentioned 
above, since 2010, NPA has also focused on building the 
capacity of the Armed Forces Demining Battalion.
MAG received operational accreditation in April 2017, and 
began technical survey and clearance operations in mid-May 
2017.90 In 2018, MAG deployed 61 staff to conduct technical 
survey and clearance, an increase of four teams (36 staff, 
plus 2 medics and 1 site surveyor), compared to MAG’s 
capacity in the previous year. MAG expected capacity in 2019 
to remain constant.91 
With the exception of MAG and NPA, clearance operators 
in BiH typically compete for international tenders in order 
to secure their funding. The UNDP evaluation suggested 
that this resulted in considerable capacity being underused 
and recommended alternative contracting models more 
appropriate for land release (either by having longer term 
contracts or being contracted for the clearance of larger 
areas), which could be more attractive to the demining 
organisations in terms of security and could also make best 
use of capacity in the long run.92 National demining NGOs, 
such as STOP Mines or PROVITA, which are registered in a 
similar way to companies, potentially have capacity to quickly 
mobilise additional resources and up-scale operations.93 
Quality control and quality assurance (QA) is conducted 
by BHMAC.94
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Clearance and technical survey operations in BiH include mechanical preparation of land, manual clearance, and the use of 
MDDs and SDDs depending on the geographical conditions.95 Much of the remaining mined area is in hilly or mountainous 
terrain, which restricts the use of machinery.




















LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 28.79km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which almost 0.92km2 was cleared, over 5.03km2 was reduced 
through technical survey, and 22.84km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. 
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, over 5.03km2 was reduced through technical survey, 
conducted by various government organisations, NGOs, 
and commercial organisations (see Table 2).96 This is a 
decrease on the 6.68km2 reduced through technical survey in 
2017.97 In addition, a further 22.84km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey in 2018,98 compared to 20.75km2 
in 2017.99
Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
by canton in 2018100










Total Federation BiH 3,021,265
Total Republika Srpska 1,684,002
Total Brčko district 330,015
Sum total 5,035,282
CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of almost 0.92km2 was cleared in 2018, during which 2,101 anti-personnel mines, 57 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,974 
ERW were destroyed (see Table 3).101 This is an increase on the 0.69km2 of mined area cleared and 1,749 anti-personnel mines 
destroyed, in 2017. Of 0.92km2 2018 clearance total, 431,808m2 of mined area was cleared (and 1,497 anti-personnel mines and 
942 items of ERW destroyed), through tasks created through the EU country assessment project and cleared by the federal 
administration of civil protection, MDDC, NPA, MAG and Provita.102
Mine clearance operations were conducted by the BiH Armed Forces, the Civil Protection of FBIH, the Civil Protection of RS, 
nine non-governmental organisations, and three commercial demining companies (see Tables 4).103
Table 3: Mine clearance by canton in 2018104
Canton Area cleared (m2) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed ERW destroyed
Unsko-Sanki 96,454 111 0 186
Posavski 75,137 33 0 20
Tuzlanski 93,765 100 10 88
Zanicko-Dobojski 19,774 9 0 14
Bosansko-Podrinjski 55,064 212 18 38
Srednje-Bosanski 744 1 0 6
Hercegovacko-Neret 375,864 1,061 0 858
Sarajevo 74,481 383 0 363
Total Federation BiH 791,283 1,910 28 1,573
Total Republic Srpska 106,169 174 29 235
Total Brčko district 22,080 17 0 166
Sum totals 919,532 2,101 57 1,974
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle
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Government Federal Administration 
of Civil Protection
6 41,041 59 10 355
BiH Armed Forces 5 92,403 220 10 264
Civil Protection Administration of RS 4 17,874 44 11 26
Local NGOs Association UEM 2 33,833 22 0 7
DEMIRA 2 3,158 2 0 0
Pro Vita 4 357,528 884 0 888
Stop Mines 1 1,735 1 0 0
Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez” 2 19,101 60 12 142
WBE 1 615 0 0 0
International 
NGOs
Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) 3 28,112 235 0 77
NPA 3 33,213 322 0 16




Detektor 5 27,857 72 5 10
N&N Ivsa 16 229,728 115 5 182
In Demining N.H.O 4 19,376 3 4 1
Totals 59 919,532 2,101 57 1,974
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENSION REQUESTED (2-YEAR INTERIM REQUEST): 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, BiH was granted a second 
extension request in 2018, for an interim two-year extension 
to 1 March 2021. Within this interim extension period, BiH 
plans to conduct a “country assessment”, to set a new 
baseline for realistic planning. Following completion of the 
“country assessment”, BiH believes it will be in a better 
position to calculate the time required to complete its Article 5 
obligations. It has pledged to submit a fi nal extension request, 
based on a more precise understanding of the challenge, by 
31 March 2020.106
Efforts to gain greater clarity on the extent of actual mine 
contamination are welcome but long overdue, considering 
that BiH still does not have an accurate picture of baseline 
contamination more than 20 years after becoming a state 
party to the APMBC. 
According to its 2018 interim Article 5 extension request, the 
next two years will see a transition of working methodologies 
throughout BiH, with land release being intensively conducted 
through the application of new standards and SoPs to 
improve effi ciency and cost‐effectiveness.107 Results gained 
so far through application of more effi cient evidence-based 
land release methodology to more accurately determine the 
location and extent of actual contamination, and cancel areas 
not contaminated, indicate the potential for large areas of 
uncontaminated SHA to be released through survey.108 BiH has 
expressed its commitment to complete its Article 5 obligations 
by 2025, as detailed in the National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2025.109 
The “country assessment” project, currently being undertaken, 
is expected to result in the cancellation of 30km2 through high-
quality non-technical survey and should enable more accurate 
tasking of technical survey and clearance going forward. 
However, this represents less than 3% of BiH’s total suspected 
mined area and it remains to be seen what the actual results of 
the assessment will be and how it will impact BHMAC’s Article 5 
completion planning. The possibility of new areas being recorded 
as contaminated through the “country assessment” is considered 
to be low, but is a possibility. Over the last fi ve years, BiH has 
released less than 6.5km2 thorough clearance (see Table 5). Since 
the ten-year extension to its initial Article 5 deadline, granted 
in 2008, BiH has continuously fallen far short of its annual land 
release targets. The painfully slow pace of clearance has resulted 
in lack of confi dence in the national mine action programme from 
donors but also from people living in mine-affected communities, 
who felt disillusioned that the mines have not been cleared.110




















Analysis by both NPA and UNDP shows that in the fi rst fi ve 
years of the 2009–19 strategy, while international donors 
maintained their planned funding commitments, anticipated 
BiH government funding level were not met, especially with 
regard to planned “additional government” sources and 
consequently, by 2013, progress was way off target.111 In the 
period 2006–17, only 50% of planned funds were available. 
The local and donor sources ensured the funds as planned, 
but unfortunately BiH did not provide additional funding to 
mine action, owing to its economic situation.112 The Ministry 
of Civil Affairs, the Demining Commission, and BHMAC have 
highlighted the limited funds for demining and have requested 
funds from the national budget.113 BiH has calculated that the 
required cost to fulfi l its planned two-year interim extension 
request is almost 80 million BAM (US$46 million), of which 
50% will be national funding and 50% donor funding.114
BHMAC expected land release operations for 2018 and 2019 
to continue in line with annual workplans, and predicted 
that a total of 237km2 would be released: 179km2 cancelled 
through non-technical survey by BHMAC (82km2 in 2018 
and 97km2 in 2019); an additional 30km2 cancelled though 
non-technical survey by BMHAC, BiH Armed Forces, and NPA 
as part of the “country assessment” project; 26km2 reduced 
through technical survey by accredited organisations (13km2
in 2018 and 13km2 in 2019); and 2km2 cleared (1km2 in 2018 
and 1km2 in 2019). In addition, through non-technical survey 
BHMAC expected to prepare a total of approximately 120 
MSAs, covering approximately 263km2.115
Based on 2018 land release outputs of almost 0.92km2
cleared, over 5.03km2 reduced, and 28.79km2 cancelled, BiH 
has already fallen behind on its new target, especially with 
regards to clearance output.
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







The new National Mine Action Strategy presents an 
opportunity for BiH to communicate and outline the mine 
action programme’s goals and objectives, both to national and 
international stakeholders. To implement the new strategy, 
in particular high-quality survey to allow for the release of 
what is expected to be substantial area found without direct 
evidence of contamination, will, however, require strong 
oversight and commitment from BHMAC, and the Demining 
Commission and their superiors in the government. It will also 
require continued funding of the operational activities in order 
to realise the goals within the envisaged timeframe. 
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2020
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Cambodia is working towards completing its baseline survey 
with 23 districts surveyed in 2018 and the remainder to be 
surveyed by 2020. This, along with the planned classifi cation 
of mined areas into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) 
and confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs), should improve 
Cambodia’s understanding of the extent of remaining mine 
contamination. However, signifi cant amounts of previously 
unrecorded contamination continue to be added to the 
database reducing the overall progress in land release. 
In 2018, Cambodia launched its National Mine Action Strategy, 
Three-Year Implementation Plan, and Gender Mainstreaming 
in Mine Action Plan (GMAP 2018–22). The Cambodia Mine 
Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) continued 
to strengthen after a management shake-up in 2017. 
Cambodia submitted what is hoped to be its last Article 5 
deadline extension request in March 2019. While progress 
is being made in planning, prioritisation, and land release, 
the target of completing anti-personnel mine clearance by 
2025 is ambitious and will only be achieved with signifi cantly 
increased funding and capacity.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Cambodia should report outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination classifi ed into SHAs and CHAs.
 ■ Cambodia should proceed to review all newly added mined areas to cancel any uncontaminated areas from 
its database. It should introduce quality control of newly surveyed areas to ensure that mined areas are being 
identifi ed through high-quality, evidence-based survey.
 ■ Cambodia should continue to improve its information management systems by eliminating discrepancies with 
operator data and ensuring synchronisation of reporting.
 ■ Cambodia should provide regular progress updates on the implementation of its Gender Mainstreaming in 
Mine Action Plan for 2018–22.












AT LEAST 400KM2 (ESTIMATED) 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
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(20% of overall score)
6 All outstanding mine contamination in Cambodia continues to be classifi ed by the CMAA 
as SHA. Its own classifi cation system disaggregates dense from scattered anti-personnel 
mine contamination. The baseline survey (BLS) of the remaining districts will be 
completed by 2020; survey of 23 districts was completed in 2018. While land reclamation 
and the BLS are cancelling uncontaminated land a substantial amount of previously 





(10% of overall score)
8 The CMAA continued to strengthen in 2018. There is good, although at times superfi cial, 
consultation with operators and a permissive environment. The Cambodian government 
contributes national resources for mine action, but to achieve completion by 2025 it 
intends to seek additional international assistance.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
7 In 2018, Cambodia released its GMAP 2018–22, which is embedded in both its national 
mine action strategy and implementation plan. The aim is to increase female participation 




(10% of overall score)
6 Cambodia made improvements to its information management system in 2018 setting 
up a virtual private network to allow operators to input directly into the database. 
Strengthening information management is one of the goals of the national mine action 




(10% of overall score)
7 Cambodia has a comprehensive National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 with a detailed 
three-year implementation plan 2018–20. Cambodia has clear criteria and processes for 
the prioritisation of tasks, involving consultation with key stakeholders. Cambodia fell 
short of its land release target for 2018 but has set itself an even higher target for 2019.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 Cambodia’s mine action standards are consistent with international mine action 
standards (IMAS) and refl ected in operators’ standing operating procedures (SoPs). 
Operators’ clearance capacity increased in 2018 but Cambodia has estimated an 
additional 2,000 deminers will be needed to meet its land release targets. A wide range 





(20% of overall score)
7 Overall land release output in Cambodia fell slightly in 2018 compared to the previous 
year, although clearance increased signifi cantly. To reach its ambitious targets tor 2025, 
Cambodia will need to secure additional funding and extra capacity and gain access to 
the non-demarcated border areas.
Average Score 6.8 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority 
(CMAA)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
 ■ Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD)
 ■ National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces Management, 
Mines and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance (NPMEC)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ APOPO 
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 









UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at December 2018, Cambodia estimates remaining 
anti-personnel mine contamination as over 890km2 across 
9,804 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)1 (see Table 1). 
The CMAA, which oversees the mine action database, 
operates its own classifi cation system for anti-personnel 
mine contamination that disaggregates land containing a 
dense concentration of anti-personnel mines (A1) from land 
containing scattered anti-personnel mines (A4).2 The CMAA 
only classifi es contamination as SHA despite the operators 
classifying contamination into both SHAs and CHAs. In 2019, 
the CMAA planned to migrate CHA data resulting from the 
cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) process into its 
database but has no plans to reclassify landmine data.3
The baseline survey (BLS) was originally conducted between 
2009 and 2012 across 124 districts. As at July 2019, BLS 
activities were ongoing across districts that were not 
surveyed or were only partially surveyed during the original 
implementation period. At end 2018, according to Cambodia’s 
National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, 23 districts had 
been surveyed and the remaining 50 were expected to be 
surveyed by 2020.4 Most of these districts are in the central 
and eastern provinces which have a high concentration of 
contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW) with 
moderate to little mine contamination.5
The CMAA and demining operators acknowledge that the BLS 
data are somewhat imprecise with contamination being found 
outside BLS polygons and substantial areas identifi ed by the 
BLS now under cultivation.6 The CMAA analysed land release 
data and found that, on average, 32% of land classifi ed as A1, 
and 51% of land classifi ed as A4 had been reclaimed.7 In 2015, 
the CMAA introduced the land reclamation non-technical 
survey and baseline survey (LRNTS+BLS) methodology, a 
stand-alone process to re-survey or re-verify SHAs identifi ed 
during the BLS. In 2015–18, the LRNTS+BLS has led to 
release of more than 44.4km2 of anti-personnel mined area 
across 1,076 SHAs.8 According to Cambodia’s Three-Year 
Implementation Plan, LRNTS will be conducted in 12,000 
polygons across the country between 2018 and end 2020 and 
will continue if suffi cient funding is available.9
Cambodia has extensive contamination from mines and 
ERW left by 30 years of confl ict th at ended in the 1990s. It is 
estimated that four million anti-personnel mines were laid 
after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 until the end of the 
internal armed confl ict in 1998. Cambodia’s anti-personnel 
mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 
north-western districts along the border with Thailand, 
which account for the large majority of mine casualties. 
The K5 mine belt, which was installed along the border 
with Thailand in the mid 1980s in an effort to block infi ltration 
by armed opposition groups, ranks among the densest mine 
contamination in the world.10
Cambodia also has signifi cant contamination from cluster 
munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW. In 2018, CMR 
contamination was estimated at 738km2 while ERW 
contamination was estimated at 468km2 (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report 
on Cambodia for further information).
Table 1: AP mined area by province (at end 2018)11
Province SHAs Area (m2)
Banteay Meanchey 2,547 172,665,603
Battambang 1,898 213,133,756
Kampong Cham 12 976,234
Kampong Chhnang 52 4,158,738
Kampong Speu 424 48,236,143





Koh Kong 103 19,041,908
Mondul Kiri 46 7,476,491
Oddar Meanchey 1,092 120,169,272
Palin 532 34,012,575
Phnom Penh 13 1,122,444
Preah Sihanouk 22 1,681,420
Preah Vihear 480 34,786,425
Prey Veng 1 5,900
Pursat 521 44,982,657
Ratanak Kiri 20 2,690,487
Siem Reap 813 76,906,134
Svay Rieng 94 9,394,723
Takeo 56 3,770,625
Tboung Khmum 16 1,493,673
Totals 9,804 890,437,236
NEW CONTAMINATION
The LRNTS+BLS has also led to the identifi cation of 1,363 
SHAs of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine 
contamination, covering a total area of 117.9km2.12 In 2018 
alone, the LRNTS+BLS captured 39.4km2 over 499 SHAs 
of additional contamination, see Table 2.13 The CMAA have 
stated that it is working with the database unit and operators 
to investigate all newly added mine contamination.14 The 
CMAA’s Department of Regulation and Monitoring and its 
quality management teams (QMTs) have been tasked with an 
increased focus on baseline survey operations to ensure that 
previously unrecorded mined areas added to the national 
database are supported by strong and clear evidence and 
are of an appropriate size. In addition, the Database Unit 
will review newly captured mined areas and verifi cation will 
be conducted by the QMTs on any questionable polygons. 
The CMAA will also hold an annual meeting with operators 
to discuss baseline survey and resurvey activity to ensure 
that they are conducted in accordance with the national 
standard. The meeting will also cover land release methods 
to strengthen their application and to ensure a consistent 
approach is taken by all operators.15
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Table 2: Newly added anti-personnel mined area in 201816
Province Operator SHAs Area (m2)
Banteay Meanchey CMAC 112 8,068,216
Banteay Meanchey HALO Trust 34 1,068,551
Battambang CMAC 55 5,917,685
Battambang MAG 23 1,902,392
Battambang HALO Trust 8 577,817
Kampong Speu HALO Trust 21 1,840,533
Kampong Thom CMAC 19 1,496,981
Oddar Meanchey CSHD 1 15,333
Oddar Meanchey HALO Trust 42 6,032,885
Pailin CMAC 40 2,759,137
Pailin CSHD 1 15,557
Pailin MAG 6 595,108
Pailin HALO Trust 11 676,796
Preah Vihear CMAC 10 947,450
Preah Vihear HALO Trust 14 559,141
Pursat CSHD 1 38,417
Pursat HALO Trust 14 667,802
Siemreap CMAC 81 5,306,041
Siemreap CSHD 1 159,932
Siemreap HALO Trust 5 712,504
Totals   499 39,358,278
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CMAA was established by royal decree in 2000 with 
the mandate to regulate, monitor and coordinate the mine 
action sector in Cambodia.17 Cambodian Prime Minister Hun 
Sen is the CMAA President and Senior Minister Ly Thuch 
its First Vice-President, overseeing the authority. Former 
CMAA Secretary-General, H.E. Prum Sophakmonkol, who 
was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016, was 
reappointed to the position with effect from the start of 
January 2018 bringing extensive experience and knowledge 
of mine action to planning and operations. It has been 
reported that the CMAA has strengthened over the past two 
years, with roles and responsibilities more clearly defi ned.18
The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established 
in 1992, ostensibly as the national mine action centre. Before 
the existence of the CMAA, it had the responsibilities to 
regulate and coordinate the sector as well as undertake 
clearance. Since 2000, CMAC’s activities have been limited 
to conducting demining, risk education, and training.19 CMAC 
conducts both humanitarian and commercial demining within 
Cambodia and is the country’s largest operator.20
In 2004, the Cambodian government passed Sub-decree 
70 on the Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance 
Operations, which established the Provincial Mine Action 
Committees (PMACs) and the Mine Action Planning 
Units (MAPU). The PMACs and MAPUs were tasked with 
establishing clearance priorities in consultation with the 
affected communities to ensure that clearance addresses 
their housing, agricultural and infrastructure needs.21
The Cambodian government established the Technical 
Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative 
mechanism between the government and development 
partners. The Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) 
and several Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have 
been established by the CMAA to facilitate coordination 
and feedback at a strategic and technical level in areas 
such as survey and clearance, risk education, victim 
assistance, information management, gender, and capacity 
development.22 
Consultation is built into every stage of Cambodia’s 
Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–20 and operators 
provide input into key strategic documents through open 
discussion forums and written feedback.23 However, it has 
been reported that at times the process can be rather 
superfi cial, with feedback not necessarily taken into account.24 
The operating environment in Cambodia is permissive, 
with the Cambodian government open to the presence of 
international operators and supportive in administrative 
actions such as the granting of visas, approval of Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoUs), and importation procedures. The 
CMAA is open to the trialling and use of innovative clearance 
methods and tools to improve effi ciency.25 









The UN Development Programme (UNDP), Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA), and the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) all provide capacity 
development support to the CMAA. NPA, as part of a 
United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID)-funded partnership that includes Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG) and The HALO Trust, focuses on information 
management, planning and prioritisation, gender 
mainstreaming, quality management, and strategic planning.26
UNDP is in the third phase of its “Clearing for Results” 
programme, which was due to come to an end in 2019, 
although UNDP has put together a proposal for phase four 
of the programme from 2020 to 2025 which would focus on 
institutional capacity development as well as clearance. Its 
key capacity development deliverables are to support the 
development of the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, 
establish a Performance Monitoring System (PMS) that 
links human development to mine action, and strengthen 
the CMAA’s international and national participation in 
relevant fora.27 In 2019, UNDP is commissioning consultants 
to assess the CMAA’s institutional capacities and develop 
a comprehensive Capacity Development Plan. The Plan 
will also inform the development of a formal partnership 
strategy following the recommendations of a mid-term 
review that found that capacity development needed to be 
institutional rather than individual and that there was a lack 
of coordination among capacity development stakeholders.28
The GICHD provides information management and risk 
management support to the CMAA.29 In 2018, the GICHD 
presented a case study on the Management of Residual ERW 
in Cambodia, and hosted a Long Term Risk Management 
workshop and an exchange visit between the CMAA and the 
national mine action centre in Sri Lanka.30
The Cambodian government contributes funding towards 
clearance and the management of the sector.31 From 2010 to 
2018, the Cambodian government has reported contributing 
just under 30% of the total funding to the mine action sector 
(US$99.49 million of US$340.2 million).32 This includes 
US$110 million for mine clearance operations in support of 
public infrastructure projects such as hydropower plants, 
irrigation system, roads, and bridges. Cambodia has also 
provided funding to the institutions responsible for managing 
and delivering mine action in the country. Indirectly, tax 
exemptions on mine action equipment has contributed to 
humanitarian demining operations, the CMAA reports.33 From 
2020 to 2025, Cambodia has estimated it will require $372 
million for mine action, of which $38 million is for sector 
management and $165 million for release of anti-personnel 
mined area. It is expected that the Cambodian government will 
continue to contribute towards clearance and the management 
of the sector. It will also settle the importation taxes for mine 
clearance equipment and provide a 10% in-kind contribution 
to any new donor funding, and a 10% in-cash contribution to 
the UNDP Clearing for Results programme.34 Cambodia has a 
resource mobilisation strategy and intends to secure additional 
funding from the government, existing and emerging donors, 
and the private sector.35
GENDER
The CMAA has developed a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine 
Action Plan (GMAP 2018–2022), an objective of the National 
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, which consists of six goals. 
These include: 
■ Preparation of guidelines to aid gender mainstreaming 
across all mine action
■ Capacity building of relevant stakeholders to implement 
the GMAP 2018–2022
■ Female representation and participation in planning 
and prioritisation, risk education, and in mine action 
and advocacy at all levels.
The Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–2020 sets out 
activities in support of these goals.36 NPA, as part of its 
capacity development, will support the CMAA with training 
on gender mainstreaming in mine action, on implementation 
of the GMAP 2018–22 and the development of associated 
guidelines, and on how to use gender- and age-disaggregated 
data in planning and prioritisation processes.37 As at March 
2019, across all operators engaged in demining, women 
accounted for just 21% of staff overall.38
CMAC provides equal employment opportunities to both 
men and women. As at April 2019, women made up 10.5% 
of CMAC’s workforce. CMAC operates in accordance with 
Cambodian Labour Law and is actively recruiting women 
to reach 15% female employment. Women currently work 
across all levels of the organisation, including in managerial 
level/supervisory positions. As at April 2019, two of the six 
directors were women.39
The HALO Trust and MAG both have organisational gender 
and diversity policies. Within MAG, Cambodia’s staff 
handbook contains guidelines on equal opportunities and 
diversity but, as at May 2019, no specifi c national policy 
or implementation plan had been elaborated. One of MAG 
Cambodia’s key strategic objectives in 2019–20 is to focus 
on “meaningful” gender mainstreaming and gender equity 
within the programme. The programme will closely review 
recruitment policies and procedures to identify areas in 
which MAG can further encourage the recruitment and 
retention of women, as well as their development and 
promotion into more senior positions.40 MAG’s community 
liaison teams are gender balanced to ensure full 
representation of all groups during data-collection and 
community liaison activities. In MAG’s survey and clearance 
teams 42% of staff are female, while 21% of their managerial 
level/supervisory positions are staffed by women.41
As at May 2019, 44% of HALO Trust’s operational staff were 
women while only 8% of HALO Trust’s staff in managerial 
level/supervisory positions were female. HALO has mixed 
gender survey, risk education and clearance teams.42
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The CMAA upgraded to the Information Management System 
for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation in 2014. The CMAA 
Database Unit (DBU) is responsible for collecting, storing, 
analysing and disseminating data in support of planning 
and prioritisation.43
The CMAA shares all available data with operators on a 
monthly basis. In 2018, the DBU set up a virtual private 
network (VPN), which allows operators to send their daily 
data input directly into the DBU IMSMA database. The DBU 
controls the quality of all submitted reports and approves 
them via this online network.44 Information management 
remains a challenge, though, with incompatibilities between 
operator databases and IMSMA, and inconsistencies between 
operator data and the data held by the CMAA.45 Strengthening 
the national information management system for mine action 
is an objective of Goal 8 of the National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–25.46 
Cambodia submits timely Article 7 transparency reports 
and gives regular statements on progress at the APMBC 
meetings of states parties. There have, though, been issues 
with the accuracy of information in Cambodia’s reporting in 
the past, evidenced by discrepancies between data submitted 
by operators and that offered by the CMAA. To reduce further 
discrepancies, as at September 2019, the CMAA has offi cially 
declared that all relevant mine action stakeholders should only 
report offi cial mine action data from CMAA.47 In 2019, Cambodia 
submitted a six-year Article 5 deadline extension request from 
1 January 2020 to 31 December 2025. Cambodia’s extension 
request was submitted on time and is comprehensive, 
outlining achievements in 2010–18, the extent of the remaining 
challenge, its workplan to 2025, and its fi nancial requirements. 
The CMAA has provided updated land release data for 2018 to 
Mine Action Review which differs from the land release data 
for 2018 submitted in its latest Article 7 report and 2019 Article 
5 deadline extension request.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 was 
offi cially launched in May 2018 with eight goals for clearance 
of mines, CMR, and other ERW. The accompanying 
Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–20 sets out the 
activities and indicators that will need to be completed in 
order to meet these goals and objectives. The fi rst goal is to 
release all known mined areas by 2025 through planned land 
release of 110km2 a year.48 Cambodia fell well short of this 
target for 2018, releasing only 65.8km2.49 In 2019, Cambodia 
submitted its Article 5 extension request with revised land 
release targets for 2019–25, as set out in Table 3. The targets 
seem arbitrary to say the least, and assume no contamination 
will be added, a highly questionable supposition.











The CMAA maintains the annual clearance workplan made 
up of all the provincial clearance workplans. The MAPU is 
responsible for developing these workplans in accordance 
with the planning and prioritisation guidelines. The PMAC 
approves the workplans, which are then endorsed by the 
CMAA. The MAPU uses the provincial workplan to monitor 
clearance performance and report progress to the PMAC 
and the CMAA.51
The CMAA pursues a national mine action policy that is said 
to be “people centred”, balancing top-down policy-making 
with bottom-up community-up requirements.52 The CMAA 
establishes an annual list of priority villages based on area 
of BLS, casualty data, levels of poverty, and population size 
in accordance with the revised planning and prioritisation 
guidelines. At least 75% of funding and resources are 
allocated to these villages. The MAPU then develops a list of 
priority minefi elds within these villages, in consultation with 
operators, according to BLS land classifi cation, casualty data, 
intended benefi ciaries, level of threat, development needs 
and post-clearance land use.53 In accordance with objective 
three of goal one of Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 
2018−25, the CMAA has identifi ed 500 priority villages that 
will be released by 2021.54
Operators have expressed some reservations about 
the “mine-free village” approach with MAG advocating 
a province-by-province approach and The HALO Trust 
prioritising clearance of the highest impact, highest density 
minefi elds in the K5 minebelt. The HALO Trust has expressed 
concerns that the mine-free village approach will lead to 
clearance of low-impact, low-density minefi elds in order to 
declare the village mine-free, diverting resources from high 
impact areas.55 MAG’s concerns that impact should be taken 
into account in the prioritisation criteria have been noted 
by CMAA who have stated that there will be some degree 
of fl exibility in the planning and prioritisation process.56 
The CMAA has stated it does not believe that high-density 
minefi elds should be the deciding factor for prioritisation as 
they believe the “mine-free village” approach addresses the 
needs of the affected communities.57
Goal seven of the national mine action strategy focuses 
on establishing a sustainable national capacity to address 
residual contamination after 2025. Objectives include 
reviewing by 2020 the legal, institutional and operational 
framework, strategy, and capacity needed to address the 
residual threats.58 The CMAA have stated that it is likely 
that the Royal Cambodian Army (RCA) will be tasked with 
addressing explosive threats after 2025.59










STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine 
Action Standards (CMAS), which are consistent with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). In 2018, a new 
CMAS on cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) was 
adopted.60 From 2019-21, the CMAA, with support from NPA, 
was planning to develop new standards – on animal detection, 
mechanical demining, information management, quality 
management, the environment, victim assistance and mine risk 
education – and to review the standards on accreditation of 
demining organisations and licensing of operations and on the 
monitoring of demining organisations.61 All operators will be 
consulted as part of this process and will provide feedback 
on any proposed modifi cations.62
National standards are refl ected in operators’ standing 
operating procedures (SoPs).63 Updates to the SoPs are 
conducted as and when required, such as when a need is 
identifi ed through the CMAA-led Technical Reference Group. 
Reviews are conducted in consultation with all operators, 
and against IMAS and best practice.64
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 emphasises the need 
for more effi cient use of demining assets. A 2016 review by the 
GICHD found that almost half the land released by full clearance 
or technical survey in 2015 contained no mines (26%) or very 
few (one to three) explosive items (23%).65 In 2018, over 3.8km2
was cleared without any anti-personnel mines being found.66
While in a 2018 monitoring visit to Pailin province it was found 
that one in three of the mined areas could have been released 
by LRNTS rather than full clearance. UNDP has now mandated 
that all minefi elds in its targeted villages will be re-surveyed 
before clearance assets are deployed.67 The CMAA recognises 
that for Cambodia to complete clearance by 2025 the full toolbox 
of land release methodologies must be properly applied and 
encourages operational effi ciency amongst operators.68 As at 
September 2019, the CMAA was planning to review the CMAS 
on baseline survey to strengthen the criteria on the evidence 
needed to capture polygons with new contamination. In addition, 
the CMAA will improve effi ciency of the quality management 
team to strengthen quality assurance (QA) and quality control 
(QC) of survey and clearance activities.69
OPERATORS 
Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national operator, 
CMAC, and two international mine action non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), MAG and The HALO Trust. To a lesser 
extent, mine clearance is also conducted by national operator 
the National Centre for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW 
Clearance (NPMEC), and by national NGO, Cambodian Self-help 
Demining (CSHD). International operator APOPO also conducts 
clearance in partnership with CMAC.70
In 2018, CMAC deployed 25 non-technical survey personnel 
across fi ve teams, the same as in 2017. In 2019, there were no 
plans to deploy non-technical survey teams. CMAC also deployed 
a total of 202 technical survey personnel across 30 teams of 
between fi ve and seven staff each. This was an increase from the 
187 staff deployed across 27 teams in 2017. In 2019, the number 
of technical survey personnel was due to increase to 231 across 
37 teams. In 2018, CMAC deployed 1,248 clearance personnel, an 
increase of 7% from the 1,164 clearance personnel deployed in 
2017. This decreased to 1,037 clearance personnel in 2019.71
In 2018, the HALO Trust deployed 45 personnel in nine teams 
of fi ve, conducting non-technical survey, risk education and 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts. HALO Trust 
considers technical survey equivalent to clearance so does not 
deploy separate personnel. In 2018, HALO deployed an average 
of 760 personnel per month for clearance (730 in teams and 30 in 
supervisory roles). There was no change in capacity from 2017 
and HALO did not expect a change in 2019.72
In 2018, MAG deployed a total of 228 personnel for mine 
survey and clearance. There was a signifi cant increase from 
the 152 personnel in 2017 due to increased donor support 
with no signifi cant change in numbers expected in 2019. MAG 
also deployed 15 community liaison staff, including its cluster 
munition remnant capacity, who undertake non-technical 
survey and risk education alongside other activities. This was 
an increase from the 11 staff deployed in 2017, with no change 
in capacity expected in 2019.73
UNDP has supported the CMAA through the Clearing for Results 
(CFR) programme since 2006, awarding contracts funded by 
international donors through a process of competitive bidding. 
In 2018, the CFR programme issued four contracts worth a total 
of $1.43 million: three going to CMAC and the other to The HALO 
Trust. CMAC was also awarded land reclamation non-technical 
survey and baseline survey contracts worth about US$180,000.74
In 2019, CMAC was awarded three clearance contracts totalling 
$1.06 million dollars with clearance targeted in high-priority 
villages in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Pailin provinces. 
As at April 2019, CFR was on track to exceed the target of 
47km2 of mined areas located in the most affected and poorest 
provinces are impact-free.75
The CMAA has calculated that in order to meet its 2025 land 
release targets for anti-personnel mined area, an extra 2,000 
deminers and 100 support personnel will be needed. The CMAA 
proposes that these deminers will come from the RCA and that 
the Cambodian government will cover the salaries, insurance, 
uniforms, and operational costs with additional funding from the 
international community. It is estimated that during the fi rst year 
of deployment the deminers will be able to release 35km2,rising 
to 57km2 from the second year.76 As at August 2019, two meetings 
had been held between the CMAA and the Commander of the 
RCA. It was agreed during the second meeting in June 2019 to 
establish a Task Force comprising of offi cials from the CMAA 
and the RCA and to formulate a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) which has since been drafted and shared for review.77
The CMAA is responsible for quality management and since 2016 
has deployed eight quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) 
teams.78 In 2017, with UNDP support, it developed the PMS, which 
will track land use and socio-economic changes after release 
of mined area/ERW-contaminated land as well as monitor the 
implementation of NMAS as a management tool for the sector.79
The CMAA approved the PMS, which was launched in May 2018 
and in 2019 a pilot-test was planned for 122 completed minefi elds 
in Banteay Meanchey province. The pilot test will allow the CMAA 
to fi nalise the PMS output and outcome matrix, data collection 
tools, and reporting templates.80 It is planned that use of half of 
the mined areas cleared in 2018 will be tracked by the PMS; these 
areas were to be selected by the end of 2019.81
54   Clearing the Mines 2019 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, The HALO trust deployed three mechanical clearance 
teams and a remote-controlled vegetation cutter for ground 
preparation.82 
MAG used mine detection dogs (MDDs) subcontracted from 
CMAC to conduct survey and clearance. Mechanical assets 
were used to conduct both ground preparation and clearance 
with seven mechanical teams in total. MAG also continues 
to trial advanced detection systems, provided by the United 
States Humanitarian Demining Research and Development 
programme, and uses drones to conduct non-technical 
survey, task planning, and post-impact monitoring.83
APOPO provides CMAC with mine detection rats (MDR). In 
2018, MDRs were used for clearance in Siem Reap and Preah 
Vihear provinces working together with vegetation-cutting 
machines and manual deminers. At the end of 2018, seven 
teams in total were working in the programme.84
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of almost 73.51km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 41.01km2 was cleared, 8.69km2 was reduced through 
technical survey, and 23.81km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. Over the course of the year, however, 39.4km2 of 
previously unrecorded mine contamination across 499 SHAs was added to the database.
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, just under 32.5km2 was released through survey, of which 23.81km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey 
(see Table 4) and almost 8.69km2 through technical survey (see Table 5). This is a 20% drop from the 40.37km2 released 
through survey in 2017. 
Overall non-technical survey output decreased by almost 9% from 2017 to 2018 although the fi gures provided by CMAA differ 
from the fi gures provided by operators by 154,150m2.85 Both CMAC and HALO Trust reported a decrease in non-technical survey 
output, this reduction was most pronounced for CMAC and was due to a reduction in their non-technical survey capacity.86 MAG 
reported increased output due to increased non-technical capacity, and a greater proportion of polygons that had already been 
ploughed three times, therefore meeting the cancellation criteria.87
Overall technical survey output fell by 39% from 2017 to 2018 although there was a marked difference in the fi gures provided 
by the CMAA when compared to the operators.88 CMAC reported that it had reduced almost 21.6km2 of land in 2018, signifi cantly 
more than the 14.7km2 reported by the CMAA.89
Table 4: Cancellation of mined area through 
non-technical survey in 201890
Province Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Banteay Meanchey CMAC 1,944,335
Banteay Meanchey HALO Trust 1,478,095
Battambang CMAC 1,001,713
Battambang HALO Trust 670,599
Battambang MAG 4,839,639
Kampong Chhnang HALO Trust 204,199
Kampong Speu HALO Trust 1,671,965
Oddar Meanchey HALO Trust 7,025,640
Pailin CMAC 192,281
Pailin HALO Trust 770,774
Pailin MAG 764,542
Preah Vihear HALO Trust 23,150
Pursat HALO Trust 321,327
Siem Reap CMAC 580,901
Siem Reap HALO Trust 2,323,016
 Total   23,812,176
Table 5: Reduction by technical survey of 
anti-personnel mined area in 201891
Province Operator Area reduced (m²)
Banteay Meanchey CMAC 277,406
Banteay Meanchey HALO Trust 42,083
Battambang CMAC 6,464,971
Battambang CSHD 15,162
Battambang HALO Trust 128,761
Battambang MAG 1,319,649
Oddar Meanchey HALO Trust 23,926
Pailin CMAC 75,084
Pailin HALO Trust 235,859
Pailin MAG 53,587
Siem Reap CSHD 50,502
Total   8,686,990










Overall technical survey output fell by 39% from 2017 to 2018 although there was a marked difference in the fi gures provided 
by the CMAA when compared to the operators.92 CMAC reported that it had reduced almost 21.6km2 of land in 2018 a massive 
14.7km2 more than was reported by CMAA.93
In 2018, during EOD spot tasks, a total of 4,301 anti-personnel mines were destroyed: 2,193 by HALO Trust, 1,457 by CMAC, 
374 by CSHD, and 277 by MAG.94












Banteay Meanchey CMAC 162 5,181,424 1,066 5 603
Banteay Meanchey HALO Trust 97 3,353,242 1,640 21 27
Battambang CMAC 299 22,737,788 3,334 29 3,028
Battambang HALO Trust 23 578,396 269 0 10
Battambang MAG 88 246,001 343 25 100
Kampong Thom CMAC 9 1,068,029 35 0 99
Kampong Thom CSHD 4 31,667 2 4
Oddar Meanchey CSHD 3 92,782 13 20
Oddar Meanchey HALO Trust 70 1,761,619 2,187 2 5
Pailin CMAC 33 2,097,716 319 2 485
Pailin CSHD 2 11,089 10 11
Pailin HALO Trust 37 747,655 407 2 10
Pailin MAG 16 77,157 323 3
Preah Vihear CMAC 19 1,314,475 1,233 0 217
Preah Vihear CSHD 1 29,959 59 2
Preah Vihear HALO Trust 3 127,390 2 6 0
Pursat CSHD 2 43,539 72 17
Pursat HALO Trust 13 446,242 302 4 32
Siem Reap CMAC 22 923,495 80 0 98
Siem Reap CSHD 3 78,626 22 35
Siem Reap HALO Trust 25 57,023 0 0 0
Totals 931 41,005,314 11,718 96 4,806
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMBODIA: 1 JANUARY 2000
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2010
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET REQUESTED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
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Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Cambodia has committed to clearing all anti-personnel 
mine contamination by the end of 2025. It plans to steadily 
increase annual land release output from 84km2 in 2019 to 
110km2 from 2020 to 2021, when 500 priority villages will be 
declared mine free, to 146.5km2 from 2022 to 2025. Cambodia 
has released an average of 84km2 per year since the 2014 
Maputo Conference, so the land release targets it has set 
itself are very ambitious and require both additional funding 
and capacity. Cambodia has stated it will require an average 
of US$62 million for sector management and clearance of 
mines, CMR, and other ERW.97 From 2010 to 2018, Cambodia 
was averaging $42.5 million in funding from the government 
and donor community, which would mean a 45% annual 
increase in funding.98 While Cambodia expects to increase 
funding from domestic and private sources in the coming 
years there will still be a funding shortfall without increased 
donor support. The CMAA is working with the Convention’s 
Committee on Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance 
to seek support from states parties under the individualised 
approach with the fi rst meeting planned for the Fourth 
Review Conference in November 2019.99 In addition to the 
increased funding Cambodia has also calculated that it will 
need an extra 2,000 deminers to complete anti-personnel 
mine clearance by 2025. It is proposed that these deminers 
will come from the RCA.100
Cambodia has made improvements to its planning and 
prioritisation system and implemented more targeted 
and effi cient land release methodologies.101 However, the 
signifi cant amounts of previously unrecorded contamination 
being added to the database hampers land release progress. 
It is vital that Cambodia ensures through quality management 
processes that anti-personnel mine contaminated land is only 
being identifi ed through high-quality evidence-based survey 
and that land without contamination is not being added to 
the database.
The high-density K5 minefi eld lies along the Cambodian-Thai 
border some of which is not demarcated and where access is 
limited.102 Improved relations between Thailand and Cambodia 
have opened the way for increased border cooperation. The 
Thailand-Cambodia General Border Committee, chaired by 
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from 
both countries, has agreed that CMAC and the Thailand Mine 
Action Centre (TMAC) can cooperate to conduct demining 
along the Thai-Cambodian border.103 In September 2018, 
CMAC and TMAC met and agreed to fi nd a task for a pilot 
project, a small area that could be cleared within a month as 
a symbolic demonstration of two sides working together. As 
at April 2019, the task had yet to be decided but CMAC hoped 
to complete the pilot project by the end of the year.104
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Mines of an improvised nature continued to claim casualties, particularly in Cameroon’s northern districts along the border 
with Nigeria amid escalating military activity by Boko Haram. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Cameroon should inform states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) of the discovery 
of any anti-personnel mine contamination, including mines of an improvised nature. It should report on 
the location of all suspected or confi rmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status 
of programmes for their destruction in its Article 7 transparency report.
 ■ Cameroon should request a new APMBC Article 5 deadline. 
 ■ As soon as security conditions permit, non-technical survey should start in the Extrême-Nord (Far North) 
region, which is reportedly the region most affected by confl ict.
 ■ Cameroon should try to mobilise and facilitate assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining 
organisations for survey and clearance. 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ No national mine action authority or national mine 
action centre
NATIONAL OPERATORS


















UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Cameroon faced a continuing threat from mines of an 
improvised nature and other explosive devices as a result 
of escalating Boko Haram insurgency spilling over from 
Nigeria into the Lake Chad region. The threat appears to be 
concentrated in Cameroon’s Far North region between Nigeria 
and Chad where its armed forces continue to conduct counter-
insurgency operations as part of the Multinational Joint Task 
Force (MNJTF). The extent of contamination is unknown.
One member of Cameroon’s elite Rapid Intervention Battalion 
was killed and 11 others injured in February 2019 when their 
truck detonated a mine of an improvised nature in the vicinity 
of Kerawa on the border with Nigeria. The troops were 
returning from an operation in which soldiers reportedly 
destroyed four workshops which were producing improvised 
mines and found to hold hundreds of containers of explosives, 
batteries, and detonators. Two other detonations in the 
area in October 2018 involving mines or improvised devices 
reportedly caused the deaths of three soldiers and injured 
six others. Seven soldiers were killed in two separate 
incidents in the same area in April 2019.1 Media also reported 
that two Cameroonian soldiers were killed after their truck 
drove over a mine near the town of Eyumedjock in an area 
of the South West region near the border with Nigeria where 
English-speaking separatists are active.2
A senior army offi cer commented in 2017 that some roads 
in areas bordering Nigeria were “riddled with mines.”3
A Cameroonian analyst commented that insurgents were 
using “homemade mines” with increasing frequency on 
roads, houses and vehicles.4 The effect has been to reduce 
access for humanitarian organisations working in the area. 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) personnel 
who visited the Far North region in September 2018 were 
denied permission to visit a number of towns in Mayo-Tsanaga5, 
a department bordering Nigeria, because of the presence of 
mines and reports of kidnappings.6
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Cameroon does not have a functioning mine action programme. Mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are the 
responsibility of the Cameroon Military Engineer Corps.
Over the past four years, the Army has received military training in demining and counter-IED [improvised explosive device] 
measures, mainly from the France and the United States.7 Cameroon received demining/EOD equipment from the United States 
and Russia in 2015, with armoured mine-detection vehicles being provided by the US Army Africa Command.8 The US also 
donated signifi cant quantities of demining equipment, including metal detectors, to Cameroon in 2017.9 US Army Africa and 
the French Army’s French Elements in Gabon (EFG) provided further demining and EOD training up to Level 4 EOD in 
March–April 2018.10
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Cameroon did not report results of clearance and EOD conducted by its Army engineers. 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMEROON 1 MARCH 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUEST REQUIRED
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Cameroon is a state party to the APMBC. Its Article 5 
deadline to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control expired on 1 March 2013.
Cameroon has previously reported there were no areas of 
mine contamination under its jurisdiction or control. In view 
of the casualties reported by Cameroon from mines and/or 
victim-activated mines of an improvised nature, Cameroon 
needs to revise its position. 
Under the APMBC’s agreed framework, Cameroon should 
immediately inform all states parties of any newly discovered 
anti-personnel mines following the expiry of its Article 5 
deadline in 2013 and ensure their destruction as soon as 
possible. It should also submit a request for a new Article 
5 deadline, which should be as short as possible and not 
more than ten years. Cameroon must continue to fulfi l its 
reporting obligations under the convention, including on the 
location of any suspected or confi rmed mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for 
the destruction of all anti-personnel mines within them.
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For a second consecutive year, Chad did not release any mined area as a result of survey or clearance. Humanity & Inclusion 
(HI) started demining operations under the European Union (EU)-funded PRODECO project in the Borno region. Strikes by 
unpaid deminers halted operations and delayed Mine Advisory Group (MAG)’s implementation of the PRODECO project in 
the most contaminated northern area of Tibesti, forcing it to redeploy teams to the Lac region. Chad has submitted a fourth 
request to extend its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline, this time for a further fi ve years. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The National High Commission for Demining (HCND) needs urgently to facilitate survey and clearance to 
demonstrate donor support for operators is delivering results. 
 ■ Chad needs urgently to elaborate a resource mobilisation strategy to secure and diversify funding and attract 
international technical and operational support.
 ■ Chad should take the necessary measures to strengthen the effectiveness of its national mine action centre 
(the HCND). It should ensure that demining personnel and resources are fully mobilised and deployed on 
areas which are confi rmed to contain anti-personnel mines.
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(20% of overall score)
4 Contamination estimates are based on outdated and incomplete data underscoring 
the need for resurvey. This did not occur in 2018 but work on the database made some 





(10% of overall score)
4 Chad’s national mine action authority coordinates the sector but lack of funds and 
deminer discontent over failure to pay salaries crippled progress in the last two years.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
3 Gender is not yet a priority in a programme that has undergone signifi cant downsizing 
and struggled to mobilise resources to implement survey or clearance. Women fi nd 




(10% of overall score)
4 Under the EU-funded PRODECO programme the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 
(FSD) is upgrading the National High Commission for Demining (HCND)’s information 
management capacity. A key question is whether the improvements in data and data 
management will be sustained.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
4 In March 2019, Chad submitted a request for an extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention Article 5 deadline but implementation depends on availability of funding.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 Chad has national standards, which were updated by HI in 2017, that comply with the 





(20% of overall score)
2 The national mine action authority reported no land was released through survey or 
clearance in 2018 for the second successive year.
Average Score 3.9 Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National High Commission for Demining (HCND)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ HCND 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI) 
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)






UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Chad reported that anti-personnel mines covered more than 
117km2 across 188 areas at the end of 2018 (see Table 1). Of 
the 10 affected regions, Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti in the 
north alone accounted for 97% of contamination.1 Although 
no land was released through survey or clearance in 2018, 
this represented a 3% drop over the previous year’s estimate 
of 122km2.2
The decrease was achieved through a clean-up of data by 
the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD).3 However, many 
survey reports were missing and the HCND also identifi ed 
suspected mined areas that need to be re-surveyed. The 
HCND’s own operational plan acknowledged that lack of 
information about mine contamination means the estimate 
will need continuous revision and updating to take account 
of the results of further survey.4 Survey in 2015–16 continued 
to locate previously unrecorded mined areas, including a 
minefi eld in the Tanoi region of Tibesti said to be around 
50km long and another mined area in the south between 
Sarh and Kyabé.5
Mine contamination in Chad’s resource-rich northern regions 
resulted from Libyan support for rebels dating back to the 
early 1970s and sporadic clashes between the two countries 
that continued until 1987. The HCND reports the presence of 
16 types of anti-personnel mine and 17 types of anti-vehicle 
mine. The north also has most of the country’s unexploded 
ordnance, reportedly affecting some 5.8km2.6
Chad contends with a number of security challenges, including 
rebel group activity in the north and Boko Haram’s expanding 
insurgency in the Lake Chad region. Chad cited insecurity in 
Tibesti and the probability that mines had been newly laid 
there as among the reasons for its failure to meet its extended 
Article 5 deadline.7 The Multinational Joint Task Force 
reported casualties in clashes with Boko Haram fi ghters in 
2018 from mines, including mines of an improvised nature.8













Wadifi ra 1 662
Lac 5 872
Totals 188 117,757,378
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Chad’s mine action programme is coordinated by the National 
High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National 
de Déminage, HCND) which comes under the Ministry of 
Economy and Development Planning.10 The National Demining 
Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND), which earlier 
conducted clearance operations, appears to have been 
dissolved. In July 2017, nine years after the government fi rst 
ordered the HCND to restructure, a new government decree 
reduced the number of personnel by more than half from 744 
to 329. At the end of 2018, it had 324 staff.11
The HCND is responsible for preparing a national demining 
strategy and annual workplans and proposing a budget 
to support their implementation.12 Chad’s latest Article 
5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2019,13
observed that its mine action programme lacked a strategic 
vision, operational planning and effective coordination, 
weakening its credibility nationally and internationally.14
The European Union is the principal source of international 
funding for mine action in Chad. A two-year EU-funded 
project (Projet d’appui au secteur du déminage au 
Tchad, PADEMIN) involving capacity development for the 
HCND and survey and clearance of mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) in the Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti 
(BET) region ended in 2016.15 In September 2017, the EU 
agreed to support a new four-year mine action project, 
PRODECO, from 2017 to 2021 at a projected cost of €23 
million providing for survey and clearance by international 
operators HI and MAG in the BET region. It also provided for 
further training and capacity building for the HCND by FSD, 
including in information management.16
Government funding for mine action is limited to payment 
of salaries for national staff.17 However, the government’s 
persistent non-payment of salaries has badly affected sector 
performance. A long-running strike by deminers starting 
halted survey and clearance in 2017. Threats by former 
deminers over government non-payment of salaries also 
prevented survey and clearance from proceeding in the 
Tibesti region in 2018 and forced MAG to redeploy staff to 
the Lac region.18 Further delays in payment were reportedly 
occurring in 2019. Operators also report lengthy delays 
obtaining the permits required to import equipment as well 
as in other bureaucratic procedures. 
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GENDER 
Gender is not discussed in Chad’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request or the July 2018 operational plan accompanying it. 
Gender balance and recruitment of female staff is not a priority for the HCND, which has undergone drastic downsizing in the 
past two years and still faces demands for back pay from staff.
Chad employs women in a variety of mine action roles. A woman underwent EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] Level 3 
training for the fi rst time in 2018, but HCND female staff are reported to be mostly in managerial, technical, and support jobs.19 
Operators reported that risk education targeted all members of the community and disaggregated resulting data by gender.20
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HCND uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but many records of past survey have 
been lost. As part of the PRODECO project, the database was being updated in 2018 by the HCND’s information management 
team, under the supervision of an FSD expert.21
Chad submits Article 7 reports annually and in April 2019 submitted a request for a fourth extension to its Article 5 clearance 
deadline, providing updated estimates of contamination and attaching a July 2018 operational plan.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Chad published an Action Plan 2020−24 in July 2018, which 
set out contamination estimates, strategy, and priorities that 
provided a basis for the Article 5 deadline extension request 
submitted in April 2019. Objectives appeared aspirational 
rather than realistic. The operational plan provided 
for survey and clearance in 86 of Tibesti’s 89 identifi ed 
hazardous areas, but Chad’s extension request observes 
that in Tibesti, the most heavily contaminated region, it was 
realistic to target survey and clearance in only 20% of the 89 
hazardous areas.22
Since September 2017, the main focus of Chad’s mine action 
programme has been on implementing the EU-funded 
four-year mine action project (PRODECO) conducted by a 
consortium of four international operators.23 HI was due to 
focus on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi 
regions, MAG was to work in the Tibesti and Lake Chad 
regions, and FSD would provide training and support for 
information management while Secours Catholique et 
Développement (SECADEV) would address victim assistance.24 
PRODECO’s initial targets included conducting non-technical 
survey in 30 zones in the Lake Chad and Tibesti regions, 
release of 2.7km2 of mined land in BET region, to release 
200,000m2 of mined land along roads in Tibesti, and, in the 
Lake Chad and Tibesti regions, to either release 50,000m2 
of land contaminated with ERW or conduct 100 spot tasks.25 
FSD is to provide technical support, training, and capacity 
building to the HCND, including support for the use of the 
IMSMA database.26
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM 
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chad’s national mine action standards are believed to be consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
HI started a review of Chad’s standards in 2016 and reported in September 2017 that 11 national mine action standards had 
been updated and issued, following HCND approval.27
OPERATORS 
The HCND had a total staff of 324 at the end of 2018. HI did not provide details of its capacity. MAG employed 47 deminers, 
survey, and mechanical personnel in its total staff of 97 but conducted no survey or clearance operations in 2018 because of 
insecurity in its designated operating area.28 FSD did not conduct operations but provided support to information management, 
training in administration, logistics and procurement, and offered technical advice on QA/QC.29 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine clearance is largely manual. However, HI, working with Mobility Robotics and the HNCD, started testing drones for 
inspection and mapping of hazardous areas. Tests were continuing in 2019 on various categories of drones and sensors, 
over different sites, at different altitudes. In the process the tests were developing standing operating procedures (SoPs) 
for drone use and compiling a database of ground signs for analysis of drone-generated imagery.30 






LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
The HCND reported that no land was released as a result of 
survey or clearance in 2018.31
After long delays importing equipment, MAG set up two 
bases in Tibesti but was unable to start operations because 
of insecurity. MAG later deployed survey teams to the Lac 
region and reported conducting non-technical survey in 25 
areas without identifying any new hazardous areas. It also 
conducted technical survey, which reduced 49,000m2 of 
mined area.32
Under the EU’s PRODECO project, MAG had planned to deploy 
demining teams to the Tibesti region in June 2018 but it was 
prevented from operating there by security problems.33
HI did not provide results of its activities in 2018. Chad 
reported HI started demining in the Borkou region in 
November 2018.34
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 NOVEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (1-YEAR, 2-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2011
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2014
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2020
FOURTH EXTENSION REQUESTED (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2025
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Chad has made little progress since the Third Review 
Conference in Maputo in 2014 and prospects remain 
uncertain. Mine action in Chad has been largely crippled 
by lack of funding, political inertia, and cumbersome 
bureaucracy. A variety of mainly local threats to security 
also obstruct progress. The EU-funded PRODECO project is 
the main focus of mine action sector activities, but between 
its launch in September 2017 and the end of 2018 it did not 
result in any signifi cant release of land.
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
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Chile increased clearance output from 2017 to 2018 but still fell short of its planned land release target for the year. Chile has 
reiterated its commitment to completing clearance of outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination by its Article 5 deadline 
of March 2020, which makes 2019 a crucial year. Chile has set itself a very ambitious target for the year and will need to 
signifi cantly increase its clearance output in the face of challenging climatic conditions. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Chile should clarify the amount of outstanding contamination in Seilao, Antofagasta, following technical 
survey of mined area there in 2017.
 ■ Chile should accelerate clearance to ensure it meets its planned targets, increasing operational capacity 
to offset the challenging climatic conditions and delays to demining. 
CHILE
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(20% of overall score)
7 Chile is contaminated with both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines with the majority 
of contamination in hard-to-access areas with technical survey planned in Antofagasta to 





(10% of overall score)
8 There is strong national ownership in Chile with leadership of the programme from the 
National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CNAD) and demining 
operations being fully funded by the Chilean government. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed forces with women 
working at all levels of the mine action programme. Chile should take the next steps 




(10% of overall score)
6 Chile uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which 
it updated to Version 6 in 2017. Chile submits timely Article 7 transparency reports and 
provides regular updates on progress in Article 5 implementation at the annual meetings 
of states parties. However, there are inconsistent and inaccurate fi gures within reports 
and across reporting periods.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 Chile has a National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020 and submitted updated 
clearance plans in 2017 and then again in 2019. Chile failed to meet its land release target 
in 2018 and has set itself a very ambitious target for 2019.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). All survey and 






(20% of overall score)
5 It is unclear whether Chile is on track to meet its Article 5 deadline as the small increase 
in clearance output in 2018 will not be nearly enough to meet its target. Chile faces delays 
to demining operations from the challenging climate and it is hard to see how it will meet 
its deadline without a major increase in capacity. 
Average Score 6.4 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de 
Desminado, CNAD) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS












UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Chile had almost 4.5km2 of mined area (see Table 1) down from just over 5.1km2 at the end of the 
previous year.1
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018)2





Arica and Parinacota 5 797,357 1 145,297 6 942,654
Antofagasta 4 158,278 2 3,129,888 6 3,288,166
Magallanes and Antártica Chilena 6 157,632 0 0 6 157,632
Tarapacá 3 49,199 0 0 3 49,199
Valparaíso 0 0 1 14,000 1 14,000
Totals 18 1,162,466 4 3,289,185 22 4,451,651
CHA = Confi rmed Hazardous Area   SHA = Suspected Hazardous Area
The mines were all laid during the Pinochet regime in the 
1970s on Chile’s borders with Argentina in the south, and 
with Bolivia and Peru in the north. The mined areas, which 
typically contain both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines, 
are generally diffi cult to access and mostly in unpopulated 
regions. The regions of Antofagasta, Arica and Parinacota, 
and Magallanes and Antártica Chilena are contaminated with 
both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines while the regions 
of Tarapacá and Valparaíso are contaminated only with 
anti-personnel mines.3 Of the 22 mined areas identifi ed in 
Table 1 ten contain only anti-personnel mines.4 The vast 
majority of the mines were laid in the northern region, with 
some minefi elds located as high as 5,000m above sea level.5
In 2017, a technical survey was carried out in Seilao, 
Antofagasta, identifying contamination estimated to cover 
2.28km2, an increase from the previous estimate of 1.97km2.6
Chile had planned to conduct further survey in 2018 of newly 
identifi ed mined area in San Pedro de Atacama to more 
accurately determine the extent of contamination.7 In May 
2019, Chile stated that it planned to reduce the confi rmed 
area of 2.28km2 through technical survey and that a 
geomorphological study of the whole area was needed.8
Chile is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants, 
currently estimated at 97km2 although actual contamination 
is likely to be much lower, and to a limited extent other 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Mine Action Review’s 
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Chile 
for further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the 
National Demining Commission (CNAD), which is chaired 
by the Minister of Defence. In May 2002, Supreme Decree 
No.79 created CNAD as an advisory body to the President 
of the Republic and interministerial coordinator to support 
the fulfi lment of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC).9 Its main functions are to advise the President, 
mobilise resources, coordinate demining with state agencies, 
and develop plans for implementing the APMBC.
Demining operations are all funded by the Government 
of Chile. In 2018, some US$4.25 million was allocated to 
the demining programme, a drop from the $4.325 million 
allocated in 2017. The amount allocated corresponds to the 
planned budget.10
GENDER
While there is no specifi c gender policy within CNAD, Chile’s 
policy of integrating women into the armed forces has been 
in place since 2000. As at May 2019, 14.4% of total armed 
forces personnel were female. In 2016, restrictions on the 
type of military positions a woman could hold were lifted 
and legislation was adopted to modify the military grading 
system, allowing women to be promoted in the same way as 
men. Women have been working in demining in Chile since 
2004 across all types of roles, including as deminers and 
in managerial/supervisory roles. In 2007, the fi rst woman 
was appointed as Manual Demining Section Commander in 
Arica. In May 2018, a woman was appointed as Demining 
Company Commander in Arica. Chile has made provisions 
to make it easier for women to work in the sector by, for 
example, adapting demining equipment to better suit female 
specifi cations, providing childcare and eliminating the gender 
wage gap.11
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since 2003, Chile has been using the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). During 
2017, Chile upgraded to Version 6 of IMSMA after starting 
the MARS (Mine Action Reporting System) application that 
replaced IMSMA Mobile. This application has equipped 
Chile with high-quality geographic information to support 
decision-making around clearance.12 
Chile has submitted its Article 7 reports almost every year 
since its accession to the convention in 2002 and makes 
regular Article 5 statements at meetings of states parties, 
although there have been some problems with the accuracy of 
the information presented. In previous years, Chile submitted 
clearance plans that contained estimates that were more than 
the amount of area that had been indicated as remaining.13
PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020 
was formulated in accordance with the request of the 
Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP) that Chile 
provide updates relative to the timelines presented in its 
2011 extension request.14 The main objective of the plan is 
to eliminate all existing anti-personnel mines on national 
territory by the March 2020 deadline.15 
In its Article 7 report for 2017, Chile submitted an updated 
annual clearance plan for 2018–20 taking into account 
contamination newly found in San Pedro de Atacama during 
2017 (see Table 2).16 In its statement at the Seventeenth 
Meeting of States Parties, Chile indicated that by the end 
of 2018 it planned to clear 13 mined areas, followed by 
clearance of 14 mined areas in 2019, and clearance of the fi nal 
mined area, which would be completed in 2020.17 In fact, Chile 
fell short of its land release target, clearing six mined areas 
totalling 962,948m2.18
As at April 2019, Chile had cleared three mined areas totalling 
26,603m2 since January and planned to clear an additional 18 
mined areas by the end of the year, leaving one mined area to 
clear in 2020 (see Table 3).19
Annually, CNAD issues a National Directive on the Execution 
of Demining Activities from the Government of Chile, which 
contains a set of provisions and tasks that supports the 
planning of demining activities.20 Clearance is prioritised 
according to proximity to populated areas, impact on land 
that has been designated a national park or is a historical 
site of touristic interest, and impact on land that obstructs 
development.21
Table 2: Mine clearance plan 2018–20





Table 3: Updated Mine clearance plan 2019–20





STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chile is guided by the international mine action standards 
(IMAS).22 It fi rst developed a joint demining manual for its 
armed forces in 2009.23 As at June 2019, the Armed Forces 
Manual of Humanitarian Demining and Clearance of Explosive 
Remnants of War was awaiting fi nal approval.24
OPERATORS 
Mine clearance in Chile is conducted by the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Navy Peace and Demining Division. In 2017, 
Chile deployed seven manual demining teams with a total of 
207 deminers.25
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Since 2008, mechanical assets have been used to support 
manual demining in Chile. During 2018, machines were 
deployed to conduct clearance in Arica and Parinacota and 
Antofagasta.26 Chile also used explosive detection dogs for 
the fi rst time in 2018 to carry out quality control of an area 
that had been cleared using machines.27
DEMINER SAFETY
In 2018, a deminer working in the Arica and Parinacota 
region detonated an M-14 anti-personnel mine while 
conducting clearance, which resulted in serious injuries 
to his face and hand.28






LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 0.96km2 was released through clearance in three regions and 3,908 anti-personnel mines and 1,117 
anti-vehicle mines were found and destroyed (see Table 4). This was an increase from the 860,000m2 cleared in 2017. 
No mined area was cancelled or reduced through survey in 2018.
Table 4: Mine clearance in 201829
Province Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
Arica and Parinacota 2 715,920 2,310 883
Antofagasta 1 91,409 1,157 234
Magallanes and Antártica Chilena 3 155,619 441 0
Totals 6 962,948 3,908 1,117
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHILE: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2020
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Chile reiterated its commitment to fulfi l its Article 5 
obligations by 2020 in its statements to the Seventeenth 
Meeting of States Parties and at the 2019 Intersessional 
Meetings.30 But Chile did not meet its clearance targets 
for 2017, clearing 0.86km2 of its forecast 3.24km2, or 2018, 
clearing 0.96km2 of its forecast 1.39km2, and has set itself 
the rather ambitious goal of clearing 3.37km2 in 2019. This 
is a marked increase from the average 1.9km2 per year 
of clearance Chile has achieved since the 2014 Maputo 
Conference. In a slightly confusing turn of events, Chile has 
stated that it will reduce 2,279,112m2 of the total through 
technical survey in Seilao, Antofagasta, despite identifying 
this same area as suspected of having mine contamination 
through technical survey in 2017.31
Chile is moving into the fi nal phase of operations but, by 
its own admission, will face considerable challenges to 
implementation from the climate and topology. The mined 
areas in the Altiplano and the Austral Islands are diffi cult to 
access and are subject to heavy rains and snow which restricts 
the length of the demining season.32 Chile has reported that 
over the past three years these highland areas have been 
hit with particularly intense winters.33 In 2018, clearance in 
Arica and Parinacota and in Antofagasta was interrupted for 
a number of months due to heavy snowfall.34 While Chile may 
have taken steps to mitigate this by making changes to the 
operational plans, redistributing clearance machines, and 
transferring specialist personnel to provide further support, 
it has still been unable to meet its annual clearance targets 
for the past two years.35 With the majority of remaining 
contamination in Arica and Parinacota and in Antofagasta it is 
diffi cult to see how Chile will reach its targets for 2019 without 
a major increase in demining capacity.
72   Clearing the Mines 2019 
 1 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2018), 
Form C. 
 2 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C. 
 3 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C. 
 4 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F. 
 5 Article 7 Report (for 2009), Form I. 
 6 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form F. 
 7 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018. 
 8 Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 
22 May 2019. 
 9 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form A3. 
 10 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018. 
 11 Statement from Chile during the Thematic Discussion on Integrating Gender 
into Mine Action, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 23 May 2019; and emails 
from Col. Juan José López Demuth, Executive Secretary, CNAD, 22 and 
27 June 2019. 
 12 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018. 
 13 Conclusions on the implementation of Article 5, 16th Meeting of States Parties, 
18–21 December 2017 .
 14 Decisions on the request submitted by Chile for an extension of the deadline 
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Convention, 11MSP, 2 December 2011. 
 15 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018. 
 16 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form F2.4. 
 17 Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 
29 November 2018. 
 18 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F. 
 19 Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 
22 May 2019. 
 20 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018; and Article 7 
Report (for 2018), Form A. 
 21 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018. 
 22 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F. 
 23 Manual No. MDO-90402. Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F2.1. 
 24 Email from Col. Juan José López Demuth, Executive Secretary, CNAD, 
27 June 2019. 
 25 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018. 
 26 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F. 
 27 CNAD, “Desminado Canino”, 27 December 2018, at: bit.ly/2VCpHwb. 
 28 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F. 
 29 Ibid. 
 30 Statements of Chile, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 
29 November 2018 and 22 May 2019. 
 31 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form F; and Statement of Chile, Committee on 
Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019. 
 32 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018. 
 33 Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 
22 May 2019. 
 34 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form F. 
 35 Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 
22 May 2019. 
KEY DATA





ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021














































Following the Presidential election in August 2018, Descontamina 
Colombia was reallocated to the Offi ce of the High Commissioner 
for Peace and a new leadership appointed. It is expected that 
changes will be made to the mine action programme in 2019 
and beyond with a new mine action strategy being developed 
and a new prioritisation model being implemented. However, 
the sector continues to face numerous challenges, not least 
because of a worsening security situation that restricts access 
to the most heavily contaminated mined areas and reports of 
new anti-personnel mines being emplaced.
Colombia is not on track to meet its current Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline and has 
stated that it will request a second extension in 2020. Mine 
Action Review believes that this extension should be only 
an interim request to better determine the baseline of 
anti-personnel mine contamination. In order to meet this 
new date, Descontamina Colombia will need to increase the 
effectiveness and effi ciency of the demining programme by 
making much needed improvements to information management 
and reporting, land release methodologies, quality management, 
and task prioritisation. Colombia continues to be without an 
accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination, making 
it diffi cult to measure progress, not least because its reporting 
of survey and clearance is inaccurate. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
■ Colombia should conduct a baseline survey 
to elaborate a meaningful understanding of 
contamination and to accelerate signifi cantly 
clearance of remaining mined areas in accordance 
with its obligations under APMBC Article 5.
■ Colombia should report more accurately and 
consistently on land released through survey and 
clearance and rely on survey rather than “events” 
to understand anti-personnel mine contamination.
■ Colombia should elaborate its land release 
national mine action standard (NMAS) and 
correctly implement both its technical survey 
and new quality management NMAS. Operators 
should be supported to use the full toolbox of 
land release methodologies to ensure they are 
conducting effi cient survey and clearance.
■ Colombia should elaborate a gender policy and 
implementation plan for mine action.
■ Colombia should engage more positively with 
civilian operators, particularly in its strategic 
planning processes, tasking them in a manner 
that ensures the best use of resources and 
prioritises the highest impact areas in response 
to humanitarian and community needs.
■ Quality management of operations should be 
enhanced and applied equally to all operators, 
including the military. 
AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018
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(20% of overall score)
3 There is no accurate estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination in Colombia. While 
the security situation makes access to some contaminated areas diffi cult, there has been 
no systematic survey undertaken of accessible areas, nor is there a plan to do so. There 





(10% of overall score)
6 Following the election of President Duque, Descontamina Colombia was without a 
director for six months. Operators have reported that slow decision-making and approval 
processes at the national level have delayed survey and clearance. In early 2019, 
Descontamina was reallocated to the Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Peace and a 
new leadership appointed. However, most decisions related to mine clearance remain 
with the Instancia de Desminado, led by the Ministry of Defence.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 Descontamina does not have gender or diversity policy and implementation plan but certain 
minority groups do have legal protections. In 2019, a female lead for Descontamina was 




(10% of overall score)
4 Poor information management and reporting continues to be a problem. Colombia relies 
on “events” where more recent survey data is unavailable to determine anti-personnel 
mine contamination, prioritisation, and planning despite their unreliability. Some capacity 
and improvement of information management systems has taken place. However, 
Colombia’s Article 7 report for 2018 contained inconsistent land release fi gures.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
4 Colombia has a Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 
2016–2021, which categorises mined areas according to impact. Operators outside the military, 
which are by far the largest operator, are typically assigned high-impact areas, which are 
often inaccessible due to security issues. Operators have found they are locked into scattered 
tasks by Descontamina without consideration for effi cient resource deployment. The Armed 
Forces receive more tasks than they can manage, resulting in more than 60% of the assigned 
municipalities without operations on the ground, but still blocked to other organisations.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 Colombia has 15 national mine action standards (NMAS) in place, but no defi ned land release 
concept. The technical survey and new quality management NMAS has yet to be implemented 
effectively and the land release NMAS is still under development. Colombia has a large 
demining capacity with nine active operators who use an increasing range of demining assets. 
Effi ciency and effectiveness of survey and clearance could still be improved with a quality 
management system causing unnecessary delays and mined areas that prove to have no 





(20% of overall score)
4 It is unclear how much land was released in 2018 due to discrepancies within Colombia’s 
latest Article 7 transparency report. Colombia is not on track to meet its Article 5 
deadline and it has already stated that it will request an extension.
Average Score 4.4 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP)
– Descontamina Colombia
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado 
Humanitario (BRDEH)
 ■ Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association 
(AEDIM)
 ■ Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
 ■ Asociación Colombiana de Técnicos y Expertos en 
Explosivos e Investigadores de Incendios y NBQR (ATEXX) 
(not operational in 2018)
 ■ Humanicemos DH (not operational in 2018)
 ■ Colombia sin Minas (not operational in 2018)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ Perigeo
 ■ Polus Colombia
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) 
 ■ Organization of American States (OAS)









UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in 
Colombia remains highly uncertain, but as at October 2018 
at least 28 of Colombia’s 32 departments were suspected 
to have a mine threat.1 As at July 2019, Colombia still lacked 
an accurate understanding of total contamination, which 
according to its strategic plan for 2016–21 was 52km2 across 
673 municipalities from a total of 1,122.2 This estimate is 
unreliable. It is based on a calculation that takes 15% of the 
number of IMSMA “events” from 1990 to 2009 and adds them 
to 24% of the number IMSMA events from 2010 to 2015, with a 
further 20% added for both periods. These percentages were 
calculated based on information from historic humanitarian 
demining operations. The fi gure it generates is then 
multiplied by an estimated average confi rmed hazardous 
area (CHA) of 5,000m2, which generated the baseline 
contamination fi gure for the country.3 Historically, the most 
affected departments are said to be Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá, 
Arauca, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Cauca, Bolívar, Tolima, 
and Putumayo.4
In May 2019, Colombia provided a revised estimate that 
713 municipalities had anti-personnel mine contamination, 
of which 350 have been declared free of mines, 163 are 
assigned, and the remaining 200 are awaiting intervention.5
However, this fi gure was not derived from a more 
systematic survey approach, and as at August 2019, there 
were no reported plans to conduct a national baseline 
of contamination. In 2018, Colombia reported that 166 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling 852,871m2 and 
199 confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 1,133,303m2
were added to the database through non-technical survey.6 Of 
this, The HALO Trust reported adding 527,603m2, Humanity 
and Inclusion (HI) 290,000m2, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
196,201m2, and Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM) 
69,832m2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine 
contamination.7 None of this newly recorded contamination 
corresponds to new or recent use of anti-personnel mines; 
security still restricts access to areas where new mines are 
being laid.8
All the landmines remaining in Colombia are said to have 
been laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and are 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature. According to 
The HALO Trust, mined areas in Colombia are low-density, 
nuisance minefi elds that average 4,000m2 in size.9 Mines were 
planted in isolated rural areas to protect strategic positions; 
often coca cultivations whose crops were used to fund 
operations. When the groups moved on, the mines were left 
behind, blocking access to roads, paths, schools, and other 
civilian infrastructure, preventing productive use of land.10
As there was little, if any, mapping of mined areas by NSAGs 
and the intended victims were the military or paramilitaries, 
local communities were often informed that certain areas 
were mined, though no specifi cs were given. This has led 
to a widespread belief that mines are everywhere and local 
people are afraid to use vast areas of land for fear of mines, 
despite scant fi rm evidence of their presence.11
In many areas where the FARC demobilised, the government 
has yet to arrive in force, with other NSAGs now struggling 
for power.12 This includes FARC dissidents, the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), and drug-traffi cking groups, 
especially the largest among them, the Gaitán Self-Defence 
Forces. Most of the fi ght for control is concentrated in 
about one-quarter of the country’s municipalities. Mine 
action operations will only be undertaken with the local 
community’s agreement, often in areas where mistrust of the 
state is high and community members are sceptical of the 
operator’s intentions due to the perception that operators 
are linked to the military. This negatively affects the ability 
of humanitarian demining organisations to conduct survey 
and clearance and to determine an accurate estimate of 
contamination in these areas.13
NEW CONTAMINATION
In 2018, the amount of land used for coca leaf production 
reached an all-time high and it has been reported that new 
mines are being emplaced to protect these plantations. 
According to Miguel Ceballos, the High Commissioner for 
Peace, the government is particularly concerned about the 
resurgence of this practice in the northern Chocó region, an 
ELN stronghold.14 There was a dramatic rise in the number of 
civilian and military victims due to anti-personnel mines in 
2018 to 178 from 57 the year before. As at June 2019, there 
had already been 72 victims of anti-personnel mines and, 
according to the High Commissioner, at least half of these 
are related to coca cultivations.15 HI estimated that of the 
290,000m2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine 
contamination they identifi ed in 2018, about 10% was new 
contamination mostly found in the department of Cauca.16
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In April 2017, following the adoption of a Presidential Decree, 
the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección 
para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) 
became Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas 
Antipersonal – Descontamina Colombia. Descontamina 
Colombia was ostensibly made Colombia’s national mine 
action authority, with responsibility for formulating 
the strategic direction of mine action, coordinating and 
monitoring mine action at national and local level, applying 
technical guidance and regulating state and non-state 
operators, and elaborating and implementing national 
standards. In practice, it also serves as the national 
mine action centre.17 In February 2019, responsibility for 
Descontamina Colombia was reallocated to the Offi ce of the 
High Commissioner for Peace with a new Director, the Deputy 
Commissioner for Peace, elevating decision-making to the 
presidential level.18 As stipulated in the National Development 
Plan 2018–2022, the President has overall responsibility 
for public policy on mine action.19 However, in this process 
mine action has been disconnected from the Offi ce of the 
Presidential Counsellor for Stabilization, limiting access to 
stabilisation and development funds for the sector.20
In 2011, Decree 3750 created the Instancia Interinstitucional 
de Desminado Humanitario (IIDH – Interinstitutional 
Tribunal for Humanitarian Demining) which is composed 
of a representative from the Ministry of National Defense, 
the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces, and 
Descontamina Colombia. It is responsible for recommending 
or suspending the certifi cation of humanitarian demining 
organisations to the Ministry of National Defence and, 
determining and assigning demining tasks.21 In addition, 
Decree 3750 called for the elaboration of National Standards 
for Humanitarian Demining and regulates the quality 
management of demining operations.22 
Promulgated in July 2017, Decree 1195 outlines mitigation and 
correction measures that must be applied by operators when 
demining in National Parks and other areas of ecological 
value.23 Operators are currently expected to reforest in 
protected areas after clearance to mitigate environmental 
impact.24
While roles and responsibilities at a national level are 
generally clear, operators often experience costly delays 
due to slow approval and lengthy decision-making 
processes.25 The HALO Trust has reported that the importing 
process is often complicated which delays the importing of 
equipment from overseas.26
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has been helping 
Descontamina Colombia to develop and implement national 
standards and to improve their information management 
capacities, albeit with mixed success. In July 2019, following 
the start of FSD’s new contract, an additional information 
management advisor was hired to support Descontamina 
with data analysis and evidence-based decision making.27
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
provides technical assistance to the national authority 
and provides training and capacity building with a focus 
on national operators. In 2018–19, UNMAS worked closely 
with Humanicemos DH to support capacity development 
with the ultimate aim of it becoming a fully self-suffi cient 
operator.28 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) provides capacity development support 
to Descontamina Colombia for information management, 
operational effi ciency including survey, and national standards.
As at August 2019, Colombia had not provided information 
on how much it contributes to support the cost of the 
mine action centre and/or demining. It does receive very 
signifi cant international donor support for mine action and 
has also secured funding from the Warren Buffet Foundation 
for demining equipment for the BRDEH. Colombia has 
estimated it will need $320 million dollars to complete 
anti-personnel mine clearance in the country. As at June 
2018, it had received almost $150 million in external funding.29
GENDER
In 2019, Colombia appointed Martha Hurtado as the head of 
Descontamina Colombia, one of the few female heads of a 
national mine action authority in the world. In the Offi ce of 
the High Commissioner for Peace, of the 30 offi cials dedicated 
to mine action 19 (63%) are women and of these (63%) are in 
managerial/supervisory positions.30 In 2017, at the request 
of the previous Director of Descontamina Colombia, GMAP 
initiated a consultative process to develop a national gender 
and diversity policy, but due to a change in management the 
process stalled.31
Operators often conduct non-technical survey in communities 
that were previously inaccessible due to the security 
situation. All the operators stressed the importance of 
community liaison and of working with local people, including 
by employing “local guides” who have either direct or indirect 
links with the FARC, as a way of both building relationships 
with the community and as a source of accurate information 
about the existence of contamination.32 The HALO Trust, 
HI, NPA, and the CCCM all reported consulting women and 
children during non-technical survey and community liaison 
and employing women in their non-technical survey teams, 
but this is not done systematically nor is it required by the 
non-technical survey NMAS although it is a requirement of 
the mine risk education NMAS.33
Colombia does have special constitutional protections for 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities which are 
taken into account during planning and prioritisation 
and stipulate that these communities require a different 
engagement approach.34
The OAS has 55% of women employed in managerial or 
supervisory positions.35 However, of the 4,076 accredited 
personnel in the BRDEH only fi ve are women, one of whom 
leads a demining battalion.36
The HALO Trust has an organisational gender and diversity 
policy. Open recruitment for jobs such as deminers 
specifi cally encourages women to apply because manual 
labour is often seen as not appropriate for women in some 
rural regions of Colombia. Women hold senior positions in the 
organisation, including deputy programme manager, location 









manager, demining and non-technical survey supervisors and 
team leaders. An average of 17% of operations staff employed 
in 2018 were women. Of the senior management positions 
available, approximately 38% are occupied by women.37
As at July 2019, NPA Colombia is in the process of developing 
a gender and diversity policy and has made gender and 
diversity the focus of one of its key performance indicators 
(KPIs). NPA is currently working to redress the gender 
balance in operations and at the managerial level. Women 
and people from indigenous communities were targeted 
during a recent recruitment drive where of 32 new staff, 
11 were female (34%), 2 were persons with disabilities (6%), 
and 4 were from indigenous communities (13%). In 2018, 
25% of staff at an operational level (37 of 150) and 41% of 
managerial staff were female (15 of 37). In 2019, NPA is 
planning to deploy an all-female demining team to challenge 
gender bias within Colombian society.38
HI has an organisational disability, gender, and age policy 
which specifi es that HI Colombia will need to elaborate an 
implementation plan. HI actively recruits women and offers 
gender-appropriate working conditions, such as separate 
living quarters in the fi eld. Despite receiving fewer job 
applications from women, overall female representation in 
demining teams is at about 30%. In 2018, 14 of 48 survey and 
clearance personnel were women (29%), 2 of 3 Demining 
Area Managers were women (66%), 6 of 15 supervisors/team 
leaders were women (40%), and the Demining Manager was 
a woman.39
CCCM has a gender and diversity policy and implementation 
plan. All non-technical survey teams are trained in gender 
sensitivity and inclusivity and CCCM has made gender and 
diversity part of its project indicators. In 2018, one fi fth of 
operational roles and half of supervisory/managerial roles 
were fi lled by women.40
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Poor information management has been a feature of 
Colombia’s mine action programme since its inception. 
Government Decree 1649 of 2014 assigned Descontamina 
Colombia responsibility for IMSMA database and to “compile, 
systematise, centralise, and update relevant information” to 
serve as a basis for programme planning.41 Descontamina 
Colombia uses the IMSMA database and its own Periferico 
database. While there continue to be issues with information 
management, the GICHD has noted improvements since 2017 
in data sharing and data quality following a signifi cant review 
and correction of IMSMA data.42
Since 1990, Colombia has collected and reported on “events” 
related to anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), 
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This data has been 
the main indicator of contamination and has formed the basis 
of demining planning and prioritisation.43 In areas where 
non-technical survey has been carried out, there is a much 
clearer understanding of contamination. IMSMA “events” are 
the main source of contamination information in areas that 
have not yet been surveyed.44 As at December 2018, 24,647 
of these “events” had been registered in IMSMA across 28 
departments.45 Operators have reported that these IMSMA 
events are beset with errors, including duplications and 
inaccuracies. Despite some improvements to the registration 
of these events and a clean-up of the database when 
operators are assigned a task and investigate each event they 
are still fi nding that most do not correspond to the presence of 
either mines or UXO.46 For example, HI stated that 76% of areas 
tasked in 2018 that were reported to contain anti-personnel 
mines were not linked to recorded IMSMA events.47
In March 2018, FSD took over information management 
support for Descontamina Colombia from NPA. Descontamina 
Colombia in conjunction with FSD has been training the OAS 
to use IMSMA and claims that the quality of the database 
is improving.48 Access to data has improved with IMSMA 
now available online and licences granted to the operators 
for access to the, separate Descontamina run, Periferico 
database. Training has also been provided for operators in 
the management of the online platforms that are required 
to submit demining outputs. HI has reported that there is a 
willingness from Descontamina to listen and provide support 
in solving problems.49 Data collection forms for inputting data 
into Periferico are missing data fi elds and some information 
cannot be captured though a number of improvements have 
been made.50 As at July 2019, the new national standard on 
information management was still under development.51
In the almost three years since the implementation of the 
Strategic Plan, Descontamina Colombia has not conducted 
signifi cant analysis of the newly available data nor have they 
updated the categorisation of municipalities to prioritise 
actions on the ground.52
Article 7 reports are submitted on a timely basis but the 
data is inconsistent and inaccurate. Colombia has stated that 
the numbers in its Article 7 report for 2018 are provisional, 
which may account for some of the discrepancies with 
operators’ fi gures. However, this does not account for the 
inconsistent land release fi gures in its Article 7 report, with 
varying numbers provided for survey and clearance.53 A 
major issue for Descontamina Colombia in providing timely 
and accurate land release data is the lengthy approval 
process which can mean that reports are approved six 
months after they have been submitted.54 Colombia makes 
regular statements on Article 5 implementation at meetings 
of states parties but there are inconsistencies in the data 
reported between statements.55
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Colombia developed a fi ve-year Strategic Plan for 
Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 
2016–2021. The aim is to address anti-personnel mine 
contamination in 673 municipalities, of which 199 are 
high-impact municipalities (type I), 291 medium-impact 
municipalities (type II), and the remaining 183 low-impact 
municipalities (type III), covering a total estimated area of 
51km2.56 Type I comprise incidents involving casualties from 
anti-personnel mines or UXO registered on IMSMA since 
2010; type II are incidents involving anti-personnel mines 
and UXO and relate to casualties registered on IMSMA 
before 2010; and type III are IMSMA “events” without 
human impact.57 
In May 2019, Colombia revised the estimated number of 
municipalities to 713 and reported that the suspicion of mines 
had been removed in 350 municipalities, though this was 
only achieved through actual survey or clearance in 174 of 
these and the majority of these areas have had very low, or 
even no contamination at all. Descontamina has assigned 163 
municipalities to operators for demining operations although 
access to the most contaminated areas is constrained due to 
the prevailing security situation. In addition, 200 municipalities 
suspected to be contaminated with anti-personnel mines have 
seen no survey or clearance yet.58
It is expected that a new strategic plan, directed by the new 
government and the development of which is being facilitated 
by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), will be elaborated by the 
end of 2019. In March 2019, a participatory review of the mine 
action sector began. Operators and other sector stakeholders 
such as UNMAS and FSD were asked to help redesign the 
mine action strategy through workshops, but these ceased 
in June 2019 along with any feedback or progress updates 
from Descontamina.59 As at August 2019, there was no 
indication that the participatory reviews would continue, 
raising concerns that the new strategy will not respond to the 
operational reality on the ground or humanitarian and local 
community needs.60 Additionally, some operators reported 
concerns that the framework for the strategy lacks specifi c 
detail in addressing some key issues, such as prioritisation, 
technical survey, insecurity, and lack of capacity at the 
national authority.61 Descontamina Colombia has also stated 
that it will work with the local authorities on the inclusion of 
demining in local development plans.62
Descontamina Colombia had an action plan for 2018, but it 
did not include any specifi c targets for land release.63 In its 
Article 7 transparency report for 2017, Colombia projected 
that it would release 1,445,971m2 of anti-personnel mine, UXO 
and other IED contamination in 2018.64 The reported total for 
2018 of 1,535,213m2 exceeded the target by 89,242m2, but 
it is likely that the reported land release fi gure for 2018 is 
inaccurate. Colombia has projected that it would release 80 
municipalities with a total area of 1,616,802m2 in 2019.65
Colombia prioritises its task allocation according to the 
IIDH and the Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action 
against Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021. The IIDH takes 
into account information provided by local bodies, the 
Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Offi ce, and the 
General Command of the Military Forces, and Descontamina 
Colombia.66 The Strategic Plan has categorised municipalities 
in Type (Priority) I, II, and III, which are then proposed for 
task allocation to the demining organisations without a given 
order, hindering a systemic approach to the demining of the 
territory. Civilian organisations can generally only bid for 
tasks in assigned type I areas while the armed forces have 
been assigned more of the type II and III areas, many of which 
they have been able to cancel and release through discussion 
with the local community and local security councils.67 Type I 
areas tend to have the highest levels of anti-personnel mine 
contamination and the most security issues. In these areas 
contaminated territories are often inaccessible to operators 
or operators are forced to suspend survey and clearance 
operations due to security concerns. These suspensions can 
last anywhere from a few days to indefi nitely depending on 
the situation severely disrupting operations.68 For example, 
as at July 2019, of the ten Type I municipalities currently 
assigned to NPA, nine were inaccessible due to insecurity.69 
The impact of this differential approach to task assignment 
is that it is diffi cult to directly compare the output and levels 
of operational effi ciency between operators.
Descontamina Colombia’s ability to coordinate has come 
under scrutiny, as it has been locking in operators to tasks 
before the extent of the challenge is known and without a 
clear appreciation of operators’ future capacities. In the 
view of UNMAS, in Descontamina Colombia’s push to assign 
tasks demonstrating the peace accord’s new opportunities, 
operators are often deployed into new areas disconnected 
from their existing areas of operation and without prior 
consideration of their capacity. This is not an effi cient use 
of resources.70 While an operator can lose an assigned 
municipality through inactivity, the bar for what constitutes 
an activity is so low that in reality no municipalities are 
reassigned. This had led to some operators running out of task 
sites while other tasks remain dormant.71 Under Article 6(8) of 
the APMBC, states parties receiving international assistance 
are obligated to cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and 
prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.
Within municipalities, operators prioritise tasks in agreement 
with municipal authorities, local leaders and the national 
mine action authority.72 There are no specifi c criteria for 
task prioritisation within municipalities and operators are 
at liberty to follow their own priorities.73
In May 2019, Descontamina Colombia reported working with 
the Armed Forces on a new model of prioritisation. This 
model will integrate IMSMA data with more than 40 indicators 
that take into account security conditions, public policy, 
and bids from demining operators.74 However, there was no 
consultation with operators on this new model nor has this 
model been discussed in the strategic review workshops as 
was previously agreed.75 
If an anti-personnel mine is found in an area that has been 
“declared free of the suspicion of mines” it is expected that 
the community will inform the national authority or demining 
operator. This reporting mechanism is communicated during 
non-technical survey and community liaison activities 
as stipulated in the non-technical survey and clearance 
NMAS. If the national authority is informed of any residual 
contamination then either the operator or the BRDEH will be 
tasked with carrying out the necessary survey and clearance.76 










STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Colombia now has 15 national mine action standards (NMAS) 
in place, including a glossary of mine action terms, up from 
just three when the 2016–21 strategic plan was launched.77
In 2018–19, discussions took place on the land release and 
medical support NMAS and adjustments were made to the 
non-technical survey, manual demining, and mine detection 
dog (MDD) NMAS.78 A new system of confi dence levels has 
been introduced into the revised quality management 
standard. Each operator will be assigned a confi dence level 
and an operator with good confi dence levels will be subject 
to less frequent visits from OAS, allowing them to focus on 
operators that need more support.79 As at July 2019, a pilot 
phase for this new system was in development.80
The non-technical survey NMAS was amended to allow 
operators to investigate IMSMA events that fall outside their 
assigned area.81 The NMAS on technical survey was approved 
by Descontamina Colombia in December 2017 but is not yet 
implemented by all operators, as according to the standard 
if any contamination is found during survey full clearance 
must be carried out, negating the effi ciencies of technical 
survey.82 A revised technical survey NMAS was expected to 
be approved by the end of 2019.83
Colombia does not yet have a land release NMAS that has 
been approved and implemented by Descontamina Colombia. 
This is due mostly to the lack of experience and exposure 
of the national authority to the concept, despite ongoing 
technical support to the authority from FSD.84 As a result 
there is an over-reliance on full clearance. The national 
standard does not allow cancellation of an area being cleared 
before at least 50% of the clearance is completed, even if all 
indications are that no explosive items will be found.85
From Descontamina Colombia’s 2018 fi gures, of 193 mined 
areas cleared, in as many as 95 (49%), no explosive device 
was found. While still extremely high, this is actually an 
improvement on 2017 when no explosive devices were found 
in 65% of areas cleared.86 In the fi gures reported by operators 
for the CCCM, 44% (eight of eighteen) of areas cleared did not 
contain any anti-personnel mines; for HI it was 21% (three of 
fourteen), for NPA it was 26% (seven of twenty-seven).87 In 
July 2019, work on the land release NMAS was halted until 
key staff at Descontamina had been replaced, due to occur 
by the end of August 2019.88
OPERATORS 
There are 12 operators accredited for demining in Colombia. 
The largest clearance operator is the Armed Forces 
Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado 
Humanitario (BRDEH). The Marine Corps Explosives and 
Demining Association (AEDIM), a smaller military operator, 
conducts clearance and destruction of anti-personnel mines 
and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in areas under the 
jurisdiction of the National Navy.89 Demining is also conducted 
by international mine action NGOs. The HALO Trust, NPA and 
HI are the largest of these operators, while Danish Demining 
Group (DDG),  Perigeo, and Polus Colombia also conduct 
limited survey and clearance. National NGO the CCCM 
was also active in 2018. Humanicemos DH, the demining 
organisation comprised of ex-fi ghters from the FARC-EP, 
was accredited in August 2017.90 As at July 2019, however, it 
was still not operational due to the OAS’s inability to certify 
former fi ghters being reintegrated under the 2016 peace 
accord (see below).91 Another national NGO, Colombia sin 
Minas, has also been accredited but is not yet operational.92
As at September 2019, the military had been assigned 57% of 
the total number of areas tasked for demining.93
BRDEH has been conducting humanitarian demining in 
Colombia since 2005.94 In 2017, there were seven demining 
battalions operational across the country composed of 
between one and sixty deminers each.95 In 2018, a total of 
4,076 personnel had been accredited to conduct demining 
operations in the BRDEH along with two mechanical assets 
and 15 MDDs.96 AEDIM has been operational since 2014. In 
2018, a total of 206 personnel had been accredited to conduct 
demining operations.97
In 2013, The HALO Trust became the fi rst NGO to conduct 
demining in Colombia.98 In 2018, The HALO Trust deployed 102 
non-technical survey personnel and 235 clearance personnel. 
There was a slight increase in clearance capacity from 2017 
and a much larger 35% increase in non-technical survey 
capacity due to non-technical survey-only contracts funded 
by international and local donors. The HALO Trust reduced 
non-technical survey capacity in 2019 due to a lack of newly 
assigned areas but clearance capacity was expected to 
remain the same.99
NPA formally initiated a mine action programme in April 
2015, having taken part in the peace talks between the 
government and the FARC that concerned demining. In 2018, 
NPA deployed 18 non-technical survey personnel, three 
community liaison/non-technical survey offi cers and 146 
clearance personnel including 65 deminers. There was an 
increase in capacity from 2017 and NPA hoped to expand 
staffi ng in 2019.100
HI began humanitarian demining in Colombia in 2017. In 
2018, HI deployed 10 non-technical survey personnel and 38 
clearance personnel, broadly the same capacity as in 2017. 
In 2019, HI planned to decrease the number of clearance 
personnel in favour of non-technical survey and Multi-Task 
Teams.101
The CCCM began humanitarian demining work in Colombia 
in 2017. UNMAS have supported the CCCM to go from an 
advocacy organisation to a demining operator, assisting in the 
development and review of operational plans and providing 
initial funding to the CCCM for this transition.102 In 2018, the 
CCCM deployed 60 non-technical survey personnel across 
15 teams and 36 clearance personnel across six teams. The 
CCCM increased non-technical survey capacity by 115% 
from 2017 and hoped to increase capacity by another 60% in 
2019. Clearance capacity also rose by 20% from 2017 to 2018; 
CCCM were hoping for a further 32% increase in 2019.103
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DDG has been active in Colombia since 2011 and received 
Phase 1 accreditation to conduct demining in 2017.104 In April 
2018, DDG began non-technical survey operations with one 
team in the department of Caquetá. As at April 2019, DDG 
was conducting non-technical survey in two municipalities 
in Caquetá.105
Humanicemos DH are still not operational despite having 
124 former fi ghters trained in survey and clearance as the 
United States (US) still recognises the FARC as a terrorist 
organisation so former fi ghters cannot be associated with 
any US-funded projects which means that the OAS is unable 
to QA/QC such deminers.106 The Government of Colombia has 
therefore decided to mandate UNMAS to assume this role, 
though the formal mandate to do so was still unsigned as 
at September 2019. This has led to delays in Humanicemos 
DH being able to start clearance operations with personnel 
sitting idle while they wait for their accreditation.107
The OAS serves as the body for accreditation and 
monitoring of humanitarian demining in Colombia. It has 
been criticised for being too focused on compliance rather 
than on supporting the operators to run effective demining 
operations. This has manifested itself in non-critical 
conformities being determined by rigid application and varied 
interpretation of national standards and/or SoPs, leading 
to delays in operations.108 At the request of Descontamina 
Colombia, FSD has been seeking to build capacity in the OAS, 
including by refocusing monitoring on QA and QC, rather 
than on minor administrative non-conformities.109 It is hoped 
that revising the quality management NMAS and introducing 
confi dence levels will improve these processes. However, the 
OAS has been without a director since May 2019, reducing the 
possibility of capacity building.110
There have also been long waiting times after paperwork has 
been submitted, which has delayed operations. The HALO 
Trust reported that once a non-technical survey report has 
been submitted to the OAS, there can be a signifi cant delay 
before the report gets approved.111 NPA waited 127 days 
for approval to use its mechanical assets, with MDD assets 
standing idle as a result, despite the dog teams having 
already been accredited.112 
Each operator carries out their own internal QC in accordance 
with the provisions in the Quality Management NMAS and 
their organisational SoPs. From June 2016 to June 2018, 
Descontamina Colombia had a team of Quality Managers 
providing technical assistance to operators on issues such 
as accreditation of personnel and demining techniques, 
interpretation of and compliance with national standards, 
and confl icts between the OAS and the operators.113 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
According to the national standards MDDs can be used in 
Colombia to conduct technical survey and clearance while 
mechanical assets can be used for ground preparation.114
NPA uses a toolbox comprising manual deminers, MDDs, 
and machines. In 2019, these assets were rebalanced to 
achieve optimal output, which was found to be a ratio of, 
three manual teams, three MDD teams, and two mechanical 
teams. Mechanical teams undertake ground preparation.115 In 
2018, NPA had two incidents where mines were found after 
clearance had been conducted by MDD teams. After thorough 
investigation it was concluded that it was the way MDDs were 
used and not the effectiveness of the assets as such that 
were the problem. NPA developed detailed plans to correct 
the problems identifi ed and is confi dent that MDDs are an 
effective asset for Colombia when used correctly.116 
In 2018, The HALO Trust conducted only manual clearance but 
carried out fi eld trials of both a newly acquired mechanical 
asset for vegetation clearance and four MDDs.117 The CCCM 
conducts clearance using manual techniques only, though 
it planned to introduce MDDs into its operations in 2019.118 
HI conducts clearance using only manual demining but was 
hoping to start machine-assisted clearance in the course 
of 2019.119
DEMINER SAFETY
In April 2018, FARC dissidents in La Reforma, San Martin 
municipality in the department of Meta seized a CCCM vehicle 
and held it for just over a month before returning it to the 
CCCM. When non-technical survey had been conducted in 
the area, the FARC dissidents had felt ignored, but after 
consultation the CCCM were allowed to conduct operations.120 
In the same month, BRDEH had a vehicle set alight in the 
Suarez municipality in Cauca. In addition, in 2018, BRDEH 
had to suspend operations in Aguazul, Casanare, and Quibdó, 
Chocó due to ELN presence and lack of community support, 
respectively.121
In July 2018, The HALO Trust had a vehicle seized and set on 
fi re in the village of Santander, Uribe municipality, in Meta. 
An armed group of 15 FARC dissidents detained a team of 
four conducting non-technical survey, forcing them to leave 
the vehicle before setting it on fi re. The group threatened the 
non-technical survey team and informed them that they did 
not want The HALO Trust operating in the Uribe or Mesetas 
municipalities.122
In February 2019, NPA staff were threatened and had a vehicle 
set alight in Puerto Lleras, Meta and were informed that they 
should leave the area. The area where the incident happened 
was close to coca production and distribution routes.123









LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, Colombia released124 a total of almost 1.54km2, of 
which 0.05km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey, 
0.52km2 reduced through technical survey and 0.96km2 was 
cleared. A total of 322 anti-personnel mines and 104 items 
of UXO were found and destroyed.
Colombia also stated in its annual Article 7 report that 
559,773m2 was “released” through data clean-up in 2018.125
This occurs in low-impact areas after discussions between 
the armed forces and the local security councils.126
In addition, Colombia reported that 166 suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) totalling 852,871m2 and 199 confi rmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 1,133,303m2 were added to 
the database through non-technical survey.127 As Colombia 
continues to operate without a land release NMAS, technically 
land is not “released” but declared free of the suspicion of 
mines and subsequently handed back to the communities.
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 48,405m2 was cancelled through non-
technical survey (see Table 1),128 a massive 80% reduction 
from the 239,068m2 cancelled in 2017. Operators’ fi gures 
differ signifi cantly from those reported by Descontamina.129
In part, this misreporting may be due to Colombia’s national 
standards which specify that land can also be cancelled 
through technical survey and clearance.130
A total of 524,936m2 was reported as reduced by technical 
survey in 2018 (see Table 2), double the output from the 
346,301m2 reduced in the previous year. Neither Handicap 
International nor The HALO reported reducing any mined 
areas through technical survey, as in 2018 it had not been 
properly implemented.131 This would suggest that Colombia 
is misreporting its survey results.
Table 1: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical 
survey in 2018132
Department Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Antioquia BRDEH 373
Antioquia HALO Trust 6,196





Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 2018133










Sucre National Army 1,077
Tolima BRDEH 66,874
Tolima HALO Trust 9,822
Valle del Cauca BRDEH 52,794
Total 524,936
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 962,232m2 was cleared across 193 mined areas (see Table 3), a 150% increase on the 383,951m2 cleared 
in 2017. Operators fi gures were again different from those reported by Descontamina.134 The increased clearance output 
from the previous year is due to increase in operator capacity, improvements in operational effi ciency, and more targeted 
deployment of clearance resources.135
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2018136
Department Operators Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed
Antioquia BRDEH 19 91,934 39 1
Antioquia HALO Trust 32 112,206 72 1
Bolivar National Army 7 55,657 0 1
Caldas BRDEH 9 39,107 18 0
Caquetá BRDEH 18 101,997 35 1
Caquetá HI 2 2,410 1 0
Cauca HI 3 4,228 0 0
Cauca HALO Trust 1 490 3 0
Huila BRDEH 4 15,377 8 1
Huila CCCM 7 12,861 2 1
Meta BRDEH 5 69,528 6 0
Meta CCCM 9 18,415 2 1
Meta HI 5 26,207 13 0
Meta HALO Trust 11 99,389 11 2
Nariño BRDEH 3 18,000 7 1
Putumayo BRDEH 3 8,535 3 5
Putumayo CCCM 3 3,845 5 0
Santander BRDEH 2 712 25 0
Sucre National Army 3 11,691 1 0
Tolima BRDEH 20 120,827 62 88
Tolima HALO Trust 15 81,983 4 1
Valle del Cauca BRDEH 10 54,564 3 0
Valle del Cauca HALO Trust 2 12,269 2 0
Totals 193 962,232 322 104
AP = Anti-personnel   UXO = Unexploded Ordnance   IED = Improvised explosive device 









ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR COLOMBIA: 1 MARCH 2001
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2011
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







In May 2019, Colombia stated it was planning to request 
a further extension to its Article 5 deadline as Colombia 
would not complete clearance by 2021.137 It is expected that 
Colombia will request a new deadline to 2025 but it is unclear 
whether Colombia will even be able to meet this new date. In 
order to do so there are numerous challenges that Colombia 
will have to overcome, some of which are outside of the 
control of the mine action programme and some which are 
of its own making.
It is very diffi cult to conduct an accurate assessment of 
Colombia’s progress to date as it continues to be without 
a reliable estimate of outstanding anti-personnel mine 
contamination through evidence-based survey. Its estimate 
of anti-personnel mine contamination of 52km2 across 673 
municipalities is based on IMSMA data that operators have 
found to be consistently unreliable. In May 2019, this was 
revised to 713 municipalities, of which 350 had been declared 
free of the suspicion of mines, though in only 174 of these was 
this achieved through actual survey or clearance. 
In 2018, Colombia reported “release” of 1.54km2 of mined 
area, though this fi gure is likely to be inaccurate. Colombia 
has projected an increase in land release for 2019, but the 
areas declared free of mines so far have had very low or even 
no contamination. Most high-impact areas are inaccessible 
due to the diffi cult security situation. The ongoing issues 
with security, with the rise of FARC dissidents, the ELN, and 
drug traffi cking, means it is unlikely humanitarian demining 
organisations will be able to access these areas any time soon. 
Focus for demining operations should remain on the high 
impact areas that can be accessed while ensuring that these 
operations are effectively and effi ciently planned.
Non-technical and technical survey is vital to effi cient 
demining operations and are particularly important in 
Colombia when the initial information given at the task 
allocation stage has been found to be so unreliable. As at 
August 2019, the NMAS for land release was under discussion 
and the technical survey and new quality management 
NMAS had still to be implemented effectively. It is vital that 
operators are facilitated by Descontamina Colombia and the 
OAS to use the full toolbox of land release methodologies to 
ensure effective and effi cient demining operations.
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AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018




In 2018, Croatia released almost 49km2 through clearance 
and 7.2km2 through survey – a signifi cant increase on the 
30.4km2 released through clearance and 6.6km2 released 
through survey the previous year. However, many of the 
mined areas cleared in 2018 did not contain mines. This calls 
into question the effi ciency of the demining and indicates 
the need for better use of pre-clearance survey to confi rm 
contamination before time- and cost-intensive full clearance 
is undertaken on mined areas recorded by the Croatian Mine 
Action Centre (CROMAC) as “confi rmed”. The failure of the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) to release mined area, in line with 
Croatia’s Article 5 extension request plans for annual output, 
is also cause for concern. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ CROMAC should ensure that it has suffi cient survey capacity in place to meet the targets outlined in its 2018 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request.
 ■ In addition to survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), CROMAC should also review the basis on which 
confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are established.
 ■ The MoD should ensure suffi cient capacity is in place and should signifi cantly increase clearance to release 
mined areas on military land, in line with Croatia’s 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request. 
 ■ CROMAC should fulfi l the pledge in Croatia’s 2018 extension request to explore the potential for mine 
detection dogs (MDDs) to enhance the effi ciency of technical survey. The 2015 demining law, which only 
allows use of MDDs in clearance, should be amended if necessary. 
(including 111 destroyed as 



















(20% of overall score)
6 Large areas of CHA were cleared in 2018 (and previous years) without fi nding 
anti-personnel mines. This raises doubt regarding the evidence underpinning CHAs 





(10% of overall score)
8 There is strong national ownership of mine action in Croatia, with political will to 
implement Article 5. In January 2019, CROMAC and the Offi ce for Mine Action (OMA) 
were integrated within the Ministry of Interior (MoI), but this is not expected to impact 
Article 5 implementation.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
5 Gender policies and implementation regarding mine action in Croatia are addressed 
under the national Gender Equality Act, which includes guidelines of gender equality 
and regulates against gender-based discrimination. However, it is hard to determine 




(10% of overall score)
8 Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and which allows disaggregation of contamination by type 
and land release by method. Croatia provides regular updates on its progress in Article 5 
implementation at APMBC meetings.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 Croatia has a national mine action strategy which expires in 2019, in addition to annual 
operational workplans for mine survey and clearance. Elaboration of a new national mine 
action strategy now falls is the responsibility of MoI.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 The 2015 law on mine action encompasses national mine action standards. Clearance of 
a signifi cant number of CHAs in 2018 where no contamination was found, highlights the 





(20% of overall score)
8 Land release output in 2018 was signifi cantly greater than the previous year, although 
Croatia is still not reaching the planned survey output. Furthermore, the MoD cleared 
less than 5% of the 2018 output planned in Croatia’s 2018 extension request. 
Average Score 6.8 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ Ministry of Interior, in which CROMAC and OMA were 
integrated at the beginning of January 2019.
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Forty demining companies are accredited for mine and 





■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
88   Clearing the Mines 2019 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Croatia is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent, 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition 
remnants (CMR), a legacy of four years of armed confl ict 
associated with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 
the early 1990s (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster 
Munition Remnants report on Croatia for further information). 
At the end of 2018, Croatia had a total of more than 355km2 
of mined area, excluding military areas.1 Of this total, 220km2 
was CHA, while mines were suspected to cover a further 
135km2 of SHA (see Table 1), collectively containing an 
estimated 31,862 anti-personnel mines and 6,430 anti-vehicle 
mines.2 
A further 32.5km2 of confi rmed mined area exists in areas 
under military control, said to contain 25,276 anti-personnel 
mines and 1,040 anti-vehicle mines. More than 90% of this 
mined area is across three military training sites, but a 
barracks and three storage sites are also believed to be 
contaminated.3 The Demining Battalion of the Engineering 
Regiment is responsible for the clearance of all military 
facilities.4
This represents a decrease compared to the 269km2 across 
57 CHAs and 142km2 across 47 SHAs, as at the end of the 
previous year.5 A total of 49km2 was released through 
clearance and 7.2km2 through survey in 2018. In addition, 
survey in 2018 added 1.4km2 of previously unrecorded mined 
areas to Croatia’s information management database.6
Eight of Croatia’s twenty-one counties are still mine-
affected. Sisak-Moslavina and Lika-Senj are the most 
heavily contaminated with anti-personnel mines, containing 
an estimated 12,479 and 11,129 mines, respectively, and 
accounting for 74% of the total number emplaced.7
At the end of 2018, 95.7% of mine contamination was on 
forested land; 4% on agricultural land; and 0.3% on other 
areas (e.g. water, marshland, and coastal areas).8 Of the 
total 355.5km2 combined SHA and CHA, 60.12% is defi ned as 
Nature 2000 protected area.9
 
Much of the remaining mined 
area is in mountainous areas and has not been accessed 
for twenty years, so the terrain and conditions will pose 
challenges to demining.10 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by county (at end 2018)*11
County CHAs Area (km2) SHAs Area (km2)
Karlovac 7 14.99 5 31.07
Lika-Senj 9 86.81 8 31.75
Osijek-Baranja 10 35.19 9 17.63
Pož ega-Slavonia 2 9.97 2 5.92
Split-Dalmatia 3 16.4 2 3.35
Sisak-Moslavina 10 30.97 9 27.43
Š ibenik-Knin 4 13.54 2 4.6
Zadar 7 12.44 8 13.46
Totals 52 220.31 45 135.21
* A further 32.47km2 of mined area exists in areas under military control.12
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In August 2018, the Croatian government formally concluded 
that some 54 government agencies, including CROMAC 
and the OMA, were to be integrated within existing state 
administration bodies. This was formally concluded through 
two pieces of legislation enacted in December 2018 and which 
entered into force on 1 January 2019.13 As a consequence of 
these laws, CROMAC and OMA ceased to exist as separate 
government entities and have been integrated into the 
Ministry of Interior (MoI).14
Prior to 2019, both CROMAC (established in 1998 as the 
umbrella organisation for mine action coordination),15 and the 
OMA (created in 2012 as a government focal point for mine 
action),16 had operated as independent entities. 
A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament on 21 October 2015.17 While the 2015 Law, which 
was initiated by the OMA with the text drafted by the Ministry 
of Interior, marked an improvement in certain respects 
(for instance, by permitting land release through technical 
survey), there were concerns that the new law would impede 
effi cient and effective mine action.18 
Regarding accreditation, the Ministry of Interior now provides 
three separate permits: approval for manual mine detection, 
approval for mechanical mine detection, and approval for 
operations by mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) detection 
dogs. This replaces the former unifi ed accreditation licence.19









As an integral part of the MoI, the Civil Protection Directorate 
implements the Gender Equality Act (Offi cial Gazette 82/08 
and 69/17), which establishes national guidelines for gender 
equality, regulates against gender-based discrimination, and 
creates equal opportunities for men and women, including 
with regards to employment.20
According to the national authorities, women, men, boys 
and girls are all effectively consulted during survey and 
community liaison.21
No information was available from the national authorities 
on the proportion of women employed in operational roles in 
survey and clearance teams, or on the proportion of women 
in managerial/supervisory level positions.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
For the purpose of information management, CROMAC 
established a mine information system (MIS), which is said 
to be compliant with the IMAS and customised to meet 
CROMAC’s needs. The MIS uses databases and a geographic 
information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated 
information management system.22 There are ongoing efforts 
to improve the quality of mine-related data, as a part of the 
regular activities of CROMAC’s survey personnel.23
Croatia submits annual Article 7 transparency reports 
and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation 
at the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of 
states parties.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Croatia has a national mine action strategy for 2009–19, which 
was drafted by CROMAC with the agreement of concerned 
ministries, the OMA, the National Protection and Rescue 
Directorate, and local administration and self-administration 
bodies whose responsibility covers regions with hazardous 
areas.24 The strategy, which was adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament, includes among its main goals the completion of 
mine clearance by 2019.25 Elaboration of a new national mine 
action strategy falls under the jurisdiction of the MoI, which 
implies it could be a part of a nationwide strategy or the 
national programme of the Civil Protection Directorate for 
2019–26.26
In 2018, Croatia submitted and was granted a seven-year 
request to extend its APMBC Article 5 deadline from 1 March 
2019 to 1 March 2026. In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension 
request, Croatia stated it has prioritised the remaining mined 
areas according to those which affect safety; pose barriers to 
socio-economic development; and impact the environment in 
other ways. Priorities at the operative level are elaborated in 
annual demining action plans.27
Based on approved funding, CROMAC drafts annual 
workplans, which are submitted to the responsible ministries 
and other state bodies for comment and approval.28 According 
to its 2019 annual mine action plan, CROMAC planned to 
release a total of 54.8km2 in 2019.29
The Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment is 
responsible for clearance of all military facilities. The 
MoD submits its demining plan for military facilities to 
CROMAC annually.30
In 2018, Croatia discussed the issue of national survey and 
clearance capacity to address mine and ERW contamination 
discovered after the release of contaminated areas or post 
completion (i.e. residual contamination), with the Geneva Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). CROMAC is working 
with the GICHD on a case study entitled “national capacities 
and residual contamination in Croatia”, which will document 
progress that is being made on this issue. The integration of 
CROMAC within the MoI, which took effect from January 2019, 
is reported to be one of the fi rst steps to deal with residual risk 
and liability and will elevate the issue within the MoI.31
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament on 21 October 2015, incorporating developments 
from the IMAS agreed upon at that time, and specifi cally those 
relating to the use of technical survey to confi rm the presence 
or absence of contamination.32 The 2015 law introduces a new 
procedure for “supplementary general survey” (a form of 
non-technical survey) and enables “exclusion” (i.e. reduction) 
of SHAs through technical survey, which was not possible 
under the previous law.33 The 2015 law has eliminated the 
need for standing operating procedures (SoPs), as all aspects 
of mine action are now clearly defi ned.34 National mine action 
standards are also encompassed within it.35
As clear from Table 3 on page 92, a signifi cant number of 
CHAs were cleared in 2018 which were found to have no 
contamination. Furthermore, other large, overly-infl ated 
CHAs were cleared with very few anti-personnel mines 
discovered. This strongly suggests the need for further 
evidence-based non-technical and technical survey prior to 
full clearance, in order to confi rm direct evidence of mines 
and task areas for clearance or else cancel or reduce mined 
areas where no evidence of contamination exists.
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OPERATORS 
As a result of conditions for earlier World Bank funding, 
Croatia has an unusually commercialised mine action sector, 
with almost all civil clearance conducted by local companies 
competing for tenders. Much foreign donor funding is 
tendered by ITF Enhancing Human Security, while CROMAC 
manages tendering for the Croatian Government and 
European Union (EU) money in accordance with the Law on 
Public Procurement. The trust fund, “Croatia without Mines”, 
raises money from private sources.36
 
In 2018, 40 commercial companies were accredited to 
conduct mine and CMR clearance.37 Of this, 26 companies 
were engaged in mine clearance operations in 2018 (see 
Table 3).38 NGOs are barred from competing for commercial 
tenders as CROMAC views their subsidy by other funds as 
unfair.39
 
The Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment 
is responsible for clearing all military facilities.40
The state-owned enterprise, MUNGOS, was dissolved and its 
assets auctioned during the fi rst half of 2018.41 The Croatian 
government decided to transfer MUNGOS employees to 
CROMAC, to help enhance QC activities and increase
survey capacity.42
CROMAC undertook all non-technical survey in 2018, 
deploying nine survey personnel. In 2018, CROMAC had 
approximately 40 deminers for technical survey, of whom 
21 were previously employed by MUNGOS.43 
As barriers to entry into the mine clearance market are 
relatively low, there is considerable fragmentation. Of the 
26 companies demining in 2018, 12 cleared less than one 
square kilometre (see Table 3).44 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2014 
needs assessment observed that in the preceding years 
the number of demining companies in Croatia had grown, 
but capacity overall had decreased.45
 
A representative of 
the Croatian Employers’ Association (CEA) – Humanitarian 
Demining Association – reported that the 2015 Mine Action 
Law had resulted in an increase in the number of demining 
organisations in Croatia.46 This rise is in part due to deminers 
leaving employment and starting new fi rms, with the 
2015 Law requiring a minimum of only fi ve deminers per 
company.47 The current number of demining companies is 
disproportionate to the number of deminers, and according 
to a representative from CROMAC, it would be better to 
have half the number of companies, but with each one being 
properly managed.48 
Lower demining costs are said to make it more diffi cult 
for fi rms to make a profi t on clearance. Larger fi rms 
claimed they were hampered by earlier over-investment in 
mechanical assets and equipment based on assumptions 
that funding would match the levels outlined in the 2009–19 
mine action strategy.49
 
A non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) representative claimed that the quality of demining 
suffers when the price of demining is low.50
 
A director of a 
commercial demining fi rm echoed this concern, saying that 
lower prices put greater pressure on deminers to clear 
more square metres a day.51
 
The Humanitarian Demining 
Association indicated that the 2015 Law on Mine Action 
has resulted in more pressure on deminers to work longer 
periods each year, as the new law does not set a minimum 
wage.52 In 2018, CROMAC reported that the average price of 
demining operations had increased compared to the previous 
year, which it believed is due to market stabilisation in the 
mine action sector.53
In 2014, CROMAC reported it had started issuing larger 
value tenders, to allow companies to reduce the cost of their 
operations, saying that this had provided an incentive for 
companies to do better planning and to cooperate with each 
other.54 A CROMAC representative claimed that although 
prices were lower, the larger tenders allowed continual 
work, resulted in fewer stoppages, and enabled companies 
to negotiate on better terms with hotels and services in their 
project areas.55
 
However, bigger contracts, some of which covered areas as 
large as 5km2, resulted in companies needing to form large 
consortia to compete for the new tenders. It was envisaged 
that four or fi ve companies would form each consortium, but 
CROMAC has seen instances of 25 companies per consortium, 
and even of 30 companies bidding together.56 In some 
instances, this has resulted in disputes over the allocation of 
funds and areas assigned for clearance within the consortia, 
often to the disadvantage of smaller organisations.57 Very 
large project tenders are also more complicated to draft and 
demand more time and resources to administer and monitor.58
 
The 2014 UNDP needs assessment recommended that 
CROMAC consider longer-term contracting to maximise use 
of operational assets in Croatia for both technical survey and 
mine clearance.59
 
However, CROMAC plans operations on a 
yearly basis, in accordance with the annual and three-year 
demining plans, which are set by the Government. CROMAC 
is unable to award multi-year contracts because it has to 
budget year-by-year, and in accordance with its own by-laws 
it is not possible to contract and reserve funds for the next 
year until the corresponding annual budget had been set.60 
UNDP also noted that the current contracting of defi ned 
polygons is suitable for mine clearance but would not be 
conducive to effective technical survey, and called for a 
new procedure to be drafted once the law is changed.61
 
The Humanitarian Demining Association said it would be 
preferable if, where possible, technical survey was already 
undertaken on project tasks prior to tendering them, so that 
commercial companies have as much information as possible 
to accurately plan for the tender.62 
With the adoption of the new law, which enables use of 
technical survey, CROMAC planned to target demining on 
confi rmed mined areas and to conduct technical survey on 
the remaining SHA.63 As noted previously, CROMAC took on 
employees from the dissolved national clearance operator 
MUNGOS at the end of 2017, to help increase survey and 
QC capacity.64
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Clearance operations in Croatia are conducted manually, with mechanical assets, and using MDDs. In accordance with the 2015 
Act on Mine Action and its prescribed demining methodologies, MDDs were used only for clearance and not technical survey.65 








LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 56km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of 
which over 48.8km2 was cleared by commercial demining 
companies and 7.2km2 was released by CROMAC through 
survey (4.9km2 reduced through technical survey and 2.3km2
cancelled through non-technical survey).66 In addition, 
a further 0.2km2 was cleared by the Croatian army on 
military sites.
During land release operations a total of 1,095 anti-personnel 
mines were destroyed (968 by CROMAC and 127 by the MoD 
and MoI); 53 anti-vehicle mines (11 by CROMAC and 42 by the 
MoD and MoI); 460,406 other items of UXO (1,409 by CROMAC 
and 458,997 by the MoD and MoI).67
SURVEY IN 2018
CROMAC released a total of 7.2km2 through survey in 2018,68
of which 2.3km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey 
and almost 4.9km2 was reduced through technical survey 
(see Table 2). This is a small increase on the 6.6km2 released 
through survey in 2017.69
No data was available on survey activities of the MoD.
In addition, survey in 2018 resulted in the addition of 
1.4km2 of previously unrecorded mined areas to Croatia’s 
contamination in information management database.70
Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201871
County Operator Area reduced (m2)
Karlovac CROMAC 484,228






In 2018, 49km2 of mined area was released through clearance 
(48.8km2 by operators working under the direction of 
CROMAC (see Table 3) and a further 0.2km2 by the Croatian 
army). During land release operations a total of 1,095 
anti-personnel mines were destroyed (968 by CROMAC 
and 127 by the MoD and MoI); 53 anti-vehicle mines (11 by 
CROMAC and 42 by the MoD and MoI); 460,406 other items of 
UXO (1,409 by CROMAC and 458,997 by the MoD and MoI).72
The 49km2 of total mined area cleared in 2018 is a huge increase 
on 2017, when 30.4km2 of mined area was released through 
clearance (29.9km2 by operators working under the direction 
of CROMAC and a further 0.2km2 by the Croatian army).
The increase in clearance output for 2018, compared to 
the previous year, is in part because of a change in when 
Croatia records clearance output, which is now only upon 
offi cial certifi cation. Consequently, several clearance projects 
completed in 2017, only received certifi cation in 2018, thereby 
increasing the 2018 clearance output. In addition, realisation 
of €5.3 million in forest-related demining funds contracted in 
2017 was delayed to 2018 (in addition to realisation of funds 
already allocated to 2018), thereby increasing funding and 
resulting clearance output in 2018.73
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Alfa Karlovac 1 70,903 0 0 0
Capsula Interna BP/Lika-Senj/Sisak-Moslavina 4 3,377,363 21 0 203
Cor BP/Lika-Senj/Š ibenik-Knin 5 1,531,484 46 0 5
Detektor Lika-Senj 1 1,167,209 35 0 40
Diz-Eko Š ibenik-Knin 1 108,950 0 0 0
Dok-Ing Karlovac/Lika-Senj/ 
Sisak-Moslavina/Š ibenik-Knin
7 4,815,397 58 0 202
Eksplorator Lika-Senj 1 1,541,424 40 0 0
Fas Karlovac/Osijek-Baranja/
Sisak-Moslavina/Split-Dalmatia
4 484,522 19 0 2
Fossio Lika-Senj 1 266,802 0 0 0
Harpija Karlovac/Lika-Senj/
Pož ega-Slavonia








6 3,306,913 40 0 323
Istraživač-Benz Zadar 1 71,610 0 0 0
Kripton Sisak-Moslavina 1 1,068 0 0 0
Maper Lika-Senj/Sisak-Moslavin 2 663,538 0 0 0
MKA demining Pož ega-Slavonia 1 199,558 0 0 0
Orkan Sisak-Moslavina 1 147,605 7 0 0
Piper Karlovac/Lika-Senj 8 4,131,492 1 0 0
Piper Sisak-Moslavina 1 10,241 0 0 0
Piton Lika-Senj/Pož ega-Slavonia/
Sisak-Moslavina
3 1,263,840 24 3 4
Rumital Lika-Senj/Sisak-Moslavina/ Zadar 4 3,924,642 78 0 113




10 5,089,204 9 0 6
TNT7 Lika-Senj/Split-Dalmatia 3 982,852 0 0 0




10 7,465,555 149 0 260
Totals 92 48,826,187 968 11 1,409
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 








In addition, the Croatian army searched and cleared 185,416m2
of military facilities in 2018, during which 16 anti-personnel 
mines and 12 items of UXO were found and destroyed.75 This 
is a decrease on the 0.48km2 of military facilities cleared in 
2017.76 As part of the continued “less arms, fewer tragedies” 
programme, the Croatian Police (under the MoI), and in 
partnership with the UNDP, also collected 111 anti-personnel 
mines and 42 anti-vehicle mines, which were subsequently 
transported to Croatian military facilities and destroyed.77
According to its 2018 Annual Plan of Mines Action, CROMAC 
had planned to release a total of 56.5km2 in 2018: 39.8km2
through clearance and 16.7km2 through technical survey and 
supplementary general survey (during which control samples 
are taken to determine the absence of mines and UXO). 78
Actual 2018 output was 56.03km2, although was achieved 
through conducting more clearance (48.83km2) than planned 
and less survey (7.2km2). In 2018, the largest proportion 
of clearance was in areas planned for economic activities, 
especially agricultural land, which the local and regional 
governments have stated as their priority.79
The fi rst part of the Swiss-funded project “Demining and 
Socio-Economic Integration”, focused on demining of 
heavily-mined Kotar forest, started on 6 August 2018 and 
fi nished on 17 September. In total, 1.74km2 of forest was 
demined, with more than 3,500 mines and UXO discovered. 
According to Croatia, this is the highest number of mines/
UXO found on a single mined area in the 20 years of Croatia’s 
mine action programme. At the height of clearance, around 
260 deminers from 26 companies were deployed on a 
daily basis.80
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019 
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
second extension (of seven years) granted by states parties 
in 2018), Croatia is required to destroy all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon 
as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. It is unclear 
if Croatia is on track to meet this deadline, as clearance of 
military facilities appears to be falling behind schedule.
Croatia’s 2018 request for a further seven-year extension to 
its Article 5 deadline, was submitted on “the basis that this is a 
realistic but not unambitious amount of time given the extent of 
the remaining problem and the human, material and fi nancial 
resources available or expected, and the demining and survey 
capacities currently available.”81 All relevant stakeholders 
in the Croatian mine action system are reported to have 
been involved in the analysis conducted as part of extension 
request process, and the request has also been “verifi ed by 
the Croatian Government, which adopted the text of the 2nd 
Request thus giving it much needed political weight.”82
While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March 
2026, it foresees that survey and clearance operations will 
be completed by the end of 2025, leaving only administrative/
paperwork issues to be settled in the beginning of 2026.83
The remaining mined area to be addressed during the period 
of Croatia’s second extension (1 March 2019 to 1 March 2026) 
covers 387.3km2. Implementing the extension request will 
require clearance of CHA (with minefi eld records), totalling 
173.9 km2 (including 32km2 of mined area on MoD land); 
clearance of CHA (with no minefi eld records, but for which 
there is evidence of contamination), totalling 79.5km2; and 
survey and release of SHA totalling 133.9km2 (see Table 
4).84 Survey will take place between 2019 and 2025, but any 
resulting clearance required, expected to be completed by 
the end of 2025.85
Table 4: Planned demining output in km2 (2019–26)86








29.4 28.7 28.3 24.7 20.8 10 0 0 141.9
Croatian Army (MoD area) 5 5 5 6 6 5 0 0 32
Totals 34.4 33.7 33.3 30.7 26.8 15.0 0 0 173.9
Mined area 
(no records)
6 6 8.2 12.5 16.3 19.5 11 0 79.5
Survey 14 14 14 14 15.5 23.7 38.7 0 133.9
Sum totals 54.4 53.7 55.5 57.2 58.6 58.2 49.7 0 387.3
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Given current capacity and the type of terrain and structure 
of remaining mined area, Croatia expects to be able to 
release roughly 56km2 per year over the next seven years.87 
For comparison, in the seven-year period 2011–17, a total 
of 440km2 was released: 238km2 through clearance and 
202km2 though survey, which included signifi cant amounts of 
cancellation between 2011 and 2015.88 Considering that most 
of the remaining mined area is in more challenging terrain, 
which will signifi cantly reduce the use of demining machinery, 
the 253.4km2 of clearance (and 133.9km2 of survey) forecast 
over the next seven years is very ambitious, without 
increased capacity or improved effi ciency.
Demining of military facilities/MoD area is conducted by 
Demining Battalion of the Engineering Regiment, according to 
plan made by the MoD.89 The 5km2 to 6km2 per year planned 
for in the 2018 extension request, is substantially more than 
what the armed forces have cleared in recent years, and in 
2018, the MoD cleared less than 0.2km2, which is even less 
than the previous year.
Croatia reportedly has suffi cient mine action capacity for 
release of remaining mined area on its territory by 2026 but 
asserts that completion of Article 5 by 2026 is contingent on 
securing the necessary budget.90 However, Croatia did not 
reach its planned survey output in 2018, calling into question 
whether it yet has suffi cient (and suffi ciently capable) 
survey capacity.
Funds from the EU have steadily increased over the last 
few years, surpassing funds from the state budget in 
recent years. CROMAC was in the fi nal stage of securing 
funding from ESI funds (e.g. structural and cohesion funds, 
cross-border cooperation fund), which gives it confi dence in 
fi nancing the implementation of the land release goals set 
out in the 2018 extension request. Croatia expected to also 
secure funding from the public company “Croatian Forests” 
(state budget of forest management positions).91 
Since the APMBC entered into force for Croatia, more than 
€727 million has been invested in humanitarian demining, 
of which Croatia’s national budget had accounted for the 
majority (€417 million) for the Article 5 implementation.92 
Croatia estimates that the fulfi lment of its Article 5 
obligations will cost a total of a further €459 million.93 Funding 
for the remainder of demining under the extension request is 
expected to come from the national budget (52.3%); EU/ESI 
funds (21.8%); EU/cross border cooperation with BiH (15.3%); 
state budget of forest management positions (10.2%); and 
from donations (0.4%).94 
Croatia’s 2018 extension request stresses that as the 
remaining areas to be cleared are mainly forested (89.7%), 
there will be a signifi cant reduction in the use of demining 
machinery, especially medium and heavy machines.95 Croatia 
foresees that more use will be made of small, mobile 
machines that can be effi ciently transported and used in 
affected areas, and that the resulting increase in manual 
demining will reduce productivity and increase the cost of 
clearance and technical survey. Use of mechanical assets 
is also further restricted in the Nature 2000 protected 
area.96 Croatia plans to research and develop methods and 
techniques for the use of MDDs, especially for technical 
survey operations, as a potentially more effective tool to 
address mined areas in mountainous terrain.97 However, this 
would require amendment to the 2015 demining law, which 
does not currently permit use of MDDs for technical survey.
More than 196km2 of mined area in Croatia has been cleared 
over the last fi ve years (see Table 5). However, while annual 
clearance output exceeds the targets in Croatia’s 2009–19 
mine action strategy,98 the amount of land released through 
survey each year has fallen well behind the yearly targets 
outlined in the strategy. In order to ensure Croatia meets 
its Article 5 obligation by 1 March 2026, CROMAC will need 
to increase its capacity and implementation of survey 
operations to more accurately determine the size and location 
of contamination, and to cancel and reduce areas in which no 
evidence of contamination is found. 
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
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No survey and clearance took place in Cyprus in 2018 following 
a breakdown of settlement talks in July 2017 and a subsequent 
reduction of the UN demining budget. No anti-personnel 
mines are believed to remain in minefi elds on territory 
under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus does not 
exercise effective control over remaining anti-personnel mine 
contaminated areas and, as at July 2019, settlement negotiations 
between the two parties remained in a hiatus. The United 
Nations (UN) Security Council, most recently in Resolution 
2453 in January 2019, called on “both sides to allow access to 
deminers and to facilitate the removal of the remaining mines in 
Cyprus within the buffer zone”, and urged “both sides to extend 
demining operations outside the buffer zone”.
In a positive development, a series of confi dence-building 
measures agreed upon in February 2019 by the President of 
Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
Mustafa Akinci, included the survey and clearance of 18 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), nine on each side of the 
buffer zone. It is expected that this work will be completed by 
February 2020. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in northern Cyprus should comply with the UN 
Security Council’s renewed call for access to all remaining mined areas within and outside the buffer zone.1
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT




 ■ None (Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DOK-ING were 
last active in 2017)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations (UN)-supported mine action in Cyprus is 
coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on 
behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As no survey or clearance was conducted in 2018, the 
estimate from the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) data for contamination in Cyprus has not changed 
since 2017. As at December 2018, 29 SHAs and 18 confi rmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) remained across Cyprus covering 
just over 1.7km2. Contamination in these areas is either mixed 
(anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines), of unknown nature, 
or from anti-vehicle mines only (see Table 1).2
Cyprus is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle 
mines. The island has been divided geographically and 
politically since 1974 by what was once a heavily mined, 
180km-long buffer zone, following Turkish Forces’ operations 
in the north of the island. Minefi elds were laid by both the 
Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces. 
The exact extent of the remaining mine contamination across 
the island is not known, and permission for UNFICYP to 
access areas outside within and outside the buffer zone 
remains limited.3










South of the buffer 
zone (territory 
controlled by Cyprus)
13 AV mines 418,543 15 AV mines 299,898 28 718,441
Buffer Zone 4 AV mines (3 areas)
Unknown (1 area)
703,581 0 N/A N/A 4 703,581
North of the buffer 
zone (territory 
controlled by Turkish 
Cypriot authorities)
1 Mixed 170,493 14 Unknown 130,784 15 301,277
Totals 18 1,292,617 29 430,682 47 1,723,299
TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY 
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
Cyprus has reported that no anti-personnel mines remain in 
the minefi elds laid by the National Guard that are in territory 
under its effective control.5 In total, between becoming a state 
party on 1 July 2003 and its original Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of 1 July 2013, Cyprus 
released all 20 mined areas under its effective control.6
BUFFER ZONE
UNFICYP reported that, as at December 2018, three of the 
mined areas in the buffer zone were contaminated with 
anti-vehicle mines and the type of contamination in the fourth 
mined area was unknown.7 In July 2018, the UN Secretary-
General’s report on the UN operation in Cyprus stated that 
“the two sides have not begun clearance of the four known 
remaining minefi elds in the buffer zone, of which three belong 
to the National Guard and one to the Turkish forces. While the 
Turkish Cypriot side has indicated that it would accept the 
clearance of all four areas as a package, the Greek Cypriot 
side maintains the position that its three minefi elds are 
required to counter a perceived threat.”8 The Government 
of Cyprus considers the three minefi elds contaminated with 
anti-vehicle mines to be under its control and not within the 
buffer zone.9
TURKISH CYPRIOT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY 
IN NORTHERN CYPRUS
The extent of mine contamination in areas controlled by 
Turkish Forces is not known. However, Cyprus claimed in its 
latest Article 7 transparency report (for 2018) that at least 
20 minefi elds laid and maintained in the occupied areas by 
Turkish Forces are yet to be cleared of anti-personnel mines, 
of which one is situated within the buffer zone.10 According 
to the UN, some military mine clearance appears to have 
been conducted over most locations that are still recorded 
as minefi elds.11
In addition, there is a minefi eld just north of the buffer zone 
in Mammari, where heavy rains led to mines being washed 
into the buffer zone in 2014 and 2015. UNFICYP has raised the 
issue of clearance of this minefi eld with the Turkish forces and 
has offered assistance in this regard.12 In 2017, a small area of 
the Mammari minefi eld was cleared by a Croatian commercial 
operator contracted by the Turkish Armed Forces.13
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are 
coordinated by UNMAS on behalf of UNFICYP.14 In July 2016, 
UNMAS became an integral component of UNFICYP, providing 
its expertise in mine action planning and coordination, 
quality assurance (QA) oversight, and management of mine 
action information.15 UNMAS also provides assistance to the 
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) to ensure safe access 
to areas it conducts activities and to UNFICYP for explosive 
ordnance disposal call-out tasks.16
UN-facilitated settlement talks between the two sides in 
Crans-Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017, came to an abrupt 
halt after 10 days, and, as at July 2019, the negotiations 
remain in hiatus. Since the breakdown of these talks a 
budget reduction resulted in the demobilisation of the UN 
demining capacity on 20 November 2017. UNFICYP retains a 
technical capacity and non-technical survey contingency to 
conduct new activities when access is permitted.17 For the 
2018–19 fi scal year, UNMAS was funded by the UN Nations 
peacekeeping assessed budget for UNFICYP. The budget 
covers technical capacity for planning and coordination; 
awareness training for UNFICYP personnel; advocacy 
activities; and data management of mine action information.18
GENDER
UNMAS is guided by the UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes and maintains gender parity in its staffi ng 
positions within the team deployed in Cyprus. Within UNFICYP, a dedicated Gender Advisor provides guidance on 
mainstreaming gender in the Mission’s policies and activities. It is not known whether gender and diversity feature in the mine 
action policies or strategies in territory controlled by Cyprus or in Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory in northern Cyprus.19
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
UNFICYP uses the IMSMA database. In 2017, a review and reconciliation of all electronic and hard-copy minefi eld database 
documentation revealed that a number of SHAs had already been cleared and/or cancelled. However, due to capacity 
limitations between 2011 and 2016, the information had not been removed from the database. The review resulted in the 
removal of seven SHAs (totalling more than 950,000m2) from the database.20
Cyprus submits annual Article 7 reports and has done since acceding to the APMBC in July 2003. Cyprus has submitted 
three Article 5 deadline extension requests: in 2012, 2015, and 2018. Cyprus submitted the reports and extension requests 
in a timely manner but the information provided is limited due to it not having effective control over the remaining 
anti-personnel mined areas.
PLANNING AND TASKING
As at July 2019, it is not known if Cyprus or Turkish 
Cypriot-controlled northern Cyprus has a strategic 
plan for survey and clearance of mined areas.
In February 2019, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC) President Mustafa Akıncı and President of Cyprus, 
Nicos Anastasiades, announced their commitment to follow 
through with various confi dence-building measures including 
the survey and cancellation and/or reduction of 18 SHAs, nine 
on each side of the island, with a view to working towards a 
mine-free Cyprus.21 With support from UNFICYP and UNMAS 
work began in May 2019 with an expected completion date 
of February 2020.22 No mine or other ERW contamination 
is expected to be found in these SHAs but to ensure due 
diligence they will be subject to non-technical survey and, 
where necessary, technical survey. The non-technical survey 
will be conducted by UNMAS staff, and a representative 
from UNFICYP and from either the Turkish Cypriot Security 
Force (TCSF) or the Greek Cypriot National Guard (NG). It is 
expected that technical survey will only be necessary in the 
southern SHAs and will be conducted by the NG with site 
visits by the UNMAS Chief of Operations.23









STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
All UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are said 
to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS).24 In 2016, to guide UN operations, 
UNMAS updated the national technical standards and 
guidelines that are used in UNFICYP to refl ect current best 
practice and to ensure the highest standards are applied for 
UNFICYP clearance operations.25
OPERATORS 
No operators were active in 2018. In previous years, survey 
and clearance in the buffer zone has been carried out by 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) on behalf of UNMAS and 
UNFICYP.26 In 2017, the Turkish Armed Forces contracted 
DOK-ING to conduct clearance, and MAG, to conduct quality 
assurance of demining in the Mammari minefi eld.27 No further 
clearance was conducted in 2018, nor was any planned for 
2019 as the TCSF has not agreed to any further survey or 
clearance on this minefi eld.28
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No survey or clearance took place in Cyprus in 2018.
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CYPRUS: 1 JULY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2019
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Cyprus has reported clearing all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas that it accepted were under its control within 
ten years of becoming a state party, namely by 1 July 2013. In 
2012, Cyprus submitted the fi rst of its three Article 5 deadline 
extension requests, the reason for which has remained the 
same throughout, namely that Cyprus does not have effective 
control over remaining contaminated areas.29 According to the 
website of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus in Geneva, “Once 
Turkey ceases the military occupation of Cyprus and returns 
control of the occupied areas under proper conditions to the 
authorities of the Republic, they [the Republic of Cyprus] will 
be able to assume full responsibility and compliance with the 
provisions of Article 5 for the entire sovereign territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus.”30
Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 
2014. In 2013, states parties granted Turkey an eight-year 
extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in 
Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for 
clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus.31 The 
last settlement talks between the two sides were held in 
June and July 2017 in Switzerland but broke down after ten 
days.32 As at July 2019, the settlement talks had not resumed, 
although in February 2019 a number of confi dence-building 
measures were agreed between the two sides, one of which 
was the clearance of 18 SHAs which is due to be completed 
by February 2020.33
The UN Security Council, most recently in January 2019, has 
called on both sides to facilitate clearance of all remaining 
mined areas on the island.34 The Council noted with regret 
“that the sides are withholding access to the remaining 
minefi elds in the buffer zone, and that demining in Cyprus 
must continue”. The Council also noted “the continued danger 
posed by mines in Cyprus”, referring to “proposals and 
discussions as well as positive initiatives on demining”, and 
urging “rapid agreement on facilitating the recommencement 
of demining operations and clearance of the remaining 
minefi elds”.35 The Council called on “both sides to allow 
access to deminers and to facilitate the removal of the 
remaining mines in Cyprus within the buffer zone”, and 
urged “both sides to extend demining operations outside 
the buffer zone”.36
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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s mine action 
programme’s land release output remained relatively static 
in 2018, though with a signifi cant decrease in the number of 
anti-personnel mines found and destroyed compared to the 
previous year. It remains on track to meet its Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline 
by 2021. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
and international mine action operators believe that the DRC 
could complete clearance by end 2020 with existing capacity 
and suffi cient funding, as projected in its latest strategic plan. 
This is, though, considerably after the 2016 deadline set out in 
its 2012–16 national mine action strategy.1
The national mine action programme continued to be 
hampered by a range of information management challenges 
in 2018, and the ability of the authorities to produce a clear 
and accurate estimate of remaining mine contamination 
remained questionable. The inexperience of many national 
survey teams, the incorrect recording of items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) as mined areas, and a lack of rigorous quality 
assurance of survey reports, give cause for concern. Greater 
scrutiny and support from international operators to ensure 
the DRC successfully meets its Article 5 obligations are 
needed at this critical time, when the end is nearly in sight 
after almost two decades of mine action in the country. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
■ The DRC should establish a realistic and accurate understanding of the remaining mine contamination, 
including through re-survey of all remaining suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), many of which are thought 
to be inaccurate or outdated. 
■ Survey in Aru and Dungu territories should be prioritised as soon as security permits in order to gain a fully 
comprehensive picture of the remaining challenge. 
■ The DRC should detail how it will meet its clearance obligations by its extended Article 5 deadline of 
1 January 2021.
■ Signifi cant efforts should be made to ensure the national mine action database is accurate and effectively 
managed and resourced by the national authorities. Updated information should be regularly shared with 
all mine action stakeholders. 
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 ■ Mine action data should be recorded and reported according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
land release terminology.
 ■ The Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM), should enhance collaboration with, and support the work 
of, international mine action organisations. 
 ■ Focus should also be placed on building national capacity to address contamination following the exit of 
international operators.






(20% of overall score)
5 The latest estimate of contamination almost certainly exaggerates the true extent of the 





(10% of overall score)
6 The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) had provided capacity-building support 
to the Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM) for its operations for several years. The 
transfer of responsibility for coordinating mine action activities was, in theory, completed 
in early 2016. In 2018, however, UNMAS continued to provide guidance and operational 
support to CCLAM.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 includes a section on gender. It 
stipulates that all activities of the mine action programme, particularly those related 
to risk education and victim assistance, must refl ect the different needs of individuals 




(10% of overall score)
4 CCLAM assumed responsibility from UNMAS for information management in January 
2016. Despite many years of capacity-building support from UNMAS, and again from 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2018, serious concerns persisted over the quality of 
the database and CCLAM’s capacity and resources to manage it. Gaps in data, a lack of 
maintenance, a lack of capacity to extract and share information from the database, and 
the lack of frequent coordination meetings with operators, all remained evident in 2018.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
5 The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 focuses on fulfi lling the DRC’s 
APMBC Article 5 obligations by 2020, one year ahead of its extended 2021 deadline. 
Despite this, the DRC has not submitted an operational workplan containing clear 




(20% of overall score)
5 National Technical Standards and Guidelines were revised during 2018, with the main 






(20% of overall score)
4 UNMAS and international operators believe that the DRC could complete clearance by 
end 2020 with existing capacity and suffi cient funding. This is, though, considerably after 
the 2016 deadline set out in its 2012–16 national mine action strategy.
Average Score 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ National NGOs conduct non-technical survey and 
mine risk education
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ DanChurchAid (DCA)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (operations ended in 2018)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ The Development Initiative (TDI)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

























UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The DRC is affected by anti-personnel mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW), a result of armed confl ict involving 
neighbouring states, militias, and armed opposition groups, 
which have increased since the late 1990s. Its remaining 
contamination challenge is primarily that of ERW; mine 
contamination appears limited with anti-personnel mines 
no longer found in signifi cant numbers. Areas suspected to 
contain anti-personnel mines often proved instead to contain 
UXO, abandoned ordnance (AXO), or small arms ammunition.2
Throughout 2018, the DRC’s national mine action programme 
continued to suffer from a lack of coordination between 
stakeholders and critical information management issues. Its 
ability to produce a clear and accurate estimate of remaining 
mine contamination from the national database remained 
open to question. According to CCLAM, as at 31 March 2019, 
a total of 53 mined areas with a total size of 741,559m2
remained to be addressed across Bas-Uele, Ituri, Kasaï, 
Lomami, Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu, North Ubangi, 
South Ubangi, Tanganyika, Tshopo, and Tshuapa provinces.3
Previously, according to fi gures provided by UNMAS, at the 
end of 2017, a total of 36 confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) 
and SHAs with a total size of 502,591m2 remained to be 
released.4 According to CCLAM, nine additional mined areas 
with a size of close to 170,000m2 were identifi ed in 2018 in 
North Ubangi, South Ubangi, Tanganyika, Kasaï, Maniema, 
and Tshopo provinces.5
On request of the CCLAM, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
agreed to assist with a re-survey of areas remaining in 
the national database.6 In 2018, NPA discussed with Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG) and DanChurchAid (DCA) the 
possibility of a joint national resurvey of the SHAs remaining 
in the country as reported by CCLAM. In May 2019, NPA 
reported that it had started the re-survey on its own, and 
that, as at mid June, a total of 115,000m2 had been cancelled 
in South Ubangi province. It considered this to be evidence 
that many of the remaining SHAs will be either discredited or 
at least signifi cantly reduced in size.7
However, NPA reported that it was likely that more explosive 
ordnance, potentially including landmines, would be found 
in the eastern parts of the country (including Bas Ulele, 
Haut Ulele, Ituri, Lubero, and North Kivu provinces) due 
to the intensity and duration of armed confl icts affecting 
those regions. NPA said these areas would be priorities for 
operations on the basis of humanitarian impact, and was still 
attempting to secure resources for expanding the re-survey 
activities as at June 2019.8
The DRC’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2019 set out among its objectives completion of survey 
of mine and ERW contamination in Aru and Dungu territories 
by the middle of 2018. While this objective was not met, as at 
mid 2019, survey was fi nally underway in Aru territory in Ituri 
province.9 CCLAM informed Mine Action Review in July 2019 
that lack of funding was the only obstacle to commencing 
survey in Dungu territory; it reported that there was no 
evidence of mines having been used in recent confl icts in 
the territory.10
CCLAM likewise confi rmed that there were no reports of 
new use of anti-personnel mines in 2018, including mines 
of an improvised nature, but said there were reports of use 
of other improvised explosive devices by non-state armed 
actors in the north-east of the country, in Goma and Beni in 
North Kivu province.11
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER 
MUNITION REMNANTS
Of the DRC’s considerable contamination from ERW as a 
result of years of confl ict involving neighbouring states, 
militias, and rebel groups, a small amount of cluster munition 
remnant contamination remained to be addressed as at July 
2019 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants 2019 report on the DRC for further information). 
Successive confl icts have also left the country with signifi cant 
quantities of AXO.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
CCLAM was established in 2012 with support from the UN 
Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and UNMAS.12
Subsequently, UNMAS provided capacity-building support to 
CCLAM for its operations until the transfer of responsibility 
for coordinating mine action activities to CCLAM was 
completed in early 2016.13 In 2018, however, UNMAS continued 
to provide guidance and operational support to CCLAM.14
Law 11/007 of 9 July 2011 underpins the national mine 
action programme.15
Previously, UNMACC, established in 2002 by UNMAS, 
coordinated mine action operations through offi ces in the 
capital, Kinshasa, and in Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani, 
and Mbandaka. UNMACC was part of the UN Stabilization 
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO). In accordance with 
Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014), humanitarian mine 
action was removed from MONUSCO’s mandate.16 In 2018, 
UNMAS was assisting MONUSCO operations under the 
Mission’s protection of civilians’ mandate.17
Although CCLAM took over responsibility from UNMAS 
as the national focal point for demining in early 2016, its 
capacity to carry out accreditation, issue task orders, and 
report remained very limited in 2018. Its lack of capacity 
to manage an up-to-date national database and carry out 
quality management activities continued to be highlighted 
by operators as critical areas of concern.18 In 2018, NPA 
continued its support to develop CCLAM’s capacity through 
training and in-kind assistance.19
CCLAM reported that in 2018, as in previous years, the 
Government of the DRC provided more than US$530,000 
for its operating expenses. The government did not, though, 
provide any funding for mine action operations. CCLAM 
reported that priorities for the national programme in 2019 
were improving the national database, conducting a new 
national contamination survey, organising a workshop 
to develop an annual workplan, and capacity building 
of operational staff.20 Key challenges, it said, included a 
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lack of funding; the withdrawal of mine action operators; 
the availability of good training of CCLAM staff to ensure 
coordination and quality management; a lack of adequate 
training for surveyors; and the absence of state budget to 
cover salaries of CCLAM staff.21
In 2018, operators and UNMAS reiterated concerns over 
a continuing decline in funding for mine action in the DRC. 
They reported that with the deteriorating political climate in 
the country, donors were reluctant to support mine action, 
prioritising instead support to address other higher-impact 
humanitarian crises such as cholera and yellow fever, 
fl ooding, and internally displaced persons.22 In 2019, this was 
compounded by new humanitarian crises from Ebola and 
ongoing armed confl icts.
GENDER 
The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 includes 
a section on gender. It stipulates that all activities of the mine 
action programme, particularly those related to risk education 
and victim assistance, must refl ect the different needs of 
individuals according to age and gender groups, in a 
non-discriminatory manner. It also states that the principles 
of non-discrimination against women as set out in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolution 
1325 (2000) are to be respected, ensuring that women are 
involved in all essential stages of mine action (planning, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation), and that activities 
take into account the special needs of women and girls.23 
According to CCLAM, mine action survey teams in 2018 were 
gender balanced, and efforts were undertaken to ensure 
that all community groups, including women and children, 
were consulted. It also noted, however, the ongoing need for 
awareness-raising within certain communities on gender 
equality as local customs can discriminate against women 
undertaking certain categories of work. CCLAM reported 
that approximately 30% of operational staff in survey and 
clearance teams were female in 2019, but only around 7% 
of managerial or supervisory positions were held by women, 
reportedly due in part to barriers presented by local customs 
about women’s employment roles.24
NPA’s demining staff were 50% female in 2018. It reported 
that it was able to hire fi ve women in operational roles 
(four deminers and one medic) during the year, following 
an awareness-raising seminar on women’s opportunities 
in mine action and demining training. It offered fl exible 
working hours for parents (especially women) and 
encouraged women to enrol in training programmes 
aimed at improving their chances for managerial positions. 
An internal women’s network was formed as a subset of 
the programme’s staff union.25
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CCLAM assumed responsibility from UNMAS for information 
management in January 2016. Subsequently, despite many 
years of capacity-building support from UNMAS, and again 
from NPA in 2018, serious concerns persisted over the quality 
of the database and CCLAM’s capacity and resources to 
manage it. Gaps in the data, a lack of maintenance, a lack of 
capacity to extract and share information from the database, 
and the absence of coordination meetings with operators, all 
remained evident in 2018.26 
In 2019, NPA elaborated that ongoing information 
management issues included a lack of reporting according 
to land release terminology, the misreporting of items of 
UXO as mines (resulting in new areas of contamination being 
incorrectly added to the database as mined areas), and a lack 
of verifi cation of incoming reports.27
NPA held refresher training courses on information 
management and use of the Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and geographic 
information system (GIS) for CCLAM staff during 2018. It 
reported that while CCLAM had competent technical staff, its 
limited administrative and fi nancial resources continued to 
adversely affect its ability to maintain the database and that, 
as a consequence, a system of parallel reporting to CCLAM 
and UNMAS had developed.28 
In 2018 and the fi rst half of 2019, UNMAS reported that, 
through extra budgetary funds, it provided assistance to 
CCLAM to develop a workplan on information management, 
including provision of IT equipment and support in assessing 
needs based on the DRC’s mine action strategic priorities.29
In July 2019, the CCLAM informed Mine Action Review that 
progress had been made in 2018 to separate recording and 
reporting of mines from ERW in the national database. It 
said that improvements to information management could 
be made by standardising reporting forms with operators 
and through the use of better software.30 It also said that 
further capacity-building support for managing the national 
database would be welcomed, along with support to improve 
communication with operators and coordination meetings.31


























The DRC’s national mine action strategy for 2018–19 focuses 
on fulfi lling the DRC’s APMBC Article 5 obligations by 2020, 
one year ahead of its extended 2021 deadline.32 The strategy 
contains the following three strategic pillars: effective and 
effi cient management of the explosive threat; ensuring the 
national programme has the capacity to manage residual 
contamination in a sustainable manner; and that the legal 
framework of the mine action programme is strengthened 
through the adoption of national laws and other implementing 
measures and adherence to relevant treaties.33
The DRC’s previous national mine action strategy for 2012–16 
had set the goal of clearing all areas contaminated with 
anti-personnel mines or unexploded submunitions by the 
end of 2016.34 The DRC failed to meet these goals.
Despite the positive development of the development 
and adoption of the DRC’s 2018–19 national mine action 
strategy, the DRC has not submitted an operational workplan 
containing clear milestones for completion of survey and 
clearance obligations under its extended Article 5 deadline 
of 1 January 2021. The DRC was requested to provide such 
a workplan by 30 April 2015, as part of the states parties’ 
decision to approve the DRC’s latest (third) Article 5 deadline 
extension; however, as at July 2019, it had yet to do so.35
NPA informed Mine Action Review that it operates on 
a province-by-province approach to tasks, rather than 
prioritising clearance of one type of contamination over 
another, as remaining hazardous areas are sparsely located 
and more effi ciently addressed by geographic location.36 As 
noted above, it raised concerns, however, about wasting 
resources in non-contaminated areas due to misreporting in 
the database, particularly the addition of new mined areas 
without robust evidence of the presence of anti-personnel 
mines, and a lack of an accurate overview of the remaining 
contaminated areas to be addressed.37
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In June 2019, CCLAM reported that the DRC’s National 
Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) had been 
revised during 2018, with the main areas of revisions made 
to standards on demining techniques and safety of deminers 
in the workplace.38
In 2018 and the fi rst half of 2019, UNMAS reported providing 
technical and logistical support to CCLAM on monitoring, 
coordinating, and assessing quality of activities conducted 
by mine action implementing partners.39
OPERATORS 
Four international operators carried out mine action 
operations in the DRC in 2018: non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) DCA, MAG, and NPA, and commercial 
operator, The Development Institute (TDI).40 A number of 
national operators also carried out non-technical survey 
and risk education activities during the year.
In 2018, NPA’s teams focused on manual clearance, explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, non-technical survey, 
and risk education in partnership with a local organisation 
APPEI, and impact assessment in the north-west of the DRC 
in North and South Ubangi provinces. It deployed three 
operational teams, which carried out clearance and EOD 
spot tasks.41
MAG ended its demining in the DRC in August 2018 following 
completion of a Netherlands-funded clearance project 
under which it deployed two multi-task teams (MTTs) and 
two community liaison teams in North and South Ubangi 
provinces. MAG reported that while the clearance project 
had been successful, overcoming the many challenges and 
complexities of working in the DRC, combined with the lack 
of anti-personnel mines being discovered, contributed to 
making further demining operations in the DRC a lower 
priority for the allocation of global resources. Following 
discussions with NPA and DCA, it was agreed that MAG 
would cease its demining operations, but that NPA would 
continue survey and clearance in the north and north-west 
of the country, while DCA would continue to operate in the 
central-eastern areas.42 MAG has also pledged to continue 
to work together with CCLAM, NPA, DCA, and UNMAS to 
develop a strategy to address residual contamination in 
the DRC, and said it was committed to working closely with 
CCLAM and to fi nding resources to carry out necessary 
activities in the future.43
UNMAS continued to contract TDI in support of MONUSCO 
operations in 2018. It deployed three six-person MTTs to 
conduct EOD spot tasks in areas where MONUSCO was 
operational and also to carry out destruction of obsolete 
weapons and ammunition held by the DRC armed forces. 
In 2018, through extra budgetary funds, UNMAS also 
contracted national organisations to conduct risk education 
to complement TDI’s activities.44
Humanity and Inclusion (formerly Handicap International, HI) 
and its local partner AFRILAM, ceased mine action operations 
in 2017.45
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Only manual mine clearance is conducted in the DRC.
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
According to the CCLAM, in January 2018 to end March 
2019, a total of 422,461m2 of contaminated area was cleared 
(275,700m2 in 2018 and a further 146,761m2 in the fi rst quarter 
of 2019), along with a total of 457 spot tasks. It reported that 
as a result, a total of 13 mines were destroyed (11 PMA2 
anti-personnel mines and 2 anti-vehicle mines), along with 
a total of 7,295 items of ERW.46 Clearance operations only 
involved the destruction of fi ve anti-personnel mines but 
there may have been others destroyed in spot tasks.
SURVEY IN 2018
According to CCLAM, a total of 16,936m2 was released 
through survey in 2018, all by DCA in Tshopo province. This 
included a total of 15,416m2 cancelled through non-technical 
survey and 1,520m2 reduced through technical survey.47 As 
noted above, according to CCLAM, nine additional mined 
areas with a size of close to 170,000m2 were also discovered 
in 2018 in North Ubangi, South Ubangi, Tanganyika, Kasaï, 
Maniema, and Tshopo provinces.48 
This compared to 2017, when operators cancelled a total of 
nearly 444,300m2 through non-technical survey and reduced 
a further 192,500m2 of anti-personnel mined area through 
technical survey, while confi rming just under 264,500m2 as 
mined.49 CCLAM reported that the reason for the signifi cant 
decrease in survey output in 2018 was the reduction in the 
number of operators and operational capacity.50
According to CCLAM, TDI carried out non-technical survey 
in Ituri province in 2018, which, as at June 2019, was still 
underway with results yet to be reported.51 CCLAM also 
reported that a series of targeted surveys were conducted 
in Shabunda territory, South Kivu province. CCLAM said 
it had become clear that the initial survey of mine and 
ERW contamination in the DRC had “had many fl aws and 
underestimated the size of certain areas”.52 UNMAS has 
reported it conducted surveys in Aru territory in March and 
April 2019 with survey reports submitted to CCLAM in early 
May 2019.53
As reported above, in the fi rst half of 2019, NPA initiated 
re-survey activities on its own, and as at mid June, had 
cancelled a total of 115,000m2 in South Ubangi province, in 
the north-west of the DRC. It expects that many remaining 
SHAs will be discredited or signifi cantly reduced in size 
following new survey.54 
CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of 275,700m2 was reportedly released through 
clearance in 2018, with the destruction of 5 anti-personnel 
mines and 1 anti-vehicle mine, along with 6,117 items of 
UXO/AXO.55 
Despite the area released through clearance remaining 
comparable with that in 2017, there was a considerable drop 
in the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed 
in 2018, compared to 2017 when a total of just over 226,000m2 
was reportedly released through clearance, with the 
destruction of 32 anti-personnel mines and 3,173 items 
of UXO.56 
Table 1: Mine clearance in 201857
Province Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
North Ubangi  NPA 4 7,718 0 0
South Ubangi  NPA 1 750 0 0
South Ubangi  MAG 1 69,900 0 0
Tshopo  DCA 2 197,332 5 1
Totals 8 275,700 5 1
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle

























ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE DRC: 1 NOVEMBER 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015 
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
six-year extension granted by states parties in June 2014), 
the DRC is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 January 2021. It appears to be 
on track to meet this deadline. As stated above, according 
to its National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–19, the DRC 
expects to complete its Article 5 obligations by 2020, one 
year ahead of its 2021 deadline. 
Optimistically, in July 2019, CCLAM informed Mine Action 
Review that it was possible that the DRC could complete mine 
clearance even during 2019, with suffi cient funding.58 In 2018, 
operators and UNMAS confi rmed that it is likely that the DRC 
can clear all mined areas on its territory, with existing mine 
action capacity and the maintenance of suffi cient funding, 
before its extended Article 5 deadline of 1 January 2021.59
The DRC’s fi rst Article 5 deadline request in 2011 largely 
blamed poor survey by demining operators for the failure to 
meet its deadline, though poor management and insuffi cient 
national ownership of the programme were also major 
factors.60 In April 2014, the DRC submitted a second request 
to extend its Article 5 deadline starting in January 2015.61
The purpose of its current (second) Article 5 deadline 
extension is to “(a) conduct technical surveys and clear the 
130 identifi ed mined areas; and (b) conduct non-technical and 
technical surveys as well as clear and/or release areas in the 
territories of Aru and Dungu in the Orientale province”.62 The 
extension request estimated that on average 0.21km2 would 
be cleared each year.63
The DRC has reported that challenges for implementing its 
current extension request plan milestones include funding 
and logistics, security, geography, and climate, including 
dense vegetation and heavy rainy seasons.64 Operators 
attributed the DRC’s inability to fi nish clearance by the end 
of 2016, as originally planned, to a lack of access and the 
remote, diffi cult terrain of remaining areas, and additional 
concerns over sustained funding, upcoming elections, and 
deteriorating security in certain areas.
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In 2018, Ecuador submitted an updated Action Plan 
2019–2022 and the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational 
Humanitarian Demining Unit completed clearance of the 
Tiwinza square kilometre. Ecuador continues to provide 
contradictory fi gures for outstanding mine contamination, 
survey, and clearance across its reports and statements. 
In 2018, it cleared only 14,068m2, a small decline from the 
previous year’s output. Ecuador did not meet its land release 
targets for 2018 and, as at April 2019, was not on track to 
meet its targets for 2019. Ecuador is at risk of not completing 
mine clearance by its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) Article 5 deadline. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Ecuador should ensure it is deploying its limited resources in the most effi cient manner and that it conducts 
non-technical and technical survey, as necessary, before full clearance.
 ■ Ecuador should further assess whether dogs could also be deployed for survey and clearance.
 ■ Ecuador should make the necessary improvements to its information management systems to ensure it 
reports accurately on mine contamination, survey, and clearance.
 ■ In seeking international support, Ecuador should provide a more detailed breakdown of its fi nancial 
requirements, including any national contributions from the government. 
AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018
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(20% of overall score)
6 In 2018, Ecuador reported 80,230m2 of outstanding mine contamination, a fi gure 
established through non-technical and technical survey. Lack of consistency across 





(10% of overall score)
5 There is clarity of roles and responsibilities at a national level and Ecuador has necessary 
demining infrastructure in place. A decrease in national funding has left the national 
programme without suffi cient resources to conduct operations.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
4 Ecuador has a small proportion of women employed in demining but the approach to 
gender mainstreaming seems superfi cial. All community members are consulted during 




(10% of overall score)
4 Information management continues to be problematic with inconsistent and inaccurate 




(10% of overall score)
6 Ecuador submitted an Action Plan for 2019–22 with annual land release targets that 
it should be able to reach but which are resource dependent. It did not meet the land 




(20% of overall score)
6 Ecuador claims it conducts survey and clearance according to the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). All clearance is conducted by manual deminers as the terrain 





(20% of overall score)
3 Ecuador’s land release outputs fell in 2018 and it is on track to fall again in 2019. It is 
unclear whether Ecuador will meet its long extended Article 5 deadline despite having 
only a small amount of contamination.
Average Score 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI)
 ■ Army Corps of Engineers (CEE)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ CEE Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI”
 ■ General Command for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD)















UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
In its latest Article 7 report, Ecuador reported that, as at 
December 2018, it had 80,230m2 of anti-personnel mine 
contamination across 34 confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) 
and 26 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the province of 
Zamora Chinchipe (see Table 1). Contamination is believed 
to comprise a total of 3,260 mines.1 Ecuador has stated that 
it applies non-technical survey and, if necessary, technical 
survey to mined areas that have been identifi ed through, 
for example, an emergency survey, military archives, or 
information from the local population.2
Ecuador’s reporting of contamination has often been 
inconsistent. For instance, the fi gure given for anti-personnel 
mine contamination in Zamora Chinchipe province in its 
2017 Article 5 deadline extension request was 65,006m2, 
but this rose without explanation to 89,874m2 in its Article 7 
transparency report for 2017.3
Ecuador’s contamination results from its 1995 border confl ict 
with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is 
the Condor mountain range (Cordillera del Condor) which 
was at the centre of the dispute.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province and district (at December 2018)4
Province District CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total CHA/SHA Total area (m2)
Zamora 
Chinchipe
Chinchipe 1 7,009 0 0 1 7,009
Yanzatza 3 6,565 0 0 3 6,565
Centinela del Condor 2 130 0 0 2 130
Nangaritza 16 4,827 0 0 16 4,827
El Pangui 12 54,186 26 7,521 38 61,707
Totals 34 72,717 26 7,521 60 80,238
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the 
National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI). The 
Ecuadorian government created CENDESMI by an Executive 
Decree in 1999.5 It is an interministerial body chaired by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility and is made 
up of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public 
Health, and the Army Corps of Engineers (CEE) through the 
Engineers Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI” and the General 
Command for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD).6 CENDESMI is 
responsible for overseeing compliance with the APMBC, 
while the CEE is responsible for coordinating the planning 
of demining and COTOPAXI is tasked with conducting land 
release operations.7
Ecuador currently funds all of its demining operations. It 
has allocated almost US$21 million for demining personnel, 
materials and equipment for 2014–22.8 This amounts to 
around $2 million per year from 2019 to 2022. However, only 
$821,953 was actually provided to the demining programme 
in 2019 and Ecuador has called on the international 
community for fi nancial support to complete demining by 
its Article 5 deadline.9 Ecuador has claimed that it requires 
just over $8 million dollars to complete clearance. This will 
be used to replace personal protective equipment and other 
demining tools which are no longer usable, as well as for 
vehicles, training, food and shelter for the deminers.10
GENDER
Ecuador has trained women in both demining and the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.11
Since 2014, Ecuador has employed three female deminers, 3% of the total trained.12 Ecuador has reported that it will continue 
to include and train female personnel according to their availability.13
Ecuador has stated that it considers all populations affected by mines, without discrimination, in the planning and execution 
of demining operations.14
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Ecuador uses the IMSMA database.15
Ecuador submits its Article 7 reports on a timely basis and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC 
intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties. Often, however, these reports and statements contain inconsistencies 
and inaccuracies. For instance, Ecuador’s clearance plan for 2018–22, included in its Article 7 report for 2017, sought to clear
 a total of 65,006m2 in Zamora Chinchipe. But in the same report it stated that 89,874m2 of area remained to be cleared. Ecuador 
is now on its third extension request and while they are submitted in a timely manner there are similar problems with clarity 
and accuracy.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Ecuador submitted an updated work plan for implementation 
of Article 5 in May 2019, as requested by the Sixteenth 
Meeting of the States Parties.16 This included planned mine 
clearance in the last remaining contaminated province of 
Zamora Chinchipe for 2019 to 2022 (see Table 2).
Ecuador submitted annual workplans for 2018 and 2019 in 
its Article 7 reports. Its workplan for 2018 sought release 
of 26,159m2 with 12 demining teams working from May to 
December.17 This target was not reached, with only 16,607m2 
of mined area being released in 2018. 
In 2019, Ecuador planned to clear 23,383m2 of contamination 
from the El Pangui and expected to fi nd and destroy 478 
anti-personnel mines. Clearance was expected to take 
place in August and September with 12 demining teams. 
Astonishingly, however, due to the lack of budget for demining 
operations for the year, only two days of clearance operations 
were planned for the whole of 2019 as of writing.18
Ecuador prioritises contaminated areas for clearance 
according to the proximity of the local population and the 
impact on socio-economic development.19
Table 2: Planned mine clearance in Zamora Chinchipe in 2019–22 (Action Plan)20 
Year District Mined areas Area (m2)
2019 El Pangui 12 23,383
2020 Yanzatza; Centinela del Condor, Nangaritza 12 18,299
2021 Chinchipe; Nangaritza 10 20,688
2022 El Pangui 26 17,868
Totals 60 80,238
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The process of humanitarian demining in Ecuador is 
carried out in accordance with the Binational Manual for 
Humanitarian Demining (Manual Binacional de Desminado 
Humanitario), developed under the Binational Cooperation 
Programme with Peru, and the Manual of Humanitarian 
Demining Procedures of Ecuador, based on the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS), which were adapted to the 
Ecuadorian context.21 Ecuador has adopted the IMAS for land 
release, non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance 
requirements, and explosive ordnance disposal.22
In granting Ecuador’s 2017 Article 5 deadline extension 
request, the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties noted 
that Ecuador should use the most relevant land release 
standards, policies, and methodologies, in line with IMAS, 
and encouraged it to continue seeking improved land release 
and certifi cation techniques which could lead to Ecuador 
fulfi lling its obligations more quickly.23 Ecuador stated in 
its 2017 extension request that non-technical and technical 
survey would be carried out to determine the location, size, 
and other characteristic of the mined areas before operations 
begin using records of mined areas.24 No non-technical survey 
and very limited technical survey was reported in 2018. 
OPERATORS 
Demining is conducted by COTOPAXI and the CGDEOD with a 
combined total of 140 trained deminers.25 In 2018, COTOPAXI 
conducted clearance in Zamora Chinchipe province.26
The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining 
Unit is deployed to areas that were at the centre of the 
confl ict between the two nations. In October 2015, the unit 
began operations in a mined area estimated to extend over 
43,500m2 within the Tiwinza square kilometre.27 In 2018, 
clearance of the Tiwinza square kilometre was completed.28
CENDESMI is responsible for observing and monitoring 
compliance of the demining, including quality control and 
certifi cation of clearance operations.29 In 2018, quality 
control was carried out in El Oro and Loja provinces.30
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, clearance was conducted only manually. Mechanical 
assets are only deployed in favourable weather conditions 
and where there is not too steep an incline.31 In the additional 
information provided alongside its 2017 extension request, 
Ecuador stated that the remaining clearance will only be 
carried out by manual deminers, due to the unsuitability of 
terrain for the machine.32 Mine detection dogs (MDDs) are 
used only for quality control following clearance.33
DEMINER SAFETY
Ecuador has reported that no demining accidents occurred 
over the past 18 years.34









LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 16,607m2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 14,068m2 was cleared and 2,359m2 was released through 
technical survey. A total of 247 anti-personnel mines and 3 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found and destroyed. 
An additional 16 mines were found outside the survey area.35
SURVEY IN 2018
No non-technical survey took place in 2018. A total of 2,539m2
was reduced through technical survey in the Tiwinza square 
kilometre by the Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit. This 
is a reduction from survey output in 2017 when 7,332m2 was 
reduced through technical survey and 10,919m2 cancelled 
through non-technical survey in the square kilometre, 
covering a total of 18,251m2.36
Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201837




In 2018, clearance of 5,056m2 remaining in the Tiwinza province was completed by the Binational Humanitarian Demining 
Unit. In total, 14,068m2 was cleared in 2018 along with the destruction of 247 anti-personnel mines, a reduction from the 
15,476m2 cleared and 453 anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2017. An additional 16 mines were found outside the area 
recorded as mined.
Table 4: Mine clearance in 201838
Province Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed
Tiwinza 3 5,056 188
Zamora Chinchipe 4 9,012 59
Totals 7 14,068 247
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ECUADOR: 1 OCTOBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 OCTOBER 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2017
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Ecuador has submitted three extension requests since the 2014 
Maputo Review Conference. In May 2016, Ecuador announced 
that, of the remaining 0.13km2 of contamination, 0.08km2 would 
be cleared in 2016 and the remaining 0.05km2 in 2017 prior to 
its October 2017 deadline.39 This did not happen. Instead, on 28 
November 2016, Ecuador unexpectedly submitted a request 
to extend its mine clearance deadline to 31 December 2017. 
At the time of the request, Ecuador stated that “the technical 
survey and clearance in the provinces of Zamora Chinchipe 
and Morona Santiago (Tiwinza square kilometre) is about to 
conclude, pending the destruction of 5,478 anti-personnel 
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mines in an area of 137,653 square metres.” Ecuador explained 
that the failure to meet the 1 October 2017 deadline was due 
to a serious earthquake on 16 April 2016, which required the 
diversion of the armed forces away from demining, as well 
as to the physical characteristics of the land and climate 
conditions in the areas requiring clearance.40 In its Article 7 
report for 2016, Ecuador suddenly and without explanation 
determined that it would need a further fi ve years to fulfi l its 
Article 5 obligations. It submitted another Article 5 deadline 
extension request in March 2017 and was granted a deadline 
extension to 31 December 2022. 
Although Ecuador’s survey and clearance output has fallen 
considerably since 2015, it could still meet its Article 5 
deadline of 31 December 2022 if it were so minded. Annual 
targets it has set are unambitious but require capacity to 
be maintained. Due to a decline in the demining budget, 
Ecuador is not doing so. In 2015, Ecuador signifi cantly 
increased clearance output by incorporating an MV-4 
remotely controlled fl ail into operations. However, Ecuador 
then determined that the remaining mines were in areas 
inaccessible to the machine and that clearance would only 
be conducted with manual deminers.41 
Survey and clearance outputs fell from 33,000m2 in 2017 to 
16,607m2 in 2018, with just under half of output in 2018 from 
the Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit that has now 
completed operations in the Tiwinza square kilometre. At 
the time of the 2017 extension request, Ecuador had a total 
of 140 trained deminers, but in its latest Article 7 report 
Ecuador stated that only two days of clearance were planned 
for 2019.42 This means it is highly unlikely to meet the land 
release target for the year as set out in its Action Plan for 
2019 to 2022 (see Table 2) and is at risk of not meeting its 
Article 5 deadline.
Despite allocating more than $20 million for demining in 
2014–22, enough to complete operations, the annual budget 
was reduced in 2019 and operations were limited. Ecuador 
is requesting fi nancial support from the international 
community and, in 2019, is participating in the APMBC’s 
“Individualised approach”. It is unclear how much Ecuador 
is willing to fund itself or how much of this support could 
be in the form of equipment or personnel rather than 
direct funding.
 1 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. 
 2 Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 5. 
 3 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45. 
 4 Ibid., Annex I. 
 5 Executive Decree No. 1297, issued on 22 September 1999. 
 6 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension request, Annex I. 
 7 Ibid., pp. 39 and 40. 
 8 Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 20. 
 9 Ibid.; and Statement of Ecuador, Committee on Article 5 implementation, 
Geneva, 22 May 2019. 
 10 APMBC Individualised Approach Meeting at Intersessionals, “Mine Action 
Program of Ecuador Status and Challenges in Implementation”, Geneva, 
23 May 2019; and Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 21. 
 11 Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 17. 
 12 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 39 and 41. 
 13 Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 20. 
 14 Ibid., p. 23. 
 15 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25. 
 16 Decisions on the request by Ecuador for an extension of its Article 5 deadline, 
16MSP, 21 December 2017. 
 17 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D. 
 18 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. 
 19 Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 17. 
 20 Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, pp. 19–20. 
 21 Ibid., p. 5. 
 22 Ibid., p. 17. 
 23 Decisions on the request by Ecuador for an extension of its Article 5 deadline, 
16MSP, 21 December 2017. 
 24 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15. 
 25 Ibid, pp. 39–40. 
 26 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. 
 27 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information provided 
on 8 September 2017, p. 1. 
 28 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. 
 29 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39. 
 30 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. 
 31 APMBC Individualised Approach Meeting at Intersessionals, “Mine Action 
Program of Ecuador Status and Challenges in Implementation”, Geneva, 
23 May 2019. 
 32 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information provided 
on 8 September 2017, p. 1. 
 33 Ecuador Demining Action Plan 2019–2022, p. 18. 
 34 Ibid., p. 21. 
 35 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. 
 36 Ibid. 
 37 Ibid. 
 38 Ibid. 
 39 Statement of Ecuador, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 
19 May 2016. 
 40 Letter from Efraín Baus Palacios, Director of Neighbourhood Relations and 
Sovereignty for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility and 
President of the National Humanitarian Demining Centre of Ecuador, to Amb. 
Patricia O’Brian, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations 
in Geneva, and Chair of the Article 5 Committee, Note No. 14839-DRVS/
CENDESMI, Quito, 26 November 2016. 
 41 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information provided 
on 8 September 2017, p. 1. 
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2020
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION





































None reported None reported None reported
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Eritrea’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
Article 5 deadline expires on 1 February 2020. As at July 
2019, it had not indicated whether it would submit a request 
to again extend its Article 5 deadline. It was the only state 
party with a deadline in 2020 which failed to acknowledge its 
upcoming deadline or report on plans for an extension. 
Eritrea is failing to comply with its obligation under Article 
5 of the APMBC to complete clearance as soon as possible. 
There is no indication of any progress in mine action since 
the end of 2013. Eritrea failed to submit an updated Article 
5 workplan as required by states parties upon granting its 
second extension and did not respond to repeated requests 
for updated information from Mine Action Review in 2019. 
It last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2014, 
in and of itself a violation of the Convention. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Eritrea needs to return to compliance with its obligations under the APMBC. The authorities should ensure 
that mine survey and clearance are undertaken for humanitarian and developmental purposes as a matter 
of urgency.
 ■ Eritrea should urgently submit an extension request for its Article 5 deadline, which includes an up-to-date 
list of all known or suspected areas with anti-personnel mines and a detailed timeline of activities planned 
for the extension period sought.
 ■ Eritrea must urgently submit its outstanding annual Article 7 transparency reports, the latest of which was 
due by 30 April 2019. 
 ■ Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance in mine action, which would 
support effi cient land release and re-open international funding paths.
 ■ Eritrea should cooperate in cross-border mine action activities with Ethiopia, including as part of recent 
efforts towards a peace agreement with its neighbour. 
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(20% of overall score)
4 The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013, when 
Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained with a size of 33.4km2. All area is 
reportedly suspected hazardous area. Mine Action Review is unaware of any indication 






(10% of overall score)
4 Eritrea’s mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The Eritrean Demining 
Agency (EDA) is responsible for mine clearance. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)




(10% of overall score)
1 Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known. However, 
its lack of submissions of Article 7 reports over the past fi ve years is a violation of 
the Convention. It has failed to provide any updates on the status of its mine action 
obligations in recent years. 
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
1 Recent details on Eritrea’s planning and tasking system are not available.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
4 Eritrea is reported to have National Mine Action Standards dating back to 2012. The EDA 





(20% of overall score)
1 Eritrea has made little, if any, progress at all in land release to meet its obligations 
under its second Article 5 extension request. In 2014, Eritrea reported that it expected 
to require a third extension, but, as at July 2019, it had taken no apparent steps towards 
requesting one. It remains in violation of the Convention for failing to complete mine 
survey and clearance as soon as possible, and for not respecting other procedural 
provisions of the Convention.
Average Score 2.7 Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA)
NATIONAL OPERATORS













UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) dating back to World War II, but largely as the result 
of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed 
confl ict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000. 
In May 2015, in response to Mine Action Review’s request for 
updated information on the state of contamination and mine 
action activities in Eritrea, the Deputy General Manager of 
the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) reported “no signifi cant 
progress registered by the EDA currently”. He claimed, 
though, that the EDA was being reorganised in an effort 
to make “better progress”.1 Since 2015, the EDA has not 
responded to repeated requests from Mine Action Review for 
further information, most recently in the fi rst half of 2019. 
The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates 
back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported 434 mined 
areas covering an estimated 33.4km.2 This was a two-thirds 
reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km2 of June 2011,3 and 
signifi cantly lower than the 129km2 identifi ed by the 2004 
landmine impact survey.4
Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2013)5
Zoba (region) SHAs Estimated area (m2)
Semienawi Keih Bahri 166 9,462,537
Anseba 144 10,230,940
Gash Barka 63 6,252,951
Debub 29 3,894,036
Maakel 24 2,423,325
Debubawi Keih Bahri 8 1,169,029
Totals 434 33,432,818
SHA = suspected hazardous area
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Eritrea mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The EDA, established in July 2002, is responsible for 
policy development, regulation of mine action, and the conduct of mine clearance operations. The EDA reports directly to 
the Offi ce of the President.
Eritrea projected that costs for its current Article 5 extension period would amount to more than US$7 million, all to be 
raised nationally.6 In 2011–13, Eritrea managed to raise only $257,000 annually. Eritrea acknowledged at the time that its 
progress in clearing mines would be slow due to its lack of resources, but it has never been clear how Eritrea intended 
to secure the funding necessary for its survey and clearance activities, particularly in light of its regrettable policy not 
to accept international technical assistance.7
GENDER 
Eritrea did not respond to Mine Action Review’s inquiries in 2019 about the national mine action programme’s policies 
relating to gender.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known. However, its lack of submissions of Article 7 
reporting over the past fi ve years is a violation of the Convention. It has also failed to provide an updated Article 5 workplan 
or any updates on the status of demining in recent years.
PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no apparent recent information on how Eritrea plans its demining operations. Re-survey during the second 
extension period was planned to involve both technical and non-technical survey of all remaining mined areas across six 
regions, and to run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.8
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Eritrea reportedly has National Mine Action Standards that 
date back at least to 2012. It is not known if any updates to 
the standards have been made in the seven years since. 
It was reported that the EDA was responsible for the 
implementation of quality assurance (QA) and quality 
control (QC) activities.9
OPERATORS 
In the past, demining has been primarily conducted by the 
engineering units of the Eritrean defence forces under the 
supervision of the EDA.10 According to its second Article 
5 deadline extension request, Eritrea planned to deploy 
“at least” fi ve demining teams during its second extension 
period.11 
Following expulsion of international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in 2005, the authorities do not allow 
international operators to conduct survey or clearance 
in Eritrea. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up 
to 15.4km2 of mined area could be cleared within fi ve years. 
It reported that 67.3km2 of contaminated area had been 
cancelled through non-technical survey and that 5.7km2 
was cleared over 38 mined areas in 2011–13.12
Eritrea has not provided any updates to states parties to the 
APMBC, nor responded to Mine Action Review requests for 
information on any mine action activities (including survey) 
undertaken in since 2014. In 2013, Eritrea had reported 
release of 157 SHAs totalling 33.5km2, leaving 385 mined 
areas of close to 24.5km2 to be surveyed.13 Forty-nine new 
mined areas with a total size of 9km2 were discovered in fi ve 
of the country’s six regions during non-technical survey in 
2013: Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi 
Keih Bahri.14
Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on 
any mine clearance undertaken in 2018 or recent years. In 
2013, Eritrea seemingly cleared approx. 2.26km2 of mined 
area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km2).15 The 
number of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines destroyed 
in 2013 was not reported. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
As stated, no land release output, including survey or clearance, was reported in 2018. 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ERITREA: 1 FEBRUARY 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2020
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 
NO AND AS AT AUGUST 2019 HAD NOT SUBMITTED AN EXTENSION REQUEST
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW








Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance 
(2014–18)*







* N/R = Not Reported
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
three-year extension granted by states parties in 2011 and 
a further fi ve-year extension granted in 2014), Eritrea is 
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not 
later than 1 February 2020. It is not on track to meet this 
deadline, is failing to comply with its Article 5 obligations, 
and as at August 2019 had not submitted a request for an 
extension to its Article 5 deadline. If Eritrea fails to submit 
an Article 5 extension for consideration and approval by 
states parties at the Fourth APMBC Review Conference in 
November 2019, it will be in serious violation of Article 5 as 
of its Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2020. 
In January 2014, Eritrea submitted a second Article 5 
deadline extension request seeking a further fi ve years to 
continue clearance and complete re-survey of SHAs, but not 
to fulfi l its clearance obligations under the treaty. In June 
2014, however, states parties granted Eritrea its extension 
request until 2020, but noted that fi ve additional years beyond 
Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline “appeared to be a 
long period of time to meet this objective”.16
Based on a predicted clearance rate of 0.384km2 per team 
per year and 1.92km2 per fi ve teams per year, Eritrea 
estimated that fi ve teams operating at this pace could clear 
almost 15.4km2 in the fi ve-year period.17 It acknowledged, 
though, that this was “ambitious” and the amount projected 
still accounted for less than half of the total area Eritrea 
estimated as requiring either clearance or re-survey 
(33.5km2), leaving some 18km2 unaccounted for.18
In April 2014, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Eritrea 
stated that the extension period was designed to gain greater 
clarity about its mine problem, at which point Eritrea “could 
plan and think about the fi nancial resources to be allocated 
for mine action”.19 It was further stated that Eritrea “won’t 
complete clearance in the next fi ve years”, and will likely 
require a third extension.20 Eritrea has not provided states 
parties with any information since, nor did it submit an 
updated Article 5 deadline extension request workplan as 
requested. It did not attend any meetings of the APMBC in 
2018 or the fi rst half of 2019. As at August 2019, Eritrea was 
in clear violation of the Convention, both substantively and 
procedurally, and had yet to submit an extension request to 
its Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2020.
 1 Email from Habtom Seghid, Deputy General Manager, EDA, 6 May 2015.  
 2 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7. This was despite fi nding 
49 previously unrecorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in fi ve regions 
across an estimated area of 9km2 during non-technical survey in 2013. 
Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 
by the President of the 13th Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the 
States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 20 June 2014, 
p. 2.   
 3 Eritrea’s reply to questions from the Article 5 Analysing Group about its 
Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 June 2011, p. 2.   
 4 Survey Action Center (SAC), “Landmine Impact Survey, Eritrea, Final Report”, 
May 2005, p. 7.   
 5 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8. 
 6 Ibid., p. 11. 
 7 Statement of Eritrea, 13th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December 
2013. 
 8 Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 
9 April 2014. 
 9 Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 5. 
 10 Ibid. 
 11 Ibid., p. 10. 
 12 Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 
2014, p. 2. 
 13 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.   
 14 Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 
2014, p. 2. 
 15 Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 10. 
 16 Decision on Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Third 
APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014. 
 17 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 10. 
 18 ICBL Comments on Eritrea’s Article 5 Extension Request, March 2014. 
 19 Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 9 April 
2014. Notes by ICBL. 
 20 Ibid.  
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In March 2019, certain that it would fail to meet its Article 
5 extended deadline of 1 June 2020 owing to insuffi cient 
progress in land release, Ethiopia submitted a second 
extension request to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) Article 5 deadline, this time for a period of fi ve 
years until 31 December 2025. This second extension request 
indicates a number of positive developments have occurred, 
including the restarting of demining and land release, which 
is welcome after years of little or no progress. The request 
states there is increasing access for mine action operations 
in the previously inaccessible contested border area with 
Eritrea, owing to recent progress in peace negotiations with its 
neighbour. Also positive is the news that responsibility for the 
national mine action programme will be moved directly under 
the Ministry of Defence’s Head Offi ce, which may increase 
effi ciency and the implementation of mine action operations, 
as well as enhance access to government resources. 
A number of reported challenges remain unchanged, 
however, including the remoteness of certain areas of 
contamination, technical and logistical challenges, a lack of 
basic infrastructure, and a critical lack of funding. Signifi cant 
questions also remain as to the feasibility of the extension 
request’s land release targets and the demining capacity and 
resources required to meet them. Ethiopia’s second extension 
period must not be another lengthy period of inactivity. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ If granted the second Article 5 extension by States Parties, Ethiopia should act immediately to carry out 
demining operations, seek additional capacity and resources, and renew its commitment to meet its 
treaty obligations. 
 ■ Ethiopia should ensure the re-established national mine action authority has suffi cient resources to establish 
and sustain an effective mine action programme, as well as to develop a robust resource mobilisation plan to 
address the wide gap in funding projected under its extension request. 
 ■ Ethiopia should clarify its ability to meet the annual land release targets in its extension request and the 
capacity of the demining companies to be deployed to address the remaining challenge. 
 ■ Ethiopia should cooperate in cross-border mine action activities with Eritrea, including as part of recent 
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STATES PARTIES
■ Ethiopia should report on plans to carry out survey on the border with Eritrea as well as on any changes to the 
security situation that could affect mine action operations.
■ All mine action data should be reported and recorded according to the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) land release terminology. Ethiopia should report regularly with updates on the number and extent of 
all mined areas and disaggregated land release output.
■ Ethiopia should reconsider use of additional mine action tools, including mine detection dogs, given the vast 
amount of suspected hazardous area (SHA) that is projected to be released through survey. 
■ Ethiopia should re-establish conditions that would allow for the re-entry of international demining 
organisations. 






(20% of overall score)
5 Ethiopia has a baseline estimate of remaining contamination, largely on the results of 
an infl ated and inaccurate landmine impact survey concluded in 2004. The estimate of 
contamination reported as at April 2019 includes a vast amount of suspected hazardous 





(10% of overall score)
5 In 2019, it was reported that Ethiopia’s national mine action programme would be moved 
to report directly to the Head Offi ce of the Ministry of Defence, which is hoped will raise 
the profi le of mine action, and improve the effi ciency of operations and availability of 
national resources. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
3 Ethiopia claimed to have a gender policy in place for its mine action centre and refl ected 
in its national mine action standards. It reported that according to the policy, there is 
equal access for employment for qualifi ed men and women in survey and clearance 
teams, including for managerial positions, but, in practice no women were involved in 




(10% of overall score)
4 Some improvement in Ethiopia’s reporting capacity was evident in its 2019 Article 5 
deadline extension request and Article 7 report, but data discrepancies remained, along 
with a lack of detail and inconsistencies in the use of land release methodology.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
5 The second Article 5 extension request contains new annual targets for survey 
and clearance for the extension request period, but whether they are realistic and 




(20% of overall score)
6 The extension request details the land release methodology and quality management 





(20% of overall score)
5 In 2019, Ethiopia requested a second Article 5 deadline extension of fi ve years until 
end 2025. On the basis of the request, it is not impossible that Ethiopia could meet this 
new deadline. But given its poor track record, key questions about assumptions in land 
release productivity, and lack of current funding, meeting even this extended deadline 
seems questionable. It is encouraging, however, to see a substantial increase in the 
amount of land released in 2018, of over 95km2, primarily through non-technical survey.
Average Score 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ Head Offi ce of the Ministry of Defence
■ Ethiopia Mine Action Offi ce (EMAO)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 30 April 2019, and according to Ethiopia’s Article 5 
deadline extension request submitted in March 2019, a total 
of 261 suspected and confi rmed hazardous areas with a size 
of 1,056km2 remained.1 The request, however, contains a 
number of discrepancies in reporting, possibly due in part 
to previous inconsistencies in reporting on area remaining 
in its 2017 updated workplan and previous fi rst Article 5 
extension request.2 
Of the total contamination remaining in 2019, Ethiopia 
reported that 35 areas with a size of just over 6.3km2 were 
confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 226 areas with a 
size of 1,050km2 were suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). 
In keeping with previous reporting, the request states that 
only 2% of the suspected hazardous area is expected to 
actually contain mines.3 As such, the request projects a total 
of 27.3km2 (6.3km2
 
of existing CHA and 21km2 of the SHA 




There appears to be a relatively consistent and coherent 
narrative in the second extension request of progress 
made since Ethiopia’s original Article 5 deadline expired 
in 2015. At that time, Ethiopia reported that a total of 314 
CHA and SHA with a size of 1,193km2 remained to be 
addressed. During 2015-18, 53 areas covering 136.8km2 
were reportedly released.5
Positively, the second extension request claims increasing 
potential for mine action operations to take place in the 
contested border areas with Eritrea due to ongoing efforts 
towards a peace agreement in 2019, and that negotiations 
through a joint border commission will allow mine action 
in previously inaccessible areas to begin. Specifi cally, new 
“military humanitarian demining” operations are to start in 
the Tigray border minefi eld.6 
At the same time, the extension request also states that 
access to mined areas in Afar and Somali regions continued 
to present a challenge for operations due to insecurity and 
their remoteness, while technical and logistical challenges 
and a lack of infrastructure continued to hamper access to 
Gambela and Benishangul regions.7
As at April 2019, CHAs and SHAs continued to remain across 
six regions (Afar, Benishangul, Gambela, Oromia, Somali, 
and Tigray), as set out in Table 1. The Somali region is 
believed to be by far the most heavily affected, followed by 
the Afar region.
Ethiopia’s mine problem is a result of internal and 
international armed confl icts dating back to 1935, including 
the Italian occupation and subsequent East Africa campaigns 
(1935–41), a border war with Sudan (1980), the Ogaden war 
with Somalia (1997–98), internal confl ict (1974–2000), and 
the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998–2000). 
In 2001–04, a LIS identifi ed mine and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) contamination in 10 of Ethiopia’s 11 regions, 
with 1,916 SHAs across more than 2,000km2 impacting more 
than 1,492 communities.8 The Ethiopian Mine Action Offi ce 
(EMAO) stated that the LIS overestimated the number of 
both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack of military 
expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for 
the overestimate.9 
Table 1: Mined area by region (at 30 April 2019)10
Region CHAs Area (km2)  SHAs Area (km2) Total SHA/CHA Total area (km2)
Afar 6 1.76 8 1.92 14 3.67
Benishangul 2 0.05 0 0 2 0.05
Gambela 0 0 20 0.84 20 0.84
Oromia 0 0 13 1.03 13 1.03
Somali 24 3.81 185 1,046.27 209 1,050.08
Tigray 3 0.69 0 0 3 0.69
Totals 35 6.31 226 1050.06 261 1,056.36
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In 2001, following the end of the confl ict with Eritrea, 
Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers established EMAO as an 
autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance 
and mine risk education.11 EMAO developed its operational 
capacities effectively with technical assistance from 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).12 
In 2011, however, EMAO’s governing board decided that the 
Ministry of Defence was better suited to clear the remaining 
mines because Ethiopia had made signifi cant progress in 
meeting its APMBC clearance obligations and the remaining 
threat did not warrant a structure and organisation the size 
of EMAO. It has further asserted on numerous occasions that 
a civilian entity such as EMAO would have diffi culty accessing 
the unstable Somali region.13 
In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer 
demining responsibility to the army’s Combat Engineers 
Division, NPA ended its direct funding support and had 
completed the transfer of its remaining 49 mine detection 
dogs (MDDs) to EMAO and the federal police by the end 
of April 2012. The Combat Engineers Division took over 
management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto where 
it conducted training in demining in early 2012. 
The transition of EMAO to the Ministry of National Defence 
appeared to be in limbo until September 2015, when Ethiopia 
reported that oversight of national mine action activities had 
been re-established as “one Independent Mine Action Offi ce” 
under the Combat Engineers Main Department.14 In 2017, 
Ethiopia confi rmed that this “autonomous legal entity” had 








been re-named the EMAO, and was responsible for survey, 
clearance, and mine risk education activities, accountable 
to the Ministry of National Defence’s Engineering Main 
Department.15
In 2019, however, Ethiopia reported that the responsibility for 
the national mine action programme had been transferred 
back to the Head Offi ce of the Ministry of Defence. It said 
this was done to enable the Ministry of Defence to directly 
manage resources and mine action activities; to improve 
access to remaining CHAs, which it stated are more “easily 
reachable” by the Ministry of Defence; and to raise the profi le 
of mine action operations at a time when resources for 
demining are increasingly limited, as the Ministry of Defence 
is said to be better placed to communicate with donors and 
secure government resources for demining.16
According to Ethiopia’s second extension request, just under 
US$41 million is required to fulfi l its Article 5 obligations by 
2025, a decrease from $46 million reported in its 2017–20 
workplan, which it said was due to progress made in land 
release in 2016–18. The request includes a breakdown of 
the budget required ($28.7 million for demining, $6.1 million 
for coordination and administration, $4.1 million for training 
and equipment to manage “residual issues”; and $2 million 
for quality assurance and information management).17 In 
2018, the Ethiopian government was the sole funder of mine 
action operations.18 Of the $41 million projected in the second 
extension request, the government is projected to cover 20% 
of required remaining funding, or $8.2million.19
Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request notes 
the positive contribution of the availability of trained and 
highly experienced demining teams ready to be deployed. 
Ethiopia has also made numerous requests for international 
assistance, most recently, to complete the capacity building 
of its demining training centre, and training for deminers 
to be better equipped to conduct battle area clearance and 
disposal of ERW.20
In 2018, EMAO reported that all administrative costs of the 
EMAO were covered by the Government of Ethiopia, along 
with all costs for survey and clearance activities. 
EMAO informed Mine Action Review that the transfer 
of responsibility for the mine action offi ce to be directly 
accountable to the Ministry of Defence would help allocate 
funding and a budget directly from the head offi ce of the 
Ministry of Defence. Positively, EMAO reported it expected 
to receive increased funding in 2019 as a result. 
GENDER 
In August 2019, EMAO claimed to have a gender and diversity plan in place and to have mainstreamed gender in the national 
mine action standards. It stated that all groups affected by anti-personnel mine contamination are consulted during survey and 
community liaison activities through face-to-face interviews and using elders to disseminate information to local communities, 
assisted by mine risk education offi cers. It also noted, though, that no female deminers were employed in the operational 
demining companies. It claimed that, according to EMAO’s policy, there is equal access for employment for qualifi ed men and 
women in survey and clearance teams, including for managerial positions, but, in practice no women were currently involved 
in survey or clearance activities in 2018.21
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Although a version of the Information Management System 
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database software was installed and 
customised by EMAO prior to 2015, in 2019, Ethiopia continued 
to report it was still using an “alternative data processing 
package” alongside the IMSMA database, due to a “gap” in 
the IMSMA system’s installation. It reported that efforts to 
upgrade capacity and data processing had been ongoing 
under EMAO, but again requested additional IMSMA training 
and assistance from the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to fi nalise the transfer 
of the database.22
While a number of inconsistencies, a lack of detail, and errors 
in data calculations persisted in Ethiopia’s Article 5 extension 
request and subsequent Article 7 report, both are evidence 
of improvements in reporting from previous years, when 
reporting was of especially poor quality. 
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Ethiopia’s second Article 5 extension request for the period 
2020–25 is to achieve the following:
 ■ Address the remaining 1,065km2 of mine contamination
 ■ Complete the survey of the buffer zone areas between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea once demarcation is completed
 ■ Obtain the support of donors and international advisors
 ■ Fully equip and train the demining companies, Rapid 
Response Teams (RRT), and explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) teams
 ■ Implement risk education in affected communities and 
mark SHAs
 ■ Finish the building of the demining training centre.23 
The extension request contains annual targets and a 
workplan, which foresee a total land release of some 175km2 
per year in 2020–24, and 3.9km2 in the fi nal year (2025). 
Despite some data discrepancies, this would appear to 
include a breakdown of 171.5km2 released through survey 
annually from 2019–24, along with 1.9km2 released through 
clearance in 2019, 4.3km2 released through clearance each 
year in 2020–24, and a fi nal 3.9km2 cleared in 2025.24 
Ethiopia’s second Article 5 deadline extension request sets 
new annual targets for the fi ve-year completion period.25 The 
workplan, however, raises a number of critical questions 
as to whether it is realistic and achievable. For example, 
Ethiopia does not provide detail on how the signifi cant jump 
in projections for clearance from 1.9km2 in 2019 to 4.3km2 
in 2020 is to be realised. The request indicates that one 
additional “demining company” will be added during the 
extension period, but does not specify at what time this will 
occur or the number of deminers who will form the company. 
EMAO later informed Mine Action Review that 90 deminers 
formed a demining company.26 The request also foresees that 
one deminer will clear on average 40–50 square metres per 
day, 22 days a month, 10 months a year; projections which 
would seem potentially improbably high.27
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Ethiopia’s second extension request elaborates in detail 
the land release methodology intended to be employed 
in demining operations.28 The request claims that manual 
demining is the most effi cient and least costly method of 
clearance, and states that machines cannot be used due to 
the terrain of the remaining contaminated areas.29 However, 
with such large projections for cancellation and reduction of 
SHA, Ethiopia could consider other options in the mine action 
tool box beyond manual clearance, such as the use of MDDs 
in technical survey.
Ethiopia previously reported in 2107 that its National Mine 
Action Standards (NMAS) would be “developed and updated” 
and that standing operating procedures (SoPs) for mine 
clearance and land release would be revised according to the 
current IMAS. It had also reported that this would happen in 
2015, according to its extension request targets.30 As at 2019, 
Ethiopia had not, however, reported that the revisions have 
been completed.
OPERATORS 
According to EMAO, two companies were deployed for 
clearance in 2018, along with two technical survey teams, 
and one EOD team.31 
Ethiopia’s second extension request foresees that following 
a “rearrangement” of its four demining companies and four 
RRTs, which include two technical survey/RRTs and two 
specialist EOD teams in 2019, these four demining companies 
and four RRTs are to be deployed each year through to the 
completion of its Article 5 extension request in 2025.32 
The request claims that the manual clearance, technical 
survey, and EOD teams have carried out extensive trainings 
and “are enough capable to implement the activities 
mentioned in the detailed workplan”.33 At the same time, 
the request anticipates the deployment of an additional 
demining company, though it does not specify the number of 
deminers which comprise a company, nor when it would be 
operational.34 As noted above, EMAO informed Mine Action 
Review that 90 deminers form a demining company.35
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Ethiopia has reported that only manual clearance has 
been used in recent years. While its national mine action 
programme is in possession of six ground preparation 
machines, it reported that these were not in use as all 
remaining hazardous areas are located in remote areas, 
which it claims are only suitable for manual clearance.36








LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2016–18
According to EMAO, a total of more than 95.4km2 of anti-
personnel mined area was released in 2018: nearly 94.3km2
through survey and 1.1km2 through clearance.
In its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7 
report, Ethiopia detailed its land release activities for the fi rst 
time in recent years. According to the 2019 extension request, 
over the previous extension period, a total of 53 areas with 
a size of 136.8km2 were released with the destruction of 582 
anti-personnel mines, 70 anti-vehicle mines, and 7,286 items 
of unexploded ordnance (UXO).37
Ethiopia’s extension request reports that in total, 0.1km2 was 
released in 2016 with the destruction of 30 anti-vehicle mines; 
just over 41.4km2 was released in 2017 with the destruction 
of 37 anti-vehicle mines and 21 items of UXO; and just over 
95.3km2 was released in 2018, with the destruction of 582 
anti-personnel mines, 3 anti-vehicle mines, and 7,265 items of 
UXO.38 The extension request underlines that this doubling in 
land release output from 2017 to 2018 was due to an increase 
in resources and government commitment.39
SURVEY IN 2018
According to EMAO, a total of over 94.3km2 was cancelled by 
non-technical survey by the Engineering Main Department in 
2018, all in Somali region. No area was reported reduced by 
technical survey in 2018.
This is a signifi cant increase in overall survey output 
compared to 2017, when EMAO informed Mine Action Review 
that in 2017, a total of just over 9.9km2 was reduced by 
technical survey, also all by the Engineering Main Department 
in Somali region.40 No cancellation through non-technical 
survey was reported during that year.
In 2016–18, EMAO reported that in total, 53 areas with a 
size of 136km2 was released in Fik, Misrak Gashamo, and 
Degehabur districts in the Somali region, of which a total of 
125km2 was reportedly cancelled and almost 10km2 reduced 
through technical survey.41
CLEARANCE IN 2018
According to EMAO, a total of fi ve areas with a size of just 
under 1.1km2 were cleared in 2018, with the destruction 
of 582 anti-personnel mines, 3 anti-vehicle mines, and 
7,265 items of UXO.42 It reported that the increase from the 
0.4km2 cleared in 2017 was due to an increase in budget and 
trainings previously carried out.43
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ETHIOPIA: 1 JUNE 2005
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2015
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 
1 JUNE 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (5-YEAR, 7-MONTH 
EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







* Estimated clearance based on report for 2016–18
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with a 
fi ve-year extension granted by states parties in 2015) Ethiopia 
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not 
later than 1 June 2020. It will not meet this deadline and 
submitted a request for a second extension of its Article 5 
deadline in March 2019, for a period of fi ve years, until 
31 December 2025.44
Ethiopia has listed the following reasons for its inability 
to comply with its Article 5 obligations: insecurity in and 
around some mined areas; the lack of basic social services 
and infrastructure necessary for operations in rural areas; 
continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered 
mined areas; lack of funding; the identifi cation of additional 
hazardous areas; climate (such as a three-month rainy 
season); and a lack of precise information on the number 
and location of mined areas.45
Ethiopia has been at best, overly ambitious, or at worst, 
misrepresentative in its projections and estimations for 
completion of survey and clearance in recent years. Its 
2017–20 workplan, submitted in October 2017, stated that 
it was “realistic” that all 314 areas then remaining could be 
addressed using “all available demining assets in Ethiopia” 
within the extension time period, and that donor funding 
will enable it “successfully to complete the clearance of 
contaminated areas from land mines and fulfi l the legal 
obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by 
2020”.46 This was not the case.
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The second extension request clearly sets out primary 
assumptions and risk factors in implementing its targets: 
that donor funding will increase steadily; that old demining 
equipment is replaced by “licensed” demining equipment; 
that one deminer will clear on average as much as 50 square 
metres per day, 22 days a month, and 10 months a year; and 
that one additional demining company will be added, for a total 
of fi ve deployed. As noted, however, the average clearance 
average per deminer would appear unrealistically high.47
While these concerns deserve greater scrutiny and 
clarifi cations from Ethiopia, its increased engagement to fulfi l 
its Article 5 obligations evidenced in its second extension 
request, the reported improvements in border security and 
greater access for mine action operations, the increase in 
government resources for mine action in 2017–18, and the 
new political reporting lines of the national mine action 
programme offi ce, are welcome signs of progress. Building 
on these positive developments, Ethiopia’s efforts to reach 
its goal of Article 5 completion by 2025 should be fully 
encouraged and supported by the international community. 
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Iraq reported a sharp rise in clearance of areas liberated from Islamic State in 2018. The areas were heavily contaminated 
with mines of an improvised nature. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) issued operational accreditation to six international 
demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs). A new director general of the DMA was appointed ad interim in February 
2019 and in June 2019 the offi ce was allocated to a former DMA director. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, equipment, and training for 
staff to enable it to discharge its responsibilities. 
 ■ International donors also should address the severely limited capacity and resources in the national mine 
action structures.
 ■ The government, the DMA, the United Nations and mine action stakeholders should address the lack of 
transparency that continues to prevent a clear, credible determination of operating results in one of the 
world’s largest mine action programmes.
 ■ The DMA should develop and consistently apply a standard procedure for tasking and reporting non-technical 
survey, technical survey, clearance, and land release, preferably in consultation with implementing partners. 
 ■ The DMA should ensure that victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the defi nition 
of an anti-personnel mine are reported as such in accordance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC). 
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(20% of overall score)
6 Iraq has a good understanding of the location of legacy mined areas but estimates of 
the extent need to be refi ned through further survey. Contamination by mines of an 
improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State has not been comprehensively 
surveyed but intensive demining operations have improved understanding of the scope 





(10% of overall score)
4 Iraq’s mine action authorities have responsibility for planning and coordination but their 
work is overshadowed by the powerful ministries of defence, interior, and oil and lack 
funding at a time when most international donor support has been channelled through 
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
4 The Iraq National Strategic Plan mentions gender equality and gender mainstreaming 
within mine action activities. Some international operators and their national partners 
employ women in a wide range of roles, subject to cultural sensitivities in different 




(10% of overall score)
4 Iraq has submitted its Article 7 transparency reports annually and in 2019 made them 
accessible to a wider audience by reporting in English. Mine action data accuracy and 
timeliness, however, remained a critical challenge in 2018, and persistent inconsistencies 
in offi cial data prevent a precise determination of progress.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
3 Iraq’s strategic plan sets general goals but implementation depends on the level of donor 
support. Cumbersome tasking procedures slowed progress and proved a source of 
tension between the DMA, UNMAS, and implementing partners in 2018. 
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 National standards need to be strengthened and updated. Iraq lacks any national 
standard for survey and clearance of mines of an improvised nature – its mine action 
priority in the last three years – and operators work according to their own standing 





(20% of overall score)
6 Outputs appear to have risen sharply in a diffi cult context but lack of consistent, 
comprehensive data prevents a precise determination of progress in survey and 
clearance. 
Average Score 4.9 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Federal Iraq:
Ministry of Health and Environment
Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
 ■ Kurdish region of Iraq (KRI):
Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Ministry of Defence
 ■ Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
 ■ IKMAA
 ■ Akad International Co. for Mines
 ■ Al Danube
 ■ Al Fahad Co. for Demining
 ■ Al Khebra Co. for Demining
 ■ Al Safsafa 
 ■ Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
 ■ Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
 ■ Al Waha
 ■ Eagle Eye
 ■ Ta’az Demining
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG) 
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Humanity & Inclusion 
(HI, formerly Handicap International) 
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) 
 ■ G4S 
 ■ Janus 
 ■ Optima
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)





UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Iraq is the world’s most contaminated country by extent of 
mined area. Total contamination by anti-personnel mines, 
including those of an improvised nature, was estimated at the 
end of 2018 to amount to 1,818km2. In Federal Iraq, the DMA 
estimated total contamination at 1,636 km2 (see Tables 1 and 
2).1 The Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) reported anti-personnel 
mined area of 182km2.2
Federal Iraq
In Federal Iraq, legacy mined areas amounted to 1,025km2, 
including contamination resulting from the 1980–88 war 
with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the 
United States (US)-led coalition. Basrah governorate alone 
accounted for 86% of these mined areas, including many of 
the barrier minefi elds along its borders with Iran which also 
stretch into Missan and Wasit. 
In addition, large areas occupied by Islamic State after 2014 
added extensive contamination with mines of an improvised 
nature and other explosive devices. The DMA reported 
611km2 were affected by improvised explosive devices.3
This includes signifi cant but unspecifi ed contamination by 
victim-activated devices of an improvised nature prohibited 
by the APMBC because they fall within the defi nition of 
anti-personnel mines. Anbar and Nineveh governorates 
appear to be the most affected, accounting for more than 
40% of the total recorded improvised mine contamination. 
Table 1: Federal Iraq mined area (at end 2018)4
Contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 107 206,848,260 14 13,625,700 220,473,960
Anti-vehicle mines 6 176,732 0 0 176,732
Mixed AP/AV mines 180 801,993,129 6 2,539,672 804,532,801
Improvised devices, including 
improvised mines*5
200 282,785,643 219 328,468,957 611,254,600
Totals 493 1,291,803,764 239 344,634,329 1,636,438,093
*The area attributed to improvised mine CHAs and SHAs in this table exceeds the area reported in Table 3.
Table 2: Mined area by province (at end 2018)6
Province CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Anbar 22 7,558,635 23 123,620,173 131,178,808
Baghdad 0 0 4 63,347,436 63,347,436
Basrah 55 886,234,437 0 0 886,234,437
Diyala 4 206,537,237 20 62,486,389 269,023,626
Kirkuk 65 32,281,006 6 757,473 33,038,479
Missan 200 45,192,914 3 400,183 45,593,097
Muthanna 2 37,845,692 0 0 37,845,692
Nineveh 113 33,652,129 182 93,922,948 127,575,077
Salah al-Din 2 2,918,535 0 0 2,918,535
Thi-Qar 0 0 1 99,728 99,728
Wassit 30 39,583,178 0 0 39,583,178
Totals 493 1,291,803,763 239 344,634,330 1,636,438,093
Table 3: IED/Improvised mine contamination (at end 2018)
Province CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total area (m2)
Anbar 17 5,459,666 23 123,620,173 129,079,839
Baghdad 0 0 4 63,347,436 63,347,436
Diyala 3 206,537,237 5 46,880,927 253,418,164
Kirkuk 61 31,992,611 6 757,473 32,750,084
Nineveh 98 32,794,261 175 93,564,110 126,358,371
Salah al Din 2 2,918,535 0 0 2,918,535
Totals 181 279,702,310 213 328,170,119 607,872,429
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Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
The KRI recorded mine contamination of 181km2 at the 
end of 2018, 14% less than a year earlier.7 KRI data did not 
include areas on the border with Turkey which have never 
been surveyed because of continuing fi ghting and Turkish 
airstrikes.8 The Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) 
declined to provide any mine action data because 
of unspecifi ed differences with the DMA, preventing 
further assessment.9







NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along 
regional lines. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) 
represents Iraq internationally and oversees mine action 
for humanitarian purposes in 15 of Iraq’s 19 governorates.11 
Mine action in the KRI’s four governorates is overseen by 
IKMAA, which reports to the Council of Ministers and is led 
by a director general who has ministerial rank.
Federal Iraq
The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,12 which 
reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves 
mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA “plans, 
coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the 
activities of mine action.” The DMA draws up the national 
strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, 
accrediting, and approving the standing operating 
procedures (SoPs) of demining organisations and certifying 
completion of clearance tasks.13 
Coordinating the planning, tasking and information 
management among all the actors remained a signifi cant 
challenge. As a department of the Ministry of Health and 
Environment, the DMA has less authority than the politically 
powerful Ministries of Defence and Interior, which manage 
signifi cant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine 
clearance capacity, as well as the Ministry of Oil. Additionally, 
the DMA’s status is not formally established by law.14`
Rapid turnover of directors has also hampered management 
and policy continuity. Essa al-Fayadh, who was at least the 
tenth director since 2003, was transferred to a different offi ce 
in February 2019. Deputy Minister of Health and Environment 
Kamran Ali took over as acting director of the DMA until June 
2019 when Khaled Rashad Jabar al-Khaqani, a former DMA 
director, was reappointed to the position. 
The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres 
(RMACs): 
 ■ North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, 
Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din;
 ■ Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, 
Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit; 
 ■ South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. 
RMAC South, located in Basra City, operated its own database 
and was responsible for tasking operators. RMAC North and 
MEU were located in Baghdad. The DMA was preparing to 
locate RMAC North in Mosul as at August 2019.15
Federal Iraq’s spending on the DMA and mine action is 
not known. The sector remains heavily dependent on 
international donor funding, most of it channelled through 
UNMAS and signifi cant bilateral funding to clearance 
operators. In the past two years, Iraqi government and 
donors have given priority to tackling massive contamination 
by mines of an improvised nature in areas liberated 
from Islamic State, leaving scant resources for tackling 
contamination by explosive remnants of war (ERW) in others 
areas of Iraq, including the substantial cluster munition 
remnant threat concentrated in the south. 
The DMA accredits operators after they have fi rst registered 
with the NGO Directorate or the Ministry of Trade, a process 
that previously could drag on for years. In the past year, 
Iraq has taken steps to accelerate the process enabling a 
signifi cant shift of mine clearance capacity from the KRI 
to Federal Iraq. Operators reported that cumbersome and 
frequently changing bureaucratic procedures governing 
tasking, reporting, team deployments, and residency 
consumed considerable time and energy, signifi cantly 
hampering productivity in 2018. DMA management changes 
in 2019 reportedly smoothed relations between the DMA 
and UNMAS and appeared to pave the way for some internal 
restructuring within the DMA.16
KRI
IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI. 
It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government’s 
Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in 
Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). Financial 
constraints halved salaries for all staff for the last three 
years and resulted in a number of posts being left vacant, 
but in 2019 payment of salaries resumed and IKMAA planned 
to fi ll vacant posts.17 
Capacity at the start of 2018 included 37 12-strong manual 
demining teams, 7 mechanical teams, 5 survey teams, 3 EOD 
teams, 10 risk education teams, and 37 quality assurance 
(QA) teams responsible for accreditation and monitoring the 
work of all operators.18 IKMAA declined to provide details of 
any changes in capacity or results of their activities.19 
IKMAA’s priorities for areas affected by minefi elds remained 
unchanged and included clearing agricultural land and 
infrastructure, tackling confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) 
close to populated areas and areas reporting most mine 
incidents and casualties.20 
Operators identifi ed areas affected by improvised mines for 
clearance in consultation with district-level authorities and 
submitted requests for task orders to IKMAA. Areas to which 
communities were returning were the main priority. IKMAA 
teams conducted QA.






UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess 
the explosive ordnance hazard threat in liberated areas 
and set three priorities: explosive threat management to 
support stabilisation and recovery, including the return of 
people displaced by confl ict; deliver risk education, nationally 
and locally; and build capacity of government entities to 
manage, regulate and coordinate Iraq’s response to explosive 
contamination. UNMAS had a staff of 100 people in Iraq as of 
late April 2019, of which 48 were international.21
Among other roles, UNMAS has functioned as the main 
channel for international donor funding for mine action in 
Iraq. In 2018, UNMAS received US$76.9 million, some of it 
for activities in 2019–20, and by the end of April 2019 had 
received pledges of an additional $10.9 million. UNMAS 
reported spending approximately $39 million on clearance 
operations in 2018 with the balance of programme spending 
going on a range of activities including risk education and 
capacity building activities such as improvised explosive 
device disposal (IEDD) training for Civil Defence and police 
and explosive hazard fi rst responder training courses.22
UNMAS contracted and issued grants to implementing 
partners and tasked them to conduct assessment, survey, 
“high-risk” search, and clearance in liberated areas on 
tasks prioritised by a government-UNDP Funding Facility 
for Stabilisation, along with other government priorities. 
Focus was on critical infrastructure as well on tasks in other 
locations identifi ed by local authorities. UNMAS said tasks 
were agreed with the DMA.23 UNMAS’s role, however, faced 
criticism in the DMA in 2018 under its previous director. 
Relations reportedly improved after the change in DMA 
leadership in early 2019.24
GENDER
The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifi cally 
mentions gender equality and gender mainstreaming within 
mine action activities, and as objectives of an effective 
programmatic response.25 International operators and their 
national partners individually recruit women for a variety of 
roles, subject to cultural sensitivities that vary in different 
parts of the country. Most operators employ women in 
administrative offi ce roles, many also have a signifi cant 
representation of women in community liaison and risk 
education functions, while some also employ women in 
clearance teams, including as team leaders. The possibilities 
for employing women depended on cultural sensitivities that 
varied between regions.26
Danish Demining Group (DDG) engaged women in 
management and administrative roles and similarly employed 
women in mixed risk education/non-technical survey teams 
but did not deploy them in clearance.27 The Swiss Foundation 
for Mine Action (FSD) employed women in community liaison 
and administrative roles in 2018 and planned to stand up 
an all-women clearance team to work in Mosul district in 
2019.28 G4S in Mosul employed mainly women community 
liaison offi cers and in Sinjar mobilised two mixed female-male 
clearance teams, with half of the high-risk searchers being 
Yazidi females.29
MAG’s staff of 1,067 people included 111 women employed 
across its programme – 88 in operational roles and the other 
23 in support functions. Clearance teams with a total capacity 
of 786 staff employed 48 women, including 26 deminers, four 
of whom are team leaders and four deputy team leaders. 
MAG’s community liaison/survey teams are all two-person, 
mixed gender teams. Among the Yazidi community in 
northern Sinjar district, MAG was able to employ women for 
manual clearance, as mine detection dog (MDD) handlers, 
and in mechanical teams.30
NPA’s Iraq operation employed women in survey and 
clearance roles, including as team leaders, as well as in most 
administrative departments and in senior management. It 
employed mixed teams of men and women for risk education 
and community liaison in Nineveh in 2018, with at least one 
woman per team conducting non-technical survey, and 
with women as team leaders in Ramadi and Mosul districts. 
Recruitment of women for non-offi ce jobs was more diffi cult 
in culturally more conservative governorates in southern 
Iraq but NPA’s survey teams there also included at least 
one woman.31
UNMAS Iraq appointed a dedicated Senior Gender Adviser 
in 2019, the fi rst UNMAS programme to create such a 
post. It required implementing partners to apply Gender in 
Mine Action guidelines and developed Standard Working 
Practices to provide guidelines for implementing partners 
with a focus on recruitment and activities in explosive threat 
management, risk education, and building capacity.32
There also exists a fully staffed Gender Unit at the DMA that 
UNMAS is supporting. UNMAS implementing partners use 
mixed gender teams in their community liaison/risk education 
work, such as the mixed-gender Yazidi team in Sinjar 
operating under G4S, and communications and advocacy 
work is being done to promote women’s empowerment 
within mine action.33
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Information management and access to reliable data remain 
a major challenge for mine action in Iraq but appeared poised 
for improvement in 2019. 
The DMA and IKMAA maintain Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation databases 
with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service 
provider working under contract to the US Department of 
State’s Offi ce of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). 
Operators complain about a marked reluctance on the part 
of iMMAP to share data with them.
The national mine action database is located at the DMA’s 
Baghdad headquarters. RMAC South (RMAC-S) maintains 
a database in Basrah, receiving reports from demining 
organisations in its area of operations, which is synchronised 
with Baghdad’s at intervals determined by the volume of 
data to be uploaded. Operators working on projects funded 
through UNMAS report directly to UNMAS, which in turn 
forwards the data to the DMA. Although iMMAP coordinates 
data on behalf of the DMA and IKMAA, operators report the 
extent to which information was shared by all national actors 
is unclear.34
Operators are required to submit results in hard copy 
delivered by hand every month to the DMA, which then 
uploads results into the database. The procedure meets Iraqi 
legal requirements, which do not recognise electronic copies, 
but can cause long delays in uploading results of survey and 
clearance. As a result, operators say task orders issued by 
the DMA have often lacked the most up-to date information.35 
In March 2019, RMAC-S started receiving data reports 
electronically as well as in hard copy. Improvements in 
cluster munitions survey are strengthening the quality of 
available data through the RMAC-S database. But in the mine 
action sector in general, operators report limited access to 
data and expressed concern about the limited quantity and 
quality of data available with task orders.36 
All mine action stakeholders identifi ed challenges to the 
sector’s information management. The DMA and iMMAP 
reported problems with the timeliness and accuracy of 
reporting by implementing partners.37 The DMA said it did not 
receive any reports from UNMAS until May 2018,38 a situation 
that UNMAS said was attributable to its agreement with the 
DMA at the time.39 Operators voiced frustration with the lack 
of consistency in DMA tasking and reporting requirements, 
diffi culties gaining access to data, and expressed a lack 
of confi dence in its quality.40 As at May 2019, the DMA was 
preparing to roll out an Online Task Management System 
(OTMS) prepared by iMMAP and designed to facilitate 
investigation of data and streamline tasking.41 
In 2018, UNMAS set up an online tasking request form for 
UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs to expedite explosive 
threat management and to report potential explosive threats 
in areas where they worked or intend to work in liberated 
areas. Once a request had been validated, and where UNMAS 
had capacity to respond, an implementing partner would be 
tasked after the DMA was informed. Alternatively, UNMAS 
would submit a suspected hazardous area (SHA) report to 
the DMA.42
PLANNING AND TASKING
Iraq’s APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, 
submitted in April 2017, laid out a general direction for 
mine action, but its proposed actions were overtaken by 
the emergency response launched for clearance of areas 
liberated from Islamic State. Iraq’s mine action priority 
in 2018 remained tackling the massive contamination by 
mines of an improvised nature as well as ERW in liberated 
areas to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons, 
rehabilitation of public services, and restoration of the 
economy. The scale of the challenge has largely marginalised 
efforts to address legacy minefi elds in Federal Iraq.43
Tasking and reporting proved a contentious issue in relations 
between the DMA, UNMAS, and international operators in 
2018, aggravated by weak coordination and the absence of 
an agreed mechanism and frequent policy shifts. Operators 
identify potential task sites and request task orders from 
the DMA. Task orders were issued by the DMA’s Operations 
Department and by the RMACs until the last quarter of 2018, 
when responsibility for issuing task orders was centralised 
in Operations in Baghdad. The DMA reported that operators 
requested task orders for survey or clearance of areas that 
had already been surveyed or cleared and failed to follow 
up some task orders issued by the DMA.44 International 
actors reported multiple concerns, including long delays in 
receiving DMA responses to task order requests, holding 
back productive use of survey and clearance assets, the poor 
quality of data accompanying task orders, and lack of clarity 
or consistency in reporting requirements.45 
In the KRI, IKMAA started work on a fi ve-year strategy in the 
last quarter of 2017, which focused on clearance of legacy 
minefi elds. This followed the KRI’S independence referendum 
and subsequent loss of control over much of the disputed 
Grey Area heavily affected by mines of an improvised nature 
and IEDs. IKMAA’s priorities remain unchanged and include 
clearing agricultural land, infrastructure, tackling CHAs 
close to populated areas as well as areas reporting most 
mine incidents and casualties.46 Population return from cities 
and big towns to rural areas as a result of changing socio-
economic conditions has increased pressure for rural area 
clearance.47 Operators have already completed clearance of 
high-risk areas and are now focused on medium-risk tasks, 
including mined areas close to villages and impacting key 
infrastructure.48 






STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle 
area clearance, non-technical survey and technical survey 
that were written in 2004–05, and some have been updated, 
but standards on land release reportedly have not kept up 
with amendments to the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS).49 National standards for IEDDs were under development 
as of September 2019.50 International operators conducted 
area clearance of mines of an improvised nature and other 
devices according to their own SoPs which were reviewed 
and approved by the DMA in the process of accreditation. 
Operators conducted little clearance of residential buildings in 
2018, but with strong demand from people displaced by confl ict 
to return to their houses the issue drew increasing attention 
in 2019, highlighting the need for international and national 
standards and Iraqi government policy decisions on issues 
relating to liability for compensation claims in the event of 
damage to private residences.51
Iraq’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) exist in Arabic 
but there is no offi cial English translation and international 
operators have found it diffi cult to get access to the Arabic 
version. The DMA was discussing with Norwegian People’s 
Aid (NPA) in mid-2019 a plan for updating standards in 
consultation with other mine action stakeholders and also 
had discussions with the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on the possibility of setting 
up a programme of capacity development, including updating 
standards and providing training.52
The rapid expansion of mine action since 2017 and pressure 
to accredit operators imposed acute strain on DMA’s quality 
assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) capacity and left it with 
limited ability to conduct effective QC. The DMA reported 
it had six two-person QA teams in 2018, insuffi cient for the 
size of the sector. To keep up with the growth of the sector it 
accredited fi ve commercial companies and six NGOs for QA.53
UNMAS had limited capacity to QA work by organisations it 
contracted early in 2018, but in the course of the year hired 
additional QA staff.54
OPERATORS 
The DMA identifi ed a total of 61 organisations accredited for 
some aspect of mine action of which at least 14 national and 
9 international organisations are believed to have conducted 
survey or clearance in 2018.55
The Ministry of Defence reported it had 12 600-man engineer 
battalions conducting EOD and clearance of mines of an 
improvised nature in which approximately half the personnel 
were operators. Army engineers worked on tasks identifi ed 
as priorities by local government authorities.56 In Federal 
Iraq, cleared items are the property of the Army which is 
the only organisation authorised to conduct demolitions.57
The Ministry of Interior’s Civil Defence units employ 494 
personnel divided into teams deployed in every governorate 
tackling unexploded ordnance and other ERW but not 
clearing IEDs or mines of an improvised nature.58
In the KRI, IKMAA reported in May 2018 that it had maintained 
capacity unchanged from the previous year: 37 demining 
teams (444 personnel), 7 mechanical teams, 3 EOD teams, 
5 survey teams, 37 QA teams, and 10 risk education teams. 
IKMAA teams are focused on clearing legacy minefi elds, 
prioritising agricultural land, but it operated under severe 
fi nancial constraints that led it in 2016 to cut salaries in half.59
IKMAA declined to provide additional information in 2019.60
Major national commercial operators included Arabian Gulf 
and Ta’az Demining, both of which were active in the oil 
sector. Other commercial companies identifi ed by the DMA 
as conducting mostly small amounts of survey or clearance 
in 2018 included Al-Waha, Al-Danube, Al-Fahad Co. for 
Demining, Alsiraj Almudhia, AKAD, Al-Khebra Company for 
Demining and Eagle Eye.61 International commercial operators 
active in 2018 included Janus Global Operations, working 
in partnership with Al-Fahad in Anbar, Kirkuk, and Nineveh 
governorates and Optima working with Al-Danube teams 
under contract to UNMAS in Anbar. G4S, also under contract 
to UNMAS, was operational in 2018 and 2019 conducting 
clearance in Nineveh governorate, including Mosul and Sinjar, 
and in Kirkuk.62
Among international humanitarian organisations, MAG, 
the longest serving operator which has been present 27 
years, also remained the biggest. It had a total staff of 1,067 
at the end of 2018, up by more than 20% on its capacity a 
year earlier. MAG continued to work in the KRI, operating 
in 2018 with 24 teams (14 demining teams, 2 MDD teams, 
1 mechanical team, and 7 risk education teams). The shift 
in control of the former Grey Area from the KRI to Federal 
Iraq at the end of 2017 saw most of MAG’s area of operations, 
concentrated in Nineveh governorate, come under the 
authority of the DMA. By the end of 2018, MAG had 89 teams 
active in Federal Iraq, including 49 teams of deminers, 5 
survey teams, 5 mechanical teams, 3 MDD teams and 27 risk 
education teams. MAG also operated with 14 demining teams 
in the KRI, as well as 1 mechanical team, 2 MDD teams, and 
7 risk education teams.63
Iraqi authorities and the DMA took steps in 2018 to accelerate 
registration and accreditation of demining organisations but 
continuing delays experienced by MAG in 2018 exemplifi ed 
procedural and regulatory issues suffered to varying degrees 
by all international operators. MAG lost the right of access to 
Nineveh governorate for most of the fi rst half of 2018. Three 
years after applying, it received registration from the NGO 
Directorate in January 2018, temporary accreditation from the 
DMA in March 2018, permission to deploy teams in May and 
visas for Federal Iraq in June and it resumed operations in 
fi ve districts of Nineveh governorate between May and July. In 
September, MAG received full accreditation for two years for 
technical survey, manual clearance, mechanical survey and 
clearance and IED disposal but not for non-technical survey, 
risk education, and MDDs, which continued with temporary 
accreditation extended until the end of the year. In October, 
MAG lost permission for movement of teams between the KRI 
and Federal Iraq because of an incident at a border checkpoint. 
The permissions were reinstated in November allowing full 
operations to resume. In the interim, MAG redeployed many of 
the affected teams to support operations in the KRI’s Dohuk 
and Slemani governorates.64
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DDG reduced its capacity in the KRI from six teams at the 
end of 2017 to one four-person EOD team a year later but 
expanded capacity in Federal Iraq from 20 to 29 teams. 
These included two clearance and two risk education/
non-technical survey teams in Basra with the remainder 
divided between Kirkuk, Mosul, and Salah al-Din, where 
DDG opened an offi ce in September 2018 to support teams in 
Tikrit and Baiji districts. Among issues DDG confronted was a 
demand from local authorities in Kirkuk that its staff in that 
governorate include 32% Arabs, 32% Turkmen, 32% Kurds, 
and 4% Christians. Its inability to comply with this condition 
meant that teams were denied access to operational sites 
for extended periods of time and it regained access only 
after the intervention of the UN Offi ce for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs.65 
FSD started 2018 with four demining teams based in the KRI 
who conducted some clearance of minefi elds in areas under 
IKMAA’s control but after receiving temporary accreditation 
from the DMA in April it added two teams in July and 
conducted survey and clearance of mines of an improvised 
nature in Nineveh. FSD received full, two-year operational 
accreditation from the DMA in October 2018 and was able to 
add two more clearance teams to fi nish the year with eight 
teams and sixty-one deminers. It expected to add additional 
capacity in 2019, recruiting deminers from minorities and 
deploying them on clearing improvised mine belts around 
minority villages.66 Humanity & Inclusion (HI, previously 
Handicap International), also based in Erbil, operated 
one team and six deminers in the KRI and three teams 
(one survey, two demining) with 10 personnel in DMA-run 
areas of Kirkuk. After long delays, HI received operational 
accreditation from the DMA in May 2018 and expected to 
receive additional funding to expand capacity in 2019.67
The HALO Trust, after setting up a Baghdad offi ce to complete 
formalities establishing a programme at the end of 2017, 
received six-month provisional accreditation in May 2018 
and was able to start operations in Fallujah with one survey 
and one mechanical team in 2018. HALO Trust operations 
experienced delays when its provisional accreditation expired 
in November before DMA conducted the operational audit 
for full accreditation. HALO Trust later opened a sub-offi ce 
in Tikrit with four manual clearance teams, two mechanical 
teams and two survey teams, and a second sub-offi ce in 
Ramadi for a total capacity of just over 100 staff.68 
NPA, which moved its management offi ce from Erbil to 
Baghdad in December 2017, opened a project offi ce in Ramadi 
in 2018 which covered Anbar governorate, where NPA also 
opened a forward operating base in Haditha and an offi ce in 
Ana. NPA also deployed non-technical survey teams to Diyala 
governorate which were managed from Baghdad. After shifting 
operations in the north from Erbil to Mosul, it closed its Erbil 
offi ce in December 2018. With additional capacity in Basra 
focusing on cluster munitions survey and clearance, NPA 
fi nished 2018 with 108 operations staff in six manual clearance 
teams, two mechanical teams, and thirteen survey teams.69 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
For area clearance of mines of an improvised nature (the 
main focus of Iraq’s mine action in 2018), operators mostly 
employed a combination of manual and mechanical assets. 
Operators early on identifi ed that mechanical assets rapidly 
accelerated search and clearance of improvised mine belts 
and employed a variety of assets, including armoured 
Backhoes fi tted with a boom and rake for lifting the main 
charge. Commercial operators conducting post-confl ict 
clearance of urban sites have employed front-end loaders 
and sifters to tackle sometimes huge quantities of rubble.70 
MAG also worked with MDDs engaged in the clearance of 
medium-and low-risk conventional minefi elds in the KRI’s 
Sulimaniya governorate.71
DEMINER SAFETY
The army acknowledged it had “sacrifi ced a lot of people” 
in clearance operations but did not give details of casualties 
and it was not apparent if engineer units had sustained 
casualties in 2018.72 A MAG deminer was killed by detonation 
of an improvised mine in October 2018. Investigations did 
not produce a defi nitive fi nding as to what had caused the 
detonation but pointed to the possibilities of it either being 
while excavating in response to a signal or in the course of 
marking a new lane.73 
An NPA staff member working in an armoured Backhoe was 
injured by the blast from an improvised mine as it was being 
lifted from the ground. Part of the machine’s lifting arm 
sheared off and hit the armoured glass, shattering but not 
penetrating it. NPA replaced the glass and added a wire 
grill placed over the glass which withstood subsequent 
test detonations.74
More than a year after the military defeat of the Islamic State, 
insecurity continued in certain localities, notably parts of 
western Anbar governorate, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Kirkuk. 
Two HALO Trust national staff were killed in Anbar in an 
attack by insurgents on a social gathering unrelated to mine 
action in November 2018.75 In addition, insurgents continued 
to carry out sporadic attacks with remote controlled and 
vehicle-born IEDs.76 UNMAS reported one attack with small 
arms fi re directed at a task site from multiple directions 
prompting its evacuation.77 The United Nations reported 
in July 2019 that Islamic State was expanding as a covert 
network with large numbers of fi ghters and supporters 
in Iraq and Syria, operating freely in many locations and 
creating conditions for an eventual resurgence.78





LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Iraq continued to give top priority in 2018 to clearance of massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature as well as 
IEDs from areas liberated from Islamic State in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by 
confl ict, the restoration of public services, and economic recovery. The concentration of resources in these areas left little 
capacity for tackling earlier, so-called legacy minefi elds, though some clearance continued of northern mined areas in the 
KRI and in southern oilfi elds. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Productivity appears to have risen sharply in 2018 but gaps 
and inconsistencies in data prevented a clear determination 
of progress. In Federal Iraq, the DMA reported release of 
a total of 135.1km2, including clearance of 83.3km2 of areas 
contaminated by improvised devices, thought to consist 
mainly of mines of an improvised nature (however, the DMA 
did not provide details of clearance by operator or identify 
device types, making it diffi cult to determine the basis 
or reliability of the data, and Mine Action Review has not 
included the clearance in its national total for Iraq); clearance 
of 1.6km2 of areas affected by anti-personnel mines; 
cancellation of 1.7km2 through non-technical survey, and 
area reduction through technical survey of 48.5km2.79
IKMAA declined to provide details of mine action results in 
the KRI.80 In Iraq’s Article 7 report for 2018, IKMAA recorded 
3,484 anti-personnel mines destroyed during the year but 
provided no details of land released.81
SURVEY IN 2018
Iraq reported little cancellation through non-technical survey 
in 2018 but considerable area reduction through technical 
survey. The unusual balance underscored lack of clarity in 
requirements for reporting cancellation and area reduction.82
Iraq’s Civil Defence and the Ministry of Defence accounted 
for a little over half the total area reduced and commercial 
companies for 40%. The basis for this data was unclear.83
Land release data reported by international humanitarian 
NGOs did not match the area reduction that the DMA 
attributed to them. 
MAG reported reducing 739,870m2 through technical 
survey, 80% of which was in Nineveh governorate, with a 
small amount in Kirkuk, and a total of 70,882m2 in the KRI 
governorates of Dohuk and Sulimaniya.84
NPA assessed a total of 94,243,575m2 in 2018, of which 95% 
was in Anbar province, including 65.7km2 in Haditha district, 
12.5km2 in Ana district and 11.1km2 in Ramadi. The other 
areas assessed were Hamdaniya district of Nineveh (2.7km2) 
and four districts of Diyala governorate (2.3km2). NPA said it 
cancelled or reduced 1.82km2.85







Civil Defence 2 857,509
Ministry of Defence 2 254,919
Handicap International 17 596,549
Total 21 1,708,977
Table 6: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201887
Operator Area reduced (m2)
Civil Defence 13,447,963


















Federal Iraq reported release of 83.3km2 of areas affected 
by IEDs and improvised mines and 63,596 devices, a 50% 
increase in area cleared compared with results reported by 
the DMA the previous year and a more than fourfold increase 
in the number of devices cleared. The DMA did not provide 
details of clearance by operator or identify device types, 
making it diffi cult to determine the basis or reliability of the 
data.88 Given this, Mine Action Review has not included the 
clearance in its national total for Iraq. The total clearance 
recorded for Iraq (8.44km2) comprises clearance of anti-
personnel mines of an improvised nature by humanitarian 
demining organisations in Federal Iraq (5.65km2; see Table 8); 
clearance reported by the Ministry of Defence (1.59km2; 
see Table 9); and clearance in northern Iraq by (1.2km2; 
see Table 10).89
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Clearance results underscored the focus on Nineveh 
governorate, including the heavily contaminated districts of 
Mosul, al-Hamdaniya, Sinjar and Telafar, which apparently 
accounted for 90% of the area cleared and 94% of devices 
(see Table 7). Mosul city, occupied for three years by Islamic 
State and saturated with improvised devices, was a priority 
for clearance by the military and international commercial 
operators who were the only operators conducting 
systematic building clearance in 2018. Mosul district, 
including the city, accounted for 0.01% of the area that the 
DMA reported cleared in Nineveh governorate but for 81% of 
devices destroyed.90 In 2018, operators in the city dealt with 
782 suicide belts, many of them still attached to corpses of 
Islamic State fi ghters, and shifted 7.6 million tons of rubble.91 
Janus reported releasing 1,462,301m2 in Anbar province, 
more than recorded by the DMA in that governorate, and 
1,716,436m2 in Nineveh and Kirkuk governorates.92









Anbar 29 1,380,180 3,483
Kirkuk 1 7,020 10
Nineveh 438 75,404,782 59,881
Salah al-Din 6 6,546,255 222
Totals 474 83,338,237 63,596
International humanitarian operators reported more modest 
results with clearance of areas affected by improvised 
mines, mostly pressure-plate mines, amounting to 
5.6km2 (see Table 8), about 18% less than the 6.9km2 of 
this contamination cleared the previous year. Most of the 
clearance in both years was conducted by MAG, much the 
biggest operator, and the downturn appears to refl ect its 
inability to deploy teams for most of the fi rst half of the 
year pending receipt of its DMA accreditation.94 
Table 8: Clearance of improvised mines by humanitarian 
demining organisations in 201895
Operator Area cleared (m2) Mines destroyed 
DDG 24,086 3
FSD 1,165,775 2,743





UNMAS reported that the operators it funded cleared 
1,158 hazardous areas and 847,004m2, but it also did not 
disaggregate results by operator. Organisations working 
for UNMAS cleared 1,117 structures and 17,956 explosive 
devices. UNMAS reported clearance of two anti-personnel 
mines, two anti-vehicle mines, and 14,443 ERW.96
The intensive effort to clear areas liberated from Islamic 
State left little capacity available to tackle Iraq’s extensive 
legacy minefi elds. The DMA reported clearance of a total of 
1.59km2, two-thirds of it apparently conducted by the Ministry 
of Defence and the rest by national commercial companies 
(see Table 9).
International NGOs reported additional clearance of legacy 
mined areas in 2018 (see Table 10). MAG and FSD both 
conducted clearance in areas of the KRI coordinated by 
IKMAA, which declined to report any details of operations by 
its own clearance teams. Nearly two-thirds of the additional 
clearance was conducted by MAG in Kirkuk governorate.97 
Table 9: Mine clearance in 201898
Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m2) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed ERW destroyed
Ministry of Defence 64 1,064,339 2,122 461 3,759
AKAD 4 124,522 15 0 24
Al-Khebra 107 336,261 1,370 10 1,594
Eagle Eye 7 63,603 17 0 26
Totals 182 1,588,725 3,524 471 5,403
Table 10: INGO mine clearance in the KRI and Federal Iraq in 201899
Province Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
Federal Iraq
Kirkuk MAG 24 736,135 290 56
Diyala HI 3 41,751 20 38
Nineva MAG100 123 4,386,484 1 2,358
Federal Iraq totals 150 5,164,370 311 2,452
Dohuk MAG 16 203,265 160 41
Erbil FSD 3 16,955 17 3
Sulimaniya MAG 11 125,385 415 40
Sulimaniya FSD 2 76,624 2 91
KRI totals 32 422,229 594 175
Overall totals 182 5,586,599 905  2,627 





ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 FEBRUARY 2008
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2018
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2017), Iraq is 
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not 
later than 1 February 2028. 
The scale of mine contamination in Federal Iraq and the 
KRI makes it highly unlikely that Iraq will meet its Article 
5 deadline. On current contamination estimates it would 
require release of more than 200km2 a year to meet its 2028 
deadline, signifi cantly more than present levels. Moreover, 
the data on area contamination does not capture the extent 
and complexity of clearing a major city such as Mosul, 
devastated by confl ict, or the thousands of residential 
buildings in towns and villages across liberated areas that 
were seeded by Islamic State with explosive devices and 
require systematic search.101
Iraq has not taken a clear offi cial position acknowledging 
victim-activated explosive devices as part of its Article 5 
obligation and debate continues on which of the wide range 
of improvised devices, such as booby-traps encountered 
in buildings come under the APMBC. Irrespective, devices 
encountered in structures represent a humanitarian 
imperative that in any event will consume signifi cant time, 
capacity, and resources of the mine action sector. 
Iraq’s Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 
April 2017 at a point it was still gearing up a response to 
contamination in liberated areas, provided few details of its 
plans, priorities, or timelines for clearance. It also did not 
include contamination by mines of an improvised nature as 
part of its treaty obligation. Iraq is due to present an update 
to the request in 2019 which should provide more clarity on 
its prospects for addressing its treaty obligations. 
Accelerating clearance reported by the DMA in 2018, if 
validated, shows the potential for Iraq sharply reducing 
contamination by 2028, even if clearance is not completed. 
Additionally, Iraq is confi dent that re-survey of legacy 
mined will lead to signifi cant reduction in estimates of 
contamination.102 Iraq, however, faces challenges that leave 
prospects for progress uncertain. The diffi culty obtaining 
quality data on either contamination or clearance points 
to deep rooted structural issues in Iraq’s mine action 
programme that hold back effi cient use of available assets. 
They include institutional relationships between Iraqi 
government entities and between the DMA, UNMAS, and 
international operators and the need to build capacity in 
the national mine action authority. 
Continued progress will depend heavily on sustained 
international donor support. The extension request envisaged 
expenditure from government sources of $30 million in 
2018−19 and $238 million over the 10-year period to the end 
of 2027. The Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties invited Iraq 
to report annually on funding available from external sources 
and the government for its treaty implementation efforts.103
Most funding in 2018 continued to be channelled through 
UNMAS and bilaterally to mine action NGO operators and 
the DMA was unable to give details of government funding 
available to mine action in 2017, 2018 or 2019.104
Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance 
(2014–18)
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018 – six years after formally declaring it had fulfi lled its Article 5 clearance obligations – Jordan fi nally completed the 
verifi cation and sampling project of previously cleared mined areas in the Jordan Valley and checks of previously cleared 
mined areas on the northern borders, bringing it back into compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC). 
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*Sampling and verifi cation of mined 
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(20% of overall score)
9 There are no remaining mined areas suspected or confi rmed to contain anti-personnel 





(10% of overall score)
8 The NCDR is responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and quality assuring 
all mine action organisations in Jordan. Jordan provided government funding to the 
NCDR and for verifi cation of previously cleared mined areas.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 According to the NCDR, there is equal access to women and men in survey and clearance 
teams. Survey and community liaison teams in Jordan are mixed and women and children 




(10% of overall score)
9 Jordan uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database 
and submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 reports.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 The NCDR has a 2015–20 National Plan which includes plans to address explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Jordan, and also covered the required 
sampling and verifi cation in the Jordan Valley and checks on the northern border.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 The sampling and verifi cation project in the Jordan Valley was conducted by manual 
demining teams under the NCDR, and the checks on the northern border by the Armed 





(20% of overall score)
9 In 2018, Jordan completed the verifi cation and sampling project of previously cleared 
mined areas in the Jordan Valley and checks of previously cleared mined areas on the 
northern borders, bringing it into compliance with APMBC Article 5.
Average Score 7.7 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Jordan reports that it completed sampling and verifi cation 
for missing mines in previously cleared areas in the Jordan 
Valley and checks of previously cleared mined areas on 
the northern borders by June 2018.1 According to Jordan’s 
most recent APMBC Article 7 report, there are no remaining 
areas in need of verifi cation in either the Jordan Valley or the 
northern borders.2
Jordan had previously declared fulfi lment of its Article 5 
clearance obligations on 24 April 2012, having determined 
that no areas under its jurisdiction or control remained in 
which anti-personnel mines were known or suspected.3
However, in formally declaring completion of its Article 5 
obligations at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in 
December 2012, Jordan noted that: “While all mined areas 
that Jordan had made every effort to identify were cleared 
by 24 April 2012, Jordan, as a responsible State Party, 
has proceeded with verifi cation efforts in two parts of the 
country, with these verifi cation efforts having resulted in 
the discovery of additional mined areas.”4
This pertained fi rst to the need for verifi cation in the 
Jordan Valley, as earlier clearance by the Jordanian Armed 
Forces’ Royal Engineering Corps (REC) did not comply with 
national and international standards and was not subject 
to quality control;5 and second to verifi cation needed along 
Jordan’s northern border with Syria, due to a considerable 
discrepancy between the recorded number of emplaced 
mines and the number actually cleared (estimated to be more 
than 10,000 mines6). Some of the difference in the fi gures 
was ascribed to the movement of mines to outside identifi ed 
areas, due to fl ooding and terrain fl uctuations, detonations,7
and unrecorded clearance operations by the army or by 
smugglers.8 In February 2019, Jordan offered a further 
explanation for some of the difference: the failure to record 
some of the earlier clearance.9
With respect to the Jordan Valley, Jordan reported in its 
December 2012 declaration of Article 5 completion that 
5km2 remained to be verifi ed in an effort expected to take 
two years.10 As at the end of 2017, 1.4km2 of area in need of 
verifi cation remained across 36 areas in the Jordan Valley.11
In September 2018, Jordan reported to Mine Action Review 
that sampling and verifi cation in the Jordan Valley, overseen 
by the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation 
(NCDR), had been completed in June 2018.12 Jordan 
subsequently announced completion of its “verifi cation for 
missing mines” project in June 2018, in its Transparency 
Statement at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in 
November 2018.13
With respect to the northern border, in its 2012 Article 
5 Declaration of Completion, Jordan reported that some 
6.9km2 remained to be verifi ed, and that the process being 
undertaken by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had been 
delayed for security reasons.14 NPA’s verifi cation procedure 
involved a mixture of visual inspection of areas adjacent to 
the mine belt, ground preparation with mechanical assets, 
and limited involvement of manual deminers, with full 
technical survey of areas where evidence and experience 
pointed to a risk of contamination.15 By May 2013, the 
estimated area needing verifi cation had been reduced to 
around 5km2, but operations by NPA were halted because 
of the security situation.16
In its 2015–20 National Plan, Jordan reported that 3.7km2
remained to be verifi ed and inspected by QC teams along the 
northern border.17 Jordan reported that, as at end 2017, just 
over 2.8km2 across 18 areas along the northern border still 
needed verifi cation.18 In September 2018, Jordan reported to 
Mine Action Review that the Jordanian military had “checked” 
the remaining areas on the northern border,19 and in its 
Transparency Statement at the Seventeenth Meeting of States 
Parties in November 2018, Jordan subsequently announced 
completion of quality control procedures by its armed forces, 
and the use of the land for military purposes.20 In February 
2019, Jordan reconfi rmed to Mine Action Review that the 
required checks in this area had been completed before June 
2018 and no future action was needed from the NCDR.21
Jordan remains contaminated by explosive remnants of war 
(ERW), primarily the result of the 1948 partition of Palestine, 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli confl ict, the 1970 civil war, and the 
1975 confrontation with Syria. Military training ranges and 
cross-border smuggling have added to the ERW problem. 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Jordan established the NCDR under a Royal Decree, which 
the government subsequently incorporated into law.22 The 
NCDR’s board of directors includes representatives of the 
Jordanian Armed Forces, the government, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), landmine survivors, and the media.23
The NCDR did not, though, become fully operational until 
2004, when a new administration, chaired by Prince 
Mired Raad Zeid al-Hussein, was appointed.24 The NCDR is 
responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and 
quality-assuring all mine action organisations, as well as for 
fundraising.25 It is also responsible for ensuring mine action is 
integrated into the country’s wider development strategies.26
In addition, Jordan’s national plan reports that the NCDR 
will transition from a national institution focusing largely 
on its own explosive ordnance clearance, to one that will 
concentrate on assisting other confl ict-affected countries to 
overcome the challenges of mine action and ERW removal.27
In 2018, the Jordanian government provided 220,000 
Jordanian dinars (approximately US$310,300) towards the 
cost of the NCDR and 20,000 Jordanian dinars (approximately 
US$28,200) for verifi cation of areas in the Jordan Valley.28
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GENDER 
All groups affected by anti-personnel mine contamination, 
including women and children, were consulted during survey 
and community liaison activities, as specifi ed in Jordan’s 
national standards.29 Survey and community liaison teams are 
mixed gender and in some surveys women made up 50% of 
the team. Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by 
sex and age.30
According to the NCDR, there is equal access for women 
and men in survey and clearance teams, including 
managerial-level positions, but there is a greater proportion 
of women in survey teams than in clearance teams.31
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The NCDR uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.32 
Jordan submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 reports under the APMBC.
PLANNING AND TASKING
The NCDR’s 2015–20 National Plan aimed to verify, sample, 
and release the remaining 5.4km2 in the Jordan Valley by 
the end of 2017, by deploying six manual clearance teams 
and one mechanical demining team at a projected cost of 
US$2 million.33 Jordan fell slightly behind schedule, due to 
not deploying the capacity assumed in the National Plan, but 
completed the sampling and verifi cation in the Jordan Valley 
in June 2018.34 
According to the 2015–20 National Plan, resuming verifi cation 
and release of the remaining mined areas along the northern 
border with Syria was dependent on the security situation 
but, would require one year’s work with three manual teams 
and one mechanical team, at an expected cost of $1 million.35 
According to the National Authorities, Jordan’s military 
reportedly “checked” the areas on the northern borders and 
that, as a result of these checks, further QC by the NCDR in 
that region was deemed unnecessary.36
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS 
The verifi cation and demining operations in Jordan were 
conducted by the NCDR and REC. From October 2015, the 
NCDR deployed four operational teams, totalling 35 deminers, 
for verifi cation and clearance.37 From January 2018, capacity 
was reduced to three operational teams.38
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
According to the NCDR, a shortage of funds prevented it from 
deploying mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs) 
in its Jordan Valley operations.39 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, Jordan reported fi nding and destroying six 
anti-personnel mines (fi ve M14 mines and one M35 mine) 
and releasing a total of 961,860m2, during sampling and 
verifi cation efforts in the Jordan Valley.40 
This represents a decrease on the 1.44km2 of land verifi ed 
and released in 2017, when 75 anti-personnel mines (72 
M14 mines and 3 M35 mines) and 2 anti-vehicle mines were 
destroyed.41 The decrease in 2018 is due to the fact that 
sampling and verifi cation efforts in the Jordan Valley were 
completed in June 2018,42 and, according to Jordan, no mined 
areas suspected or confi rmed to contain anti-personnel 
mines remain.43
In addition, Jordan’s military reportedly “checked” the areas 
on the northern borders,44 but Jordan did not report any 
anti-personnel mines as having been found and destroyed 
in 2018, as part of that process.45
 








ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR JORDAN: 1 MAY 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009 
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MAY 2012
DATE OF ACTUAL COMPLETION: JUNE 2018 
Jordan is believed to no longer have outstanding Article 5 
obligations. In its latest Article 7 transparency report, Jordan 
reported that, as at the end of 2018, no mined areas requiring 
verifi cation or quality control (QC) remained.46
Prior to June 2018, Jordan declared fulfi lment of its Article 
5 obligations on 24 April 2012, just ahead of its 1 May 2012 
Convention deadline, in accordance with the three-year 
extension request granted by states parties in 2008. When 
Jordan submitted its formal declaration of completion to 
the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012,47
it acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas 
where landmines have been emplaced”,48 and noted that 
verifi cation efforts had resulted in the discovery of additional 
mined areas.49 Between declaring completion in 2012 and 
completion of the sampling and verifi cation project in 2018 
in the Jordan Valley and of checks of remaining areas on the 
northern border, Jordan had been in violation of the APMBC 
as it had failed to request an extension to its 2012 Article 
5 deadline while it undertook the required sampling and 
verifi cation. 
Jordan had continued to discover and clear signifi cant 
numbers of mines in areas it verifi ed, despite having 
declared completion.
In the period between 2014 and 2018, Jordan verifi ed close to 
5km of mined area (see Table 1), during which a total of 463 
anti-personnel mines, 10 anti-vehicle mines, and 181 other 
items of UXO were discovered and destroyed.50
Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Niger experienced a surge in attacks by non-state armed groups employing mines and other explosive devices of an 
improvised nature in 2018. Niger pledged to resume mine clearance from the end of 2018 but has not recorded any 
survey or clearance since that date. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Niger should submit a comprehensive Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline 
extension request, including details of past survey and clearance, an updated list of mined areas requiring 
clearance, and a detailed workplan for meeting its international legal obligations.
 ■ Niger should submit annual Article 7 reports detailing the progress of mine action as the APMBC requires.
 ■ Niger should develop and implement a fundraising strategy to ensure it fulfi ls commitments made in its 
earlier Article 5 deadline extension request. 
 ■ Niger should seek and facilitate engagement of international demining organisations.
 ■ Niger should ensure its national mine action standards are in accordance with international standards and 
that there is a quality management system in place to safeguard the quality of demining operations. 
LIGHT, 
BUT PRECISE EXTENT UNCLEAR
NIGER












(20% of overall score)
6 Niger has identifi ed limited anti-personnel mine contamination in the Agadez region but 
it lacks clarity on the extent. It also now faces escalating attacks by non-state armed 





(10% of overall score)
5 The limited mine action in the past fi ve years was funded by Niger’s limited resources 
but while stipulating the need for international funding and for further progress has not 
availed itself of support offered by humanitarian organisations. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)




(10% of overall score)
3 Inconsistent reporting of mine clearance points to weak information management. 
Niger has submitted only one Article 7 transparency report since 2012 (in 2018).
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
3 Niger lacks a strategic plan for mine action or detailed workplans.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
4 Niger has reported that it has national standards that are compliant with the International 





(20% of overall score)
2 Niger did not release any mined area in the last two years and there is a lack of clarity 
about the extent of clearance since 2014.
Average Score 3.7 Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Niger reported in 2018 that it had two mined areas totalling 
235,557m2 near Madama, a military base in the north-east of 
the country: a confi rmed hazardous area (CHA) of 39,304m2 
and a suspected hazardous area (SHA) of 196,253m2.1 Three 
hazardous areas visited by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
in Madama in 2017 were believed to contain mostly French 
M51 minimum-metal anti-personnel mines. Nigerien army 
engineers, conducting earlier clearance operations, had 
found the mines buried in sand at depths of up to one metre.2 
Niger’s varying statements on clearance activities leave 
some uncertainty about the extent of the CHA remaining to 
be cleared (see Article 5 compliance section below).3
Niger also identifi ed fi ve additional SHAs in the Agadez region 
(in Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudinga) 
but said non-technical and technical survey in 2014 had 
determined they were not contaminated by anti-personnel 
mines and that communities in the area had reported 
accidents only involving anti-vehicle mines.4 A PRB M3 
anti-vehicle mine was also discovered in March 2019 near 
the central town of Intikane.5 The areas are all located 
in Niger’s Agadez region, in the north in a remote desert 
area, 450km from the rural community of Dirkou in Bilma 
department and reported to contain mines that date back 
to the French colonial era.6 
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by region (at 2016)7
Region CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHA/CHA Total area (m2)
Agadez 1 39,304 1 196,253 2 235,557
NEW CONTAMINATION
The growing use of mines of an improvised nature in western 
Niger over the past year has added another dimension of 
uncertainty over the scale of Niger’s challenge. Starting in the 
second half of 2018, Niger experienced a surge in attacks by 
groups affiliated with Islamic State or al-Qaida. Attacks were 
concentrated in the western Tillabery and Tahoua regions, 
employing a range of artisanal explosive devices, including 
anti-vehicle mines; victim-activated, pressure plate devices 
that appear to meet the APMBC defi nition of anti-personnel 
mines; and command-detonated devices.8
A mine or improvised explosive device (IED) detonation in 
January 2019 injured four Niger soldiers near Titahoune 
(Tillabery)9 and an improvised device detonated under a 
convoy of vehicles in an ambush by heavily-armed insurgents 
in Tillabery in May 2019 during which 28 soldiers were 
killed.10 A 12-ton armoured US Army vehicle was disabled 
in June 2019 by an improvised mine on the outskirts of 
Ouallem town (Tillabery). The device was activated by a 
weather-proofed pressure plate linked to an 81mm mortar. 
Its explosion detonated a main charge consisting of nearly a 
dozen 60mm mortar shells.11 A car bomb attack on a Nigerien 
army base near the border with Mali in July started an 
assault in which insurgents killed 18 Nigerien soldiers.12
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the 
National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit 
Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le 
Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly 
to the President. 
All demining has been carried out by the Nigerien army. 
In 2015, Niger said it had 60 deminers but lacked suffi cient 
equipment for them to be able to work at the same time.13
NPA conducted evaluation missions to Niger in May 2015 and 
December 2017 to assess the possibility of assisting Niger 
to meet its Article 5 deadline. Contacts continued in 2019, 
exploring the possibility of NPA setting up a programme to 
support CNCCAI clearance operations.14 
GENDER 
Niger’s latest (third) Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2016, made no reference to gender.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Niger submitted an Article 7 report in 2018, the fi rst report since 2012. It also delivered statements to the APMBC 
Intersessional Meetings and Meeting of States Parties in 2018.







Niger does not have a strategic plan for mine action. Its third Article 5 deadline extension request in 2016 did not set out 
a workplan or benchmarks for survey or clearance as requested by the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation. 
Niger’s Article 7 Report for 2013–18 set out a rudimentary operational timeline providing for clearance of 196,253m2 by 
2020, including 56,000m2 in 2018, 100,253m2 in 2019, and 40,000m2 in 2020.15
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In its Third Article 5 Extension Request Niger reported that, 
it had drafted national mine action standards (NMAS) in 
accordance with the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) and standard operating procedures.16 No information 
has been provided on whether Niger’s NMAS have been 
fi nalised and adopted.
A Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) team’s visit to Adama in 
December 2017 noted manual clearance was the main tool 
of demining by Niger’s army engineers but highlighted the 
operational challenges. The M-51 mines mostly found in the 
area contained no components and were largely undetectable 
by conventional metal detectors and suffi ciently small as to 
make detection by GPR-based detectors unreliable calling 
for full manual excavation. The process was slow and the 
sandy environment, prone to subsidence and back-fi lling, 
made it diffi cult to maintain consistent excavation depths. 
Mechanical excavation using sifting and screening equipment 
would dramatically improve the speed of technical survey 
and clearance but faced severe logistical challenges because 
of the long distances, absence of roads, limited provisions 
for maintenance and cost. Mine Detection Dogs were also 
deemed unsuitable because of the extreme climate and the 
potential for deep-buried mines.17
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
CLEARANCE IN 2018
Niger claimed it was unable to conduct any clearance in 2018 because of the lack of fi nancial resources, the higher priority 
given to counterterrorism activities, and the “failure” of unspecifi ed international organisations to respect their commitments. 
It pledged to resume demining activities at the start of 2019.18 CNCCAI reportedly deployed 30 deminers in mid-June 2019 to 
conduct mine clearance in Madama. The operation was reportedly funded by Niger from national resources.19
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGER: 1 SEPTEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR, 4-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (1-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2016
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
four-year extension request granted by states parties in 
2016), Niger is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 31 December 2020. It is not on 
track to meet this deadline.
It is unclear what progress Niger has made since the 
Maputo Review Conference in 2014. The amount of clearance 
reported by Niger from 2014 to 2016 in Madama has varied 
from 17,000m2 and 750 mines to 39,304m2 and 1,075 mines.20
NPA’s assessment mission in December 2017 received 
reports of clearance ranging from 29,000m2 to 39,304m2.21
Niger submitted a second request for an extension to its 
Article 5 deadline on 12 November 2015, less than two 
months before the expiry of its fi rst extended deadline. States 
Parties observed this did not conform to procedure and left 
insuffi cient time for analysis and discussion. The decision 
also observed that the plan presented by Niger in the request 
was “workable but lacks ambition”. States parties agreed 
to give Niger a one-year extension and requested that it 
provide, in its revised submission, information on the areas 
already released disaggregated by the method of release and 
an updated workplan listing all areas known or suspected 
to contain anti-personnel mines and annual clearance 
projections during the period covered by the request.22
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The third extension request Niger submitted in 2016 did not 
include such a workplan and a request from the Committee 
on Article 5 Implementation for additional information 
received no reply.23 
Niger’s third extension request said it needed more than 
US$3.2 million in funding to fulfi l its remaining Article 5 
obligations, including $1 million for the CNCCAI from the 
national budget over the fi ve-year period, and $2.2 million 
to be mobilised from external donors.24 At the June 2018 
APBMC Intersessional Meetings, Niger stated that without the 
support of partners it was unlikely that Niger would be able 
to complete clearance by its Article 5 deadline and reserved 
the right to submit another extension request by the end of 
December 2019.25
Niger has made repeated appeals for international assistance 
for mine action and claimed receiving no external support 
for its activities, save for assistance from France for medical 
evacuation in the case of demining accidents.26 NPA and DDG 
have made offers of assistance to Niger but received no reply.27
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Nigeria’s military reopened the strategically-important Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road in March 2018 after four years when it was 
closed due to insecurity and the presence of explosive devices. Nigeria informed states parties in May 2019 that non-technical 
survey and clearance of mines and improvised explosive devices would start “as soon as security conditions permit”, enabling 
Nigeria to report on suspected or confi rmed contamination. Confl ict, which is ongoing, features continued use of munitions by 
non-state armed groups. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Nigeria should urgently take all possible measures to clear anti-personnel mines, including those of an 
improvised nature. 
 ■ Nigeria should give priority to mine action in the humanitarian response to the emergency in the north-east 
and establish a mine action centre to work with humanitarian partners to develop a structured programme for 
survey and, when security permits, clearance.
 ■ Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision of assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining 
organisations and continue to provide risk education to the civilian population.
 ■ Nigeria should support systematic collection of data on incidents, casualties, and contamination, 
disaggregated by device types. 
 ■ Nigeria should submit an Article 7 report to inform states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) of the discovery of any contamination from anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised 
nature, and report on the location of all suspected or confi rmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. 
It should also report on the status of programmes for their destruction and request to its Article 5 deadline 
which expired on 1 March 2012. 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ No national mine action authority or mine action centre
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Army, police
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Nigeria continued to experience casualties in 2018 and 2019 
from Boko Haram’s widespread use of explosive devices, 
including mines of an improvised nature, in Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe states in the north east. The extent and nature of 
contamination remains unclear. 
A scoping mission by UNMAS to assess explosive threats in 
Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in 2017 noted widespread 
use of pressure-plate devices along the main supply routes 
which were confi gured to detonate from the weight of a person 
and function as very large anti-personnel mines.1 These 
fall within the APMBC. Borno state was the most severely 
impacted. Civilians reported the presence of victim-activated 
devices in 76% of Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno; 
59% of LGAs in Yobe; and 52% of LGAs in Adamawa.2 
Improvised devices, whether body-borne, vehicle-borne, 
command-detonated, or victim-activated, continue to pose 
the main explosive threat. The widespread presence of these 
devices holds back the resettlement of people displaced by 
confl ict, prevents access to agricultural land and obstructs 
delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services.3 
Assessments in 2015 and 2017 both cited reports of 
the presence of mines but that perception is changing. 
Interviewees in a DDG assessment in Borno and Adamawa 
in November 2015 reported the presence of Chinese Type 
4 anti-personnel mines and Type 72 anti-vehicle mines. It 
noted local community reports of local government areas in 
Borno state that were believed to need clearance, including 
Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza, Kala-Balge, Kukawa, Marte, and Ngala.4 
UNMAS’s scoping mission said “reliable resources” had 
reported the use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines 
around defensive positions.5 In 2019, UNMAS said that despite 
such oral reports, “no physical evidence of (manufactured) 
landmine(s) has been found”.6 
NEW CONTAMINATION
Operators report continued re-contamination of roads that 
have been opened by the military and police.7 Troops took 
back control of the town of Gwoza in 2014 but a roadside 
device explosion close to the town in March 2019 killed eight 
people and injured seven more.8 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nigeria does not have a formal mine action programme. 
The Nigerian army and police conduct explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) operations coordinated by the Theatre 
Commander to respond to operational priorities. The army’s 
clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is primarily 
focused on facilitating military operations and clearing roads 
and areas to facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks 
on Boko Haram and keep military supply routes open.9 
The police have seconded units to the military to conduct 
clearance in newly-secured areas and deployed EOD teams 
to Maiduguri and a number of other towns.10
The United Kingdom and the United States each provided a 
military support team to the Theatre Command headquarters 
in Maiduguri. The teams included EOD advisers capable 
of providing training and equipment. In 2018, the Nigerian 
authorities were reportedly unwilling to receive their 
advice or support and made no request for UN support, but 
cooperation with British military experts was reported to 
have developed in 2019.11
The 2016 Buhari Plan for Rebuilding the North East from the 
Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI) 
includes a plan for demining as part of clean-up operations 
in reclaimed communities before resettlement of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). It assigns responsibility for 
clearance to the National Emergency Management Agency 
(NEMA), the Nigerian Military, and paramilitary bodies. The 
plan provided a budget of 76 million naira (approximately 
$380,000) for clearance of 38 local government areas but 
provided no details of how the plan would be implemented 
or the basis for this budget.12 In September 2018, it was 
announced that the federal government was planning to 
spend $6.7 billion to deliver the Buhari Plan.13
The humanitarian response programme for the north-east 
has a Mine Action Sub-sector co-chaired by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement and UNMAS. 
At the request of the UN humanitarian coordinator, UNMAS 
deployed a team of fi ve to the capital of Bornon state, Maiduguri, 
in July 2018 to provide planning, coordination and technical 
advice notably to support plans for resettlement of IDPs and 
for the delivery risk education, survey and clearance.14 
GENDER 
Nigeria, lacking a mine action programme, has not taken up 
gender in the context of mine action. 
The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21 
unveiled in December 2018 said women, girls, boys, and 
men living in, or potentially returning to, areas suspected 
or known to be contaminated with mines or other explosive 
devices would be involved in all stages of mine action 
programming. It called for “age and gender appropriate risk 
education activities to minimize loss of life and injuries as a 
result of explosive remnants of war”, targeting 200,000 girls, 
178,000 boys, 51,000 women, and 45,000 men.15 UNMAS was 
conducting an analysis in 2019 on the impact of explosive 
devices on different socio-economic groups, genders, and 
age groups to inform the humanitarian response.16
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Nigeria does not have a mine action information management 
system and has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2012. 
In a statement to the 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 
Nigeria said it would provide information on all areas of 
contamination “as soon as security conditions permit” access 
for non-technical survey of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe 
states. It acknowledged that “much needs to be done” and 
called for international technical support.17
UNMAS said it started to collect data on explosive incidents 
in 2018. Information was gathered mainly from open sources, 
including the Armed Confl ict Location & Event Data Project 
(ACLED), as well as security information provided by the UN, 
NGOs, and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Information 
was also provided by the Nigerian army and police EOD 
units but not on a systematic basis.18 MAG also maintained 
a database of different incidents related to mines and 
other explosive ordnance, as well as collecting information 
on casualties.19
UNMAS, DDG, and MAG developed standardised reporting 
forms to capture data on risk education, non-technical 
survey, and victims. Incidents and victims are not recorded 
due to the limited geographic reach of operators as a result 
of insecurity. To strengthen the reporting, UNMAS was 
developing a reporting network and planned to provide 
training for NGOs.20
PLANNING AND TASKING
Nigeria does not have an institutional framework for 
humanitarian mine action, a strategic plan for mine action 
or annual workplans for the humanitarian organisations 
responding to emergency needs in the north-east. 
The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21 
provided for mine action activities focusing on:
■ risk education on the dangers posed by explosive threats, 
with the aim of reducing the risk to a level where people 
can live safely 
■ non-technical surveys to collect and analyse data on 
the presence, type, and level of contamination, in order 
to support land release and the prioritisation of any 
subsequent clearance; and 
■ clearance of contaminated areas.
However, humanitarian mine action activity in 2018 and 
the fi rst half of 2019 was restricted by insecurity to limited 
survey and risk education in areas that were accessible, 
which included Banki, Gwoza, and Ngala in Borno state.21
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS 
All clearance is conducted by the Nigerian army and police 
with support from paramilitary groups.
MAG has worked in Nigeria since 2016, initially in arms 
management and destruction. In 2017 it opened an offi ce 
in Maiduguri and started providing risk education to 
IDPs, refugees, and host communities affected by the 
confl ict. In 2018, MAG operated with 12 community liaison 
teams delivering risk education and working to develop 
understanding of contamination in Borno state, mainly 
through remote assessment (see Survey in 2018 section 
below). Since 2017, MAG has worked in Maiduguri, Ngala, 
Mafa, Konduga, Bama, Jere, Dikwa, Biu, Chibok, Damboa, 
Gwoza, Gubio, Kaga, Mobbar, Monguno, and Nganzai.22
DDG undertook a limited explosive threat assessment in 
December 2015 and subsequently undertook risk education 
in IDP camps.23
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
SURVEY IN 2018
UNMAS reported that MAG and DDG conducted 
“23 non-technical surveys” in 2018, believed to have 
actually been preliminary assessments, which identifi ed 
two victim-activated explosive devices and a range of other 
items, including hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades 
and air-dropped ordnance.24
MAG said it had not had suffi cient access to locations to 
conduct non-technical survey, but between March 2017 and 
December 2018 it conducted “initial survey” in 36 areas in 
Borno state and marked and mapped 43 explosive ordnance 
devices for destruction by the army or police. In 2019 MAG 
has also conducted remote contamination assessments, 
interviewing individuals from displaced communities and 
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
Nigeria has not released results of any clearance activities. 
In March 2018, the army reopened the main road linking 
Maiduguri, Bama (Borno state’s second biggest town), and 
Banki, which had been closed by Boko Haram activity for 
four years. The re-opening was made possible by clearance 
of mines, including those of an improvised nature, but 
no details were reported. The theatre commander, Major 
General Nicholas Rogers, said authorities envisaged 
insurgents would continue to lay mines.26 
The Acting Brigade Commander of the 21st armoured 
Brigade, Colonel Garba Nura, said in March 2018 that it was 
conducting operations around Bama to prepare the way for 
the return of IDPs.27
Between January and the end of July 2019, army and 
police EOD teams were reported to have cleared 105 IEDs 
planted on roads in north eastern states, “including 46 
victim-activated devices”.28
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGERIA: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
NO EXTENSION REQUESTED
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: DEADLINE EXPIRED
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Nigeria was required to 
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 
1 March 2012. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 
November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known 
anti-personnel mines from its territory.29 
Under the Convention’s agreed framework, in the event 
mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a state party’s 
Article 5 clearance deadline, it should immediately inform 
all other states parties of this discovery and undertake to 
destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines 
as soon as possible. Nigeria has not submitted an Article 7 
transparency report since 2012.
Given the extent of apparent contamination from mines of an 
improvised nature, Nigeria should request a new extended 
Article 5 deadline, which should be no more than fi ve years. 
It must also continue to fulfi l its reporting obligations under 
the APMBC, including by reporting on the location of all 
suspected or confi rmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or 
control and on the status of programmes for the destruction 
of all anti-personnel mines therein.30
 1 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 3. 
 2 Email from Lionel Pechera, Technical Advisor, UNMAS, 25 June 2019. 
 3 Ibid; and email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 2 September 2019. 
 4 DDG, “Mine Action Assessment: Northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa and Borno 
States) 1–15 November 2015”, undated, at: bit.ly/2xS56FZ.  
 5 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 3.  
 6 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June 2019. 
 7 Interview with Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019. 
 8 Agence France Presse, “Landmine killed eight in NE Nigeria”, 19 March 2019. 
 9 DDG, “Mine Action Assessment: Northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa and Borno 
States) 1–15 November 2015”. 
 10 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 5. 
 11 Ibid .
 12 PCNI, “The Buhari Plan: Rebuilding the North East: Volume II”, June 2016, 
pp. 23–26. 
 13 “Federal government to spend $6.7 billion Northeast reconstruction, 
rehabilitation, resettlement plan”, News Agency of Nigeria, 1 September 2018, 
at: bit.ly/2Z8u1ko. 
 14 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019. 
 15 UN, “Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019 – December 2021”, 
December 2018, pp. 43, 48. 
 16 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 17 July 2019. 
 17 Statement of Nigeria, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 May 2019. 
 18 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019. 
 19 Email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019. 
 20 Emails from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June and 17 July 2019. 
 21 UN, “Humanitarian Response Strategy January 2019–December 2021”, 
December 2018, pp. 43, 48.  
 22 Email from Nina Seecharan, MAG, 2 October 2018. 
 23 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 
3 to 14 April 2017”, p. 6. 
 24 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 25 June 2019. 
 25 Email from and telephone interview with Nina Seecharan, MAG, 9 July 2019. 
 26 A. Haruna, “Military reopens Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road held by Boko Haram 
for years”, Premium Times, 24 March 2018, at: bit.ly/2GhEZgq.  
 27 A. Haruna, “How Bama IDPs will return home – Gov. Shettima”, Premium 
Times, 30 March 2018, at: bit.ly/30IBLKD. 
 28 Email from Lionel Pechera, UNMAS, 2 September 2019. 
 29 Statement of Nigeria, APMBC 11th Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 
29 November 2011.  
 30 Final Report of the APMBC 12th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 
2013, p. 10.  




















































In 2018, Oman informed states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that it was considering setting 
up a mine action centre. Oman is conducting “re-clearance” of certain suspected mined areas and plans to complete release 
of these areas ahead of its Article 5 deadline in 2025. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Oman should proceed with setting up a mine action centre and programme to oversee and ensure release of 
all suspected mined areas as soon as possible and no later than its Article 5 deadline in 2025.
 ■ Oman should ensure it conducts land release operations according to international standards and seek to 
apply non-technical and technical survey, to confi rm contamination prior to clearance, whenever possible. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
OMAN
LIGHT, 
BUT PRECISE EXTENT UNCLEAR
*Area cleared included in Oman’s Article 7 report for 2018. 
Number of AP mines destroyed not reported and therefore 
assumed to be zero.
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(20% of overall score)
7 Oman does not have any confi rmed mined areas, but does have suspected mined areas 
resulting from contamination during the 1960s and 70s. Oman reported that it has cleared 
most of the suspected mined areas in accordance with available resources, but that it 






(10% of overall score)
7 The Army is the only institution involved in mine action.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)




(10% of overall score)
5 Oman has submitted an Article 7 transparency report for 2018, detailing clearance and 
its plans for land release.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 In its Article 7 transparency report for 2018, Oman included a work plan to release all 
remaining suspected mined areas before its 2025 Article 5 deadline. 
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)





(20% of overall score)
5 Oman reported clearance of a small amount of mined area between July and December 
2018. Oman did not include information on the number of anti-personnel mines 
discovered during clearance in 2018, which Mine Action Review has therefore assumed 
to be zero. 
Average Score 5.0 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ No national mine action authority or mine action centre
NATIONAL OPERATORS











UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Oman is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though 
the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not 
known. In its initial Article 7 report, submitted in 2015, Oman 
declared that there were no areas in the Sultanate confi rmed 
to be mined, but reported “many” suspected mined areas in 
the south, particularly Dhofar Region.1 In a statement to the 
APMBC Intersessional meeting in Geneva in June 2018, and 
in its Article 7 report for 2018, Oman repeated there were no 
confi rmed mined areas and no record of any mine casualties 
in the last 20 years.2
According to its 2015 report, during the mid-1960s to 
mid-1970s the presence of rebel movements in Dhofar 
led to “vast” areas being affected by anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines. Mines were planted randomly by 
militants in small quantities and there are no maps or 
registers detailing contamination. Friendly forces reportedly 
cleared their own contaminated area directly after the end 
of actions in 1976 and the Armed Sultan’s Engineering Unit 
Forces started clearance of the areas suspected to have 
been mined by the militants. However, Oman has reported 
that it is impossible to be sure that the areas have been fully 
cleared, and therefore re-clearance of certain suspected 
mined areas is required to ensure no anti-personnel mines 
remain.3 This is for three reasons: the size of the region 
(about 99,000km²); the lack of maps or marking; and the 
terrain (which includes mountains and valleys), with many 
mined areas located on steep slopes. In addition, the rain 
over the years may have scattered the mines.4
In 2001, it had been reported that the Royal Army of Oman 
had mapped seven zones of suspected mined areas based on 
historical records of battlefi eld areas, unit positions, and mine 
incident reports.5
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Oman has not had a functioning mine action programme. Clearance is being performed by its army engineers.6
Oman stated in June 2018 that it began implementing a national programme in 2017 and was planning to set up a national 
mine action centre and would then appeal for supply of equipment but it did not specify when this would occur.7
GENDER 
Details are not available on the extent to which gender is considered and refl ected in Oman’s national mine action efforts.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
After joining the APMBC in 2015, Oman submitted annual Article 7 reports.
PLANNING AND TASKING
 In its most recent Article 7 report, submitted in August 2019, Oman provided a workplan for the release of all remaining 
suspected mined area before its Article 5 deadline in 2025.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Standards applied by the army are not known. According to its latest Article 7 transparency report, mined cleared have 
historically been cleared in accordance with the resources available.8
OPERATORS 
Oman’s army engineers are responsible for mine/ERW clearance.
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 1 Initial Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5. 
 2 Oman statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7−8 June 2018; and Article 7 Report, (for 2018). 
 3 Article 7 Reports submitted in 2015 and 2019.  
 4 Initial Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5. 
 5 “Humanitarian Demining”, Journal of Mine Action, 2001, p. 49. 
 6 Article 7 Report (for 2018). 
 7 Statement of Oman to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7−8 June 2018. 
 8 Article 7 Report (for 2018). 
 9 Article 7 Report (for 2018). 
 10 Ibid. 
 11 Statement of Oman, 17th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2018.  
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Between July and December 2018, Oman cleared 79,200m2 of suspected mined area. Oman did not report the number of 
anti-personnel mines discovered during clearance, which Mine Action Review has therefore assumed to be zero. This 
compares to clearance of 638,314m2 between April 2017 and January 2018, during which no anti-personnel mines were 
discovered or destroyed.9 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR OMAN: 1 FEBRUARY 2015
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Oman is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or 
control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2025. 
In its most recent Article 7 report, Oman presented a plan to complete clearance of remaining suspected mined areas by its 
Article 5 deadline.10
Oman has cited the challenges it faces in locating and clearing mines in large and remote areas of desert. Conditions were 
further complicated in 2018 by severe weather, including Cyclone Mekunu in May 2018 and Tropical Storm Luban in October 
2018, which caused fl ooding likely to have compounded the shifting of mines.11 





In April 2019, the Governor of Peleliu – the only Palauan 
State in the Second World War where a prolonged ground 
battle took place – issued an offi cial statement declaring 
that “Peleliu State believes the presence of anti-personnel 
(AP) landmines has been eradicated from our state.” The 
Governor further noted that, “Cleared Ground’s local teams 
from Peleliu have been systematically surveying and clearing 
ERW [explosive remnants of war] across Peleliu Island for 
almost 10 years now with funding from many countries 
including Palau, and of the hundreds of caves, no known cave 
has gone unchecked for AP landmines. In May 2018, Palau’s 
10 year treaty deadline to be free of AP mines was met, and 
continuing ERW surveys have found no AP landmine since.”1 
Mine Action Review has, as a consequence, deleted Palau 
from the list of mine-affected states parties with outstanding 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 
obligations. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Palau should submit an APMBC Article 7 transparency report confi rming there are no mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2018
HAS FULFILLED ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS
PALAU
158   Clearing the Mines 2019 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Until recently, it was unclear whether or not Palau still had 
mined areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, as the 
results of survey in Peleliu state, by Cleared Ground Demining 
(CGD), had not been made public. In 4 April 2019, however, the 
Governor of Peleliu issued an offi cial statement noting that 
while small stocks of anti-personnel mines were discovered by 
survey teams, before and since the expiry of Palau’s APMBC 
deadline for clearance of emplaced anti-personnel mines no 
emplaced anti-personnel mine has been discovered.2
Palau became a state party to the APMBC in 2008 and 
invited CGD to help Palau deal with its Second World War 
explosive ordnance contamination, with particular emphasis 
on determining whether anti-personnel mines remained. 
According to the Governor, Peleliu state was the only one 
in Palau where signifi cant combat took place during the 
Second World War.3 Survey activities “discovered some small 
stores of Japanese Type 93 AP landmines in the defensive 
caves constructed by Japanese Forces in 1944 on Bloody 
Nose Ridge (Omlebelochek Mountains) on Peleliu Island, 
with 22 mines found the fi rst year, 7 mines the next year, and 
one or two in the next years. The mines, some still in their 
packing boxes, had decayed badly over 75 years, and in many 
instances the explosives were eaten away by termites”.4 
According to the Governor of Peleliu, there have been no 
reported accidents on Peleliu from anti-personnel mines.5 
Furthermore, military maps made available by Japan did 
not indicate the use of anti-personnel mines,6 and archival 
research, including a 1945 Cave Fighting Manual by the 
US military, based on the Peleliu cave systems, shows no 
reference to the use of anti-personnel mines. Rather, artillery 
was wheeled out from protection within the caves and 
Japanese Forces frequently reinfi ltrated the cave system, 
often at night, supporting the argument that mines would 
not have been emplaced around the caves.7
However, since 2011, there has been a lack of clarity and 
consistency in the reporting of anti-personnel mines 
destroyed in Palau, in particular whether anti-personnel 
mines discovered and destroyed were abandoned stocks 
of anti-personnel mines, which fall under Article 4 of the 
APMBC, or emplaced and armed anti-personnel mines, 
which fall under Article 5. 
In its initial Article 7 report following entry into force of the 
APMBC, Palau had declared no known or suspected mined 
areas.8 However, in 2011, Palau stated for the fi rst time that 
it had mined areas on its territory and that contamination to 
date had included Japanese anti-vehicle and anti-personnel 
mines as well as sea mines, with anti-personnel mines 
reported in the Umubrogol mountains and Death Valley 
regions of Peleliu state.9 In December 2011, in its statement to 
the APMBC Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Palau claimed 
(wrongly) that it was not “obligated under the AP Convention 
to destroy emplaced antipersonnel mines because it never 
produced, stockpiled, used, nor transported them.”10 
In its subsequent Article 7 report submitted in 2012, Palau 
stated that clearance had been completed of all anti-
personnel mines at the only two areas with confi rmed 
contamination. Palau further reported that areas containing 
abandoned anti-personnel mines remained in caves at Bloody 
Nose Ridge in the Umubrogol mountains in Peleliu state, 
recording that: “Landmines have been found stored in the 
complex cave and tunnel systems of the former battlefi eld. 
A total of 608 caves exist – operations have only taken 
place in 34 caves to date.”11 At that time, CGD confi rmed that 
anti-personnel mine contamination was only of abandoned 
stockpiled mines.12 
In its Article 7 report for 2012, Palau reported that “AP 
Landmines have been found on Bloody Nose during the 
course of ERW clearance over the past three years. The AP 
landmines have been found emplaced and fused but unarmed 
in the ground as well as stored within defensive cave and 
tunnel complexes”, and that “ongoing clearance operations 
are removing these AP Landmines”.13 In addition, Palau also 
reported that sea mines had been found in two locations 
in Airai state, noting that the mines had been used in both 
anti-boat and anti-personnel roles.14 Palau also reported that 
its contamination “was a result of a fi ercest battle fought 
in the Pacifi c during WWII [the Second World War]. With 
such circumstance, Palau is seeking assistance toward [an] 
island-wide survey to know its mine[d] areas and or suspected 
mine[d] areas.”15 
In December 2015, CGD reported having cleared emplaced 
and armed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines in Palau 
between January 2014 and November 2015 in Peleliu state.16 
This included clearance of fi ve type 93 HE blast anti-personnel 
mines, which were reportedly laid and armed, in two separate 
caves, between January 2014 and November 2015.17
 
Palau 
did not submit Article 7 reports for 2013, 2014, or 2015, as 
it is obligated to do by the APMBC, but in its Article 7 report 
for 2016, submitted in 2017, it included the back-dated period 
and reported the fi ve type 93 HE blast anti-personnel mines 
destroyed by CGD under Article 4, rather than Article 5, of the 
APMBC.18 CGD also reported clearing during the same period: 
one yardstick anti-vehicle mine, found on a beach; three JB 
spherical anti-vehicle mines, found in three separate locations 
(underwater and in mangroves); 12 JE HE blast mines, found 
in nine different locations (in mangroves and residences); and 
one mine of an improvised nature (using modifi ed aircraft 
bomb components), found on a beach.19
 
According to CGD, 
these mines can “be classed as anti-vehicle or anti-personnel 
(as both of those types deployed in World War II in Palau 
can be activated by people)”.20
 
These mines are covered and 
prohibited by the APMBC, but were not included in Palau’s 
reporting under Article 7 of the Convention.
In its UXO [unexploded ordnance] Action Plan 2017–19, Palau 
records that “A total of 43 anti-personnel landmines have 
been cleared”, and that “it has ‘cleared all known mined 
areas’ in compliance with the APMBC.”21 
While it has now been confi rmed that Palau does not have 
mined areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel 
mines, it continues to be contaminated by ERW, including 
UXO on many of its 200 islands, and sea mines, left over 
from World War II,22 when it was the scene of land and naval 
battles between Japanese and American forces. An estimated 
total of 2,800 tons (2.8 million kg) of ordnance was dropped 
or fi red on Palau.23 Much of this ordnance failed to detonate 
or was abandoned after the war, and as a result, an unknown 
amount of UXO remains on the land and in the sea, including 
in sunken ships.24 In February 2017, defensive maps detailing 
laid aircraft bombs, depth charges, and sea mines were 
provided to the Palau authorities by the Japanese military, 
via a Japanese demining non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS).25 







NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Palau is in the process of establishing a mine action 
programme to address its ERW contamination. Under the 
authority of Executive Order No. 335 of 14 May 2013, issued 
by the Offi ce of the President, a UXO Advisory Committee was 
established.26 The UXO Advisory Committee is composed of 
government ministries, states, agencies, and organisations. 
The Director of the Bureau of Domestic Affairs within the 
Ministry of State acts as the secretariat.27
Palau’s national mine action programme is now structured 
according to its UXO Policy, which was enacted by 
Presidential Executive Order 392 in March 2017, and which 
authorises the establishment of a national coordination 
system and a unifi ed database mechanism.28
As at August 2018, the National Safety Offi ce team had an 
operational capacity of 16 personnel, in addition to 2 safety 
offi cers (responsible for coordinating operations) and 1 
international NPA advisor.29 National Safety Offi ce ERW team 
personnel also provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
cover to Palau’s water and sewer improvement projects,30
and will conduct risk assessments for all planned 
infrastructure work.31
GENDER 
Details are not available on the extent to which gender is refl ected in Palau’s ERW action programme.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
With the support of NPA, the National Safety Offi ce 
established a national UXO database in January 2017,32 to 
help in the coordination of survey and clearance of explosive 
ordnance. With the adoption of the UXO Policy and UXO 
Action Plan 2017–19, the Palau authorities now have a formal 
mandate to collect historical data from operators conducting 
ERW clearance in Palau, and to verify and assess data for 
reporting to the Palau authorities, local communities, and 
the international community.33
The National Safety Offi ce now receives both historical and 
current data on contamination, survey, and clearance, to 
populate the Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) database.34 All items found to date have been reported 
by clearance operators, and entered into the UXO database, 
with the exception of certain historical data from CGD.35
PLANNING AND TASKING
The UXO Advisory Committee has overseen the development 
of the UXO Policy and UXO Action Plan 2017–19, which were 
enacted by Presidential Executive Order 392, signed on 1 
March 2017.36
The UXO policy outlines national coordination measures 
and assigns responsibilities to the relevant ministries and 
documents the role of the UXO Advisory Committee.
Palau, in conjunction with international partners including 
NPA, CGD, and JMAS, has been implementing a nationwide, 
non-technical survey, referred to in the UXO Action Plan 
2017–19 as a “general UXO survey”, to confi rm the 
UXO-affected areas of the country.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In March 2017, Palau enacted Presidential Executive Order 
392, which formally adopted the Palau UXO Policy.37
The UXO Advisory Committee is also tasked to determine 
rules and regulations for the quality and standard of work 
performed by agencies such as the National Safety Offi ce, 
the police, international organisations, NGOs, and foreign 
militaries. These rules and regulations, known as ‘Palau 
UXO Standards’, are based on the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) and have been drafted with the support 
of NPA.38
In July 2017, the draft standards were streamlined to 
concentrate more on permissions and legalities for the 
removal of ERW rather than the technical aspects of 
clearance.39 As at August 2018, the draft UXO standards had 
been accepted and disseminated, but had yet to be formally 
approved and adopted by the national authorities.40
In its Article 7 report (for 2017), Palau reported that UXO 
Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs) had been drafted and 
were undergoing review prior to adoption.41 As at July 2019, 
Palau had not submitted an Article 7 report for 2018.
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OPERATORS 
CGD has been conducting ERW clearance operations in Palau, 
both on land and in the sea, since 15 September 2009.42 The 
clearance project is focused on Peleliu and Angaur – two 
southern islands of Palau – and aims to reduce the immediate 
risk from ERW to local people and tourists.43 
In 2012, JMAS, a Japanese demining NGO, began working in 
Palau, with a focus on underwater UXO clearance.44 
In 2015, NPA received a grant to assist Palau to strengthen 
national capacity to manage and coordinate the UXO 
sector, and to help undertake surveys and UXO clearance; 
and subsequently initiated a programme of support. NPA 
reported that from April 2017 it had begun working under 
the National Safety Offi ce, as the “ERW/UXO team
Palau now has capacity to direct trained national personnel 
to clear priority areas of ERW.45 A new government demolition 
area became operational in early 2018, which is run by the 
National Safety Offi ce, and which is also used by JMAS.46
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No operators in Palau reported fi nding any anti-personnel mines in 2018.47 
SURVEY IN 2018
NPA started a nationwide non-technical survey on 18 
September 2016 and, as at August 2018, NPA had completed 
non-technical survey of all states in Palau, except for Peleliu, 
where permission had not yet been granted for non-technical 
survey. Pre-2017 survey and clearance data had not yet 
been provided by CGD. NPA has found no evidence of 
anti-personnel mine contamination in its non-technical 
survey operations to date.48 
In 2017, CGD concentrated its activities in validating whether 
any anti-personnel mines remain on Peleliu state, in the 
vicinity of the caves in the Umubrogol Mountains. CGD’s 
work, which included non-technical survey, technical 
survey, and clearance, was reportedly requested by the 
UXO Advisory Committee and Government of the state of 
Peleliu, and funded by a consortium of donors including 
Palau itself, as well as Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland, 
and New Zealand. As part of this process, CGD stated that 
“methodologically wise any caves surrounding those caves 
where AP landmine stockpiles were previously found have 
also been checked thoroughly, and utilising sub-surface 
landmine detection drills and equipment to search for 
the presence of emplaced (buried) landmines at the cave 
entrances, CGD teams have been systematically working 
their way up and down the valleys and sub-ridges of the 
Umurbrogol Mountain range.” In addition, CGD reported 
that “cave search activities are taking place on the fringes 
of the Ridge, as well a number of cave systems not actually 
on Bloody Nose Ridge, even including caves on neighbouring 
Ngedebus Island, have been searched for the presence of 
landmines during these last 2 quarters to confi rm that no AP 
mines remain in Palau”.49
CGD reported undertaking door-to-door survey of every 
household in Peleliu, during which an example of a landmine 
found previously on Peleliu was shown. CGD’s non-technical 
survey also included Second World War research on how the 
caves were used during the confl ict, which indicated that 
anti-personnel mines had not been emplaced.50 Finally, 
military maps made available by Japan did not indicate the 
use of anti-personnel mines.51
CLEARANCE IN 2018
No operators in Palau reported fi nding any anti-personnel mines in 2018.52
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALAU: 1 MAY 2008
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2018 (COMPLETED FULFILMENT OF ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS)
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Palau was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2018. On 4 April 2019, the Governor of Peleliu issued a statement that, 
“Peleliu State believes the presence of anti-personnel (AP) land mines has been eradicated from our state.”53
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Palestine acceded to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in December 2017, becoming a state party on 1 June 
2018. All mined areas are located in territory under Israeli control. To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to 
be conducted by or on behalf of the Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC), but progress is being made in clearance of mine 
contamination in the West Bank. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ PMAC should report accurately and consistently on the extent of mined area and annual clearance output. 
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Higher Committee for Mine Action
 ■ Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ 4M (clearance now completed)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ The HALO Trust
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)






*Excludes 2018 clearance output for the Karne Shomron and 
Jinsafut minefi elds in the Qalqiliya governorate of the West Bank, 
which was not reported by Israel
MEDIUM, 




ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
PALESTINE
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
In its initial APMBC Article 7 report submitted in November 
2018, Palestine reported 69 areas suspected to contain 
anti-personnel mines on the border with Jordan, covering a 
total area of 18.51km2 and all under Israeli control.1 Palestine 
also reported that is it not possible for it to know if there 
are further mined areas in eastern Jerusalem or in other 
areas under Israeli control, including in the region of Israeli 
settlements or closed military zones.2
A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identifi ed 90 
minefi elds, 13 of which were laid by the Jordanian military 
in 1948–67, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli 
military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. All 
minefi elds, including those laid by the Jordanian military, 
are under Israeli military control.3 In addition, HALO Trust 
reported being made aware of three other anti-personnel 
mined areas in the Jordan Valley, namely at Shademot 
Mehola (65,000m2) and Sokot (228,000m2), containing mixed 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination; and at 
Taysir (5,500m2), which contains only anti-vehicle mines.4
Clearance operations must therefore be coordinated with 
the Israeli authorities,5 in addition to PMAC. 
According to The HALO Trust, as at July 2019, there was 
nearly 0.3km2 of confi rmed mined area (excluding the Jordan 
Valley) across four minefi elds in Palestine and two minefi elds 
in no-man’s-land between the West Bank and Israel (see 
Table 1).6 All six minefi elds were laid by the Jordanian army.
This is a reduction of two mined areas, compared to mine 
contamination at the end of 2017, as clearance of Karne 
Shomron and Jinsafut minefi elds in Qalqiliya governorate 
was completed in 2018 by Israeli demining company, 4M, 
which won an Israeli Ministry of Defence tender.7
Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo 
II accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three 
areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civil and security 
control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint 
Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to 
areas where Israel has full civil and security control.8
Most mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank, 
along the border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately 
60% of the West Bank.9
Table 1: Mined area (at July 2019) (excluding the Jordan Valley)*10
Governorate Minefi eld Task Contamination CHAs Area (m2)
Jenin Araba AV and AP mines 1 1,257
Qabatiya AV and AP mines 1 8,212
Yabad AV and AP mines 1 42,829
Tul Kareem Nur a-Shams AV and AP mines 1 37,810
Ramallah No Man’s Land Yalo AV and AP mines 1 104,226
No Man’s Land - Canada Park AV and AP mines 1 85,708
 Totals 6 280,042
CHA = Confi rmed hazardous area   AV = Anti-vehicle AP=Anti-personnel
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
PMAC was established in accordance with Palestinian 
Minister of Interior decision on 25 March 2012,11 which 
appointed a director and created a Higher Committee for 
Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members 
representing the ministries of education, foreign affairs, 
health, intelligence, interior, justice, and military liaison, as 
well as the police and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. 
The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the 
national mine action authority, is tasked to develop mine 
action legislation and allocate resources for the sector.12
PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, 
is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the 
West Bank. It receives technical advice from the UN Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS).13 The committee has established a 
number of sub-committees to deal with technical issues, risk 
education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.14
In November 2016, Palestine announced that it was seeking 
to adopt and enact a mine action law. Palestine was hopeful 
of completing the legal procedures within a year and 
then presenting the draft law to the legislative council for 
endorsement, followed by signature by the President.15 As at 
February 2019, however, the process was still ongoing.16
PMAC, which has 12 employees,17 is staffed with personnel 
from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, 
and Civil Defence. In 2013, 36 PMAC personnel were 
trained by UNMAS for demining but were not subsequently 
authorised by Israel to conduct clearance.18 The Civil Police 
have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42 
personnel in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, 
Ramallah, and Tulkarm, who conduct rapid response to locate 
and remove items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The EOD 
unit is only permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.19
A new director of PMAC was appointed in July 2017, following 
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PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian 
authority only provides funding for the salaries of PMAC 
employees and the costs of the PMAC offi ce.21 Israel 
does not grant Palestine authorisation to conduct mine 
clearance operations.22 
Neither PMAC nor the Israeli National Mine Action Authority 
(the INMAA) provides direct funding for HALO Trust’s 
clearance operations.23 At the baptism site clearance task 
in the West Bank, the INMAA contributes ILS2 million 
(approximately US$548,000) to quality assurance (QA).24 
The HALO Trust’s clearance programme in the West Bank is 
primarily funded by the governments of the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as by private 
donors, and since 2018, by the European Union too.25 
GENDER 
It is not known whether national mine action programme has a gender policy and implementation plan.
The HALO Trust has a global policy on gender and diversity. HALO Trust’s operations team works and lives within 
the Palestinian communities and is all male. During 2018, The HALO Trust deployed a female fi nance offi cer, who also 
participates in survey work in the fi eld as a native speaker, and a female doctor at the baptism site.26
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
PMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, Level 1.27 
The HALO Trust follows the INMAA’s national standards and provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports 
for every task. The information is shared with PMAC.28 As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO Trust survey 
and clearance data relating to demining operations in the West Bank.
Palestine submitted an initial Article 7 report in November 2018, as required by the APMBC.29 However, Palestine’s Article 7 
report for 2018 (submitted in 2019), does not contain any further details, including the amount of mined area cleared in 2018.30
PLANNING AND TASKING
PMAC has a Strategic Plan for 2017–20, in which primary objectives are the clearance of the Araba, Deir Abu Daif, Nur a-Shams, 
Qabatiya, and Yabad minefi elds.31 Clearance of Deir Abu Daif was completed in 2017.
HALO Trust’s survey and clearance in the West Bank is prioritised by its international donors, in conjunction with the INMAA 
and PMAC.32 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The HALO Trust’s standing operating procedures (SoPs), 
which are based on its international standards and which also 
comply with national standards, are approved by the INMAA. 
Once a year, The HALO Trust submits its SoPs, including any 
necessary amendments, to the INMAA for approval.33
OPERATORS 
To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to 
be conducted by or on behalf of PMAC.34 In September 2013, 
however, the INMAA gave formal authorisation for The HALO 
Trust to clear two minefi elds in the West Bank deemed high 
priority by PMAC. Following INMAA authorisation, HALO Trust 
began mine clearance in the West Bank in April 2014,35 and 
continues to conduct clearance operations in the West Bank. 
The HALO Trust works under the auspices of both the INMAA 
and PMAC. Its manual clearance team in the West Bank is 
composed of deminers from Georgia with capacity varying 
between 10 and 33 deminers according to the task/work 
cycle.36 In addition, during 2018, HALO Trust deployed three 
armoured CASE721 wheeled medium loaders, one armoured 
CAT320B tracked excavator, and one industrial rock crusher. 
The machines were operated by a Palestinian team.37 HALO 
Trust added a second armoured tracked excavator and a 
screener to its operations in April 2019, with EU funding, to 
support mechanical clearance of the three minefi elds in the 
Jenin governorate.38
The HALO Trust planned to deploy up to 24 deminers at 
the baptism site and in Jenin governorate in 2019. Since 
the manual segments of the three minefi elds in Jenin 
governorate have been completed, up to six deminers will 
support the mechanical team.39
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The HALO Trust’s work in the West Bank complies with the 
Israeli Standard Institute for Standards, in particular ISO 
9001, 14001, and 18001. The HALO Trust carries out its own 
internal quality control (QC), which is conducted by senior 
programme staff, and which complies with the ISO standards 
and HALO Trust’s own SoPs.40 In addition, as required by the 
INMAA, 4CI Security, an external INMAA-certifi ed QA/QC 
company, is contracted to monitor HALO Trust’s clearance in 
accordance with Israeli National Mine Action Standards.41
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust conducts both manual and mechanical 
clearance in the West Bank. HALO Trust also uses a drone 
for survey and mapping purposes, and maps generated are 
shared with all parties involved for planning and follow up.42
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
The HALO Trust released 5,221m2 through clearance in 2018 
and did not release any land through survey.
Under Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II, Israel reported that the INMAA 
had overseen clearance of approximately 1.2km2 in 2018, 
destroying 1,350 mines and ERW, in addition to cancellation 
of 0.7km2 non-technical survey.43 However, there was no 
disaggregation on what proportion of this land release was 
of mined area (as opposed to battle area) or whether it 
also includes land released in Palestinian territory in the 
West Bank.
In 2018, clearance of Karne Shomron and Jinsafut minefi elds, 
in the Qalqiliya governorate of the West Bank, was completed 
by Israeli operator, 4M, contracted by the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence, but clearance output is not known.44
SURVEY IN 2018
No land was reduced by The HALO Trust through technical 
survey in 2018 or cancelled through non-technical survey.45
HALO Trust performs survey as part of its clearance 
operations of the Jordanian-laid minefi elds in Area C of the 
West Bank, which includes joint site visits with PMAC and the 
INMAA, but it is part of pre-clearance task preparation, and is 
of CHAs already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps.46
CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, The HALO Trust cleared 5,221m2 of mined area, at 
the Yabad minefi eld in Jenin governorate, during which 12 
anti-personnel mines were destroyed.47 This is a decrease 
compared to 2017, when HALO Trust cleared 41,857m2, 
and the drop in output is due to the fact that HALO Trust’s 
operations in Jenin district were suspended between April 
to October 2018, due to a change in US Foreign Policy which 
led to the cessation of US funding for the external QA.48
The HALO Trust also commenced clearance of the West Bank 
minefi eld at Qaser al-Yahud (the baptism site), in the Jordan 
Valley, in March 2018,49 with both funding from international 
donors and Israel.50 The project aims to remove mines and 
explosive ordnance in the area of the baptism site, which 
covers a total estimated area of 870,000m².51 Approximately 
90,000m2 is thought to potentially contain anti-personnel 
mines, including those of an improvised nature.52 IDF 
minefi eld records provided to The HALO Trust separate the 
land for clearance outside of the church compounds into 
eleven areas, all of which contain a potential UXO threat. Six 
of the eleven areas are known to contain signifi cant numbers 
of M15 anti-vehicle mines in multiple lines and more than 
2,600 anti-vehicle mines in total. The land and buildings 
inside the seven church compounds are suspected to contain 
mines and booby-traps, but no offi cial records exist regarding 
this contamination.53
In addition, from October 2017 Israel funded clearance of 
the Karne Shomron and Jinsafut minefi elds in the Qalqiliya 
governorate of the West Bank. Israeli operator 4M was 
awarded the demining tender by the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence, and clearance of the two minefi elds was completed 
in 2018.54 The INMAA has not, however, provided details of the 
area of land cleared in these two minefi elds or the number of 
mines destroyed.
PROGRESS IN 2019
The HALO Trust secured funding for external QA from a 
private foundation, and in May 2019 resumed clearance 
operations at Araba minefi eld in Jenin Governorate.55
The HALO Trust completed clearance of the seven 
churchyards and their compound buildings at the baptism site 
by the end of July 2019.56 It was also looking to secure Israeli 
funding to clear the remainder of the valley fl oor (anti-vehicle 
mine lines (some of which are being cleared by the IDF and 
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALESTINE: 1 JUNE 2018
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE. 
COMPLETION IS CONTINGENT ON POLITICAL FACTORS AND DEMINING PROGRESS MADE BY ISRAEL AND
 THE HALO TRUST, AS PALESTINE DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF MINED AREAS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
PMAC planned to complete clearance of mined areas by 
the end of 2020, if there were no obstacles from the other 
parties.58 Clearance in the West Bank is constrained by 
available funding59 and is impacted by political factors, 
including the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for 
Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations.60 
It is, however, a positive development that The HALO Trust 
was permitted to begin mine clearance operations in April 
2014, and, as at July 2019, HALO Trust had completed 
clearance of fi ve minefi elds in Area C of the West Bank. 
Clearance of a sixth minefi eld, Araba, was planned to be 
completed by the end of September 2019.61
As at the end of 2018, four Jordanian-laid minefi elds in the 
governorates of Jenin and Tul Kareem, which fall within 
HALO Trust’s donor agreement, remained to be cleared. 
After completion of the four priority Jordanian-laid 
minefi elds, HALO Trust planned to look into clearance of 
mined areas in the Jordan Valley, the majority of which are 
Israeli-laid.62 
In February 2019, the INMAA hoped that clearance of mined 
areas in the West Bank would be fi nished in two years. 
According to the INMAA, the Yalo and Canada Park minefi eld 
will be cleared, but according to humanitarian prioritisation, 
noting that minefi elds are fenced and marked, and pose little 
humanitarian impact.63 
Furthermore, the INMAA began survey of the Jordan Valley 
minefi elds in the West Bank in 2017, using Israeli national 
budget and operating with Israeli companies. The INMAA 
sees signifi cant potential for cancellation and reduction of 
land in the Jordan Valley, and is using various technologies 
and scientifi c tools to assess the likelihood of mine drift. The 
INMAA planned to invest around ILS 900,000 (approximately 
US$250,000) on this project in 2017–19.64
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance in the 
West Bank (2014–18)
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In 2018, the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian 
Demining Unit completed clearance of the Tiwinza square 
kilometre. In other respects, however, Peru fell well short 
of its land release targets for the year. Peru’s estimate of 
outstanding mine contamination is not based on high-quality 
survey and no progress appears to have been made in 
realising Peru’s promised improvements of its mine action 
programme. In May 2019, a helicopter accident with four 
casualties caused a delay to operations and even before then, 
Peru was not on track to meet its targets for the year. Peru 
is at growing risk of not completing clearance of outstanding 
mine contamination by its Article 5 deadline, already 
extended for far too long. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Peru should conduct quality survey on its outstanding mined areas to develop an accurate baseline of 
anti-personnel mine contamination.
 ■ Peru should develop and implement new policies for land release to ensure that targeted clearance is being 
conducted as part of a comprehensive land release methodology.
 ■ Peru should provide updates in its annual Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 
transparency reports on progress with respect to its “Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 
2018–2024”.
 ■ Peru should develop and implement prioritisation criteria for survey and clearance tasks.
 ■ Peru should seek international assistance to expand its use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) to fi nd mined areas 











ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2024
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
PERU
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(20% of overall score)
4 Peru has yet to carry out quality survey to determine accurately the extent of its 
outstanding mine contamination. The fi gure given in its latest Article 7 report cannot be 
reconciled with the amount of clearance conducted in 2018 and is inconsistent across 





(10% of overall score)
6 Peru has the requisite legislation and the necessary management structure in place to 
oversee demining operations. Peru funds all its own operations and while the budget 
increased in 2018 there was still a gap between budget and costings.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)




(10% of overall score)
4 Anti-personnel mine contamination, survey and clearance fi gures are inconsistent and 
in accurate within reports and across reporting periods. Peru has not reported on any 
improvements to information management in 2018.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
5 Peru has a national plan for demining 2018-24 with annual land release targets. However, 
it did not meet its targets for 2018 and is not on track to meet its targets for 2019. There is 
a lack of clarity about whether Peru has a criteria for prioritisation in place.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 Peru has twice made commitments to develop new policies for land release and 
implement new demining techniques. As at July 2019, Peru has not reported on whether 






(20% of overall score)
3 Peru’s land release output rose very slightly in 2018 but was expected to fall in 2019. 
Peru could easily meet its Article 5 deadlines with the implementation of improved land 
release methodologies given a modicum of political will.
Average Score 4.3 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Peruvian Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian 
Demining (DIGEDEHUME)
■ CONTRAMINAS Security Division (DIVSECOM)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The estimate of remaining anti-personnel mine contamination 
in Peru’s latest APMBC Article 7 report, as at end 2018, was 
358,867m2 across 116 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) 
within four “sectors” (see Table 1). Previously, Peru reported 
that as at the beginning of 2018 mine contamination totalled 
396,171m2 across 124 SHAs.1 The difference between the 
beginning and end of 2018 is not reconciled by the amount 
of land release reported.2
Peru’s reporting of outstanding mine contamination is 
inconsistent between reports. In its Article 7 transparency 
report for the previous year (for the period March 2017 to 
March 2018) Peru stated that as at March 2018, remaining 
mine contamination totalled 426,325m2 across 134 SHAs 
and, in the same report, 396,171m2 across 124 SHAs.3 In 
its statement to the Article 5 Committee in May 2019 Peru 
reported that it had 117 mined areas of 411,660m2 remaining 
and 7,556 anti-personnel mines to destroy.4
The size and extent of the 116 suspected mined areas varies 
widely, with one area only 5m2 in size while the largest, by far, 
is estimated to extend over 160,000m2.5 In fact, most of this 
large area should be released by survey, without the need for 
recourse to full clearance. The true amount of contaminated 
land is probably no more than 100,000m2 as Peru does not 
use polygons to delineate hazardous areas, despite having 
detailed mine maps of almost all the affected areas. 
In its 2016 Article 5 extension request and “Updated National 
Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024” Peru stated that 
it would carry out survey activities to determine the size and 
location of the mined areas using mine records.6 Since 2016, 
however, Peru has only reduced 34,736m2 by technical survey 
and 25,433m2 by non-technical survey. As at end 2018, all of 
Peru’s outstanding contamination was in SHAs.
Mine contamination in Peru results from a 1995 border 
confl ict with Ecuador. The mined section of the border was 
predominantly in the Condor mountain range that was at 
the centre of the dispute.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by sector 
(at end 2018)7
Sector CHAs SHAs Area (m2)
Santiago 0 42 70,690
Tiwinza 0 16 88,922
Cenepa 0 40 18,290
Achuime 0 18 180,965
Totals 0 116 358,867
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by 
the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de 
Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS). 
CONTRAMINAS is responsible for setting strategy and 
priorities and for overall coordination of mine action 
activities. It consists of an Interministerial Executive Council, 
chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a Technical 
Secretariat, which oversees the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
Directorate of Security and Defence.8
CONTRAMINAS was created in December 2002 after the 
issuance of a “Supreme Decree”, an additional “Supreme 
Decree” issued in July 2005 regulates CONTRAMINAS.9 
Directive 001 regulates demining operations at the Peruvian 
Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Demining 
(DIGEDEHUME) while Directive 006 regulates compliance 
under the APMBC.10
In its revised second Article 5 deadline extension request, 
submitted in August 2016, Peru estimated that US$38.6 
million would be needed to fi nish the job, all of which was 
due to be funded by the Peruvian government.11 This 
estimate was also included in its “Updated National Plan 
for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024”. Since 2010, Peru 
has reported contributing about $1.4 million annually for 
anti-personnel mine survey and clearance which is less than 
the annual amount costed by Peru as needed to complete 
clearance by 2024. Based on the fi gures it has supplied, 
almost half of this total could be saved by completing 
clearance by 2021. In its 2016 extension request Peru 
pledged to increase the annual budget to meet its requested 
deadline and that it would reach out to international entities 
for support in order to conclude implementation well in 
advance of its deadline.12 In 2018, the Executive Council of 
CONTRAMINAS increased the annual budget to $2.36 million 
although it had been costed at $3.88 million.13
GENDER
As at July 2019, no information had been provided by the national authority on gender within the Peruvian mine action 
programme. Gender does not feature in Peru’s 2016 Article 5 deadline extension request or in its Updated National Plan 
for Humanitarian Demining.14
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CONTRAMINAS uses the Information Management System 
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.15 Peru submits its Article 
7 reports on a timely basis and reports on its progress in 
Article 5 implementation at intersessional meetings and 
Meetings of States Parties. However, the quality of data 
in these reports are poor with frequent inconsistencies 
and inaccuracies both within reports and across reporting 
periods.16 The Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, in their 
decision on Peru’s 2016 extension request, noted the 
importance of Peru providing updated information on an 
annual basis within its Article 7 reports and that Peru 
should report on progress in accordance with the Guide 
to Reporting.17
Peru submitted its last Article 5 deadline extension request 
in 2016.18 In granting Peru’s request, the Fifteenth Meeting 
of States Parties called on Peru to provide, by 30 April 2018, 
an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by 
the extension detailing the results of the activities to meet 
its strategic objectives; an updated list of all areas known 
or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines; annual 
projections of which areas would be dealt with during the 
remaining period covered by the request and by which 
organisation; and an updated budget.19 Peru submitted 
an “Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 
2018-2024” on 30 May 2018. Included is an annual plan for 
demining of 127 areas covering almost 0.5km2, which is 
more than the remaining mine contamination.20
PLANNING AND TASKING
According to Peru’s Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–24, remaining suspected mine contamination of some 
0.49km2 spread across 127 SHAs will be released by 31 December 2024. Peru expected to clear 8,089 mines from the areas.21
The plan for the seven years beginning 1 January 2018 is as follows:
Table 2: Planned clearance in 2018–24 (Updated Plan)22
Year Sector Mined areas Area (m2) AP mines
2018 Tiwinza 16 119,415 2,697
2019 Cenepa 13 92,850 627
2020 Achuime 20 9,458 746
2021 Cenepa 16 12,301 653
2022 Cenepa – Santiago 18 180,965 392
2023 Santiago 16 28,225 838
2024 Santiago 28 48,065 2,136
Totals 127 491,279 8,089
In its Article 7 Report for 2018, Peru included a plan for 
clearance of 116 mined areas from 2019 to 2024:
Table 3: Planned clearance in 2019–24 (Article 7)23











In 2018, Peru was due to clear 16 mined areas totalling 
119,415m2 from the Tiwinza sector according to its Updated 
National Plan for Demining for 2018–24 or 12 mined areas 
from Tiwinza of unspecifi ed area according to its Article 7 
Report for 2017. In fact, Peru released just 27,303m2 across 
eight mined areas in the Tiwinza sector.24
Peru had a Demining Action Plan for 2019, with clearance in 
the Cenepa sector beginning in April, but in May demining 
operations were suspended following a helicopter accident.25
Peru’s criteria for prioritising survey and clearance 
operations are unclear. In its decision on Peru’s 2016 
extension request, the Article 5 Committee noted that Peru 
should prioritise operations based on the socio-economic 
impact of mined areas.26 One of the activities listed as 
part of CONTRAMINAS objective to develop new demining 
policies was to determine the priority of the objectives 
for the clearance, in coordination with DIGEDEHUME and 
DIVSECOM.27 As at July 2019, Peru has not reported on 
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Peru conducts demining in accordance with the Binational 
Manual for Humanitarian Demining, developed under the 
Binational Cooperation Programme with Ecuador, and with 
the Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual, based on 
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) which were 
adapted to the Peruvian context.28
One of CONTRAMINAS four objectives in Peru’s 2016 
extension request was to develop new policies for land 
release, with the aim of fi nalising these policies within six 
months of approval of the plan. The same objective was 
included in its Updated National Plan for Demining for 
2018–24.29 As at July 2019, it is not known if these new 
policies have been developed, and Peru had not provided 
an update on the issue in its latest Article 7 report. As 
noted by the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Peru 
should conduct evidence-based survey to defi ne its SHAs 
and identify confi rmed hazardous areas (CHA).30
OPERATORS 
DIGEDEHUME is responsible for demining on the border 
with Ecuador with two teams each of 60 deminers.31 In 2018, 
DIGEDEHUME carried out eight “work days” of 20 days each 
between April and October.32 The CONTRAMINAS Security 
Division (DIVSECOM), which is responsible for supporting 
DIGEDHUME with demining operations, has 40 police offi cers 
trained in demining.33
In its 2016 extension request, Peru committed to 
strengthening the capacity of the Humanitarian Demining 
School of CONTRAMINAS, with the aim of increasing capacity 
by 20% in the second semester of 2017. This was deferred to 
the second semester of 2018 in Peru’s Updated National Plan 
for Demining for 2018–24.34 As at July 2019, no information 
has been provided on whether this has occurred.
The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining 
Unit is deployed to areas that were at the centre of the 
confl ict between the two nations. In October 2015, the unit 
began operations in a mined area estimated to extend over 
43,500m2 within the Tiwinza square kilometre.35 In 2018, 
clearance of the Tiwinza square kilometre was completed.36
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Peru has not yet used machines for demining, and until 2015 
mine detection dogs (MDD) were only used for quality control 
after clearance. In 2015, MDDs were used for the fi rst time 
to locate mines.37 Their use should be expanded signifi cantly 
to both identify the location of mined areas and to reduce 
and release land within those areas. Peru should consider 
seeking international assistance for this work. 
In its revised Second Article 5 deadline extension request, 
Peru announced that it would be using both machines and 
MDDs for demining which, as at April 2019, had not yet been 
introduced.38 In its updated multi-year plan submitted in 
May 2018, one of Peru’s strategic objectives for 2018–24 
included the development, design, and implementation of 
new humanitarian demining techniques, such as with 
machines or dogs.39
DEMINER SAFETY
In May 2019, a helicopter carrying four demining personnel 
crashed killing two and wounding two others. After the crash 
the Accident Investigation Board of Army Aviation went to the 
scene to determine the cause of the accident.40
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 27,303m2 was released in the Tiwinza sector, of which 15,576m2 was cleared, 9,911m2 cancelled through 
non-technical survey, and 1,817m2 reduced through technical survey. A total of 140 mines were destroyed.
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 11,728m2 was released through survey
in the Tiwinza sector, including 9,911m2 cancelled through 
non-technical survey (see Table 4), and 1,817m2 reduced 
through technical survey (see Table 5).41
This is a reduction compared to 2017, particularly in technical 
survey output, when Peru reduced 7,171m2 through technical 
survey and cancelled 10,738m2 through non-technical survey 
in Tiwinza.42
There is some overlap between the fi gures for 2018 and 
2017 due to the reporting periods of Peru’s Article 7 reports. 
In its 2017 Article 7 report the reporting period ran from 
March 2017 to March 2018, while in its 2018 Article 7 report 
the reporting period was from January to December 2018.
Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201843
Sector Area cancelled (m²)
Tiwinza 9,911
Total 9,911
Table 5: Reduced by technical survey in 201844
Sector Area reduced (m2)
Tiwinza 1,817
Total 1,817
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 15,576m2 was cleared in the Tiwinza sector and 140 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.45
This is an increase in the area cleared from 2017 when Peru reported clearance of 9,246m2 in Tiwinza.46 From March 2017 
to March 2018, Peru was clearing 24m2 per mine, while from January to December 2018, Peru was clearing 111m2 per mine.
Table 6: Mine clearance in 201847
Sector Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
Tiwinza 8 15,576 140 N/R N/R
Totals 8 15,576 140 N/R N/R
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle   N/R = Not Recorded
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PERU: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR, 9-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 
(MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM
Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







* Covers the period March 2017 to March 2018
** Covers the period March 2016 to March 2017
*** Covers the period March 2015 to March 2016
In its decision on Peru’s 2016 extension request, the Fifteenth 
Meeting of States Parties noted that as Peru was seeking 
to develop enhanced processes of land release “Peru 
may fi nd itself in a situation wherein it can proceed with 
implementation faster than that suggested by the amount 
of time requested”.48 Peru should easily be able to complete 
clearance well before its Article 5 deadline if it used the 
full range of land release techniques and effi cient, targeted 
clearance. At least 75,000m2 can be released each year based 
on an earlier review of data and on discussions with senior 
offi cials at the General Directorate.49
In its Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–24, Peru 
outlined three scenarios for the completion of anti-personnel 
mine clearance by the 2024 deadline. The fi rst, the “probable” 
scenario, involves completing demining operations with 
the current available personnel (two demining companies 
and 40 police offi cers trained in demining) but to achieve 
this, the annual budget needs to be increased. The second, 
the “possible” scenario, is to complete clearance before 
the deadline with increased personnel (three demining 
companies and the police deminers, equipment and budget. 
The third scenario, the “desirable” scenario, is to complete 
demining well in advance of the deadline with the support of 
international entities.50 In Peru’s statement to the Committee 
for the Strengthening of Cooperation and Assistance in May 
2019, Peru thanked Germany and China for their donations of 
demining equipment in 2018–19 and thanked Italy, the United 
States, Hungary, Norway and the NGO Norwegian People’s 
Aid for ongoing discussions on possible cooperation and Chile 
for the exchange of information on demining issues.51
Since the 2014 Maputo Review conference, Peru’s survey and 
clearance output has fallen by 78% from a high of 122,926m2
in 2015 to 27,303m2 in 2018. Peru’s land release output was 
similar between 2017 and 2018. In Peru’s Updated National 
Plan for Demining 2018–24, four specifi c goals have been 
set within an overarching institutional strategic objective of 
the total elimination of anti-personnel mines from Peruvian 
territory by 2024. These goals include CONTRAMINAS 
formulating new land release policies; developing and 
implementing new demining techniques; and strengthening 
the capacity of the demining school.52 All of these goals 
have the potential to increase Peru’s land release output if 
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW
0KM2 N/R
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
SENEGAL
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Humanity and Inclusion (HI; formerly Handicap International), 
the only international mine action operator in Senegal since 
2014, was forced to suspend operations in October 2017 due 
to a lack of funding. In February 2019, it resumed operations 
in Goudomp department, with new funding secured from the 
United States.
Under the European Union (EU) Council Decision in 
support of the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Maputo Action Plan, a 
“National Stakeholder Dialogue” workshop was held in Dakar 
on 29–30 October 2018, with support from the APMBC’s 
Implementation Support Unit.
Overall progress in land release remained painstakingly slow 
for yet another year in 2018, as Senegal continued to fail to 
make signifi cant strides towards meeting its international 
legal obligations to demine as soon as possible. This failure, 
combined with its apparent unwillingness to clear mines 
around military bases, raises serious doubt as to Senegal’s 
compliance with its core obligations under the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Serious obstacles also 
remain to be overcome, primarily in regard to ongoing 
insecurity which denies access for demining in certain areas 
of Casamance and a lack of technical and fi nancial resources. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a 
complete and accurate estimate of its remaining mine contamination.
 ■ Senegal should ensure that suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are recorded on the basis of demonstrable 
evidence and with specifi c size estimates and the information made public. 
 ■ Senegal should submit its outstanding Article 7 transparency report and ensure subsequent annual updates 
are submitted each year prior to the 30 April deadline. 
 ■ The Government of Senegal should make national funding and resources available for demining while 
developing and implementing a resource mobilisation strategy to secure longer term funding.
LIGHT, 
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 ■ Senegal should prioritise clearance and technical survey in readily accessible areas and where the presence 
of mines is reliably attested.
 ■ The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS) should continue to 
improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations.
 ■ CNAMS should work actively to restore confi dence among donors and international operators in its mine 
action programme.






(20% of overall score)
5 Senegal’s reporting of its estimate of remaining mine contamination has been 
inconsistent. It also includes over 140 areas which have still to be surveyed and a 
number of areas with an unknown size, making it diffi cult to have much confi dence 





(10% of overall score)
3 Senegal has shown scant political commitment to meeting its Article 5 obligations with 
any urgency in recent years. The failure to demine areas around military installations 
raises concerns about its compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) and even the prohibition on use of landmines. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)




(10% of overall score)
4 Senegal’s reporting has been highly inconsistent in recent years and diffi cult to make 
sense of. It failed to submit an updated Article 7 transparency report in 2019, in violation 
of its treaty obligations, and did not offi cially report on progress in land release in 2018.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
3 In October 2018, Senegal elaborated a revised timeline to address the remaining areas 
of contamination by its 2021 APMBC Article 5 deadline. However, a persistent problem 
which has curtailed progress in land release in recent years has remained a lack of 
access to certain areas due to ongoing insecurity. In the past, Senegal’s tasking has 
been strongly criticised by an international mine action operator.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)





(20% of overall score)
3 Senegal’s progress towards meeting its 2021 Article 5 deadline has been meagre. It 
is hopeful, though, that the return of Humanity and Inclusion (HI) and the resumption 
of demining operations will prevent further stagnation while a stakeholder dialogue 
workshop held in October 2018 might renew interest and commitment to making 
progress in mine action. 
Average Score 3.9 Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Commission for the Implementation of the 
Ottawa Convention




 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ None









UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of 
the extent of its mine contamination, nearly 20 years after 
becoming a state party to the APMBC. In 2018, it continued 
to report inconsistent fi gures for the amount of confi rmed 
and suspected contaminated areas remaining, as it has 
in previous years. Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, 
Oussouye and Ziguinchor) of Senegal’s total of 45 still 
contain confi rmed or suspected mined areas. The affected 
departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, 
between The Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the 
south. A comprehensive claim of 1.2km2 for nationwide mine 
contamination does not appear to be based on fi rm evidence.1
According to fi gures reported by CNAMS, as at end 2018, a 
total of almost 0.49km2 remained to be addressed across 
37 mined areas with a further 11 other areas of unknown 
size.2 In addition, 144 areas which still remained to be 
surveyed (127 areas in Bignona department, 4 in Oussouye, 
and 13 in Ziguinchor), along with.3 It is not possible to 
reconcile these fi gures with past reported estimates of 
remaining contamination and reported progress in land 
release. Moreover, according to HI, given the historical 
evidence of frequent clashes and rebel bases in the area, the 
identifi cation of SHAs in north-west Casamance suggests 
a high probability that other areas of contamination will 
be found as survey progresses further east, nearer to the 
northern border.4
The extent of contamination is better known in the south of 
Casamance, where previous survey in the region has identifi ed 
several SHAs, between the border with Guinea-Bissau and the 
Casamance river to the north and the Atlantic Ocean to the 
west.5 In August 2018, HI informed Mine Action Review that 
areas such as north Sindian in Bignona department where 
signifi cant contamination was suspected were still unsurveyed. 
However, for security reasons and a lack of resources, the area 
had not been addressed.6
Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 
30 years of fi ghting between the armed forces and a 
non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces 
of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de 
Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fi ghting with some factions 
of the MFDC has continued despite a ceasefi re in place 
since 2004. 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Commission for the Implementation of the 
Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action 
authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance 
are coordinated by the CNAMS. Regional mine action 
coordination committees have been established in Kolda, 
Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.
The CNAMS is responsible for promoting the national mine 
action programme, mobilising resources, coordinating survey 
and conducting demining, designing and implementing 
a victim assistance programme, accrediting demining 
organisations, and monitoring and evaluating activities.7
In June 2018, the CNAMS informed states parties to 
the APMBC that it expected approximately €6.5 million 
is required to complete clearance of the remaining 
contaminated areas. It stated that Senegal contributes 
€460,000 annually for the operating costs of the CNAMS, and 
€308,000 for mine action activities.8 CNAMS revised the fi gure 
reported as needed to complete clearance in October 2018, 
down to close to €5.5 million. It claimed that the government 
had earmarked more than €1.8 million for mine action in 
2019.9 Senegal’s revised October 2017 workplan notes that 
a resource mobilisation plan should be included in the 
document but it does not contain one.10
GENDER 
CNAMS informed Mine Action Review that the national mine action strategy prohibit sexual discrimination and strongly 
encourages recruitment of women in demining. Four of ten members of the demining team in the Senegalese national 
mine action programme were women in 2018.11
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to HI, CNAMS’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system was upgraded in 2015.12
Senegal’s reporting in recent years has been diffi cult to follow, and it failed to submit an updated Article 7 transparency report 
in 2019 or any offi cial reporting of land release carried out in 2018. 
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PLANNING AND TASKING
At the October 2018 stakeholder dialogue workshop, CNAMS 
outlined a workplan for completion of survey and clearance 
by its 2021 Article 5 deadline. This included non-technical 
survey of areas of unknown size and the 144 areas not yet 
visited in 2019, and technical survey and clearance of all 
remaining areas and any new areas identifi ed through the 
non-technical survey in December 2018–January 2021.13 
Specifi cally, of the 37 areas with a known size of 
contamination totalling just over 491,000m2, in December 
2018–April 2019, 12 areas with a size of 265,233m2 in 
Goudomp department were planned to be addressed, while 
in May–June 2019, six areas with a size of 37,048m2 were 
to be addressed in Ziguinchor department along with fi ve 
areas covering 38,020m2 in Bignona department. In January 
2020–January 2021, the remaining nine areas with a size 
of 77,240m2 will be addressed in Oussouye and Bignona 
departments, along with fi ve areas with a size of 73,554m2 
in Ziguinchor department, for a total of 14 areas with a size 
of just under 150,800m2. Of the areas of unknown size, eight 
areas in Bignona and three areas in Goudomp departments 
would, it is claimed, be addressed in October–November 
2019 with all remaining areas will be addressed in January 
2020–January 2021.14
Previously, Senegal submitted an updated workplan in 
accordance with its Article 5 deadline extension request in 
May 2017 for the remainder of its extension period, until 
1 March 2021. A revised version was then concluded on 
13 October 2017. The workplan lists all known or suspected 
contaminated areas and establishes annual targets for the 
amount of contamination to be addressed. However, there 
are inconsistencies and incompatibilities in its reporting on 
contamination and the size of projected annual milestones 
for land release. Additionally, Senegal’s extension request 
is until March 2021, but the plan does not contain details of 
work to be carried out after 2018.
Senegal did not meet the targets set in its 2017 workplan 
for 2018, nor those in its most recent Article 7 report 
(for calendar year 2017).
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Senegal does not have national mine action legislation in 
place, based on available information. 
Senegal’s national mine action standards were developed 
in 2009 and revised in 2013. According to CNAMS, the 2013 
revision included standards for accreditation, technical 
investigation, minimum mine clearance depth, and the use 
of machines and mine detection dogs in demining.15
OPERATORS 
HI has remained the only international demining operator 
in Senegal since 2014. As at October 2017, it had suspended 
its demining operations in the country for lack of funding.16 
During that year, it employed 26 operational staff, two 
national managerial staff, and an expatriate operations 
manager.17 Operations resumed in February 2019 thanks 
to funding from the United States. In May 2019, however, 
fi ve deminers were kidnapped and then released the same 
day, and some of their equipment stolen. Since then, the 
authorities have been in negotiations to be able to recover 
the equipment and restart clearance.18 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Prior to cessation of operations in October 2017, HI deployed 
a soil preparation and mechanical mine clearance machine, 
the Digger D-3.19
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Senegal did not formally report on progress in land release in 2018. In October 2018, CNAMS reported that since its second 
extension request granted in 2016 it had visited 72 of 79 locations, determining that 67 were not contaminated and the 
remaining 5 (with a size of 14,670m2) were recorded as SHAs. In addition, 29 areas with a total size of 164,990m2 had been 
cleared, with the destruction of 22 mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).20 It did not disaggregate these fi gures by year. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
SURVEY IN 2018
As noted above, Senegal has not offi cially reported any area released or confi rmed through survey in 2018. Previously, in 
2017, HI reported confi rming 16 mined areas with a combined size of 65,393m2: one area in Bignona department with a size 
of 1,000m2 and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a size of 64,393m2, all of which were subsequently released through 
technical survey and clearance.21
CLEARANCE IN 2018
Likewise, Senegal has not offi cially reported on any clearance in 2018. In 2017, HI reported releasing a total of 65,400m2
through technical survey and clearance (though it was unable to disaggregate between the two), including one area in Bignona 
department with a size of 1,000m2 and 15 areas in Goudomp department with a combined size of 64,393m2. These areas 
were released with the destruction of two anti-personnel mines, one anti-vehicle mine, and one item of unexploded ordnance 
(UXO).22 However, CNAMS reported that 18 CHAs with a total size of 106,658m2 were cleared in 2017 in Goudomp department, 
Ziguinchor region, with the destruction of three anti-personnel mines.23
DEMINER SAFETY
In mid-May 2019, demining operations, which had recently restarted thanks to US funding, were again suspended following the 
kidnapping of fi ve deminers by an MFDC faction. This occurred despite an agreement having been obtained to operate in that 
zone, according to CNAMS. As noted above, the deminers were all released the same day.24
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SENEGAL: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







*Includes technical survey and clearance
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with 
the fi ve-year extension granted by states parties in 2015), 
Senegal is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. It is improbable 
that it will not meet this deadline.
In August 2018, HI stated that the likelihood that Senegal would 
meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2021 was “more than 
low” in view of the remaining situation of more than 1.2km2
of area reported to be contaminated and nearly 144 localities 
which had not been surveyed, and without the resources to 
do so. HI additionally cited that the CNAMS’ ability to mobilise 
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In June 2018, Senegal informed APMBC states parties that 
with the current pace of performance it was unlikely to be 
able to meet its clearance objectives of end 2020.26 In October 
2018, CNAMS highlighted a lack of access to certain targeted 
areas, the withdrawal of traditional mine action partners, and 
deteriorating demining equipment as primary challenges.27 
Senegal has previously claimed that the circumstances 
impeding compliance with its international legal obligations 
include general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to 
demining operations; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; 
and a decrease in technical and fi nancial resources in 
recent years.28 
In fact, since 2013, the apparently wilful lack of land release 
and concrete political will to address its mine problem, 
and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance 
capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulfi lling its Article 
5 obligations. This led to the withdrawal of Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) in 2014 and the loss of fi nancial support 
from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in 
its clearance capacities. CNAMS’ allocation of tasks has also 
been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets 
to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while 
requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying 
clearance assets were denied.29 
Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations 
would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing 
peace talks and would fi rst be approved by the MFDC in 
meetings with Senegalese offi cials.30 At the same time, 
CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by 
authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action 
centre.31 CNMAS has, though, reported that events in The 
Gambia had improved the security situation in the north 
of Casamance, particularly in the department of Bignona, 
allowing signifi cant numbers of displaced persons to return. 
It expected that the continued evolution of the peace process 
would ensure better security conditions and improve access 
for mine clearance in planned locations.32 
There is, though, no explanation in the action plan presented 
in Senegal’s second extension request of how peace 
negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Refl ection Group on 
Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réfl exion sur la Paix en 
Casamance, GRPC) will address the issue of mine clearance.
Another fundamental problem is Senegal’s ongoing lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of its mine problem. Concerns 
have also been raised about its apparent reluctance to deploy 
clearance assets in CHAs, and its continued failure to clear 
contaminated areas around existing military bases verges 
on use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the 
APMBC. According to NPA, there is overwhelming evidence 
that the laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic, 
while the Senegalese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not 
thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance.33
Previously, in 2015, NPA criticised CNAMS for obstructing 
dialogue between operators and the armed forces in 
particular, which could provide the specifi c locations of 
mined areas. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS 
was preventing dialogue between parties, including the 
spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a 
complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.34
However, in August 2017, CNAMS claimed that it has already 
demined around all the military bases, with the help of the 
army where that was necessary.35 HI has reported that its 
teams cleared 22,162m² in Boutoute-Djibanar in connection 
with a former army base in 2015–16, destroying “around” 
19 anti-personnel mines.36 It is not certain that all other 
bases have been demined.
Based on present capacity and its poor track record, without 
a major change in political will and resources, Senegal will 
not meet its Article 5 deadline, or even the Maputo political 
declaration 2025 goal.
 1  Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, 
CNAMS, 16 September 2019. 
 2 Ibid. 
 3 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a 
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018, available at: 
bit.ly/2TJTY89. 
 4 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Article 7 Report 
(for 2016), Form D. 
 5 Ibid. 
 6 Email from Faly Keita, Coordinator, Casamance Site, HI, 8 August 2018. 
 7 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a 
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018. 
 8 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018. 
 9 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a 
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018. 
 10 CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021”, 
13 October 2017, p. 20. 
 11 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 16 September 2019. 
 12 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.  
 13 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a 
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018. 
 14 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a 
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018. 
 15 Ibid. 
 16 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2016.  
 17 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018. 
 18 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019. 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a 
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018. 
 21 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018. 
 22 Ibid. 
 23 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D. 
 24 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 20 September 2019. 
 25 Email from Faly Keita, HI, 8 August 2018. 
 26 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018. 
 27 Presentation by CNAMS, “National Stakeholder Dialogue: Towards a 
Mine-Free Senegal” workshop, Dakar, 29–30 October 2018. 
 28 Analysis of Senegal’s request for a second Article 5 deadline extension 
submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, 
p. 22. 
 29 K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it 
should?”, Blog post, 2014, at: bit.ly/33M3nRs.  
 30 H. Sagna, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations 
still deadlocked”, Enquête+, 17 June 2015.  
 31 Statement of ICBL, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; 
and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.  
 32 CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–21”, 
April 2017; and CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 
2016–2021”, 13 October 2017, p. 21. 
 33 Ibid. 
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH
290.29KM2
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Serbia requested and was granted a further four-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
Article 5 deadline until 1 March 2023. The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) continued to demonstrate a willingness to adopt 
more effi cient land release methodology in instances where technical survey is more appropriate than full clearance. SMAC 
also attracted a new international donor in 2018 and another in 2019, putting it back on track to meet its Article 5 deadline. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Serbia should consider using its armed forces for mine clearance or inviting demining non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to help meet its treaty obligations by fulfi lling its Article 5 obligations by 2023. 
 ■ SMAC should conduct non-technical and technical survey, rather than full clearance, in instances where 




ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
SERBIA
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
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(20% of overall score)
5 Serbia has remaining suspected hazardous areas, but needs to conduct survey for 






(10% of overall score)
7 Serbia has strong national ownership of its mine action programme, which is nationally 
funded. It also doubled the amount of national funding towards survey and clearance in 
2018 and is actively attracting new donors to help it meet its completion plan.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
3 SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine 
action data by sex and age. However, it does ensure women and children are consulted 
during survey and community liaison activities and there is equal access to employment 




(10% of overall score)
7 Serbia submits timely, accurate, and comprehensive annual Article 7 reports on Article 5 
progress, which are consistent between reporting periods, and provides regular updates 
on progress at APMBC meetings.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 SMAC has a plan in place for completion of Article 5 implementation with planned 
annual land release output through to its treaty deadline, subject to funding. Serbia 
also produces revised annual workplans based on actual progress.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 Although SMAC has expressed a preference for full clearance of SHAs over technical 
survey, it did reduce land through technical survey in 2017 and 2018, demonstrating a 





(20% of overall score)
7 Serbia has set a target date for completion of Article 5, but meeting it is largely 
contingent on securing suffi cient funding. Land release output in 2018 was through 
both technical survey and clearance, and was an increase on 2017.
Average Score 6.0 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of 
Interior (acts as the national mine action authority)
 ■ Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Saturnia d.o.o.
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ DOK-International d.o.o., Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), Belgrade branch
NGOs:
 ■ In Demining, Pale, BiH, Belgrade branch
 ■ Stop Mines, Pale, BiH, Belgrade branch
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ None







UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 1 April 2019, eight areas in Bujanovac municipality, 
covering more than 1.73km2, were suspected to contain 
anti-personnel mines (see Table 1).1 This is a decrease from 
the 2.35km2 of mined areas a year earlier, the result of 
release through technical survey and clearance.
Bujanovac is the only municipality in Serbia still affected 
by mines. According to SMAC, the contamination is from 
mines of an unknown origin and type; which have not been 
emplaced to follow a pattern; and for which there are no 
minefi eld records.2 According to the national authorities, 
previous surveys found insuffi cient evidence for mined 
areas to be classifi ed as confi rmed hazardous areas, so 
they remain as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).3
Historically, mine contamination in Serbia can be divided into 
two phases. The fi rst was a legacy of the armed confl icts 
associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s. The second concerned use of mines in 2000–01 in 
the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by a non-state 
armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and 
Medvedja (OVPBM). The contamination remaining in Serbia is 
a result of this later phase.4 Contamination also exists within 
Kosovo (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines report 
on Kosovo for further information). 
Serbia is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), which are 
either the result of the 1999 bombing, remain from previous 
confl icts, or are the result of explosions or fi re at military 
depots5 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report on Serbia for further information).
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by village 
(at 1 April 2019)6
Municipality Village SHAs Area (m2)
Bujanovac Ravno Bučje 1 390,300
Končulj 5  1,181,820 
Dobrosin 1  28,000 
Turija 1 131,400
Totals 8 1,731,520
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
According to a Government Decree on Protection 
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency 
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the 
national mine action authority (NMAA).7 The NMAA is 
responsible for developing standard operating procedures 
(SoPs); accrediting demining operators; and supervising 
the work of SMAC.8
SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law 
making it responsible for coordinating demining; collecting 
and managing mine action information (including casualty 
data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to 
plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and 
monitor operations, ensure implementation of international 
standards, and conduct risk education.9 As from 1 January 
2014, according to a Government Decree on Protection 
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency 
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible 
for accrediting demining operators. Previously, SMAC was 
responsible for doing so.10
A new director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian 
government in the autumn of 2015,11 and as at 2018, SMAC had a 
total of eight staff.12 SMAC reported that, in 2016, restructuring 
resulted in a greater proportion of operational posts.13
SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including for survey activities, 
development of project tasks for demining and clearance of 
contaminated areas, follow-up on implementation of project 
tasks, and quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. 
Around €150,000 per year is allocated to the work of SMAC 
from the national state budget.14 In addition, the unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) disposal work of the Sector for Emergency 
Situations of the Ministry of Interior is also state funded.15
Since 2015, Serbia has also been allocating national funds for 
survey and clearance, with roughly €100,000 allocated per 
year.16 In 2018, the Serbian Government allocated double the 
amount of national funds for demining operations to €200,000 
allocated per year (which were matched with US and Korean 
funding and tendered through ITF Enhancing Human Security 
(ITF)), and Serbia continues to seek additional international 
funding.17 At the request of the national authorities, national 
funding was increased to €350,000 for 2019 demining 
operations.18 SMAC hopes that national funding, matched 
through ITF, will be made available annually throughout the 
remainder of its Article 5 extension request period.19
GENDER 
SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However, 
it does ensure women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison activities and there is equal access to 
employment for qualifi ed women and men in survey and clearance operations. Around 10% of those employed in survey and 
clearance teams, and also of those in mine action managerial or supervisory positions in Serbia, are women.20
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
SMAC uses its own information management system. Previously, SMAC discussed the possibility of the installation of the 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD),21 but there were no ongoing discussions in that regard as at June 2019. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia 
included a costed plan for the completion of demining, with 
clear milestones, for 2018–23.22 In its Article 7 report for 2018, 
Serbia set out a slightly updated plan: to release 606,210m2 
in 2019; 467,880m2 in 2020; 316,790m2 in 2021; 195,000m2 in 
2022; and the remaining 145,640m2 in 2023.23 Serbia intends 
to use non-technical survey, technical survey, manual 
clearance, mechanical demining (where applicable), and 
mine detection dogs (MDDs, where applicable), to complete 
clearance in Serbia before its 2023 Article 5 deadline.24 
Progress is, however, contingent on funding and Serbia 
has stated that if it cannot secure international support for 
demining, its workplan will be directly affected. On the other 
hand, if more funds are provided, Serbia maintains it could 
implement its workplan more quickly.25
The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC’s annual workplan, 
as well as the annual report on its work.26 The 2019 workplan 
has been adopted by the Serbian government.27
Serbia prioritises the demining of areas which directly affect 
the local population, such as those close to settlements 
where local people have abandoned their houses and stopped 
cultivating land due to fear of landmines.28 SMAC also noted 
that donors themselves sometimes also infl uence the choice 
of the areas which will be demined fi rst, depending on 
availability and amount of their funds.29
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations in 
Serbia are conducted in accordance with the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).30
 
National mine action standards (NMAS) were said to be in 
the fi nal phase of development as at September 2015.31
 
In 
April 2017, SMAC reported that, along with the relevant 
national authorities, it was in the process of establishing a 
commission to develop national standards and SoPs to defi ne 
methods and techniques for demining in Serbia.32 However, 
this process has been hindered due to lack of capacity,33 
and as at March 2019, the development of the NMAS was 
still “in progress”.34
Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed 
its land release methodology to prioritise full clearance 
over technical survey of hazardous areas.35
 
This does not 
correspond to international best practice, and is an ineffi cient 
use of scarce clearance assets. In February 2016, the new 
director of SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that while 
SMAC supports the use of high quality non-technical survey 
to identify suspected mined areas, it will fully clear these 
areas, rather than using technical survey to more accurately 
identify the boundaries of contamination.36
 
SMAC’s position on its preferred land release methodology 
remains the same, although there is now a willingness to 
conduct technical survey in a form “adjusted to the context of 
Serbia”, in response to the stated preference of international 
donors for technical survey above clearance, where 
appropriate.37 
SMAC’s primary reluctance to using technical survey as a next 
step to further delineate confi rmed mined area is its lack of 
confi dence that such survey can effectively identify groups of 
unrecorded mines, not planted in specifi c patterns.38 According 
to SMAC, incidents involving people or animals have occurred 
in most of these suspected areas or else mines have been 
accidentally detected.39 The reduction of mined area through 
technical survey in the municipality of Bujanovac in 2017 and 
2018, however, demonstrates SMAC’s greater willingness to 
adopt more effi cient land release practices.
SMAC has reported that the results of the initial survey 
data are analysed and then further non-technical survey is 
conducted to assess conditions in the fi eld, and to gather 
statements by the local population, hunters, foresters, 
representatives of Civil Protection, and the police, among 
others. Data on mine incidents is another signifi cant 
indicator.40 Also, in the context of Serbia, there is reportedly 
limited potential to obtain additional information on the 
location of mined areas from those who laid the mines 
during the confl ict.41 
Technical survey is employed “to additionally collect 
information by technical methods on a suspected area and 
in case when the data collected by a non-technical survey 
are not suffi cient for suspected areas to be declared 
hazardous or safe”.42 Clearance is reported to be conducted 
in accordance with the IMAS and to a depth of 20cm.43
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OPERATORS 
SMAC does not itself carry out clearance or employ 
deminers but does conduct survey of areas suspected to 
contain mines, CMR, or other ERW. Clearance is conducted 
by commercial companies and NGOs, which are selected 
through public tender procedures executed by ITF, supported 
by international funding.44
The Ministry of Interior issues accreditation to mine action 
operators that is valid for one year. In 2018, 14 companies/
organisations were accredited for demining: seven from 
Serbia, four from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), two from 
Croatia, and one from Russia.45
Thirty deminers were deployed for technical survey of mined 
areas in 2018; one team (10 deminers) from Saturnia d.o.o. 
and two teams (20 deminers) from Stop Mines.46 A further 30 
deminers were deployed for mine clearance in 2018: one team 
each (10 deminers) from DOK-International d.o.o., In Demining, 
and Stop Mines.47 This represents an increase in survey and 
clearance capacity compared to the previous year.
No non-technical survey was conducted in 2018.48
The Serbian Armed Forces maintain a capability to survey, 
search for, detect, clear and destroy landmines. This 
capability includes many types of detection equipment, 
mechanical clearance assets, disposal experts, and specialist 
search and clearance teams.49 An explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) department within the Sector for Emergency 
Management, in the Ministry of Interior, responds to 
call-outs for individual items of ERW, and is also responsible 
for demolition of items found by SMAC.50
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Technical survey and clearance in Serbia is primarily 
conducted manually. 
MDDs were used in technical survey and clearance 
operations in 2018 to release land,51 but according to Serbia 
most of the suspected mined areas are mountainous 
with challenging terrain and thick vegetation and are not 
appropriate for the use of MDDs or machinery. 52 The fact 
that these areas have not been accessed since the end of the 
confl ict (2001), due to suspicion of mines, means that the land 
is unmanaged, making it even less accessible.53
SMAC uses data obtained by unmanned aerial vehicles to 
develop and monitor clearance and technical survey projects.54
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 0.62km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 0.29km2 was cleared and 0.33km2 was reduced through technical 
survey, during which a total of 29 anti-personnel mines and 1,347 other items of UXO were destroyed. No mined area was 
cancelled through non-technical survey.
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, 329,820m2 of mined area was reduced through technical survey, in the villages of Ravno Bučje and Djordjevac, in 
Bujanovac municipality, by Saturnia d.o.o. and Stop Mines, during which 14 anti-personnel mines and two other items of UXO 
were destroyed (see Table 2).55 This is an increase on the 275,800m2 reduced through technical survey in 2017.56 No mined area 
was cancelled through non-technical survey in 2018 or in 2017.
Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey in 201857
Municipality Village Operator Area reduced (m2) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
Bujanovac Ravno Bučje Saturnia and Stop Mines 113,600 5 2
Ravno Bučje Stop Mines 71,120 4 0
Djordjevac Saturnia and Stop Mines 145,100 5 0
Totals 329,820 14 2
AP = Anti-personnel
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, two mined areas were cleared, releasing 293,200m2 and destroying 15 anti-personnel mines and 1,345 items of 
other UXO. The mine clearance, in the villages of Dobrosin and Lučane in Bujanovac municipality, was conducted by two 
NGOs and a commercial company, all from BiH (see Table 3).58 This is an increase in clearance output on 2017, when no land 
was released clearance.59 
SMAC did not have available data on the number of mines destroyed by the EOD department within the Sector for Emergency 
Management during spot tasks in 2018.60
Table 3: Mine clearance in 201861
Municipality Village Operator






Bujanovac Dobrosin In Demining, and 
DOK-International 
1 220,000 9 0
Lučane Stop Mines 1 73,200 6 1,345
Totals 2 293,200 15 1,345
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SERBIA: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: JUST ON TRACK, DEPENDENT ON FUNDING
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
second extension (for four years) granted by states parties in 
2018), Serbia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Serbia is just on 
track to meet this deadline, if it can secure required funding.
Furthermore, Serbia’s claim to continued jurisdiction over 
Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined 
areas under Article 5 of the APMBC. However, Serbia did 
not include such areas in either its fi rst or second extension 
request estimates of remaining contamination or plans for 
the extension periods. 
Serbia reported facing several challenges in complying with 
its Article 5 obligations, including lack of adequate fi nancial 
resources, and the presence of areas contaminated with 
CMR and other ERW.62 In addition, Serbia reported that the 
remaining mine contamination is of unrecorded mined 
areas/groups of mines, with mines having been emplaced 
with no particular pattern, which has complicated survey 
and clearance efforts. Furthermore, climatic conditions 
prevent access to some mined areas for parts of the year.63
In the last fi ve years Serbia has cleared a total of almost one 
square kilometre of mined area (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







*0.28km2 was reduced through technical survey, during which three anti-personnel 
mines were destroyed.
Serbia has fallen well behind the clearance plan it set out 
in its 2013 Article 5 deadline, and also fell behind on land 
release output in its subsequently adjusted workplans in 
2015, 2016, and 2017.64 This was largely due to a lack of 
funding, but in a positive development, on top of existing US 
funding, Serbia also secured funding from a new donor, the 
Republic of Korea, in 2018, and has further secured funding 
from another new donor, Japan, in 2019.65
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This additional funding is set to put SMAC back on track to 
meet its planned land release outputs detailed in its 2018 
Article 5 deadline extension request, and updated most 
recently, in its Article 7 report for 2018.66
In its 2018 Article 5 extension request Serbia calculated that 
it requires an estimated €2.5 million to complete the release 
of all remaining mined areas, of which €900,000 is planned to 
come from national budget and around €1.6 million from ITF 
and other sources of international funding.67
In June 2018, during the APMBC intersessional meetings, 
Serbia and the Committee on the Enhancement of 
Cooperation and Assistance convened an “Individualised 
Approach Platform” meeting, to hold a frank discussion 
with relevant stakeholders on the current status of Serbia’s 
national programme, the needs and challenges in completing 
its Article 5 obligations and it commitments net the Maputo 
Action Plan.68
SMAC has pledged to continue to raise awareness of its 
need for further funding and will seek funding from state 
authorities, public enterprises, and local authorities.69
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(including 77 destroyed 
during spot tasks)
MEDIUM, 
GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE, AND NO BASELINE EXISTS, 
BUT ACTUAL CONTAMINATION LIKELY TO BE FAR LESS
72.2KM2 
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The extent of survey of anti-personnel mined areas rose during the year, but clearance fell by more than 60% compared to 
2017 and no anti-personnel mines were found (although 45 mines were destroyed in spot tasks). This adds yet another year 
to the track-record of limited progress in fulfi lling Somalia’s Article 5 obligations. In Somaliland, land release fared far better, 
with substantial increases in anti-personnel survey and clearance, and more than double the amount of mines destroyed. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Somalia should establish a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as security 
conditions allow.
 ■ Somalia should commit resources for mine action operations. 
 ■ Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)’s status within the Federal Government of Somalia should 
be offi cially recognised and national resources budgeted annually for its operating costs. 
 ■ Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all 
implementing partners. 
 ■ The Federal Government should formally endorse the new National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020. 
 ■ Somalia should develop a mine action resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with 
development partners on long-term support. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022

































































































































































mineactionreview.org   189
STATES PARTIES






(20% of overall score)
4 Considerable effort is needed to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine 
contamination across Somalia. Large swathes of the country have yet to be surveyed 
and many areas are inaccessible due to ongoing confl ict and insecurity. Lack of funding 





(10% of overall score)
4 More effective management of the mine action programme was achieved through 
ongoing capacity development with the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA). 
The Somali Government has still to formally recognise SEMA as a government institution 
and provide funding for its operations.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
5 Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2022 includes provisions on 
gender and diversity. SEMA has demonstrated a positive orientation to addressing 





(10% of overall score)
5 SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action 
database, resulting in improvements in information management. Somalia submitted 
its fi rst Article 7 transparency report for several years in July 2018; but subsequent 
reporting remained of poor quality, lacking in detail and clarity. 
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 Operators reported that SEMA’s ability to manage planning and tasking increased in 
2018, but external factors such as the security situation continue to prevent access to 
certain areas of the country and hampered the deployment of mine action teams.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 A process to revise Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines was ongoing 





(20% of overall score)
4 Land release outputs remained limited in 2018, primarily due to ongoing armed confl ict, 
new security threats, and a lack of resources and operational capacity. No anti-personnel 
mines were found during clearance operations, adding yet another year of very minor 
progress in fulfi lling Somalia’s Article 5 obligations. Substantial progress was, however, 
made in anti-personnel survey and clearance operations in Somaliland.




■ Mine Action Department in the Somaliland Ministry of 
Defence (formerly, Somaliland Mine Action Centre)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ SEMA federal state consortium 
■ National NGOs
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■ The HALO Trust
■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
■ Ukroboronservice
OTHER ACTORS
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Contamination from mines and ERW exists across 
Somalia’s three major regions: south-central Somalia, 
including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, 
a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates 
autonomously in the north-west. Mines along the border with 
Ethiopia, mainly in legacy minefi elds, also continued to affect 
civilians in south-central Somalia.1
As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 
(also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of 
internal confl ict, Somalia is signifi cantly contaminated with 
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). According to the 
United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines 
were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool 
and Sanaag.2
A baseline of mine contamination is still lacking in Somalia, 
primarily due to a lack of resources to deploy suffi cient 
survey teams and lack of access to areas due to security 
concerns and al-Shabaab control, though operators reported 
some progress towards establishing a better understanding 
of anti-personnel mine contamination during the year.3 
Of greater concern was the drastic shrinking of areas for 
mine action operations due to security in 2018. The HALO 
Trust reported that, as at March 2018, a large portion of 
Hiraan region became too dangerous for operations due to 
al-Shabaab attacks. It was forced to refocus operations in 
Galmudug state instead.4
According to Somalia’s Article 7 transparency report, as at 
April 2019, a total of 879 contaminated areas (192 confi rmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs), 511 suspected hazardous areas 
(SHAs), and 176 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks) 
had been registered in the SEMA national database. Of 
this, it reported 38% of recorded contamination was mixed 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination, while a 
further 8% was contaminated solely by anti-personnel mines.5 
A total of 74 areas were reported as confi rmed or suspected 
to contain solely anti-personnel mine contamination with a 
size of just under 72.2km2 (28 CHAs with a size of just over 
12.4km2 and 46 SHAs covering close to 59.8km2).6 This is a 
massive, and unexplained increase on the contamination 
Somalia reported in its Article 7 report for 2017 of 21.3km2.7
According to Somalia’s Article 7 report for 2018, mine 
contamination remaining in Somalia, as recorded in the 
national database was as follows.
Table 1: Mine contamination (at end 2018)8




AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine 
contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in 
Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 
communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines 
and/or ERW.9 Other contaminated areas lie along the border 
with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions. 
Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identifi ed more than 
6km2 of mined area.10
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at May 2018, 
a total of 16 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefi elds 
remained to be cleared with a size of just over 8km2, most 
of which are barrier minefi elds or military base perimeter 
minefi elds.11 
In 2018, The HALO Trust continued to deploy survey teams 
across Somaliland in order to build a more accurate 
assessment of the remaining contamination, focusing on 
former military camp minefi elds along the Ethiopian border. 
While the general extent of contamination in Somaliland has 
been well established as a result of surveys undertaken by 
The HALO Trust over the past 20 years, a combination of 
low-density minelaying and lack of fi rst-hand information 
has meant that new mined areas continue to be found. 
Four minefi elds were added to the database in 2018, with 
a combined size of just over 1.5km2.12
In the Puntland state administration, mine contamination 
was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey 
(LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the 
Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, 
Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.13 
Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and 
ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) and mines of an improvised nature by non-state 
armed groups, have a serious humanitarian impact. The 
extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland 
and Somaliland where a range of surveys have been 
carried out over the past decade.14
Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at April 2019)15
State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total CHA/SHA Total area (m2)
Galmudug 13 5,810,966 8 2,891 21 5,813,857
Hirshabelle 3 761,727 0 0 3 761,727
South West 12 5,837,076 0 0 12 5,837,076
Jubaland 0 0 1 59,776,693 1 59,776,693
Puntland 0 0 37 N/R 37 N/R
Totals 28 12,409,769 46 59,779,584 74 72,189,353
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EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
Somalia also has a signifi cant problem contamination from ERW, including what is thought to be very limited contamination 
from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Somalia for 
further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action management in Somalia continues to be divided 
into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and 
Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine 
action in each of these areas are SEMA and the Mine Action 
Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence 
(formerly, the MCICA, and before that the Somaliland Mine 
Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.16
SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its fi ve 
Federal State members: the Puntland State Offi ce, Galmudug 
State Offi ce, Hirshabelle State Offi ce, South West State Offi ce, 
and Jubaland Offi ce.17 Under each of the fi ve members is an 
independent consortium of national NGOs implementing mine 
action activities.
SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre 
for Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action 
Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.18 SEMA’s aim 
was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard 
coordination, regulation, and management by December 
2015.19 However, SEMA’s legislative framework was not 
approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and 
progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017 
that resulted in a period of government paralysis.20 Due to 
this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received 
funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the 
expiry of its grant in 2015.21
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that no 
further progress had been made in the Somali Parliament 
towards the formal adoption of SEMA’s legislative framework, 
though it was hopeful that this could be achieved by the end 
of 2019. It reported it did not receive any national funding 
or support from the government again in 2018; however, it 
also said that efforts were underway to secure government 
funding for its operations in 2019.22
SEMA continued to face external challenges posed by the 
security situation. In July 2018, the SEMA offi ce at the 
Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and 
signifi cantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of 
SEMA’s offi ce materials, including computers and documents, 
were destroyed.23 UNMAS reported in May 2019 that efforts to 
restore the offi ce were ongoing with its support.24
In 2018, with United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID) funding, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
continued its capacity development work with SEMA. NPA 
reported that capacity building of SEMA and their national 
consortium partners was closely monitored in 2018 by 
milestones developed and agreed upon between NPA and 
SEMA. Key focus areas were information management 
support; support for operational planning, prioritisation, 
and tasking of available clearance resources; and increasing 
capacity within the senior SEMA management team.25 UNMAS 
reported providing fi nancial support to SEMA’s headquarters 
and state offi ces in 2018.26
NPA reported seeing positive progress throughout the year, 
especially with SEMA taking ownership of its coordination/
tasking role, but also with its capacity to participate in treaty 
meetings. In NPA’s view, without support from the Federal 
Government at present, capacity development support 
remains critical to ensure national ownership of the mine 
action programme and a sustainable national capacity in 
Somalia.27
SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine 
action implementing partners in November 2018, with a 
focus on monitoring of operations. Operators considered this 
a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, 
consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the 
clearance operators within Somalia.28
PUNTLAND 
The SEMA Puntland State Offi ce, formerly known as PMAC, 
was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional 
government, the Puntland State Offi ce has coordinated mine 
action with local and international partners, including Danish 
Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).29
It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and 
destroying explosive ordnance.30
SOMALILAND 
As part of a larger process of government reform in early 
2018, the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC), which 
was responsible for coordinating and managing demining 
in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed 
the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority 
(MCICA), and underwent a change of line ministry from the 
Offi ce of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.31 It was 
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GENDER 
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020 
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for 
the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia’s 
National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender 
equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its 
programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National 
Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action 
programme must refl ect gender objectives and ensure 
that the specifi c needs of women, girls, boys, and men are 
taken into account, including through delivery of gender-
equality programming, and insistence on the adoption of a 
gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing 
partners. It also recognises the importance of conducting 
context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify 
important gender and diversity issues, such as clan affi liation, 
movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to 
participation for different gender and age groups.33
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that 
it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy 
or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was 
“unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender 
balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment 
opportunities for qualifi ed men and women.34 
SEMA also reported that within the federal state national 
mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on 
gender and gender balance in survey and community liaison 
teams to ensure the inclusive participation of all affected 
groups, including women and children. It confi rmed that data 
collection was disaggregated by sex and age, and gender 
taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking 
of survey and clearance activities.35
NPA reported that the gender balance within its programme 
staff increased in 2018, up from 16% female and 84% male 
staff in January, to 23% female and 77% male staff by 
December, and with a 50/50 gender balance within its senior 
management team. NPA provided three trainings on gender 
mainstreaming and sexual harassment for SEMA staff and 
consortium partners from each of the federal states. The 
results were surprisingly positive, with open and frank 
discussions during the trainings, particularly within SEMA’s 
and NPA’s management teams.36 
The HALO Trust reported that in its operations in Somalia in 
2018, 13% of operations staff were female, and that two out 
of fi fteen management staff were women. It confi rmed that 
across its operations, survey and mine risk education (MRE) 
teams regularly liaised with different community groups, with 
a focus for certain MRE efforts on children. It reported that 
all MRE teams and most of its EOD teams had at least one 
woman, who could effectively reach out to women in local 
communities to ensure their voices were heard.37
The HALO Trust informed Mine Action Review that while 
gender was a priority focus for survey activities to ensure 
that a clear and holistic understanding of contamination 
is gained through reaching men, women, girls, and boys, 
gender was not a consideration in prioritisation of tasks 
(see Planning and tasking section below).
In its operations in Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported 
that of the 38 women employed by HALO in 2018, 18 (47%) 
were employed in operational roles in survey and clearance 
teams, and 6 (16%) were employed in managerial/supervisory 
level positions. The HALO Trust noted, however, that in 
the Somaliland programme, there had been a historical 
preference towards recruiting men, prompted in part by 
local cultural and religious norms. Efforts to introduce 
female demining sections began in 2007 in the face of some 
initial diffi culties, not least in convincing women themselves 
that demining was a suitable career option given cultural 
norms and expectations. As the Somaliland programme has 
decreased in size since 2014, and no new demining sections 
have been hired, HALO reported it was challenging to redress 
this balance at a late stage in the programme’s lifespan.38
The HALO Trust additionally reported that, following a visit 
from the Geneva-based Gender in Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP) in 2017, HALO made improvements to its reporting 
mechanisms for sexual abuse, exploitation, and harassment, 
and appointed a female member of national staff as Point of 
Contact for gender issues in Somaliland in 2018.39
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was 
fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and 
capacity-building from NPA.40 NPA reported that IMSMA 
operators within SEMA were carrying out data verifi cation 
and entry. Reporting forms were standardised throughout 
the mine action sector during the year, ensuring that all 
operators were using the same reporting forms.41 
Somalia’s national mine action strategic plan places 
considerable emphasis on remedying shortcomings in 
information management.42 According to the Plan, a specifi c 
national mine action standard on information management 
was developed in 2018.43 In May 2019, SEMA informed 
Mine Action Review that a process to verify the historical 
data contained in the UNMAS database was ongoing, with 
assistance from NPA. This will help SEMA to develop a list 
of priorities for clearance in its workplan for 2020.44 
NPA and HALO Trust both noted improvements in SEMA’s 
information management capacity in 2018. HALO would welcome 
a process for regular review of the IMSMA database and data 
sharing with implementing partners, to ensure staff are not 
put at risk if new minefi elds are identifi ed. NPA pledged to 
continue capacity development support for SEMA on information 
management through 2020, where after SEMA information 
management staff are expected to fully manage the database 
independently, barring any signifi cant staff turnover.45
In July 2018, SEMA submitted its fi rst APMBC Article 7 
transparency report for several years covering calendar year 
2017, refl ecting improvements in its information management 
and reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts 
to engage with the APMBC community. However, subsequent 
reporting has been of poor quality, lacking basic details on the 
size of and progress to address remaining contamination, and 
with considerable inconsistencies in year-to-year reporting.
The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in 
Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The 
HALO Trust reported that regular checks of the database 
for accuracy of recording were carried out in 2018.46
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020, 
developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international 
operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions 
in late 2017, was awaiting fi nal approval by the Somali Minister 
of Internal Security throughout 2018. A review of the fi nal draft 
of the document was scheduled for June 2019.47
The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the next 
three-year period. The strategy’s fi ve goals, identifi ed by 
SEMA, are as follows:
■ To enhance SEMA’s ability to lead and enable effective and 
effi cient mine action
■ To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly 
national mine action capacity
■ To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and 
better respond to, their mine action needs
■ To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia 
■ To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and 
other explosive threats.
In February 2018, an updated second “phase” of the fi ve-year 
“Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management 
for 2018–2022”, fi rst developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and 
the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was offi cially 
launched in Geneva. It claims to be a plan to “make Somalia 
mine free by 2022”, but it is not realistic and does not contain 
any detail as to the amount of contamination remaining to 
be addressed, nor targets for completion.48 This view is not, 
however, shared by UNMAS.49
SEMA is developing a mine action workplan for 2020, in 
cooperation with the SEMA state offi ces, which would be 
offi cially presented as Somalia’s fi rst annual workplan during 
the treaty meetings in 2019.50
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that no strategic 
mine action plan was in place in 2018, though a series 
of meetings with the mine action authority and other 
stakeholders were held in preparation for transition of 
the mine action programme to national ownership and the 
development of a mine action strategic plan in 2019.51
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS 
developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) 
for Somalia in 2012–13.52 In May 2019, SEMA reported that a 
review of the NMAS had been carried out in 2018 but that nothing 
was changed, though a chapter on information management was 
added.53 Final approval of the revisions was expected by mid 
2019, following consultations with all mine action stakeholders.54
The HALO Trust reported that SEMA still lacked capacity and 
technical training to perform quality assurance (QA) checks 
in 2018, and that consequently it carried out internal QA. 
It noted that SEMA staff had expressed interest in QA and 
was receiving training from NPA to build a national external 
QA capacity.55
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust confi rmed that the Mine Action 
Department continued to conduct formal QA reviews in 2018, 
with support from HALO.56
OPERATORS 
In 2018, two international NGOs conducted clearance 
operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and 
NPA, along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance 
company, Ukroboronservice.57
While The HALO Trust’s mine clearance programme in 
Somaliland has been ongoing since 1999, in the fi rst half of 2015, 
the organisation opened a new programme in south-central 
Somalia. At the start of 2018, The HALO Trust had 12 manual 
mine clearance teams deployed for clearance of anti-personnel 
mines in Somalia. In March, the operations of eight teams 
were suspended for security reasons, and the remaining four 
were sent to a battle area clearance (BAC) task, which was 
still ongoing in May 2019. HALO also deployed four weapon 
and ammunition disposal (WAD) teams, which were primarily 
occupied with EOD call-outs during the year.58
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust employed 434 demining/
operational personnel and 3 mechanical assets in 2018. 
In addition to demining staff, it reported employing a 
further 117 support staff and 95 temporary staff from local 
communities in Somaliland during 2018.59
NPA continued mine clearance throughout the year within the 
disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland, with two 
manual mine clearance teams and one survey/MRE team. It is 
the only international operator accepted to work in the disputed 
area by the different local clans. In addition, throughout the 
fi rst quarter of the year, fi ve survey/MRE teams were deployed 
across all fi ve federal states of South-Central Somalia, until the 
completion of a UK DFID grant at the end of March.60
NPA reported that a new fi eld offi ce was established within 
the capital of Puntland to accommodate the arrival and 
in-country training of mine detection dogs (MDDs) and 
the capacity development of SEMA state personnel and 
consortium partners from Puntland and Galmudug states, 
as well as forward fi eld support for planned survey and 
clearance and police EOD activities in 2019.61
UNMAS continued to contract Ukroboronservice to carry out 
mine action activities in support of the African Union Mission in 
Somalia’s (AMISOM) security priorities in 2018 through its four 
mobile multi-task teams conducting ERW clearance across four 
of Somalia’s federal states, with the exception of Puntland; 56 
community liaison offi cers to deliver risk education and liaison 
activities; and two 18-strong manual clearance teams. During the 
year, the number of manual clearance teams increased from two 
to six, all of which were deployed along the border with Ethiopia 
in Bakool and Hiran regions from September 2018.62 In response 
to a request received from a local authority, one clearance team 
relocated to Galgadud in August 2019 in coordination with the 
Galmudug Mine Action Centre (SEMA Galmudug).63
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Only manual clearance of mines was conducted in Somalia in 
2018. In Somaliland, both manual clearance and mechanical 
demining was carried out, with the deployment of machines 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Close to 2.43km2 of anti-personnel mined area was released in total across Somalia and Somaliland in 2018: almost 1.6km2 
through mine clearance and close to 0.55km2 reduced through technical survey, and 0.28km2 through cancellation through 
non-technical survey. A total of 220 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, and 148 items of UXO were destroyed as a 
result. A further 77 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in spot tasks. A total of just under 1.85km2 of mine contamination 
was confi rmed during the year.64
SURVEY IN 2018
As reported above, no comprehensive overview of SHAs 
exists in Somalia, and as at the end of 2018, no nationwide 
survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security 
situation and a lack of resources.65 
In 2018, The HALO Trust and NPA cancelled a combined total 
of nearly 0.28m2 through non-technical survey and reduced 
a further 0.55m2 through technical survey in Somalia and 
Somaliland.66 Of this, the majority of survey output occurred 
in Somaliland (just over 435,000m2 (29,000m2 through 
non-technical survey and 406,000m2 through technical 
survey), while just over 274,700m2 was released in Somalia 
(248,700m2 through non-technical survey and 26,000m2 
through technical survey), along with an additional 113,600m2 
reduced in the disputed area between Somaliland and 
Puntland.67 
This is an overall increase from 2017, when the two operators 
reported cancelling a total of just under 1,300m2 through 
non-technical survey and reducing just under 42,000m2 
through technical survey in Somalia and Somaliland.68
The HALO Trust reported that survey was not its primary 
activity in 2018 as most of its resources were deployed on 
BAC tasks and EOD call-outs. It cancelled a total of 248,795m2 
in Hirshabelle state in Somalia and just over 29,000m2 in 
Somaliland, along with identifying one previously unrecorded 
area of anti-personnel mine contamination with a size of just 
over 305,400m2 in Somalia.69 
NPA reported that non-technical survey activities were carried 
out through the fi rst quarter of 2018 in all federal states of 
Somalia, as part of joint NPA and federal consortium partner 
projects.70 A total of 2,810,095m2 of area was confi rmed but 
no area was cancelled. NPA completed survey in the disputed 
area between Somaliland and Puntland during the year, with 
the release of just over 113,600m2 through technical survey.71 
It did not record any additional mined areas containing 
anti-personnel mines, only anti-vehicle mines.72
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201873
Area Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Hirshabelle (Somalia) HALO 248,795
Toghdeer (Somaliland) HALO 29,054
Total 277,849
Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201874




Hirshabelle (Somalia) HALO 25,942
Toghdeer (Somaliland) HALO 406,022
Total 545,601
CLEARANCE IN 2018
A combined total of just under 1.6km2 was released 
through clearance in Somalia, Somaliland, and the disputed 
area between Somaliland and Puntland in 2018, with the 
destruction of 220 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, 
and 148 items of UXO. The great majority of this occurred 
in Somaliland, where a total of just under 1.49km2 was 
cleared and 219 anti-personnel mines destroyed; while in 
Somalia a total of 0.03km2 was reported cleared, however 
no anti-personnel mines were found. An additional 0.08km2 
was cleared in the disputed area between Somaliland and 
Puntland, with one anti-personnel mine destroyed.75
This compared with 2017, when just over 0.9km2 of anti-
personnel contaminated area was cleared in total in Somalia 
and Somaliland.76 Of this, 0.08km2 was cleared in Somalia 
with the destruction of 4 anti-personnel mines, while 
0.81km2 was cleared in Somaliland, with 87 anti-personnel 
mines destroyed.77
In 2018, The HALO Trust reported conducting three months 
of manual mine clearance before switching its clearance 
teams to a high priority BAC task for the remainder of the 
year. As such, its clearance outputs for mined areas in 
Somalia in 2018 were signifi cantly lower than in 2017. It 
reported that 15 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD 
spot tasks in Somalia during the year.78 A further 45 
anti-personnel mines were destroyed by Ukroboronservice 
in spot tasks during 2018.79
In Somaliland, clearance of anti-personnel mined areas by The 
HALO Trust rose signifi cantly from just over 0.75km2 in 2017 
to nearly 1.46km2 in 2018, with an increase in anti-personnel 
mines destroyed from 87 in 2017 to 219 in 2018. A total of 17 
additional anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot 
tasks in Somaliland in 2018.80 An additional 1.5km2 of mined 
area was also confi rmed during the year.81
NPA reported clearing two areas with a size of 80,464m2 
in the disputed territory between Somaliland and Puntland 
in 2018, with the destruction of 1 anti-personnel mine, 
1 anti-vehicle mine, and 81 items of UXO.82
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Sool/Sanaag (disputed area)  NPA 2 80,464 1 1 81
Hirshabelle (Somalia) HALO *2 28,038 0 0 5
Awdal (Somaliland) HALO 0 127,836 76 0 0
Maroodi Jeex (Somaliland) HALO 3 295,210 34 0 44
Toghdeer (Somaliland) HALO 2 1,066,527 109 3 18
Totals 9 1,598,075 220 4 148
* HALO reported one area was not yet completed in 2018 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 OCTOBER 2012
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18







Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy 
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 
2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline. 
According to operators, without signifi cant improvements 
in the security environment and signifi cant amounts of 
funding, there is no possibility that Somalia will meet its 
2022 deadline. The full extent of contamination remains 
unknown, and survey is far from complete with large areas 
not yet surveyed due to lack of safe access. Active confl ict 
continued to stymie progress, severely limiting fi eld access 
for operators in 2018 and requiring constant adaptation to 
volatile situations. Adding to this instability, the government 
had still yet to offi cially recognise SEMA in its role as the 
national mine action centre.84
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust had hoped to complete 
clearance of the last known and accessible mined area in 
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The number of areas suspected or confi rmed to contain 
anti-personnel mines in South Sudan dropped dramatically, 
by nearly 50km2, from just under 80km2 at the end of 2017, 
to just under 30km2 at the end of 2018. Improvements in 
the security situation which enabled greater freedom of 
movement for mine action teams, coupled with a focus on 
targeted re-survey and database review of large recorded 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), led to the signifi cant 
cancellation of a number of hazards that were for some time 
thought to be either infl ated or just inaccurate. Clearance of 
anti-personnel mined area also rose during 2018, along with a 
considerable increase in the number of anti-personnel mines 
found and destroyed.
While South Sudan has determined it will not meet its July 
2021 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 
deadline, and will request an additional extension for a period 
of fi ve years, as a result of the progress made in 2018, it is now 
far more able to accurately present the size of the remaining 
challenge and the resources and time required to address it. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ South Sudan should set concrete and realistic annual targets for completing survey and clearance of 
anti-personnel mines in its forthcoming Article 5 deadline extension request. 
 ■ South Sudan should strive to plan, where possible, for mine action operations to support peace and 
stabilization efforts. 
 ■ Efforts should continue to ensure accurate recording and reporting by operators of data according to 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology. 
 ■ South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development 
partners on long-term support for mine action. 
 ■ South Sudan should increase its fi nancial support for mine action operations as well as to the National Mine 
Action Authority (NMAA). 
 ■ The mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) should be changed to include support for capacity 
development of the national mine action programme. 
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): MEDIUM
2.08KM2 1,166




ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
SOUTH SUDAN
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(20% of overall score)
7 The understanding of remaining contamination in South Sudan improved signifi cantly 
in 2018, with more than 53km2 of land released, primarily as a result of re-survey and 
database review. The task remaining became far more achievable, with estimated 





(10% of overall score)
4 The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) continued to face serious fi nancial and 
technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively in 
2018. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was responsible for much of the 
mine action programme’s functioning, including database management, accreditation, 
tasking, and quality management.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for 2018–22 includes a section on 
gender, as does South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs). 
These include a focus on ensuring gender-balanced survey teams and gender- and 




(10% of overall score)
7 A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s Information Management System 
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was carried out in 2018, along with re-survey of 
recorded suspected and confi rmed hazardous areas thought to be exaggerated or 




(10% of overall score)
6 South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, developed with 
support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 
was offi cially launched in September 2018. Improvements in the security situation 




(20% of overall score)
7 According to UNMAS, the NTSGs for mine action in South Sudan are subject to constant 
review by UNMAS and the NMAA. In 2018, the NTSGs were amended in regard to 






(20% of overall score)
7 While South Sudan will not meet its current Article 5 deadline of 2021, its remarkable 
progress in land release output and obtaining a more realistic picture of remaining 
contamination in 2018 place it in a much better situation as it prepares its second 
Article 5 extension request, with a much more achievable problem to tackle.
Average Score 6.5 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT




 ■ DanChurchAid (DCA)
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
 ■ MECHEM
 ■ The Development Initiative (TDI)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)












UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines, as well as explosive remnants of war 
(ERW), including cluster munition remnants (CMR). The 
weapons were used during nearly 50 years of Sudanese 
civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the 
independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two 
years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, 
heavy fi ghting erupted in the capital city, Juba, in December 
2013, initiating new armed confl ict across the country. 
According to UNMAS, at end 2018, South Sudan had a 
combined total of 147 areas confi rmed and suspected to 
contain anti-personnel mines covering a total area of 
almost 29.8km2 (see Table 2).1 This is a massive decrease 
from the end of 2017, when a total of 220 areas containing 
anti-personnel mines were reported with a total size of 
nearly 80km2.2
Nine of South Sudan’s (formerly ten) states contain mined 
areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, 
followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to 
UNMAS. Of the remaining anti-personnel mine contamination, 
less than 3.3km2 is confi rmed hazardous area (CHA), while 
26.5km2 of SHA is thought to be mined (see Table 2).3
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018)4
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 69 3,276,155 78 26,505,130
Anti-vehicle mines 32 1,339,612 31 1,765,906
Totals 101 4,615,767 109 28,271,036
CHAs = Confi rmed hazardous areas
Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2018)5
State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHAs and CHAs Total area (m2)
Central Equatoria 38 1,189,016 37 443,736 75 1,632,752
Eastern Equatoria 16 546,654 11 92,836 27 639,490
Jonglei 9 1,112,036 15 20,680,535 24 21,792,571
Lakes 0 0 1 2,500 1 2,500
North Bahr El Ghazal 1 37,500 0 0 1 37,500
Upper Nile 3 93,761 4 4,684,713 7 4,778,474
Warrap 0 0 1 40,000 1 40,000
West Bahr El Ghazal 1 201,738 1  0 2 201,738
Western Equatoria 1 95,450 8 560,810 9 656,260
Totals 69 3,276,155 78 26,505,130 147 29,781,285
While signifi cant progress was made in 2018 to more 
accurately defi ne the extent of contamination remaining, its 
full extent is not known, as additional mined areas continue 
to be identifi ed. Ongoing confl ict continues to result in 
new unexploded ordnance (UXO), particularly in Greater 
Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. Insecurity 
continues to greatly limit access to many areas of the 
country, severely impeding efforts to confi rm or address 
contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region.6
In 2017, UNMAS reported that a review of the national 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database led to the conclusion that many existing hazards 
may have been over-reported in size. UNMAS consequently 
initiated a process of targeted re-survey during the year 
aimed at better defi ning the estimated size of SHAs. The 
results of the re-survey were not fi nalised as of writing, but 
UNMAS reported that ongoing survey in Upper Nile state, 
previously reported as the most heavily contaminated in 
terms of the size of area recorded, has revealed remarkably 
little contamination. Current projections of the number of 
minefi elds and cluster strikes remaining to be addressed are 
thought to be highly accurate, but markedly less reliable are 
estimates of their sizes as well as the type of contamination. 
In the Equatoria region, the NMAA reported that while 
the peace agreement signed in September 2018 had 
brought a cessation in violence across the majority of the 
country, fi ghting continued in the region as at May 2019, 
which prevented access to determine the full extent of 
contamination or clearance in the region. However, the 
NMAA reported that of all hazards remaining in the database, 
the three largest recorded areas accounted for more than 
10km2, and it was confi dent that more survey work will 
yield continued signifi cant reduction in the contamination 
to be addressed.7
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At the same time, new areas of anti-personnel mine 
contamination continued to be added to the database in 2018. 
A total of close to 3.2km2 was added, including over 1.1km2 
of recorded contaminated area which was re-classifi ed as 
anti-personnel contamination from other types of recorded 
hazardous area in a database review; just over 600,000m2 
of previously unknown anti-personnel mined area identifi ed 
through survey; and a further nearly 1.5km2 of area was 
added to the size of a number of recorded anti-personnel 
mined areas already existing in the database.8
While previously undiscovered areas of anti-personnel 
mine contamination continued to be found in 2018, Mine 
Action Review is not aware of any confi rmed new use of 
anti-personnel mines in the renewed confl ict that erupted 
in 2013. In July 2019, UNMAS stated that no new use of 
anti-personnel mines, including of an improvised nature, 
was recorded in 2018.9 
Previously, dating back to 2015, there were allegations of 
use of anti-personnel mines by South Sudanese government 
forces in an area around Nassir, Upper Nile state.10 In June 
2018, South Sudan informed states parties to the APMBC 
that in November 2017, a four-person investigation team 
travelled to Nassir to investigate the March 2015 allegation. 
The investigation team found no evidence of landmines being 
laid in the vicinity of Nassir, on or around the alleged date 
in 2015.11
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) – since renamed 
the NMAA – was established by presidential decree in 2006 
to act as the national agency for planning, coordination, 
and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.12 There is no 
national mine action legislation in South Sudan.13
In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS 
with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening 
the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has 
been overseeing mine action across the country through its 
main offi ce in Juba, and sub-offi ces in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, 
and Wau. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action 
organisations, drafting national mine action standards, 
establishing a quality management system, managing the 
national database, and tasking operators.14
While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume 
full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to 
UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious fi nancial and 
technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action 
operations effectively in 2018. It requires substantial resources 
and capacity building assistance if it is to operate effectively.15
UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to 
support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.16 
In May 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2155, adopted 
in response to the confl ict that broke out in December 2013, 
effectively ended the mission’s mandate to support capacity 
development of government institutions. In 2018, UNMAS 
reported that reversing this change in the mission mandate 
to support the capacity building of government institutions 
would greatly enhance UNMAS’ ability to support the NMAA.17
In 2018, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs 
of NMAA staff salaries and its sub-offi ces across the 
country. It did not, however, provide any funding for the 
conduct of survey or clearance.18 UNMAS has reported that 
the Government of South Sudan is only able to provide 
minimal funding and support to all national institutions, 
including the NMAA. It has raised concerns over resource 
mobilisation in the face of overwhelming donor fatigue and 
frustration due to the ongoing confl ict, which continues to 
exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. Mine action, which is a 
critical enabler for humanitarian assistance, has not been 
prioritised by donors, who have been increasingly unwilling 
to support government institutions until a peace agreement 
is implemented.19 
Positively, UNMAS reported that as part of South Sudan’s 
preparations to request an extension to its APMBC Article 
5 deadline, a centrally-led effort to mobilise additional 
resources for mine action was underway in 2019.20
GENDER 
South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for 
2018–22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how 
different gender and age groups are affected by mines and 
ERW and have specifi c and varying needs and priorities. 
Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine 
action planning and operations in South Sudan are also 
incorporated in the strategy, including on the collection 
of data disaggregated by sex and age.21 UNMAS reported 
that the programme was also implementing the UN 
Gender Guidelines for Mine Action, monitored by a gender 
focal point.22
South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines 
(NTSGs) contain provisions requiring all community liaison 
teams to tailor activities on the basis of the gendered needs 
of benefi ciaries, and to address the specifi c risks faced by 
women and girls.23 All teams are reportedly gender balanced 
in composition and trained to be inclusive, for example by 
ensuring outreach through non-technical survey and risk 
education is done separately for different age and gender 
groups, and taking local cultural practices into consideration.24
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At the same time, UNMAS reported that task prioritisation 
in 2018 was predominantly dependent on security 
considerations and that resources were concentrated on 
tasks within limited geographical areas rather than on the 
basis of gender needs.25 It claimed there was equal access 
in employment opportunities for qualifi ed men and women 
in survey and clearance teams across the organisations 
operating in South Sudan, but reported that 16% of staff in 
operational roles such as deminers and community liaison 
offi cers were women, while women accounted for 11% of all 
staff in managerial or supervisory positions across the fi ve 
operators conducting mine action operations in South Sudan 
in 2018.26
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported that, in 2018, a basic 
demining training course was offered to 20 interested 
women with no previous demining experience, in an effort 
to increase the number of potentially qualifi ed women 
applicants for operational demining positions. It reported 
that, since the training, 16 of the women had been hired for 
MAG operational teams. As at April 2019, MAG stated that 
all of its seven clearance teams included women deminers, 
including a number of women previously employed as 
cooks or community liaison offi cers who had participated 
in the demining training course and were subsequently 
offered operational positions.27 MAG reported that during 
2018, it continually hired women as deminers as openings 
became available, and by April 2019 one third of its deminers 
employed were female.28
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s IMSMA database was carried out in 2018, along with re-survey of 
recorded SHAs and CHAs thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. These activities resulted in signifi cant gains 
in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the 
database disaggregates mined areas, CMR, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.29
PLANNING AND TASKING
South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy 
2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and 
funded by Japan, was offi cially launched in September 2018.30
According to UNMAS, the strategy has three strategic goals 
with related targets:31
Strategic Goal 1: Advocacy and communication of South 
Sudan’s mine/ERW problem continues through national 
and international awareness-raising and adoption and 
implementation of international conventions to facilitate a 
mine-/ERW-free South Sudan.
Strategic Goal 2: The size of the mine/ERW contamination 
area is clarifi ed and confi rmed and the problem is addressed 
through appropriate survey and clearance methods, ensuring 
safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.
Strategic Goal 3: Safe behaviour is promoted among women, 
girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and 
promote safe livelihood activities.
According to UNMAS, the operational focus for 2019–2020 
would be on further clarifying the contamination remaining 
in the database, with re-survey of hazards that are thought 
to be exaggerated in size. Clearance will continue across the 
country, wherever it is safe to do so.32 UNMAS also reported 
that it was working with the NMAA to develop plans for a 
national capacity that will be responsible for the clearance of 
residual contamination. This will be the responsibility of the 
Government of South Sudan.33
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to UNMAS, the NTSGs for mine action in South 
Sudan are subject to constant review by UNMAS and the 
NMAA. In 2018, the NTSGs were amended with respect to 
the storage and transport of explosives and the conduct 
of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.34 UNMAS 
also noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to 
conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with 
quality control (QC) sampling of 10% of each area cleared. 
UNMAS conducted additional external QA through visits to 
each clearance task in 2018, as well as upon the completion 
of a clearance task.35
In May 2019, the NMAA reported that as a result of years 
of fi ghting and insecurity, most mine action teams in South 
Sudan had been reconfi gured to be small and mobile, able to 
react to rapidly changing security access, which has greatly 
reduced the extent of demining.36 As a result, the teams 
are not properly scaled to undertake area clearance in the 
most effi cient manner. The NMAA said that existing capacity 
would need to be reconfi gured into fewer but larger demining 
teams, which will require additional support, as well as peace 
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OPERATORS 
In 2018, UNMAS reported that mine action operating capacity 
remained on a par with that deployed in 2017, with almost 
1,000 persons working in the sector. Operators included three 
international demining non-governmental organisations (MAG, 
DanChurchAid (DCA), and Danish Demining Group (DDG)), and 
three commercial companies (G4S Ordnance Management 
(G4S), MECHEM, and The Development Initiative (TDI)).38
MAG reported beginning operations in 2018 with seven 
clearance teams, which reduced to six at the end of the 
year. It deployed one dedicated team for mechanically-
assisted minefi eld clearance, as well as number of EOD spot 
tasks, and four MTTs with the capacity to conduct manual 
or mechanically assisted clearance, depending on tasking 
orders. Of the fi ve teams, one was deployed on tasks which 
included anti-personnel mined areas during the year.39
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
According to UNMAS, a range of mine action operational tools 
were in use in 2018, including two MineWolf 240 machines, a 
MineWolf 330, Bozena, and PT300 machine, and eight mine 
detection dogs.40
DEMINER SAFETY
According to UNMAS, there were no accidents during mine 
clearance in 2018. However, one accident occurred during 
EOD activities, when a female national staff member was 
killed and another national staff member injured. The incident 
was investigated by a joint team comprised of the NMAA, 
UNMAS, and a third-party clearance operator. The incident 
led to the withdrawal of MECHEM’s accreditation to work in 
South Sudan. UNMAS reported that lessons learned were 
shared with all operators in the country.41
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
South Sudan has reported a total release of all forms of 
hazardous area of more than 45.1km2 in 2018: 2.08km2 released 
through clearance, 0.02km2 reduced through technical survey, 
and 43.06km2 cancelled through non-technical survey, with 
the destruction of 1,163 anti-personnel mines.42 A additional 
three anti-personnel mines were destroyed during spot 
tasks. A further 7.4km2 cancelled during a desk review of 
database records and just under 0.5km2 re-classifi ed from 
anti-personnel mine contamination to other types of 
hazardous area.43
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, there was a remarkable twentyfold increase in 
survey output compared with 2017, with 43km2 cancelled 
through non-technical survey and a further 20,000m2 reduced 
through technical survey.44 This compared to just over 2km2 
released through survey in 2017, all by cancellation.45
The increase in survey output was due in part to a 
rapprochement between the principal warring parties that 
culminated on 12 September 2018 with the signing of the 
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution on the Confl ict in 
South Sudan. This led to greater freedom of movement for 
mine action teams and enabled them to access some reported 
hazards in previously hard to reach areas. This increased 
access, coupled with a focus on re-survey from all operators 
as well as a thorough desk review of all reported hazards by 
UNMAS, resulted in the cancellation of a signifi cant number of 
hazards that it stated had for some time had been suspected 
of being either infl ated or incorrect.46
As noted in table 4, the desk review of the database led to a 
number of tasks being cancelled or re-classifi ed in 2018, with 
a total of 65 areas with a size of just over 7.4km2 cancelled 
outright and a further 16 areas with a size of just under 
0.5km2 re-classifi ed from anti-personnel mine contamination 
to other types of hazardous area.47
Table 3: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical 
survey in 201848
State Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Central Equatoria G4S 57,182
Central Equatoria TDI 124,486
Eastern Equatoria TDI 143,588
Jonglei G4S 8,115,945
Lakes G4S 21,000
Northern Bahr El Ghazal TDI 59,686
Unity G4S 80
Upper Nile MAG 34,471,616
Upper Nile G4S 3,063
Western Bahr El Ghazal G4S 65,500
Total 43,062,146
Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201849
State Operator Area reduced (m2)
Central Equatoria MAG 14,922
Jonglei TDI 1,426
Total 16,348
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of 15 mined areas covering nearly 2.1km2 were 
released through clearance in 2018, with the destruction of 
1,163 anti-personnel mines, 71 anti-vehicle mines, and 553 
items of UXO (see Table 5).50 This is a sizeable increase from 
2017, when a total of 20 areas with a size of just over 1.7km2
were cleared, with the destruction of 734 anti-personnel 
mines, 42 anti-vehicle mines, and 34,600 items of UXO.51
UNMAS reported that the increase in clearance in 2018 was 
in large part a refl ection of increased security in the country.52
An additional three anti-personnel mines were destroyed 
in EOD spot tasks by TDI and G4S during the year.53 UNMAS 
also reported that in 2018 a total of six areas suspected to 
contain anti-personnel mine contamination with a total size 
of just over 67,000m2 were cleared, which were not found to 
contain any mines, although four items of UXO were found 
and destroyed.54












Central Equatoria G4S 7 762,617 132 70 298
Central Equatoria MAG 3 1,227,678 906 0 250
Eastern Equatoria TDI 1 8,162 42 0 0
Jonglei G4S 1 29,314 67 0 5
Jonglei TDI 0 4,845 16 0 0
Northern Bahr El Ghazal TDI 2 35,276  0  0 0
Unity TDI 1 8,000 0  1 0
Totals 15 2,075,892 1,163 71 553
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 9 JULY 2011
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM 
Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







In accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, South Sudan 
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, 
but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan will not meet 
this deadline.
In 2020, South Sudan intends to submit an extension request 
asking for an additional fi ve years to complete its Article 
5 obligations. According to UNMAS and the NMAA, this is 
believed to be an adequate to clear all known contaminated 
area in the country, and that given the appropriate support 
and the necessary security conditions, the clearance of both 
mines and CMRs could be completed by 2026.56
However, serious obstacles to completion remain the poor 
security situation that still prevails in some parts of the 
country, a lack of stable humanitarian access to certain 
areas, the continued discovery of previously unrecorded 
contamination, and a lack of certainty over sustained funding. 
The focus for 2019–20 will be on further clarifying the extent 
of contamination remaining, with re-survey of areas thought 
to be exaggerated in size. Clearance will continue across the 
country, wherever it is safe to do so.57
204   Clearing the Mines 2019 
 1 Email from Richard Boulter, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 22 July 
2019; and Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.  
 2 Email from Tim Lardner, Chief, Mine Action, UNMAS, 27 February 2018.  
 3 According to UNMAS, the most heavily affected provinces are those with 
the highest number of SHAs, rather than those with the largest recorded 
total area size of contamination, as the size of contamination can change 
dramatically through the process of technical survey. Email from Tim Lardner, 
UNMAS, 27 February 2018. In October 2015, South Sudan’s previously 
established 10 states were redefi ned into 28 by President Salva Kiir, 
which were then further subdivided into 32 states by presidential decree 
in January 2017.  
 4 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019; and Tess Bresnan, 
Senior Programme Offi cer, 3 August 2019. 
 5 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. 
 6 UNMAS, “2018 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan”. 
 7 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, 
Geneva, 22 May 2019.  
 8 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. 
 9 Ibid. 
 10 The monitoring group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) Monitoring and Verifi cation Mechanism, consisting of seven East 
African states, reported that the offi cer made the statement on 12 March 
2015, in a meeting between senior members of the government armed forces, 
UNMISS staff, and members of IGAD. See Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development Offi ces of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, “Summary 
of Latest Reports of Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
(COHA) Investigated and verifi ed by the IGAD Monitoring and Verifi cation 
Mechanism in South Sudan from 1–16 March 2015”, at: bit.ly/2Y5xsvT. See 
also ICBL-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), “Concern at Reported Use 
of Antipersonnel Mines in South Sudan”, Press release, Geneva, 31 March 
2015, at: bit.ly/2JVspW3; and I. Gridneff, “South Sudan Army’s Landmine Use 
Escalates War, Monitors Say”, Bloomberg Business, 30 March 2015, at: 
bloom.bg/2LKsiPe.  
 11 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, 
Geneva, 8 June 2018. The three-day investigation involved formal interviews 
with Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) offi cers and the police 
commissioner, along with a physical inspection of the ground around the 
SPLA barracks. 
 12 “South Sudan De-Mining Authority”, undated, at: bit.ly/2Y5Eb4o. 
 13 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. 
 14 South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016”, 
Juba, 2012, p. iv.  
 15 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 30 May 2019; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 
27 February and 1 March 2018. 
 16 UNMISS, “United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre [UNMACC]”, 
undated, at: bit.ly/2YctHjI.  
 17 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018. 
 18 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. 
 19 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018. 
 20 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. 
 21 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018. 
 22 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. 
 23 Ibid. 
 24 Ibid. 
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Ibid. 
 27 Email from Katie Shaw, Programme Offi cer, MAG, 26 April 2019. 
 28 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 21 August 2019. 
 29 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. 
 30 Ibid. 
 31 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018; and 
Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018. 
 32 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. 
 33 Ibid. 
 34 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. 
 35 Ibid. 
 36 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, 
Geneva, 22 May 2019; and emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 
and 1 March 2018.  
 37 Statement by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, Intersessional Meetings, 
Geneva, 22 May 2019.  
 38 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. 
 39 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 19 July 2019. 
 40 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. 
 41 Ibid. 
 42 Ibid. 
 43 Ibid. Of the 16 tasks, fi ve were re-classifi ed as ‘confrontation areas’, three as 
cluster munition strikes, and eight were re-classifi ed as UXO spot tasks.  
 44 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 19 July 2019. 
 45 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018; and Article 7 Report 
(for 2017), pp. 7 and 12. 
 46 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. Of the 16 tasks, fi ve were 
re-classifi ed as ‘confrontation areas’, three as cluster munition strikes, and 
eight were re-classifi ed as UXO spot tasks.  
 47 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. Of the 16 tasks, fi ve were 
re-classifi ed as ‘confrontation areas’, three as cluster munition strikes, and 
eight were re-classifi ed as UXO spot tasks.  
 48 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019; and Katie Shaw, MAG, 
19 July 2019. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February 2018; and Richard Boulter, 
UNMAS, 5 September 2018. 
 51 Ibid. 
 52 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. 
 53 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019. 
 54 Ibid. 
 55 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 22 July 2019; and Katie Shaw, MAG, 
19 July 2019. 
 56 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019. 





AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2018
















































CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): HIGH
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Sri Lanka offi cially became a state party to the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 1 June 
2018, becoming the 163rd country to adhere. While its Article 
5 deadline is 1 June 2028, Sri Lanka has set a far more 
ambitious goal to complete mine clearance on its territory 
by the end of 2020.
While initially optimistic that Sri Lanka was on track to meet 
this goal, at the end of 2018, The HALO Trust and Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG), the two international demining 
operators in Sri Lanka, reported that with existing capacity 
and funding levels, Sri Lanka is unlikely to complete 
clearance by the end of 2020. However, with relatively small 
extra funding, Sri Lanka’s mine action operators could 
expand their capacity and operational output, making the 
end-2020 goal a possibility. Even if Sri Lanka is unable to 
meet the end-2020 goal, Sri Lanka should still complete 
clearance far in advance of its APMBC deadline. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Sri Lanka should clarify the total estimate of remaining mine contamination. 
 ■ Greater efforts should be placed on information management and ensuring that the database is up to date 
and that survey and clearance reports are sent to the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) and entered into 
the national database in a timely fashion. 
 ■ Any changes in capacity or funding requirements that will impede completion of mine clearance should be 
reported as a matter of priority.
 ■ Greater resources should be allocated to develop long-term national capacity, in particular the NMAC and 
the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining Units and national mine action operators.
 ■ Increased interaction between the NMAC and mine action operators would enhance the effi ciency of the 
national mine action programme.
 ■ Sri Lanka should develop plans for the management of contamination found after Article 5 completion. 
Strategies for the vocational retraining of deminers should be put in place. 
3.46KM2 31,622
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(20% of overall score)
8 A district-by-district re-survey in 2015–17 resulted in the cancellation of 42.4km2, 
providing far greater clarity on the extent of confi rmed contamination remaining. 
However, Sri Lanka’s offi cial reporting of the estimate of contamination in its Article 
7 transparency reports contain discrepancies and are infl ated estimates based on 
projections for survey and reduction and outstanding survey and clearance reports 





(10% of overall score)
8 Sri Lanka’s national mine action programme is fully nationally owned, with considerable 
committed funding from the national government and signifi cant contribution from the 
Armed Forces in the dedicated demining units. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
8 Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020 contains a section on gender and 
diversity as cross-cutting themes for all mine action. It refl ects awareness of the cultural 





(10% of overall score)
6 As required under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Sri Lanka has 
submitted an initial Article 7 report and a subsequent annual updated report. While 
progress can be seen in information management, data reporting between operators and 
the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) continued to refl ect a number of disparities and 
inconsistencies, which are also apparent in the Article 7 reports. 
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, developed with the support of the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining Centre, elaborates the national 
planning and tasking criteria, which are strongly centred around resettlement and urgent 
livelihood priorities for displaced civilians.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 Ongoing revisions to Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards took place in 2017 
and in 2018, in a reportedly extensive review process. They were not yet made public. 
Improvements to land release methodology and corresponding increases in effi ciency 





(20% of overall score)
7 Sri Lanka is well on track to meet its Article 5 clearance deadline of June 2028 and has 
set a highly ambitious goal of completing clearance of all mines and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) by end 2020. It did not, however, meet its national mine action strategy 
target for land release in 2018.
Average Score 7.4 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Ministry of National Policies, Economic Affairs, 
Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Northern Development, 
Vocational Training, Skills Development and Youth Affairs
 ■ National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH) and sub-
contractor SHARP
 ■ Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining Units
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)









UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
According to Sri Lanka’s NMAC, as at 30 April 2019, 271 mined areas were believed to contain anti-personnel mines covering 
a total of just over 22.4km2 with a further nine suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) that may contain anti-personnel mines 
covering just under 1.6km2, for a total of 280 areas with a size of close to 24km2.1
However, NMAC also reported that a total of nearly 5.1km2 of clearance was not refl ected in these Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database fi gures, along with a further 209,600m2 expected to be cancelled and over 2.5km2
expected to be reduced through technical survey. On this basis, NMAC reported that the actual estimate of remaining 
contamination was closer to 16.4km2.2
Sri Lanka was once extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Most remaining contamination 
is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed confl ict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Much progress in land release has occurred in the last decade however, with estimates of 
total contamination falling sharply: from 506km2 at the end of 2010, to 98km2 at the end of 2012, to nearly 68.4km2 in 2015, 
and down to close to 16.4km2 as at April 2019. The Northern province is still by far the most affected, as set out in Table 1.3
Table 1: Mined area and ERW contamination (at end 2018)4
Province District CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHAs and CHAs Total area (m2)
Northern Jaffna 16 1,635,450 1 182,783 17 1,818,233
Kilinochchi 77 9,541,362 0 0 77 9,541,362
Mullaitivu 94 7,911,557 5 649,220 99 8,560,777
Vavuniya 18 1,303,850 1 667,057 19 1,970,907
Mannar 53 1,626,788 2 76,177 55 1,702,965
Subtotals 258 22,019,007 9 1,575,237 267 23,594,244
Eastern Trincomalee 7 170,922 0 0 7 170,922
Ampara 1 12,686 0 0 1 12,686
Batticaloa 1 8,294 0 0 1 8,294
Subtotals 9 191,902 0 0 9 191,902
North Central Anuradhapura 4 216,524 0 0 4 216,524
Subtotals 4 216,524 0 0 4 216,524
Totals 271 22,427,433 9 1,575,237 280 24,002,670
While the progress achieved in land release in the past 
decade is remarkable, NMAC reported that just over a further 
2.4km2 of newly confi rmed hazardous area was added to 
the database in 2018 as a result of mine action operations 
in 2018.5 Operators reported continuing to confi rm new 
hazardous areas during demining operations, with MAG alone 
confi rming 40 new hazardous areas with a size of nearly 
0.7km2 in four districts during the year.6
MAG informed Mine Action Review that the CHA reported in 
Batticaloa district was identifi ed after clearance of the district 
was completed in 2017.7
In total, in April 2019, Sri Lanka reported that since demining 
operations began in 2002, Sri Lanka has been able to declare 
4,616 areas totalling over 1,280km2 free from the threat of 
mines, with the destruction of more than 737,000 anti-
personnel mines and over 1,400,000 other explosive items, 
including anti-vehicle mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).8
Non-technical survey which began in June 2015 was completed 
in February 2017, with cancellation of 42km2 of SHA, reducing 
total contamination from more than 68km2 to close to 26km2.9
In another milestone achievement, Batticaloa district in 
Eastern province was declared free of the threat of mines in 
June 2017, the fi rst of Sri Lanka’s mine-affected provinces to 
do so.10 As at August 2019, clearance of two other districts, 
Puttalam, Polonnaruwa, was also reportedly complete.
Most remaining contamination is located in Sri Lanka’s fi ve 
northern districts. Both sides made extensive use of mines, 
including belts of P4 Mk I and Mk II blast anti-personnel 
mines laid by the SLA, and long defensive lines with a 
mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid 
by the LTTE.11 Indian Peacekeeping Forces also used mines 
during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990.12
The SLA used both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, 
with all use said to have been recorded.13 Operators have 
encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including 
anti-personnel mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms. 
Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser 
extent, anti-vehicle mines, were also used by the LTTE, along 
with a number of forms of improvised devices to act as 
fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and magnetically 
initiated explosive devices, and mines connected to 
detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells.14
Aside from mines, Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a 
wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs, 
artillery shells and missiles, mortar bombs, hand-held 
anti-tank projectiles, and rifl e and hand grenades. Large 
caches of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) also exist, 
particularly in the north.15 These are being cleared at the 
same time as the remaining minefi elds.16
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu 
Religious Affairs became the lead agency for mine action 
in 2015 as chair of the interministerial National Steering 
Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA). In 2019, the Ministry’s 
name had changed to the Ministry of National Policies, 
Economic Affairs, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Northern 
Development, Vocational Training, Skills Development, and 
Youth Affairs. The Ministry’s Secretary serves as the Director 
of the NMAC. The NMAC has responsibilities for priority 
setting, information management, quality assurance (QA) 
and quality control (QC), coordination with demining 
organisations and cooperation partners, and establishing 
policy and standards.17
Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality 
managed by a Regional Mine Action Offi ce (RMAO) in 
Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering 
Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired 
by government agents heading district authorities.18
The Government of Sri Lanka created a national budget 
line for mine action in 2015.19 According to Sri Lanka’s 
initial Article 7 transparency report, the government of Sri 
Lanka has committed 758,534,964 rupees (approx. US$4.45 
million) each year in 2018–20 to cover the operational 
costs of the SLA Humanitarian Demining Units and the 
Navy Humanitarian Demining Unit’s survey and clearance 
activities, with an additional 20 million rupees (US$118,497) 
a year to cover the administrative costs of the NMAC.20 
GENDER 
Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2016–20 
contains a specifi c section on gender and diversity, which 
it emphasises are cross-cutting issues for the planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of all mine action initiatives. 
The strategy pledges to ensure that all mine action 
activities, from survey and clearance to victim assistance, 
are conducted in a targeted manner to ensure the equal 
participation of all age and gender groups, and that all 
data is collected is disaggregated by sex and age. It further 
recognises that mine action in Sri Lanka should be tied to the 
implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda 
and Sustainable Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality and 
the empowerment of women, noting that the safe-guarding 
of non-discriminatory employment opportunities and the 
promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women 
has been a particularly successful aspect of Sri Lanka’s 
national mine action programme.21
In 2019, Ms. Sasi Jalatheepan was appointed Deputy Director 
of the NMAC, promoted from within the government Ministry 
which oversees the NMAC. She is the fi rst woman to hold this 
position in Sri Lanka.
National operator DASH considers gender equality and 
employment of women important to its programme, with 
25% of its staff Sri Lankan female employees, 80% of whom 
are widows, single mothers, and/or breadwinners for their 
families. Together with its subcontractor, SHARP, both have 
sought to progressively increase the number of women 
employed in operational positions, recognising the positive 
impact employment has on women and their families’ 
well-being.22
International operators The HALO Trust and MAG confi rmed 
that each organisation has gender policies in place, with a 
focus on achieving equal access to employment, gender-
balanced survey and clearance teams, gender-focused 
community liaison outreach, disaggregated data collection, 
and a gender focus to be employed during pre- and post-
clearance assessments.23 Both organisations reported 
increasing efforts to encourage women to apply for 
operational, as well as managerial positions, and positive 
trends in the increasing number of women employed in 
their respective programmes as a result.24
The HALO Trust reported that more than 40% of its staff 
in Sri Lanka were women and that it was making special 
efforts to employ women war widows and women who 
are the sole breadwinners of their families. It reported its 
deployment structure was designed to allow demining teams 
to be deployed daily from bases in Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and 
Jeyapuram, in order to allow female staff to return to their 
homes at the end of each working day, rather than being 
based in remote camps for lengthy periods of time. This 
ensured that women who had dependants at home were 
able to provide for their families while maintaining their 
daily home lives. HALO Trust also reported specifi c efforts 
to encourage women’s employment through advertising 
maternity leave policies.25 
MAG reported actively encouraging women to take up 
traditionally male-oriented roles within its programme, 
including operationally as deminers, mechanical operators, 
site supervisors, or team leaders. It stated that overcoming 
barriers which inhibited participation by women, girls, people 
with disabilities, ethnic minorities, and other marginalised 
groups was an essential focus for its programme operations 
in order to ensure that programme delivery is inclusive, 
both in terms of internal staff composition and external 
programme outreach. As such, it reported that internal 
training and awareness-raising ensures that staff working 
with communities recognise the importance of gender and 
diversity and have an understanding of tools and approaches 
to enable inclusive participation.26
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Sri Lanka’s national IMSMA database has undergone 
substantial and continuing improvements since the 
installation of an updated version in 2015 and a subsequent 
process of data entry and ground verifi cation.27 Since that 
time, operators have reported that signifi cant efforts have 
been exerted by all stakeholders to correct erroneous data 
entered into the IMSMA database and to update it on the basis 
of re-survey, leading to a more accurate representation of 
remaining contamination.28
In 2019, The HALO Trust reported it was submitting reports 
every two weeks to NMAC and that a review of IMSMA data 
was usually held on a quarterly basis.29 It reported that a 
number of training sessions were held in 2018, including 
a follow-up Geographic Information System (GIS) training 
delivered by HALO Trust staff for NMAC, the RMAO, and the 
SLA Humanitarian Demining Units, with a focus on developing 
new skills using Esri ArcGIS online software for the creation 
of maps and operational dashboards. It had budgeted for 
further information management capacity development 
initiatives in 2019, with a focus on recording and display of 
clearance data during ongoing tasks and training in the use of 
a prediction tool, developed by HALO, to assist the NMAC with 
end-state planning.30
MAG reported that the number of meetings held to update 
the IMSMA database increased in 2018, with weekly 
meetings frequently held with the RMAO to ensure that 
database entries and newly identifi ed SHAs were recorded 
accurately. A transition to the use of IMSMA Core software 
with assistance from the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is also planned for 2020.31
In compliance with its APMBC obligations, Sri Lanka submitted 
an initial Article 7 transparency report, which appears to cover 
the period from 2002 up until August 2018, and a subsequent 
annual updated report with information current as at April 
2019.32 Both reports refl ect considerable progress in the quality 
of reporting, although challenges remain. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
At the request of the NMAC, Sri Lanka’s National Mine 
Action Strategy for 2016–20 was reviewed in April 2018 in 
a multi-stakeholder workshop facilitated by the GICHD, and 
in consultation with operators and the SLA. The reviewed 
strategy was offi cially re-launched at an event in Colombo 
in March 2019, attended by representatives of all mine 
action stakeholders, government offi cials, civil society, and 
international donor governments.
As stated, the strategy sets the goal of clearing all mines by 
end 2020, and contains the following strategic objectives:
1.  The remaining mine/ERW problem is addressed using 
 the most appropriate methodologies and tools.
2.  Mine/ERW safe behaviour among women, girls, boys 
 and men is promoted.
3.  The needs of mine/ ERW victims are determined and 
 met and victims are integrated into the society.
4.  Sri Lanka complies with its international convention 
 obligations.
5.  Long-term residual contamination is effectively 
 managed with appropriate and sustainable 
 national capacities.
6.  Sri Lanka mine action sector can access good 
 quality information for its strategic and operational 
 decision-making.33
The initial strategy set a target of the release of 6.5km2 of 
contamination by clearance and technical survey per year.34
This target increased however to 9km2 released through 
clearance and technical survey per year in the revised version 
of the strategy published in September 2018 (but only fi nalised 
in 2019).35 The revised strategy states that “completion 
of clearance at the end of 2020 will only be possible if 
considerably more funding is made available, allowing all 
fi ve operators to expand to their maximum capacity”.36
The strategy commits the government of Sri Lanka to 
ensure that relevant plans are in place to ensure effective 
management of residual contamination.37 It sets out 
that the NMAC will lead efforts to plan for a transitional 
phase, a process which will involve the SLA, relevant 
government ministries, and civil society, noting that post-
completion roles and responsibilities for management of 
residual contamination must be clarifi ed, transparent, and 
communicated to all relevant stakeholders. It also commits 
the government and mine action operators to develop 
strategies for the demobilisation of deminers as completion 
approaches, in order to enable them vocational training and 
other employment prospects.38
Sri Lanka’s mine action programme has a well-developed 
prioritisation system. The primary priority is the clearance 
of land for resettlement of displaced persons, where it 
is essential that areas used for livelihoods are cleared 
simultaneously. According to the NMAC, despite marking 
of contaminated areas and sustained risk education, 
returnees are likely to enter contaminated areas, especially 
agricultural areas, to meet their basic livelihood needs. As 
such, socio-economic pressures and livelihood activities are 
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Sri Lanka, 
based on available information. According to The HALO 
Trust and MAG, a review of Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action 
Standards (NMAS) was carried out in May 2017 with the input 
of all demining operators, and support from the GICHD. Input 
on suggested changes was subsequently provided by all 
stakeholders in the second quarter of 2018 and a follow-up 
workshop was held in April 2018, facilitated by the GICHD, to 
discuss proposed revisions. As at August 2018, however, the 
subsequent expected revised version of the NMAS had yet to 
be made public and the previous version remained in place.40
The HALO Trust reported increased land release output 
in 2018 due to a number of improvements in methodology 
and standing operating procedures (SoPs). HALO Trust said 
these included more deminers carrying out raking, which 
HALO Trust referred to as “REDS” or “Rapid Excavation and 
Detection System”, and a corresponding decrease in the 
number of deminers using full manual excavation. The REDS 
method, HALO stated, had a higher clearance rate of nine 
to twelve square metres per deminer per day, compared to 
seven to nine square metres per deminer doing full manual 
excavation methods.41 
The number of teams using the REDS method increased 
from 16 at the start of the year to 25 by December 2018. 
Improvements to the REDS methodology were also made 
during the year, expanding the technique’s application from 
a 1.2-metre-wide demining lane to a 3-metre-wide lane. The 
rationale for the change was that a deminer working over 
a wide lane would result in more effi cient use of time and 
energy, and, as such, the increase to 3-metre-wide lanes was 
expanded to all REDS teams in June, following trials carried 
out in May.42
The HALO Trust also reported an increase in mechanical 
clearance outputs from 2017 to 2018 following research and 
development in ground preparation and spatial management. 
It reported a 70% increase in mechanical clearance rates 
where a PrimeTech 300D tiller and “earth bunds” to facilitate 
simultaneous deployment of machines and manual demining 
are used.43 The tiller is a remote-controlled armoured 
machine, designed to withstand any detonations. The 
PrimeTech tills (ploughs) the soil fi rst, then an excavation 
machine moves the tilled soil into a cleared area where it 
is spread out for manual inspection by raking. Tilled soil 
can be excavated and manually inspected much faster than 
non-tilled soil.44 
According to the NMAC, external QA and QC were conducted 
in 2018 as in previous years.45 The HALO Trust and MAG 
confi rmed that NMAC continued QA/QC in 2018, with 
completed areas sampled during post-clearance inspection 
prior to handover to local communities.46 Final QA checks 
of post-clearance inspection had been occurring within one 
month of HALO Trust’s submission of completion reports, the 
organisation said, and approval of minefi eld execution plans 
often occurred within the same day of submission.47 
OPERATORS 
In 2018, demining continued to be conducted by the SLA; 
a national NGO, DASH and its subcontractor national 
organisation SHARP; and the two international NGOs,
The HALO Trust and MAG.
The HALO Trust reported that, on average, HALO employed 
683 operations personnel per month in 2018, a slight 
increase from 654 operations personnel per month in 2017.48 
With predicted increased donor funding, HALO planned to 
recruit and deploy an additional eight manual teams and fi ve 
mechanical teams in 2019, resulting in a workforce of more 
than 800 staff.
MAG’s capacity increased in 2018 to 18 manual clearance 
teams, up from 15 in 2017, and nine mechanical teams, 
an addition of one from the previous year, as a result of 
increased funding. Highly encouragingly, MAG reported 
that it was increasing its capacity from 18 manual clearance 
teams to 36 in 2019 as a result of increased funding, and that, 
as a consequence, its capacity was set to double in a very 
short time.49
According to the NMAC, in 2018, the SLA’s demining unit 
deployed a total of 380 personnel in demining operations, 
which was a slight decrease from the 418 employed in 2017. 
DASH’s demining personnel remained at 365 in 2018, but with 
a decrease in the number of demining staff deployed by its 
subcontractor, SHARP, which fell by more than half to 50.50 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, The HALO Trust reported that as at December 2018, a 
total of nine mechanical assets were deployed in operations, 
including fi ve front-end loaders, one tracked Caterpillar, one 
JCB excavator, one Prime Tech tiller, and one Beach Tech 
machine. This increase in capacity compared to previous 
years was enabled by greater donor funding and more use 
of machines to clear mine lines in the Muhamalai minefi eld. 
The HALO Trust planned to purchase several additional 
mechanical assets during 2019.51 
According to the NMAC, the SLA reportedly deployed seven 
mechanical assets and eleven mine detection dogs in 2018.52 
MAG reported deploying nine mechanical teams, including 
excavators, mini-excavators, and front-end loaders for 
vegetation clearance and ground preparation to facilitate 
clearance.53
DEMINER SAFETY
According to NMAC, a total of six persons were involved in 
demining accidents in 2018: four injured in separate incidents 
in Trincomalee, Kilinochchi, and Jaffna districts, and two 
deminers killed in an incident in Mullaitivu district. NMAC 
informed Mine Action Review that as per Sri Lanka’s National 
Mine Action Standards, investigations were conducted shortly 
after each incident and lessons learned were shared as part 
of awareness raising efforts by NMAC with the organisations 
concerned.54
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of nearly 4.8km2 of anti-personnel mined area was reported released in 2018: more than 3.46km2 through clearance, 
reduction of nearly 1.3km2 through technical survey, and close to 0.01km2 cancelled through non-technical survey.55
SURVEY IN 2018
A total of 1.3km2 was reportedly released through survey 
in 2018: 7,590m2 cancelled through non-technical survey in 
2018, along with almost 1.3km2 reduced through technical 
survey.56 This compared with 2017, when a total of close to 
2.5km2 was released through survey (0.96km2 cancelled and 
1.54km2 reduced).57
According to the NMAC, a continued decrease in survey 
output was a result of the re-survey which was completed in 
early 2017. As a result, there were no area tasks cancelled 
through survey in 2018, and partial cancellations within tasks 
rarely happened during the year, it said.58 MAG reported that a 
greater accuracy in defi ning new SHAs through non-technical 
survey also contributed to lesser cancellation and area 
reduction during the year.59 The HALO Trust did not report any 
cancellation through non-technical survey in 2018. Three tasks 
were identifi ed for cancellation but due to restricted access 
caused by fl ooding, cancellation was postponed until 2019.60
The HALO Trust also reported that a small increase in 
area reduced through technical survey in 2018 of just over 
72,100m2 was due to the nature of the tasks worked on in 
2018, which included more SLA tasks where distinct and 
clean minelaying patterns were more likely to occur, thereby 
increasing opportunities for reduction through technical 
survey.61 HALO Trust also reported identifying and surveying 
nine new tasks in 2018 with a total size of 193,776m2.62 MAG 
also reported identifying 40 CHAs in 2018, with a total size of 
743,695m2 in Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya.63
MAG reported a decrease in the amount of area reduced 
through technical survey in 2018, as the clearance to 
technical survey ratio shifted from 45:55 to 60:40 during 
the year. Additionally, the programme worked predominantly 
on newer, more accurate SHAs identifi ed in the re-survey 
in 2017.64
Table 2: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical 
survey in 201865




Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey in 201866
District Operator Area reduced (m²)
Anuradhapura Sri Lanka Army  45,025 
Jaffna Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony  2,440 
HALO Trust  205,467 
Kilinochchi Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony  129,417 
HALO Trust  44,163 
SHARP  67,260 
Mannar MAG 411,294 
Mullaitivu Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony  100,473 
HALO Trust  11,006 
MAG 116,410 
Sri Lanka Army  30,929 
Puttalam Sri Lanka Army  472 
Trincomalee MAG 54,373 
Sri Lanka Army  2,780 
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
More than 3.46km2 of mined area was reportedly cleared in 2018, with a total of 31,323 anti-personnel mines, and 85 
anti-vehicle mines destroyed.67 This compared with 2017, when more than 3.2km2 of mined area was reportedly cleared.68 










Ampara Sri Lanka Army 1 13,530 72 0 0
Anuradhapura Sri Lanka Army 1 26,037 3 0 3
Jaffna DASH 1 22,165 987 0 10
HALO Trust 7 89,729 145 1 168
Sri Lanka Army 2 45,558 72 0 276
Kilinochchi DASH 11 280,809 2,198 41 927
HALO Trust 14 1,506,703 9,138 31 2,214
SHARP 5 215,934 3,432 12 1,570
Sri Lanka Army 4 90,384 2,052 0 51
Mannar MAG 31 519,916 2,458 0 152
Mullaitivu DASH 11 108,855 4,672 0 3,342
HALO Trust 4 117,202 191 0 7
MAG 6 80,099 769 0 4
Sri Lanka Army 5 137,809 1,938 0 75
Polonnaruwa Sri Lanka Army 1 5,825 2 0 0
Puttalam Sri Lanka Army 1 17,761 815 0 0
Trincomalee MAG 8 113,103 600 0 9
Sri Lanka Army 1 27,123 1,441 0 2
Vavuniya DASH 3 45,972 338 0 16
Totals 117 3,464,514 31,323 85 8,826
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
The HALO Trust reported an increase of just over 410,400m2 
of anti-personnel mine clearance in 2018 compared with 
the previous year, which it attributed to an increase in 
the average number of teams deployed, from 61 to 65, 
with an increase in donor funding, along with a number of 
improvements in land release methodology and standard 
operating procedures that resulted in increased effi ciency 
(see section on land release methodology above).70 The 
number of anti-personnel mines destroyed by HALO Trust 
during clearance also increased signifi cantly, from nearly 
6,600 in 2017 to almost 9,500 in 2018.71
MAG also reported increased clearance output in 2018, by 
a smaller margin of just over 80,400m2, which it said was 
due to the introduction of an additional mechanical asset 
for ground preparation and vegetation removal and three 
additional mine action teams. The number of anti-personnel 
mines MAG reported clearing more than doubled, however, 
from just over 1,700 in 2017 to over 3,800 in 2018.72
In addition, the HALO Trust reported 299 anti-personnel 
mines were destroyed during explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) spot tasks in 2018, along with 2 anti-vehicle mines, 
and 69 items of UXO.73
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STATES PARTIES
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SRI LANKA: 1 JUNE 2018
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Sri Lanka is required to 
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 
1 June 2028. It should complete clearance far in advance of 
this deadline, at the latest by the end of 2021.
The HALO Trust and MAG have both reported that meeting 
the end-2020 goal is an ambitious target which will require 
additional funding and capacity.74 While there were a number 
of positive developments towards this goal during the year, 
a signifi cant set-back was that the anticipated increase in 
capacity of the SLA demining units did not materialise in 
2018 as was hoped. NMAC additionally also continued to be 
under-resourced.75
MAG had hoped to complete clearance of all remaining tasks 
in Trincomalee by mid-2018, enabling the Government of 
Sri Lanka to declare Sri Lanka’s second mine-affected district 
after Batticaloa as free of mines. However, it reported that 
nine CHAs with a total size of over 182,000m2 had been newly 
identifi ed in Trincomalee in 2018–19, and that as at August 2019, 
clearance was ongoing and expected to continue into 2020.76
The HALO Trust reported that, in coordination with NMAC 
and its RMAO, all accessible minefi elds were expected to be 
cleared in Jaffna district by the end of 2019, a highly signifi cant 
achievement given the level of contamination. The HALO Trust 
stated that while it did not have permission as at August 2019 
to conduct clearance inside the High Security Zone, it was 
continuing to pursue a collaboration with the SLA to support 
further handover of cleared areas to local communities. At 
the same time, it was continuing to focus operations on the 
Muhamalai minefi eld, along with other tasks in southern 
Kilinochchi district and northern Mullaitivu district.77
It also reported that with an expected increase in donor 
funding, HALO can complete its allocated clearance tasks by 
the end of 2020. However, it noted that HALO will likely need 
to absorb tasks from other organisations to compensate 
for shortfalls and that key discussions on this issue will be 
required across the mine action sector.78
MAG cautioned that its community liaison teams alone had 
confi rmed an additional 21 hazardous areas with a size of 
over 486,900m2 in the fi rst seven months of 2019, in addition 
to what was identifi ed in 2018. As a result, MAG’s teams 
would need to work at a fully increased capacity until 2021 
to meet the current allocations, it said. If funding support 
is stepped up, however, the timeframe could be reduced. 
Without this increase, reaching the 2020 national goal will 
not be likely, MAG said.79
At the same time, the re-launch of the National Mine Action 
Strategy in March 2019 and the government of Sri Lanka’s 
renewed commitment to becoming mine free by 2020, 
has attracted new attention from the international donor 
community and operators reported receiving increased 
funding in 2019.80
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In November 2018, Sudan was granted a four-year extension 
to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 
deadline of 1 April 2019, setting a new deadline for completion 
of clearance by 1 April 2023. While the extension request is of 
good quality and sets concrete annual targets and projections 
for survey and clearance to reach completion by 2023, Sudan 
did not meet its land release targets in 2017–18. In 2018, mine 
clearance output increased slightly, though with a decrease 
in the number of anti-personnel mines destroyed. 
Positively, Sudan reported improvements during the year in the 
security situation in both Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, 
the two most heavily contaminated regions in Sudan. Sudan’s 
ability to meet its extended deadline will be highly dependent on 
security and access to these areas, as well as on resources. 
On 4 April 2018, Kassala state was declared free of mines 
and explosive remnants of war (ERW), making all three of 
Sudan’s eastern states free of contamination, following the 
completion of clearance of Red Sea and Gadaref states. These 
achievements are the result of 12 years of clearance efforts.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Sudan should regularly update states parties to the APMBC on access to, and progress in clearance in Blue 
Nile and South Kordofan states, and update its workplan and extension request targets accordingly.
 ■ Sudan should clarify its plans for demining in Western Kordofan state, which lack detail and consistency in 
its March 2018 extension request, along with efforts to address remaining contamination in Abyei.
 ■ Sudan should produce two updated workplans, the fi rst by 30 April 2020, with revised estimates of 
contamination and budgetary requirements, in accordance with the terms of Sudan’s latest extension. 
 ■ Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology. 
 ■ Sudan should update states parties on progress in implementing the resource-mobilisation strategy in its 
latest extension request, including how it intends to fi ll the considerable funding gap it has identifi ed.
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 ■ Sudan should continue its efforts to encourage international operators to return, which could signifi cantly 
boost mine action capacity and output. 






(20% of overall score)
7 Sudan has a good understanding of contamination, although the vast majority of 
recorded contamination is suspected hazardous area, which likely will result in signifi cant 
cancellation or reduction through survey. A major exception, however, are the states of 
South Kordofan and Blue Nile, where insecurity has prevented access in recent years and 





(10% of overall score)
7 Sudan’s national mine action programme is entirely nationally owned. It benefi ts from 
experienced national mine action centre staff, as well as from experienced national mine 
action operators. The government has notably provided consistent funding for mine 
action at US$2million per year. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 Gender is said to be mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 
and in the national mine action standards, with an emphasis on gender-balanced survey 
teams and the employment of women. At the same time, Sudan acknowledges diffi culties 




(10% of overall score)
8 Sudan’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software is being 
upgraded to the New Generation version, with assistance from the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Signifi cant efforts to correct errors in the 
database were made during the year, including ongoing efforts to incorporate data from 
Abyei. Sudan’s increased transparency in reporting and communication, with the aim of 
facilitating international cooperation and assistance, is evident. 
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 A new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 has been fi nalised and is awaiting 
endorsement. Sudan’s Article 5 deadline extension request is realistic, achievable, 
and contains clear targets and resources required to reach completion. However, the 
security situation in Blue Nile and South Kordofan has prevented the deployment of 




(20% of overall score)
7 A review of Sudan’s National Mine Action Standards was completed and the revised 





(20% of overall score)
6 Sudan did not meet its Article 5 extension request targets for 2018; however, the 
forthcoming revised national mine action strategic plan will set new annual milestones 
for survey and clearance. The primary factors which will determine Sudan’s ability 
to comply with its Article 5 deadline are security and access to Blue Nile and South 
Kordofan states and a funding gap of an estimated $58 million.
Average Score 6.8 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
 ■ Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)
 ■ JASMAR for Human Security




 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)







UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Sudan had a total of 94 areas suspected 
or confi rmed to contain anti-personnel mines, covering a 
total of just over 18.9km2. According to the Sudanese National 
Mine Action Centre (NMAC), of this total, 52 areas with a 
size of nearly 2.4km2 are confi rmed contamination, while 
anti-personnel mine contamination is suspected in a further 
42 areas with a total size of just over 16.5km2.1 An additional 
29 areas covering nearly 5km2 are suspected to contain only 
anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 1.2
According to NMAC, during clearance operations in 2018, 
three areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines with 
a total size of 10,400m2 were ‘closed’, while six new areas 
with a size of 557,798m2 were registered, of which three 
areas with a size of 362,245m2 were ‘closed’ while three 
areas with a size of 195,553m2 remained opened. It was also 
discovered that two areas thought to be contaminated with 
UXO contained anti-personnel mines and were reclassifi ed. 
NMAC stated that the difference between contamination 
remaining at the end of 2017 and that at the end of 2018 was 
185,153m2 which was a difference in the size of contamination 
remaining, not the number of areas to be addressed.
This is a slight increase in the overall size of contamination 
recorded as at the end of 2017, when Sudan had 94 mined 
areas covering a total of just over 18.7km2.3 An additional 
27 areas were suspected to contain only anti-vehicle mines, 
with a total size of nearly 5km2.4
Sudan’s mine and ERW contamination results from 
decades-long confl ict since the country’s independence in 
1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and 
other explosive ordnance were used heavily by all parties 
to the confl icts, resulted in widespread contamination 
that has claimed thousands of victims.5 In January 2005, 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ostensibly 
ended the civil war, ultimately leading to the independence 
of the south in July 2011. However, since South Sudan’s 
independence, confl icts have again broken out in Blue Nile 
and South Kordofan states as well as in the Abyei region, 
leading to new contamination from UXO. 
At the end of 2018, of Sudan’s mine- and ERW-affected 
states, three contained anti-personnel mines: Blue Nile, 
South Kordofan, and Western Kordofan. Blue Nile and South 
Kordofan were believed to be the most heavily contaminated, 
as set out in Table 2.6 According to NMAC, a total of 557,798m2
of anti-personnel mine contamination was added to the 
database in 2018.7 No mines have been reported in Darfur, 
where the main threat is from UXO.8
Kassala state was declared free of mines on 4 April 2018, 
joining Red Sea state which declared completion in May 2017, 
and Gadaref state, which was declared free of mines and ERW 
in May 2016.9 On 4 April 2019, another milestone was reached 
with the declaration of Abu Karshola town in South Kordofan 
state, once heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, free of 
known contamination, a positive indication of increasing access 
and improvements in the security situation.10
A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 
covering Blue Nile, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South 
Kordofan states. Since then, “ad hoc” reports of additional 
mined and ERW-contaminated areas have been registered as 
“dangerous areas” in the national database. This has caused 
the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand signifi cantly, 
including by encompassing areas not originally surveyed.11
As at April 2019, a total of 3,582 hazardous areas had been 
registered in the Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) database since 2002, of which 3,376 were 
reported to have been released through various clearance 
methods, leaving a total of 206 hazardous areas with a size 
of just over 26.1km2 to be addressed.12
In 2018, the extent of mine and ERW contamination in the 
border area of Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan 
remained not fully known due to ongoing restrictions 
on access.13
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018)14
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 52 2,402,260 42 16,516,788
Anti-vehicle mines 0 0 29 5,000,082
Totals 52 2,402,260 71 21,518,870
CHAs = Confi rmed hazardous areas   SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas
Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2018)15
State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2) Total SHA/CHA Total area (m2)
Blue Nile  4 219,663 5 841,683 9 1,061,346
South Kordofan 48 2,182,597 34 15,653,114 82 17,835,711
Western Kordofan 0 0 3 21,991 3 21,991
Totals 52 2,402,260 42 16,516,788 94 18,919,048
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NEW CONTAMINATION
NMAC reported that there were no reports of the use of 
anti-personnel mines, including of an improvised nature, 
in 2018.16
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER 
MUNITION REMNANTS
Sudan also has a signifi cant problem with ERW, including 
very limited contamination from cluster munition remnants, 
primarily as a result of the more than 20 years of civil war 
that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 
and South Sudan’s independence in July 2011 (see Mine 
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report 
on Sudan for further information). While no mines have 
been found in Darfur, ERW in Darfur includes unexploded 
air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and mortar shells, 
and grenades.17
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and 
NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action programme. Upon the 
independence of South Sudan, NMAC assumed full ownership 
of national mine action with responsibility for coordinating all 
mine clearance, including accreditation and certifi cation of 
clearance agencies. After starting an emergency programme 
in 2002, in 2015 the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) resumed 
a lead role in supporting UN mine action efforts in Sudan and 
provided assistance and technical support to NMAC following 
an invitation from the Sudanese Government.18 
In 2017, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) 
continued to monitor the activities of the Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA) in Abyei, which it has done since the 2011 outbreak 
of heavy confl ict in the area.19 As UNISFA does not have a 
mandate to conduct mine clearance, UNMAS continued its UN 
Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes the 
identifi cation and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized 
Border Zone as well as Abyei, and facilitating access by 
assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.20 
In Darfur, under the umbrella of UNAMID, UNMAS works 
under the name of the Ordnance Disposal Offi ce (ODO) in 
direct support of UNAMID priorities.21 UN Security Council 
Resolution 2429 (2018) calls for the gradual withdrawal of 
UNAMID by 2020. As such, UNMAS reported that some of 
ODO’s responsibilities in Darfur were being handed over to 
UNMAS Sudan, and that it was to take over ODO’s role in ERW 
clearance, risk education, and victim assistance as of 2019 in 
North, South, East, and West Darfur states, while ODO would 
focus its responsibilities in the area of Jabal Marrah.22
In 2018, the Government of Sudan contributed US$2 million 
to the running costs of NMAC and for demining activities.23 It 
has consistently funded the national mine action programme 
at this level for the past three years, doubling its funding for 
mine action from $1 million in 2015, and up from almost $0.5 
million in 2014.24 NMAC expected to receive the same funding 
in 2019.25 
In its extension request, Sudan projects $75.5 million is 
required to complete clearance by 2023, of which $14 million 
is expected to be provided by the government. At the same 
time, it reports Sudan is facing a funding gap of $58 million 
to meet the 2023 deadline.26 The request outlines a resource 
mobilisation strategy, which includes identifying new donors, 
including Gulf States, emerging economies receptive to 
becoming “donor” governments, and “non-conventional” 
partners such as philanthropists, private individuals and 
foundations, and commercial companies and corresponding 
funding modalities and mechanisms.27
GENDER 
In 2019, NMAC reported that gender is mainstreamed in the 
national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 and in the 
national mine action standards. It stated that under those 
standards, all survey and community liaison teams are to be 
gender balanced, and that women and children are consulted 
during survey and community liaison activities. It said 
that gender is also taken into account in the prioritisation, 
planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities, as 
per the national mine action standards.28
NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for 
employment in the national programme, whether at the offi ce 
level or in the fi eld. Positively, it reported that almost 40% of 
NMAC staff employed at the managerial or supervisory levels 
are women. However, it noted that there were few women 
employed in operational roles in the survey and clearance 
teams due to “local customs and traditions”.29
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In May 2019, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that it 
was using both the IMSMA legacy version in parallel with 
the newer version, IMSMA-NG.30 In 2018, NMAC began a 
process of upgrading the IMSMA software to the newer 
New Generation version, with assistance from the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). 
Signifi cant efforts to correct errors in the database were also 
undertaken.31 The database does not contain information on 
the disputed Abyei area.32 However, UNMAS informed Mine 
Action Review in June 2019 that UNISFA was working with 
NMAC on database sharing and had co-located an IMSMA 
offi cer within the NMAC offi ce in Khartoum to help share 
historical data, while it was also providing NMAC a monthly 
report on activities in Abyei.33
PLANNING AND TASKING
In March 2018, Sudan submitted a request for an extension 
of its APMBC Article 5 clearance deadline for a period of 
four years to 1 April 2023. The request contains a detailed 
workplan with annual survey and clearance projections on a 
state-by-state basis (see Article 5 Compliance section). 
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a new national mine action 
strategic plan for 2019–23 had been fi nalised and was 
waiting approval. The plan aims at fulfi lling Sudan’s APMBC 
obligations, and was developed in coordination with the GICHD 
to replace its previous national mine action strategy for 
2016–19.34 NMAC stated that detailed annual workplans had 
been developed for each year under the new strategic plan.35
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan’s National 
Mine Action Standards (NMAS), reportedly ongoing since 
2015, had been completed and the revised standards were 
awaiting endorsement.36
NMAC confi rmed that in 2018, QA and quality control activities 
were carried out according to the NMAS.37
OPERATORS 
In 2018, no international non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) was conducting demining operations in Sudan. National 
demining operators are JASMAR for Human Security, 
National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), 
and the Friends for Peace and Development Organization 
(FPDO). In 2018, NMAC reported that a total of 22 mine 
action teams were operational (7 manual clearance teams, 
11 multi-task teams, 3 mine detection dog teams, and 1 
route verifi cation and clearance team). It reported that the 
deployment of additional teams was made possible in newly 
accessible areas in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.38
In Darfur, in 2018, clearance operations continued to be 
conducted by commercial operator Dynasafe (DML) and 
NUMAD.39
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
As noted above, demining is carried out primarily using 
manual clearance, as well as through the use of mine 
detection dog teams. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Sudan’s Article 5 deadline extension request is to clear all mined areas and ERW-contaminated areas by 1 April 2023. Towards 
this goal, overall land release rose dramatically in 2018, to a total of nearly 17.4km2 mine and battle area released, up from 
just under 3.9km2 released in total in 2017.40 Of this, just over 1km2 of mined area was released through technical survey and 
clearance. No cancellation was reported in 2018. 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
SURVEY IN 2018
A total of just over 21,000m2 was reduced through technical 
survey in 2018. No areas were reported released through 
cancellation, and a total of just under 558,000m2 was 
confi rmed. This is a signifi cant decrease in output from 
2017, when nearly 335,000m2 was released through survey, 
including close to 260,000m2 reduced through technical 
survey, just under 75,000m2 cancelled through non-technical 
survey, and six areas with a size of 157,000m2 confi rmed 
as mined.41
CLEARANCE IN 2018
According to NMAC, nearly 980,000m2 was released 
through clearance in 2018, almost all by NUMAD, as in the 
previous year. This was an increase from 2017, when just 
over 707,330m2 was released through clearance.42 A total of 
689,898m2 was cleared manually and a further 289,550m2 by 
MDD teams in 2018.43
Despite the increase in clearance output in square metres, 
only 31 anti-personnel mines and 13 anti-vehicle mines were 
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Table 3: Mine clearance in 201844
State Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed
Blue Nile
 NUMAD 0 0 0 0
 JASMAR 0 5,140 0 1
 FPDO 0 4,140 0 1
South Kordofan
NUMAD 1 722,963 0 0
JASMAR 2 45,529 23 0
FPDO 0 4,242 0 1
Kassala NUMAD 5 197,434 8 10
Totals 8 979,448 31 13
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SUDAN: 1 APRIL 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
four-year extension granted by states parties in 2018), Sudan 
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not 
later than 1 April 2023. 
In March 2018, Sudan submitted a request for a four-year 
extension of its Article 5 deadline to 1 April 2023. The 
extension request was notably thorough, generally of good 
quality, and includes a workplan with annual targets for 
completion and a revised number of areas in each state it 
plans to address with a total planned release of 53 CHAs with 
a size of 26.4km2 and 171 SHAs with a size of 22km2.45 The 
request does, however, contain some discrepancies in the 
total amounts of survey and clearance output projections, 
which require additional clarifi cation.46
According to the extension request, when full access is 
available, a detailed and updated workplan for clearance 
of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states for 2019–23 will be 
produced. NMAC expects that non-technical survey in both 
states can then be completed in six months.47 The request 
contains detailed projections for Blue Nile state of eight 
areas with a total size of just over 1km2 to be addressed in 
2018–20 and 127 areas with a size of just over 23.3km2 to 
be addressed in South Kordofan from 2017–23. The request 
does not, though, provide any details on plans for clearance 
of Western Kordofan state, noting only that three SHAs with 
a total size of 21,991m2 remain to be addressed, offering 
confl icting information as to when this will occur.48 It also 
does not contain information on how contamination in Abyei 
will be cleared.
The workplan foresees a considerable increase in land 
release output, from a total of 8km2 in 2017–18 to 23.4km2 
in 2018–19. Sudan was asked by the Article 5 Committee at 
the Intersessional Meetings in June 2018 to provide updates 
on the reason for the sharp increase and corresponding 
efforts to increase capacity to meet this increase in output.49 
Concerns were also raised that under the plan for 2019–23, 
close to 90% of SHAs remaining will be released through 
survey, and that this percentage is higher than any survey 
outputs in 2012–16 (averaging close to 74%).50 
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Overall, the primary concern with Sudan’s ability to meet its 
Article 5 extension request deadline remains that it is heavily 
dependent upon improved security in the heavily affected 
states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. A further signifi cant 
factor which continues to impede Sudan’s progress is a lack 
of clearance capacity formerly provided by international 
demining operators. Sudan has made numerous requests for 
technical and logistical support and appeals for the return of 
international operators’ support.
In November 2018, Sudan reported that as a result of 
enhanced cooperation, both nationally and internationally, 
in particular stemming from a meeting on Sudan of the 
APMBC’s Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and 
Assistance’s “individualised approach” initiative in 2017, a 
number of positive developments had resulted. This initiative, 
Sudan reported, alongside nationally convened mine action 
events and donor fi eld visits to mine-affected areas, had 
resulted in an increase in earmarked funds to the mine action 
programme, with some US$7.1 million in new funding for 
mine action pledged by the governments of Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.51
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In 2018, the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) 
began elaborating what may be Tajikistan’s fi nal Article 5 
extension request, with assistance from the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Tajikistan is requesting a 
fi nal extension of its deadline to 31 December 2025, but the 
forecast that this will be enough time to complete clearance 
is based on a signifi cant expansion in capacity, which has not 
yet been secured.
Tajikistan also approved a national gender strategy in mine 
action for 2018–22 in October 2018, elaborated with support 
from the Geneva Mine Action Programme (GMAP, now a 
programme of the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)).
The fi rst ever state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to 
Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements 
were signed between the two countries, including one on 
demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek 
border where mines remain. Any survey of the border will 
require agreement and cooperation between both nations. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Tajikistan should seek to expand its demining capacity in order to survey its 41 suspected hazardous areas 
(SHAs) as soon as possible, in order to more accurately determine the extent of mine contamination.
 ■ Tajikistan should commit to provide regular updates to Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
states parties on progress in implementing Article 5 during the extension period.
 ■ Tajikistan should consider expanding the humanitarian demining capacity of the Tajik Armed Forces, 
as well as further exploring the potential to train and deploy Tajik Border Guard forces, to help it meet its 
Article 5 obligations. 
 ■ Tajikistan should report more accurately and consistently on land release data, in a manner consistent with 
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
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(20% of overall score)
5 Tajikistan’s baseline of remaining anti-personnel mine contamination is not yet an 
accurate assessment. Forty-one SHAs have yet to be surveyed, and many confi rmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) require further survey to more accurately locate and delineate 






(10% of overall score)
7 Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, including the contribution 
of Ministry of Defence (MoD) clearance teams. There is political will and an enabling 
environment for Article 5 implementation.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
7 A national gender strategy in mine action for 2018–22, elaborated with support from 
GMAP, was approved in October 2018. Mine Action data is disaggregated by sex and age, 




(10% of overall score)
6 TNMAC is in the process of installing Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) Core, with support from the GICHD.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
7 Tajikistan has a National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020, and is 
developing a strategic workplan for implementation of Article 5, in line with the deadline 
extension it is requesting to the end of 2025. The GICHD has worked with TNMAC and 
UNDP to develop PriSMA (the Priority Setting Tool for Mine Action).
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 Tajikistan has appropriate national mine action standards in place, and deploys 
evidence-based land release methodology. It currently lacks suffi cient survey capacity, 





(20% of overall score)
6 Tajikistan cleared nearly 0.6km2 of mined area in 2018. This is less than it had planned 
to clear, and is substantially less than the average 1.3km2 of clearance per annum 
foreseen in its deadline extension request. In order to meet planned targets and have 
any chance of meeting its Article 5 obligations by 2025, Tajikistan must secure funding 
for additional capacity.
Average Score 6.3 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ Commission for the Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
■ Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ TNMAC
■ Ministry of Defence (MoD), Humanitarian Demining 
Company (HDC)
■ Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
■ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) 
■ Tajik Border Guard Forces
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Tajikistan is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent, 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition 
remnants, as a result of past confl icts (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report 
on Tajikistan for further information).
At the end of 2018, Tajikistan had 12.1km2 of mined area: 
just over 7.9km2 of mine contamination across 154 confi rmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) and almost 4.2km2 across 95 SHAs, 
as set out in Table 1.1 The mined areas are located in 
four provinces.
The overall baseline contamination at the end of 2018 is 
an increase compared to the end of 2017, which it stood at 
7.46km2 of CHA and almost 1.35km2 of SHA.2 This is largely 
due to 3.25km2 of legacy SHA on the Tajik-Uzbek border being 
added to the baseline of mined area. However, even taking 
this into account, the difference in fi gures between mined 
area as at the end of 2017 and 2018, cannot be satisfactorily 
explained or reconciled.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2018)3
CHA  SHA
Province District Nos. Area (m2) Nos. Area (m2)
Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Region
Darvoz 8 1,169,600 2 20,000
Vanj 6 908,119 0 0
Shugnan 3 56,000 0 0
Ishkoshi 0 0 1 5,000
Subtotals 17 2,133,719 3 25,000
Khatlon Farkhor 6 96,800 1 8,000
Hamadoni 3 80,772 6 177,000
Panj 24 1,600,585 13 204,000
Jayhun 8 135,636 11 307,000
Shamsiddin Shohin 91 3,659,698 4 140,000
Kabodiyon 1 0 0 0
Shahri 1 30,000 0 0
Khovaling 2 120,000 1 30,000
Subtotals 136 5,723,491 36 866,000
Sughd Region (Uzbek border) Asht 0 0 11 610,000
Ayni 0 0 5 535,000
Isfara 0 0 20 1,105,000
Konibodom 0 0 3 165,000
Panjakent 0 0 13 715,000
Shahriston 0 0 2 120,000
Subtotals 0 0 54 3,250,000
Central Region Sangvor 1 50,000 2 50,000
Subtotals 1 50,000 2 50,000
Totals 154 7,907,210 95 4,191,000
Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of 
different confl icts. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan 
was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with 
Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and 
the Central Region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a 
result of the 1992–97 civil war.4 
A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation 
for Mine Action (FSD) estimated that mine and ERW 
contamination extended over 50km2.5 Tajikistan subsequently 
alleged that lack of experience among the initial survey 
teams, the absence of minefi eld records and other important 
information, and inadequate equipment led to that fi rst impact 
survey generating unreliable results. As a result, the sizes of 
SHAs were miscalculated and their descriptions not clearly 
recorded.6 While most minefi eld maps/records are of good 
quality, some do not refl ect the reality on the ground and as 
such the records have to be verifi ed and validated through 
survey and data analysis.7
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Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon and 
the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) along 
the Afghan border (reported to contain 60,357 anti-personnel 
mines), in the Central Region, and along the Uzbek border.8
Shamsiddin Shohin district (formerly known as Shuroobod 
district) in Khatlon province is the most heavily mined 
district. Mines were laid in and around military positions on 
hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered 
remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in 
and out by helicopter as there are no established roads or 
tracks to access the minefi elds for survey or clearance.9
Depending on the weather, land release operations in the 
Khatlon region of the border usually start in February/March; 
the GBAO part of the border only becomes accessible from 
May until October; and the Central Region from June until 
September.10
Information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border 
is limited and based on non-technical survey conducted 
in 2011–15 by FSD and a needs assessment survey by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15. 
However, the FSD non-technical survey did not cover the 
whole of the Tajik-Uzbek border, only Sughd province, and 
it was not comprehensive, being mainly based on incident 
forms as the boundary line was not accessible to survey 
teams. Records lack detail on the exact location where mine 
incidents occurred.11
While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 
1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, certain areas have not yet been delineated 
and therefore the exact location of mined areas is not 
known. Most of the mined areas are thought to be in 
disputed sections of the Tajik-Uzbek border which have 
not been accessible, and for which evaluation and analysis 
of information is not yet complete.12 Most of the mines are 
believed to be on Uzbek territory,13 but there is a possibility 
that some mines may have been displaced downhill into 
Tajikistan due to landslides or fl ooding.14 The 3.25km2 of SHA 
on the border with Uzbekistan, included in Tajikistan’s 2019 
extension request,15 is a rough estimate and the actual extent 
of any anti-personnel mined area on Tajik territory along this 
border will only be more accurately established once both 
countries permit survey and have delimited the border. 
The fi rst ever state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to 
Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements 
were signed between the two countries, including one on 
demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek 
border.16 Any demining operations will require agreement 
and cooperation between the two nations; as at July 2019, the 
Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) was in negotiation 
with the Uzbek MoFA regarding survey of the Tajik-Uzbek 
border.17
In September 2013, records of 110 (subsequently corrected 
to 107) previously unrecorded and unsurveyed minefi elds 
were made public for the fi rst time, with security constraints 
said to have prevented survey activities in the past.18 All 
are located in the provinces of Khatlon and the GBAO along 
the border with Afghanistan.19 Non-technical survey of the 
minefi elds began in 2014.20 As at May 2019, 41 unsurveyed 
SHAs (corresponding to 30 minefi eld records) were said to 
remain.21 TNMAC plans to complete survey of the remaining 
unsurveyed minefi elds by 2023.22 While none of the 
unsurveyed areas is considered completely inaccessible for 
the survey (or for subsequent clearance),23 serious challenges 
have been reported during survey in accessing the mined 
areas in mountainous terrain and with one mined area 
blocking access to a number of others.24
Furthermore, many surveyed minefi eld records/CHAs do 
not accurately refl ect the reality in the fi eld, as signifi cant 
time has passed since the minefi eld records were made and 
the landscape may have changed in the meantime. Further 
technical survey/re-survey is therefore required to more 
accurately locate and delineate the actual mine contamination.
According to Tajikistan, the total size of un-surveyed area is 
estimated to be 941,000m2 (with approximately 11,685 mines) 
and the total area planned for re-survey is 2,770,557m2. 
Survey and re-survey of these areas will be conducted 
by Union of Sapers of Tajikistan (UST) and Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA). Tajikistan acknowledges the urgency 
and importance of establishing a clear baseline of anti-
personnel mine contamination as soon as possible and in 
August 2019 TNMAC announced that a survey working group 
will be established with expert representatives from all key 
stakeholders and implementing partners, under the guidance 
and direction of TNMAC. The group will help plan and 
prioritise survey tasks.25
With the introduction of an arrangement for medical 
evacuation by helicopter, in collaboration with the Armed 
Forces, there are no longer any mined areas deemed to be 
“inaccessible”.26 There are, however, mined areas on two 
islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border, one of 
which is 538,500m2 in size and the other 30,000m2, which 
are said to be “non-executable” at the present time. The 
islands were created by a change in the fl ow of the river, 
and it is possible that the river may again change its path 
and re-connect the islands with the Tajik river bank in 
the future.27
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Commission for the Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the fi rst deputy of the 
Prime Minister, and containing key representatives from 
relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan’s national mine 
action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action 
in the government’s socio-economic development policies.28
In June 2003, the Government of Tajikistan and UNDP 
established the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) with 
a view to it becoming a nationally owned programme in the 
short term,29 though this did not happen until more than ten 
years later. TMAC was made responsible for coordinating and 
monitoring all mine action activities.30 Since then, TMAC has 
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On 3 January 2014, TNMAC was established by government 
decree to replace TMAC.32 While transition to national 
ownership is considered to have been successful, UNDP’s 
Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) 
project has continued to support the building of sustainable 
national structures and TNMAC’s technical capacity.33 In 2018, 
UNDP helped TNMAC to elaborate Tajikistan’s plan for Article 
5 completion. UNDP plans to transfer assets, knowledge, 
and expertise directly to TNMAC34 with UNDP support due to 
decrease in 2019.35 In 2016, Tajikistan’s Parliament adopted a 
Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers all aspects 
of mine action.36
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a signifi cant role in 
Tajikistan’s mine action sector, in particular by conducting 
demining directly.37 The Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe Programme Offi ce in Dushanbe (OSCE 
POiD) has supported the MoD to update its multi-year plan, 
entitled “Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan 
Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023”.38
An agreement on cooperation between the Governments of 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan was signed in 2014, since when 
TNMAC has coordinated with the UN Mine Action Centre for 
Afghanistan (UNMACCA) and Afghanistan’s Department of 
Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) on land release approaches, 
NMAS, exchange visits, cross-border projects, victim 
assistance, and risk education.39 Since 2017, this also includes 
collaboration on quality management (QM).40 
In 2018, the Government of Tajikistan supported TNMAC 
coordination activities with funding of US$53,933.41 In 
addition, the Tajik government contributes fi ve MoD demining 
teams (500,000 Tajik Somoni), and provides support for the 
joint projects of TNMAC and UNDP, and OSCE POiD.42 In total, 
$480,000 is allocated annually from Tajikistan’s state budget 
as in-kind contributions.43
GENDER 
In September 2017, experts from the Geneva Mine Action 
Programme (GMAP, now a programme of the GICHD) 
prepared and submitted to TNMAC a draft of a national 
gender strategy in mine action for 2018–22. The strategy was 
approved by TNMAC in October 2018.44 Gender in Tajikistan 
is also addressed by a number of laws and documents, 
including the national development strategy through to 
2030, approved by the parliament on 1 December 2016.45
TNMAC reported that women and children are consulted 
during survey and community liaison activities. As at July 
2019, community liaison/non-technical survey teams were 
not yet gender balanced, but TNMAC plans to diversify survey 
teams to help reach a wider audience and more sources of 
information. Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by 
sex and age.46
Women account for around 20% of survey and clearance 
teams in Tajikistan, and around 25% of managerial/
supervisory level positions.47 According to its 2019 Article 
5 extension request, Tajikistan aims to double its demining 
capacity, subject to funding.48 Such an increase to operational 
capacity will present an opportunity to build on the lessons 
learned from fi elding female and mixed teams, and to improve 
the gender balance for deminers in line with Tajikistan’s 
Gender and Diversity Mine Action Strategy.
The MoD’s Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC) does 
not currently have a gender policy or implementation plan. 
However, the HDC does consult with all groups, including 
women and children, during survey and community liaison 
activities. While there is equal access to employment for 
qualifi ed women and men in the HDC survey and clearance 
teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions, 
in practice women do not apply for these positions and as at 
August 2019, no women were employed by the HDC.49
The HDC deploys conscript soldiers as deminers, with regular 
MoD personnel overseeing operations. In Tajikistan, military 
service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women. 
However, while there are no formal obstacles for women 
undertaking military service, very few currently choose to do 
so, which also helps explain the absence of women serving in 
the HDC. The OSCE Programme Offi ce in Dushanbe regularly 
emphasises the importance of including women in all aspects 
of the work and especially as offi cers and in managerial 
positions.50 TNMAC has acknowledged that it will be a 
challenge to achieve gender balance as those who currently 
serve in the military are predominantly male. However it will 
discuss and prioritise identifying key positions that can be 
fi lled by female candidates, such as paramedics and/or QA/
QC offi cers, in addition to seeking to increase female civilian 
capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.51
NPA has a gender and diversity policy which is integrated 
into NPA’s Tajikistan project proposals and operations, and 
gender mainstreaming is a mandatory part of its training 
activities in Tajikistan. NPA ensures that all groups are 
included during community consultation activities, and has a 
gender balanced community liaison team to help ensure this. 
NPA disaggregates mine action data by sex and age.52
NPA makes an effort to try to employ a gender balanced 
workforces to the extent that is possible in Tajikistan context, 
and has men and women employed in key positions. Of NPA’s 
operational staff, 22% are women; and 36% of management/
supervisory staff.53
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2016, Tajikistan updated its national mine action database 
to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
version 6.0.54 TNMAC is now installing IMSMA Core, with 
support from the GICHD,55 and expected it to become fully 
operational in the course of 2019.56
Data in the national information management system are 
accessible to clearance operators, and data collection forms 
enable collation of necessary data.57 Tajikistan submits 
annual Article 7 transparency reports and delivers updates 
on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC 
intersessional meetings and meetings of states parties. 
However, TNMAC should aim to improve its land release 
terminology and methodology, to make it more consistent 
with the IMAS, and refer to the amount of mined area 
cancelled through non-technical survey or reduced through 
technical survey.
PLANNING AND TASKING
The previous national mine action strategic plan for 2010–15 
expired at the end of 2015.58 A new National Strategy on 
Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020 was approved by 
government decree No. 91 on 25 February 2017.59
The national strategy is, however, very general, and while 
it includes a “plan”, which lists the various overarching 
activities to implement the strategy, it lacks detail on 
prioritisation of clearance tasks, timelines, or capacities 
for survey and clearance operations.60
In September 2018, a group was created to prepare 
Tajikistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request, which 
included representatives from the Executive Offi ce of the 
President of Tajikistan, multiple ministries, and the Committee 
for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense.61 UNDP also 
supported the preparation of the extension request.
The annual projections in Tajikistan’s 2019 Article 5 extension 
request are, however, simplistic, based on average clearance 
rates, without more detailed analysis of the remaining mined 
areas. Tajikistan’s extension request projections also assume 
an increased clearance capacity that Tajikistan has not yet 
secured. 
TNMAC plans to reach an average annual clearance target 
of more than 1.3km2 in order to release nearly 8.85km² of 
remaining mined area (excluding the Uzbek border) by 2025.62
In its operational workplan for 2019, planned clearance 
output was 1,369,429m2,63 signifi cantly greater than the 
0.59km2 cleared in 2018.
The GICHD is working with TNMAC and UNDP to develop 
a prioritisation system and tool for Tajikistan, which will 
identify distinct criteria and indicators for the separate 
regions.64 A pilot of PriSMA (the Priority Setting Tool for 
Mine Action) was conducted from July to September 2017,65
and a second version was subsequently developed and 
piloted.66 TNMAC prepared its latest operations plan based 
on PriSMA and Tajik Border Forces recommendations, using 
a district-by-district approach based on the following criteria: 
■ mined areas with economic and infrastructure impact; 
■ the number of unsurveyed minefi eld records in each 
district (those with a larger number of minefi elds records 
will be considered a priority for the deployment of non-
technical survey teams and those with a smaller number 
can be surveyed by clearance teams during demining 
operations); and 
■ the number of mined areas in each district (a smaller 
number of minefi elds will be considered a priority to 
deploy clearance teams to release the whole district).67
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Tajikistan’s revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) 
were approved by decree on 1 April 2017.68
In 2017, TNMAC further developed its new approach to 
survey, known as “non-technical survey with technical 
intervention”. In addition to standard non-technical survey, 
survey teams are also using technical assets to confi rm and 
locate actual evidence of mines and unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). This methodology helps improve the effi ciency of 
survey operations, by confi rming areas as mined and more 
accurately determining the location of mined areas.69 It 
is especially useful, as minefi eld records are sometimes 
incomplete or inconsistent due to incorrect coordinates and 
grid numbering or lack of landmarks/reference points, and 
there are often few local people to ask about evidence of 
mines or accidents as people have moved away because of 
the contamination. This can result in infl ated polygons. In 
addition, mines are sometimes displaced due to landslides, 
rock falls, or fl ooding.70
Since early October 2017, the UST has been conducting non-
technical survey with technical survey intervention, in line 
with the new land release methodology in Tajikistan.71 Prior to 
this, UST was only conducting non-technical survey. The use 
of technical interventions is expected to improve operational 
effi ciency, but it will also slow down the rate of survey by 
UST of the remaining unsurveyed minefi elds.72
While in many instances the suspected mined area is 
cancelled or reduced through survey, there are also 
instances when survey reveals the size of the mined area 
as being larger than indicated on the minefi eld records. This 
can be due to a number of factors, such as windy conditions 
at the time when helicopter-dropped mines were deployed 
which leads to greater dispersal of the mines; the height of 
the helicopter above the ground at the time of deployment 
(in time of hostilities, the distance of the helicopter from the 
ground is signifi cantly increased, resulting in wider dispersal 
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OPERATORS 
In 2018, operational capacity included fi ve military 
multi-purpose manual teams (four from the MoD HDC and 
one from the Committee of Emergency and Civil Defence) 
totalling 64 personnel; four multi-purpose manual Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) teams (for clearance and technical 
survey), totalling 33 demining personnel;74 and two UST 
non-technical survey teams (totalling 11 personnel).75 
Following the signature of an MoU with the OSCE POiD 
in 2009, the MoD established the HDC.76 Since TMAC’s 
nationalisation, the HDC has acted as a contractor for TNMAC, 
and OSCE POiD funds the HDC through TNMAC.77 The MoD 
provides fi ve teams to the HDC as part of its commitment 
to assist TNMAC meet Tajikistan’s Article 5 obligations. The 
HDC’s de-mining activities are conducted using conscript 
soldiers as deminers, with regularly employed MoD offi cers 
managing operations and the clearance sites. In 2018, three 
of the fi ve MoD teams were supported by OSCE POiD unifi ed 
budget (from participating states) and two by the United 
States Department of State via the OSCE POiD. In 2019, OSCE 
continued to three teams from the unifi ed budget as before 
and the two teams that were funded by United States through 
OSCE in 2018 are now funded directly by United States 
Department of State to TNMAC after successful capacity 
building and as part of a transition to national ownership 
and sustainability.78
According to the MoD, more deminers could be trained 
and deployed if additional funding were available. Military 
deminers are reportedly less expensive than deminers of 
international NGOs, and have the additional advantage of 
having security access to survey and clear mined areas in 
the vicinity of military bases and other areas which may 
be inaccessible to other implementing partners due to 
security restrictions.79
In its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request, Tajikistan 
set out its hope to double the clearance capacity currently 
provided by the MoD and NPA. The government of Tajikistan 
would pay the salaries of the fi ve additional MoD teams, 
but Tajikistan still needs to secure international funding for 
equipment and running costs for these teams.80 
The OSCE POiD has been supporting mine action since 
2003. The OSCE POiD’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: to 
support the development of national demining capacity; and 
to foster regional cooperation in border management and 
security.81 The OSCE POiD supported the HDC via the UST, 
which it contracted to provide project management and 
administrative support to the Ministry of Defence’s HDC in 
2010–13.82 
UST, a national not-for-profi t organisation, is accredited to 
conduct non-technical survey, risk education, and victim 
assistance. In 2017, UST received additional accreditation 
to conduct non-technical survey with technical survey 
intervention, but it is not accredited to conduct clearance.83 
While some staff positions at UST are permanent, such as the 
Operations Manager, deminers are recruited annually for the 
operations period from Spring until October, based on UST’s 
annual survey plan.84 In 2018, two UST teams (four surveyors 
per team) conducted non-technical survey in the Shamsiddin 
Shohin district of the Khatlon region.85 The capacity of the 
two UST survey teams was due to increase slightly, to six 
surveyors per team in 2019.86
In late 2018, NPA established a technical advisor position, 
focused more on supporting national capacities (including 
TNMAC and the survey capacity of UST). NPA has proposed 
establishing a survey working group to meet at least monthly 
and be active during the 2019 demining season, bringing 
relevant stakeholders together. In August 2019, Tajikistan 
reported that it planned to establish the survey working 
group.87
Technical survey is conducted as standard during NPA 
clearance tasks. NPA did not have a dedicated survey team 
in 2018, and non-technical survey conducted in 2018, at the 
request of TNMAC, was conducted by NPA’s technical advisor, 
task supervisor, and supported with medical staff. NPA hopes 
to be able to transition into conducting more survey activities 
in coordination with TNMAC in order to be able to better 
defi ne the remaining levels of contamination. As such, NPA 
trained and deployed its fi rst survey team in April 2019 and 
planned to add a second survey team in February 2020, to 
conduct non-technical survey and targeted technical survey 
to support TNMAC with resurvey of CHAs and potentially with 
the survey of unsurveyed mined areas.88 The survey team is a 
multi-task team and so can also be deployed to support NPA’s 
clearance teams, when it is not deployed for survey.89 
Tajikistan’s 2019 extension request references the role of the 
Tajik Border Guard Forces in providing security for demining 
operations on the Tajik-Afghan border and says TNMAC 
planned to involve Tajik Border Guard Forces in demining 
on the Tajik-Afghan border.90 There is currently a small pilot 
project in which NPA has trained two border guard offi cers 
who have been seconded to work with NPA’s civilian capacity 
during the 2019 demining season.91 This could be further 
expanded, if the political will is there and funding is available. 
Since the Border Guard Forces are also responsible for 
granting permission to access the contaminated areas along 
the Tajik/Afghan border, increased cooperation on demining 
may help to overcome previous security restrictions on 
access to these areas.92
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Neither mine detection dogs (MDDs) nor machines were 
used operationally in 2018. The MDD programme ended in 
early 2015 due to the very limited number of tasks suitable 
for dogs. Consequently, 18 MDDs were handed over to the 
Ministry of Interior and to the Border Forces.93
The MoD has one demining machine, which is not currently 
deployed.94 Tajikistan recognises that there are still 
potentially mined areas where mechanical assets can 
usefully be deployed (15–20% from total remaining areas in 
the lowlands), though this would require additional fi nancial 
support.95 Many of the western districts of the Tajik-Afghan 
border, which are currently not accessible because of 
security restrictions, contain mined areas on fl at terrain, 
which could be suitable for mechanical demining.96 In August 
2018, TNMAC announced that it had recently established a 
Technical Working Group focused on operational effi ciency 
and quality assurance, and that one of the fi rst tasks of the 
working group will be to conduct a feasibility study on the 
reactivation of mechanical assets in Tajikistan.97
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 1.12km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of 
which 0.6km2 was cleared, over 0.2km2 was reduced through 
technical survey, and nearly 0.4km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey.98
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 0.4km2 was cancelled through non-technical 
survey by NPA and UST in Khatlon province (see Table 2), 
and a further 0.23km2 was reduced through technical 
survey by the MoD and NPA in Khatlon and GBAO provinces 
(see Table 3).99 This was a slight decrease on the 0.48km2
cancelled in 2017, but an increase compared to the 0.16km2
reduced in 2017. 100
Also in 2018, two minefi elds of 865,000m2 were confi rmed by 
TNMAC, and three minefi elds that make up 146,000m2 were 
confi rmed by NPA.101
Table 2: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical 
survey in 2018102
Operator Province District Area cancelled (m²)
UST Khatlon Sh. Shohin 366,000
NPA Khatlon Sh. Shohin 34,634
Total 400,634
Table 3: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 2018103
Operator Province District Area reduced (m2)
MOD Khatlon Sh.Shoin 83,100





In 2018, the MoD/HDC and NPA cleared nearly 0.6km2 across 
9 mined areas (including suspended areas not yet completed 
as at the end of 2018), destroying 4,998 anti-personnel mines 
and 136 items of UXO (see Table 4).104 This is a very slight 
decrease on the 0.62km2 cleared in 2017.
An additional 15 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during 
spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2018.105
Anti-personnel mines were found in all clearance tasks in 
2018, with the exception of a minefi eld in Khavalong district, 
Khatlon province tasked to NPA for clearance. However, while 
no mines were found, there was strong evidence of the past 
presence of mines, with discoveries of mine fragments and 
demolition craters.106
Table 4: Mine clearance by operator in 2018*107
Operator Province District Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
NPA GBAO Darvos 1 22,622 11 2
Khatlon Sh. Shohin 1 12,522 214 29
Khatlon Sh. Shohin 1 8,210 488 0
Khatlon Sh. Shohin 1 20,143 2 5
Khatlon Khovaling 1 12,699 0 0
Khatlon Khovaling 1 54,658 7 0
MoD GBAO Darvos 1 16,270 64 0
Khatlon Sh. Shohin 1 423,439 4,210 100
Khatlon Sh. Shohin 1 22,650 2 0
Totals 9 593,213 4,998 136
AP = Anti-personnel 
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TAJIKISTAN: 1 APRIL 2000
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2010
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (5-YEAR, 9-MONTH EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with 
the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2009), 
Tajikistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon 
as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020. Tajikistan 
will not meet this deadline and has requested a second 
extension of its Article 5 deadline to 31 December 2025. 
However, Tajikistan’s extension request is very optimistic 
and calculated on the assumption of substantially increased 
capacity (fi ve additional MoD teams and two additional NPA 
teams), for which Tajikistan has yet to secure funding, but 
which are planned to be operational from 2020. Based on 
current capacity and land release output, Tajikistan is not on 
track to complete Article 5 clearance obligations by the end 
of 2025, and may even be hard pushed to complete by 2030.
Tajikistan has faced a number of challenges in Article 5 
implementation, including a reduction in demining capacity; 
insecurity along its border with Afghanistan and lack of 
permission to conduct demining in some of the Western 
districts; inaccessibility and/or operational diffi culty of some 
mined areas; and the very poor quality of some minefi eld 
records, mostly from the civil war in the Central Region.108 In 
addition, since its fi rst extension request in 2009, Tajikistan 
identifi ed 107 previously unrecorded and unsurveyed SHAs, 
which also set it behind target.
Tajikistan’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request includes 
plans to address the SHAs and CHAs in the provinces of 
Khatlon and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region 
(GBAO) along the Afghan border and in the Central Region, 
but not the 3.25km2 of SHA on the Uzbek border which 
Tajikistan says will be addressed only once a political 
agreement has been made.109 As at July 2019, the Tajik MoFA 
was in negotiation with the Uzbek MoFA regarding survey of 
the Tajik-Uzbek border.110
The annual land release milestones in Tajikistan’s Article 
5 extension request are 1,388,819m2 (2020), 1,218,722m2 
(2021), 1,284,655m2 (2022), 1,277,666m2 (2023), 1,138,919m2 
(2024) and 1,170,000m2 (2025). However, Tajikistan needs 
an additional US$12.4 million in total, to enable it to double 
capacity in order to reach these targets and complete by the 
end of 2025.111
TNMAC plans to hold strategy workshops in 2019, convening 
relevant mine action stakeholders together to develop a 
workplan for implementation of the 2020–25 extension 
request period, including resource mobilisation.112
In total during the last fi ve years, Tajikistan has cleared 
just over 2.6km2 of mined area (see Table 3). Progress 
was hampered in 2015 and 2016 due to restricted access 
for clearance in the Afghanistan border region because 
of heightened security.113 In a very positive development, 
clearance was permitted in parts of the Tajik-Afghan 
border in 2017 and continued in 2018, including Shamsiddin 
Shohin district, which is one of the most mined districts 
in Tajikistan.114
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance 
(2014–18)115







Tajikistan had expected to release 30 minefi elds) in 2018 
(26 in Khatlon district, 3 in GBAO, and 1 in the Central Region, 
totalling over 1.9km2;116 an estimate which it subsequently 
reduced to 1.5km2 across 20 minefi elds,117 but Tajikistan’s 
actual clearance output in 2018 was less than half this 
estimated output.
Tajikistan’s baseline of remaining anti-personnel mine 
contamination is not yet an accurate assessment, which 
makes elaboration of accurate clearance projections and 
timelines for Article 5 completion diffi cult. TNMAC estimates 
that it will complete survey of the 41 unsurveyed minefi eld 
records by 2023.118 Many of these unsurveyed minefi elds 
are extremely hard to access, with UST’s survey teams 
sometimes having to walk for more than three hours each 
way in mountainous terrain, to access the survey area, 
leaving only a few hours each day for survey activities.119 
Some mountainous areas only permit 40 operational days 
per year.120 
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In addition to challenges posed by the remoteness and 
challenging terrain of the mined areas and the short demining 
window in some regions, the volatility of the security 
situation on the Afghan Border is also a potential challenge.121
Tajikistan’s 2019 extension request tacitly assumes that all 
districts along the Tajik-Afghan border will be accessible, 
from the perspective of security, for clearance. To date, this 
has not been the case for many of the heavily mined western 
districts of the Tajik-Afghan border. Access to these mined 
areas is a prerequisite for Tajikistan’s Article 5 completion.
In May 2019, during the APMBC intersessional meetings, 
Tajikistan convened an “Individualised Approach Platform” 
meeting, with support from the Implementation Support 
Unity (ISU). The meetings allowed TNMAC to outline its 
current work and to present the challenges and opportunities 
faced in meeting its Article 5 obligations.122
Tajikistan has reported that it requires continued 
international assistance to increase demining capacity and 
fulfi l its Article 5 obligations, including the need to modernise 
the capacity of its mine clearance teams.123 Tajikistan requires 
a total of US$36 million to fulfi l its Article 5 obligations up to 
2025.124 Without this funding, Tajikistan will not meet the 2025 
Maputo aspiration for completion of mine clearance.
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KEY DATA
LAND RELEASE OUTPUT











Thailand’s mine action programme continues to improve. 
Although land release output only rose by almost 0.8km2 
from 2017 to 2018, Thailand expected to reach its target of 
120km2 for 2019. While this target is ambitious, improvements 
to land release methodology, along with increased survey 
capacity and the mine action budget, means that, as at July 
2019, Thailand was on track to meet this fi gure for the year.
The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) is working to 
resolve challenges in staff and skill retention and to sustain 
the necessary national funding needed for extra capacity 
and equipment. Access to mined areas subject to successful 
border demarcation remains an issue and Thailand will not be 
able to meet its clearance deadlines without resolving this. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Thailand should report anti-personnel mine contamination classifi ed into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) 
and confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs).
 ■ Thailand should agree a task with Cambodia to complete its pilot border clearance project by the end of 2019.
 ■ Thailand should elaborate a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action. 
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(20% of overall score)
7 Thailand is currently conducting non-technical survey on all suspected hazardous areas 
(SHAs), which is due to be concluded by October 2020 and expects actual anti-personnel 





(10% of overall score)
7 Rotation of personnel and limited funding have been challenges for TMAC. In 2018, staff 
stayed in post providing continuity while plans are put in place to resolve staffi ng issues. 
The budget for 2018 was much lower than foreseen in the 2017 extension request, but 
there was a marked increase in the budget for 2019.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
4 While TMAC has had a female chief of unit in the past, much more could be done 
to achieve gender parity within the organisation. Women are mainly employed in 
administrative roles within TMAC and due to military regulations cannot work in the 




(10% of overall score)
7 TMAC made improvements to its information management in 2018 with the introduction 
of the Arc GIS Online, which will allow demining units to submit information online and 
TMAC to verify progress and make corrections.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 Thailand met its land release targets for 2018 as set out in the plan for 2017–23 in its 
2017 extension request. As at April 2019, this plan had been replaced by the “Five-Year 
Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October 2023”. Thailand was on 
track as of writing to meet its targets for 2019.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 TMAC revised two national standards in 2018 – on worksite planning and cancellation 
of SHAs – in support of its move towards a comprehensive toolbox of land release 
methodologies. Thailand is increasing non-technical survey capacity to focus on 





(20% of overall score)
7 Land release output was on a par with 2017 with a dramatic rise in output expected in 
2019. Thailand’s land release targets are ambitious and will require sustained funding, 
extra capacity and border demarcation where there are mined areas.
Average Score 7.0 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC)
 ■ Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAU) 1-4 and HTMAC
 ■ Thai Civilian Deminer Association (TDA)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ None









UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at December 2018, Thailand estimated that it had 360km2 
of outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination in 254 
SHAs across ten provinces, a reduction of 31km2 from 2017 
(see Table 1). In 2018, 0.94km2 of additional anti-personnel 
mined area was discovered in Sa Kaeo, Trat, Surin and Yala.1
Since 2016, TMAC and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
have been working on a pilot project re-surveying the 
overestimated SHAs. Taking into account the results of the 
pilot project, TMAC has forecasted that up to 80% of existing 
SHAs can be cancelled or reduced through survey so will be 
focusing their efforts in 2019–20 on cancelling land through 
non-technical survey before moving on to technical survey 
and full clearance in 2021–23.2 NPA estimates that actual 
contamination is at 10–15% of the total.3 In its “Five-Year 
Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October 
2023” (hereafter, Five-Year Plan), Thailand projected that 
of the outstanding 360km2 of contamination, 269km2 will be 
cancelled through non-technical survey and nearly 91km2 of 
CHA will remain for technical survey and clearance.4
Thailand is affected by mines as well as by explosive 
remnants of war (ERW), the result of confl icts on its borders 
with Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao 
PDR), Malaysia, and Myanmar. The majority of outstanding 
contamination is located in seven eastern and north-eastern 
provinces bordering Cambodia, with the rest in Chiang Mai 
and Chumphon, bordering Myanmar, and in Pitsanuloke, on 
the border with Lao PDR.5
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province 
(at end 2018)6
Region Province SHAs Area (m2)
North Chiang Mai 4 25,615,188
Phitsanulok 1 28,530,520
North-east Ubon Ratchathani 58 101,227,784
Si Sa Ket 43 73,383,526
Surin 26 27,299,749
Buri-Ram 15 19,483,928
East Sa Kaeo 20 7,696,798
Chanthaburi 21 3,936,224
Trat 65 69,654,131
South Chumphon 1 3,173,520
Totals 254 360,001,368
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Thailand created the National Committee for Humanitarian 
Mine Action (NMAC) in 2000, chaired by the prime minister 
and with responsibility for overseeing the national mine 
action programme. Since 2008, NMAC did not convene until 
it was reconstituted in May 2017, still with the prime minister 
as chairman. The engagement of national leadership in 
the Committee was seen as important in facilitating policy 
direction and progress on issues affecting national security, 
notably regarding cooperation with neighbouring countries 
on clearing border areas.7
NMAC is currently tasked with creating policy guidance and 
mobilising resources from all sectors to support mine action 
to be able to complete clearance in the allotted timeframe.8 In 
reality, however, NMAC has no operational or strategic power 
and is purely procedural.9
TMAC was established in 1999 under the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces Headquarters to coordinate, monitor, and conduct 
mine/ERW survey and clearance, risk education, and victim 
assistance throughout Thailand.10 While the roles and 
responsibilities within the sector are clear and coherent 
TMAC has had to contend with limited funding and, as a 
military organisation, with regular rotation of personnel at 
all levels.11 Lieutenant-General Sittipol Nimnuan took over 
as TMAC’s director in October 2017, the eleventh director 
since TMAC was created in 2000 and the seventh in the last 
eight years. In order to maintain continuity, TMAC has made 
a request with the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters 
that personnel working within TMAC remain in post for at 
least two years rather than be rotated out on an annual 
basis. TMAC also requested that personnel working in the 
Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAUs) either have the 
required training and qualifi cations before they assume the 
role or that personnel remain in post for no less than two 
years. TMAC aims to have a 60:40 ratio of old personnel to 
new for the purposes of continuity and to retain knowledge.12
While the roles and responsibilities within TMAC are clear 
and coherent there have been some challenges with the 
command structure of the HMAUs. With the exception 
of one of the HMAUs, HTMAC, personnel come from the 
Division-Level Force of the Royal Thai Army and the Royal 
Thai Navy which means that they report to both TMAC and 
their respective divisions.13 TMAC has worked to educate the 
HMAUs, high ranking generals, and the Supreme Commander 
on the importance of mine action.14
Thailand and TMAC are said to be very accommodating to 
operators. They have given their full support to ensure that 
NPA has the required approvals and offi cial documents 
necessary to operate. However, strong and strict regulations 
on who can handle explosives in Thailand together with 
restrictive rules and defi nitions on most demining equipment 
being regarded as military equipment hampers the possibility 
for civilian entities to become clearance operators.15
In 2018, TMAC received a budget of about THB70 million a 
year (approx. US$2.1 million), much lower than the THB177 
million (approx. US$5.8 million) budgeted in Thailand’s 
2017 Article 5 deadline extension request.16 In 2019, TMAC’s 
budget was greatly increased to THB248 million (approx. $7.5 
million) and TMAC stated in its Five-Year Plan that for the 
“foreseeable future” budget will not be a problem.17 TMAC will 
also be seeking additional funds to procure new equipment 
and repair of existing equipment, amounting to THB23 million 
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(approx. $746,000) through to 2022.18 In September 2019, 
TMAC was due to fi nalise the budget for October 2019 to 
October 2021 and was planning to request funds for more 
personnel and equipment. This budget will be determined 
by need and will be adjusted dependent on results of the 
re-survey.19
Thailand indicated in both its 2017 extension request and 
its Five-Year Plan that it would welcome international 
assistance for capacity building and support for survey, 
equipment, technical capacity, and the development of 
new technologies.20
GENDER
TMAC has stated that it will attempt to diversify where 
applicable as the male and female ratio is dependent on who 
volunteers for assignment to TMAC. In 2018, 27.5% of staff 
at TMAC were women, though they were mainly occupying 
administrative positions. In the past, women have been in 
leadership positions, with one woman acting as Chief of 
Special Affairs in 2012–13, and three women assuming head 
of section positions for mine risk education, victim assistance, 
and training at various points.21 There are no women working 
within the HMAUs as the Thai military does not allow women 
to perform combat duties and the roles are restricted to 
combat personnel.22
During non-technical survey, the Thai Civilian Deminer 
Association (TDA) speaks to both men and women and 
employs both male and female local informants as part 
of its teams. There is equal access to employment for 
qualifi ed women and men in TDA survey and clearance 
teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions. 
Currently, women make up 15% of operational roles, which 
was due to increase to 30% in 2019. Approximately 55% of 
managerial level/supervisory positions are held by women.23
NPA has an organisational gender and diversity policy and 
all NPA survey teams are gender balanced. NPA encourages 
TMAC and the HMAUs to become gender balanced. When 
NPA conducts non-technical survey or community liaison 
activities, all local people are invited to participate, including 
women and children. Of 11 operational staff, 4 are women 
(36%), while three of fi ve managers (60%) are women, as are 
two of four supervisors (50%).24
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TMAC established a data centre to process land release, risk 
education, and quality management data. It manages the 
central database using Excel and Geographic Information 
System (GIS) mapping. This information supports TMAC 
senior management in decision-making and operational 
planning.25 The ArcGIS Online is being used as part of a 
support package provided by the Department of Survey of 
the Royal Thai Armed Forces. The ArcGIS assists TMAC and 
the HMAUs in data collection and dissemination, and mapping 
of SHAs and CHAs.26 HMAUs will start to submit information 
to TMAC via an online system which allows for the verifi cation 
of progress in the fi eld and rectifi cation of any issues. In 2018, 
TMAC organised training on the newly established system for 
20 HMAU staff.27
According to NPA and TDA, data in Thailand is accurate, up 
to date, and reliable, with data in the national information 
management system accessible to clearance organisations 
and data collection forms that are consistent and enable the 
collection of the necessary data.28
Thailand submits timely and accurate Article 7 reports. 
Thailand was requested by the Sixteenth Meeting of State 
Parties to provide an updated workplan to the Committee 
on Article 5 Implementation by 30 April 2019.29 The Five-Year 
Plan provides details on remaining challenges, outstanding 
mine contamination, and prioritisation and land release 
outputs for each area.30 In previous years, Thailand had 
issues disaggregating data but its latest Article 7 report 
disaggregates survey and clearance data by province and 
by non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
According to Thailand’s Five-Year Plan in the fi rst two years, from November 2018–October 2020, non-technical survey was 
prioritised in all outstanding SHAs with the expected cancellation of more than 269km2. The second phase, from November 
2020 to October 2023, will focus on technical survey and clearance of CHAs. It is expected that over 90km2 of land will be 
cleared during this phase. Thailand is also operating under the assumption that the border demarcation issues will be 
resolved through bilateral cooperation, allowing the HMAUs to access these areas.31
Table 2: Planned land release from Five-Year Plan 2019−202332
Region Province 2019 (m2) 2020 (m2) 2021 (m2) 2022 (m2) 2023 (m2)
North Pitsanulok 9,510,170 9,510,170 9,510,180 LF LF
Chiang Mai 1,103,526 0 0 9,308,072 15,203,590
North-east Buri Ram 15,587,142 0 3,896,786 LF LF
Surin 0 21,839,800 5,459,949 LF LF
Si Sa Ket 39,495,981 19,210,841 0 14,676,704 LF
Ubon 
Ratchathani
21,364,937 59,617,291 0 0 20,245,556
East Chanthaburi 3,562,113 374,111 LF LF LF
Sa Kaeo 1,724,472 1,695,254 1,669,773 1,490,174 1,117,125
Trat 26,912,587 34,354,161 3,107,481 3,005,862 2,274,040
South Chumphon 1,586,760 1,586,760 LF LF LF
Totals 120,847,688 148,188,388 23,644,169 28,480,812 38,840,311
LF = Landmine Free
In Thailand’s Second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in August 2017, the completion of clearance was split 
into two phases, see Table 3. The fi rst phase was from January 2017 to November 2018, with planned release of 63.8km2 of 
suspected contamination, leaving 358.8km2 to be tackled in the requested fi ve-year extension period.33 Thailand released 
30.98km2 in 2017 (target 34.74km2) and 31.75km2 (target 29.05km2) in 2018, totalling 62.73km2 over the two-year period, 
which was just over 1km2 short of the target.34
Table 3: Extension request 2017−23: land release targets (km2)35
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
34.74 29.05 72.12 72.06 73.23 74.54 66.86
In 2019, according to the Five-Year Plan, TMAC planned 
to release nearly 121km2 across 93 SHAs by focusing on 
non-technical survey.36 From 1 November 2018 to 30 April 
2019, Thailand released nearly 72km2, of which just over 
70.3km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey, 1.5km2
was reduced through technical survey, and 39,080m2 was 
cleared.37 TMAC claimed to be on track to meet its 2019 land 
release targets as of writing, citing improved understanding 
of the land release methodology from the HMAUs, who have 
adopted a more dynamic planning process, and increased 
capacity from NPA and TDA.38
Thailand is prioritising the north-eastern region, the most 
heavily contaminated area of the country where 61% of SHAs 
are located, but is also taking into account resource limitation 
and access issues in certain areas. Thailand is prioritising 
clearance according to the following fi ve criteria (in order of 
importance): development potential; the access needs of the 
local community; proximity to the local population; terrain and 
environmental challenges; and border and security concerns.39
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
TMAC drafted its fi rst national mine action standards (NMAS) 
with NPA’s support in 2010, formally adopting them in June 
2012, the year Thailand adopted the land release process.40 
Since then, the NMAS have undergone revisions in 2015 and 
2018 in support of Thailand’s shift towards using the full 
toolbox of land release methodologies rather than solely 
relying on technical survey and full clearance.41 In 2018, 
TMAC revised the NMAS on worksite planning and released 
a new NMAS on the “Cancellation of SHAs by Evidence Based 
Survey”, which has made it easier to cancel previously 
infl ated, largely uncontaminated SHAs.42 TMAC personnel 
have also been undergoing training on non-technical survey 
to improve speed and effi ciency. The initial results have 
been promising with the release of three provinces in 2018: 
Uttaradit bordering Lao PDR, Tak bordering Myanmar, and 
Yala bordering Malaysia.43
TMAC plans to revise its NMAS annually to keep them 
up-to-date and compliant with international mine action 
standards (IMAS) and in support of the Five-Year Plan. As at 
April 2019, TMAC’s NMAS were undergoing major revisions 
to ensure their functionality.44 TMAC says it considers input 
from operators and IMAS guidelines when revising the 
NMAS, ensuring there is a proper consultation process with 
input gathered at the beginning of every fi scal year (usually 
late October to early November).45 The standing operating 
procedures (SoPs) will then be adjusted accordingly to 
the NMAS.46
OPERATORS 
All clearance in Thailand is conducted by the military due 
to regulations on who can handle explosives and operate 
demining equipment. There are fi ve HMAUs, supervised 
by TMAC with personnel from the Royal Thai Army and 
Royal Thai Navy, which carry out survey and clearance 
operations. In addition, there is one national operator, TDA, 
and an international operator, NPA, which carry out survey 
in support of the HMAUs.47 There may be changes to the 
regulations in the coming years due to the complications and 
related security concerns for military personnel entering 
the border areas. Once the TMAC/Cambodian Mine Action 
Centre (CMAC) border pilot project is completed, there is a 
possibility that civilian deminers will take part in clearance 
operations.48 As at August 2019, TMAC is looking into easing 
the regulations so that operators can conduct EOD.49
In 2018, TMAC deployed 24 non-technical survey personnel 
across 2 units, 104 technical survey personnel across 4 units, 
22 clearance/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel 
across 5 units, and 11 mine detection dogs (MDDs) and 22 
handlers across 5 units.50 In 2018, there was an increase in 
the number of non-technical survey personnel compared 
to 2017 as TMAC is building capacity in preparation for an 
increase in non-technical survey operations in 2019 and 
2020. A sharp increase in non-technical survey personnel 
is expected in 2019. TMAC plans to make a request for more 
armed forces personnel, who have already received the 
relevant training, in order to complete the re-survey by 
October 2020.51 The numbers of technical survey personnel 
were similar from 2017 to 2018, with a slight decrease is 
expected in 2019. The number of clearance/EOD personnel 
will remain the same from 2017 to 2019.52
In 2018, TDA deployed 19 fi eld staff supporting HMAU 3 by 
conducting non-technical and technical survey. There was no 
change in capacity from 2017 but in 2019, due to an increase 
in Japanese funding, the number of fi eld staff will increase 
and TDA will focus on expanding its “SIMA”, its survey to 
identify mined areas comprised of non-technical survey, 
technical survey, and clearance of EOD spot tasks, which is 
focusing on technical survey capacity.53
NPA has supported TMAC operations since 2011, conducting 
land release through non-technical and technical survey. 
In 2018, NPA deployed 11 non-technical survey personnel 
supporting HMAU 2 and 3. This was no change in capacity 
from 2017, but in 2019 NPA was deploying one more 
non-technical survey team, increasing from three teams 
to four. One of these teams will support MDD operations 
in 2019 before being deployed for technical survey.54
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
All the HMAUs use MDDs during technical survey and 
verifi cation. One of the HMAU units also uses a Medium 
MineWolf and Mini MineWolf for clearance when conditions 
permit. These machines have been lent to TMAC by the 
Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program 
of the United States Department of Defence.55 In 2018, NPA 
began to pilot the use of MDDs during technical survey with 
initial results reported to be promising.56 TDA is planning to 
do research on bee mine detection.57
DEMINER SAFETY
In 2018, in two separate incidents Cambodian soldiers 
requested TMAC deminers and TDA personnel to cease 
operations due to ongoing border demarcation, underscoring 
the potential for delays in the progress of border clearance.58
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Thailand released a total of almost 31.8km2 in 2018, of which 0.5km2 was cleared, nearly 2.3km2 was reduced through 
technical survey and almost 29km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.
In addition, 94,296m2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination was found and added to the database 
in 2018.59
SURVEY IN 2018
A total of more than 31.2km2 was released through survey in 
2018 a slight increase from the 30.5km2 released in 2017.
In 2018, almost 29km2 was cancelled through non-technical 
survey, an 8% increase from the 26.8km2 cancelled in 2017 
(see Table 4). TMAC’s focus on non-technical survey began in 
November 2018, so a much greater increase in non-technical 
survey output was expected for 2019.60 The increase in 
non-technical survey output for NPA in 2018 is attributed 
to NPA teams gaining experience and an improved working 
relationship between NPA and HMAUs 2 and 3 in the areas of 
NPA operations.61 TDA reported that its non-technical survey 
outputs were signifi cantly greater in 2018 than 2017.62
In 2018, nearly 2.27km2 was reduced through technical 
survey, a 39% decrease from the 3.75km2 reduced in 2017. 
TMAC attributed this to the shift in focus away from technical 
survey and towards non-technical survey.63 Minimal technical 
survey output was expected for 2019. 
Table 4: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical 
survey in 201864
Province Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Tak HMAU 4 366,772
Uttaradit HMAU 4 3,345,061
Si Sa Ket NPA+HMAU 3 10,416,942
Ubon Ratchathani HMAU 3 1,646,971
Surin TDA+HMAU 3 773,681
Sa Kaeo HMAU 1 1,328,000




Table 5: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201865
Province Operator Area reduced (m2)
Si Sa Ket HMAU 3 274,426
Ubon Ratchathani HMAU 3 910,810
Surin TDA+HMAU 3 839,266
Sa Kaeo HMAU 1 181,618
Trat HMAU 2 59,190
Total 2,265,310
CLEARANCE IN 2018
A total of 0.5km2 was cleared by four HMAU units in 2018.66 This is a small increase from the 0.4km2 cleared in 2017.
Table 6: Mine clearance in 201867







Si Sa Ket HMAU 3 4 54,986 567 0 51
Ubon Ratchathani HMAU 3 5 169,740 2,791 681 92
Surin HMAU 3 2 283,487 3,717 228 66
Sa Kaeo HMAU 1 4 3,552 137 0 0
Trat HMAU 2 2 17,137 180 0 29
Totals 17 528,902 7,392 909 238
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THAILAND: 1 MAY 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (9-YEAR, 6-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 NOVEMBER 2018
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 OCTOBER 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): MEDIUM
Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Thailand has made signifi cant improvements to its mine 
action programme since the 2014 Maputo Review Conference 
moving away from an over reliance on clearance to the use 
of the full range of land release methodologies demonstrated 
in its Five-Year Plan. Thailand plans to cancel more than 
269km2 through non-technical survey from November 2018 
to October 2020 before moving on to technical survey and 
clearance of the remaining 90km2 over the following three 
years. While this is a positive step these land release targets 
are ambitious. In 2014–18, cancellation through non-technical 
survey totalled 129km2, while reduction through technical 
survey released a further 18.3km2. During the same period, 
clearance released only 3.6km2. Land release therefore 
averaged just 31.5km2 per year. NPA and TDA both believe 
that fi ve years to complete clearance is too ambitious as 
Thailand will not only need more resources but will have 
to resolve the border demarcation issues which currently 
prevent access to certain mined areas.70
Thailand was on track as of writing to meet its land release 
targets for 2019 but has set itself an even bigger target for 
2020 and will need to further enhance the capacity of the 
HMAUs and operators. To achieve this TMAC, has identifi ed 
areas for improvement, such as by increasing the number of 
survey teams and improving skills through training; obtaining 
the necessary demining equipment including exploring 
new technologies for survey and clearance; and increasing 
cooperation with neighbouring countries.71 For 2021 to 2023, 
TMAC has planned to release on average 30km2 of mined 
area per year through technical survey and clearance, which 
will be a huge increase from its current output. In 2018, TMAC 
released just 2.8km2 through technical survey and clearance.
The high proportion of remaining contamination located in 
border areas that are the subject of decades-old demarcation 
disputes or which are diffi cult to access due to insecurity 
is a major challenge for Thailand.72 Areas to be demarcated 
(ADs) have been divided into two categories: areas that can 
be accessed immediately and more complicated areas where 
access will need to be negotiated. In border areas with Lao 
PDR, 96% of the land boundary has been demarcated and 
there are no security concerns, while the border areas with 
Cambodia are still subject to the demarcation process.73
Improved relations between Thailand and Cambodia have 
opened the way for increased contacts with Cambodia 
on border cooperation. The Thailand–Cambodia General 
Border Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defence from both countries, has agreed that 
TMAC and CMAC can cooperate to conduct demining along 
the Thai-Cambodian border.74 In September 2018, TMAC and 
CMAC met and agreed to fi nd a task for a pilot project, a small 
area that could be cleared within a month as a symbolic 
demonstration of two sides working together. As at April 
2019, the task had yet to be decided but TMAC hoped to 
complete the pilot project by the end of the year.75
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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 DECEMBER 2025
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE














































Turkey’s mine action programme continued to make progress in 2018, releasing signifi cantly more mined area than in previous 
years. This included demining on its Eastern border with Iran as part of the European Union (EU) Eastern Border Mine Clearance 
Project, managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); survey and clearance by Turkish armed forces 
demining personnel on the Syrian border, in support of the project to build a Border Security Surveillance System; and clearance 
of a former military base in the non-border region.
The Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) continued to strengthen its structure and capacity during the year, through recruitment 
and training of personnel, and enhanced coordination with other state institutions. It received support for capacity building from 
UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). An Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) database, created during 2017, became operational at the start of the 2018 demining season.
Turkey continued to expand its national military demining capacity in 2018 with approval being granted for fi ve armed forces 
demining companies. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ TURMAC should approve and publish its national strategic mine action plan for 2019–21 as soon as possible.
 ■ Turkey should move forward, without delay, to expand survey and clearance of its non-border areas; 
continue and expand systematic survey and clearance on the Syria border; and start survey and clearance 
of its south-eastern/Iraqi border. 
 ■ TURMAC should provide additional details of ongoing survey of eastern border areas, as well as confi rming 
how and when it will address the huge contamination in this region that is not specifi ed in the workplan it 
included in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2015.
 ■ Turkey should comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) by including all victim-activated 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the defi nition of an anti-personnel mine in its clearance under 
Article 5 of the APMBC and its reporting under Article 7.
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STATES PARTIES
■ Turkey should minimise the turnover of personnel at senior management level within TURMAC.
■ Turkey should report on any survey or clearance of mined areas under its control in Northern Cyprus, or 
planned land release, in order to meet all of its APMBC Article 5 obligations.
■ Turkey should heed the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s renewed call for access to all remaining mined 
areas inside and outside the buffer zone on Cyprus. 






(20% of overall score)
6 Turkey has a good understanding of the extent of CHA contamination, and the number of 





(10% of overall score)
6 TURMAC, which is entirely nationally funded, is now fully operational, with ongoing 
capacity development support from UNDP and the GICHD. However, TURMAC reports 
solely to the Ministry of Defence and suffers from a high level of turnaround in senior 
level positions, including the directorship. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
4 TURMAC is making efforts to take gender considerations into account in its mine action 
programme, including having mixed community and survey teams. However, while 
women make up 40% of TURMAC non-operations staff, regulations of the armed forces 
prevent women from serving in military demining units. Civilian operators are, however, 




(10% of overall score)
7 IMSMA, which become operational in Turkey from the start of the 2018 demining season, 
is being used by both military demining teams and for Phase 2 of the Eastern Border Mine 




(10% of overall score)
5 TURMAC has yet to adopt and make public the draft national strategic mine action plan 
for 2019–21. The workplan published by Turkey in 2015 only includes plans for a relatively 
small proportion of Turkey’s overall mined area.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 With support from UNDP and the GICHD, Turkey elaborated national mine action 





(20% of overall score)
7 Turkey increased its clearance output in 2018, and also cancelled a signifi cant amount of 
mined area on the Syrian border. Furthermore, Turkey approved expansion of its armed 
forces demining units in 2018, to become fully operational in 2019.
Average Score 6.2 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ Ministry of Defence
■ Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Altay (national sub-contractor under MECHEM)
■ Turkish Armed Forces
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Denel MECHEM 
■ RPS-Explosive Engineering Services 
(QA and QC of the EU project)
OTHER ACTORS
■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Turkey is contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, as well as command-detonated IEDs. There is more than 
157km2 of confi rmed mined area across 3,020 confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs), as summarised in Table 1. A further 701 
areas are suspected to be mined, but the area they cover and the number of mines that may lie within them remain to be 
qualifi ed,1 therefore the total contaminated area is likely to be larger, but according to Turkey not signifi cantly so.2
This is a reduction in the size of baseline contamination compared to the end of 2017, when more than 164km2 of mine 
contamination was reported across 3,061 CHAs,3 the result of land release in 2018. The suspected mined area at the end 
of 2018 was unchanged from a year earlier.
According to TURMAC, the suspected mined areas are “relatively small”, their location and perimeters are mostly known, 
and some of them are believed to be mapping duplications or mistakes. TURMAC is planning to conduct non-technical survey 
of all mined areas in 2020, with a budget of €2.1 million.4
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018)




in CHAs SHAs Area (m2)
Syrian border 1,294 133,970,046 412,027 194,635 84 N/K
Iraqi border 596 2,862,835 79,017 0 373 N/K
Iranian border* 423 16,566,718 150,714 0 38 N/K
Armenian border 42 1,097,077 20,275 0 0 0
Non-border areas 665 2,830,422 34,410 0 206 N/K
Totals 3,020 157,327,098 696,443 194,635 701 N/K
SHA = Suspected hazardous area   AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle   N/K = Not known 
* A section of mined area also intersects with the Azerbaijan border. 
The great majority of anti-personnel mines in Turkey are 
found along its borders. The mines were laid in 1955–59 all 
along the border with Syria, as well as on some sections 
of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–95,5 and 
also with Azerbaijan.6 According to Turkey, its western 
borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with 
Georgia, are mine-free.7 Mines were also laid around military 
installations within the country.8 
Government forces emplaced landmines around military 
bases during the 1984–99 confl ict with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the 
south-east of the country. According to Turkey, these mines 
were marked, fenced, and have been progressively cleared 
since 1998.9 In addition to mines laid by Turkish security 
forces, non-state armed groups have also emplaced mines 
and IEDs, rendering clearance more challenging.10 
The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well 
as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according 
to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by terrorist 
activities and the presence of unconfi rmed mined areas. 
In addition, fewer mines are expected along the Syrian border 
than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as 
a result of wildfi res.11 
NORTHERN CYPRUS
Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 
2014. In 2013, states parties granted Turkey an eight-year 
extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in 
Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for 
clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus12 
(see the report on Cyprus in this work for further 
information). This puts into question its compliance with 
Article 5 of the APMBC.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action 
Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws” was adopted 
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in January 2015, 
entering into force on 3 February 2015. The law defi nes the 
modalities and identifi es the functions, jurisdictions, and 
responsibilities of the NMAC, which has responsibility for 
the clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
to humanitarian standards in Turkey.13 The law entitles the 
Turkish mine action centre (now known as TURMAC), which 
was established under the Ministry of National Defence, to 
elaborate policies for clearance; to plan and steer related 
activities and monitor their implementation; and to carry out 
the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic 
and foreign institutions.14 
TURMAC was established on 3 February 2015,15 with a 
director appointed in August of that year.16 The director 
of TURMAC reports directly to the Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of National Defence.17 
TURMAC is now fully operational but there has been a high 
level of turnaround in senior level positions, including the 
directorship, which negatively affects the management of the 
national mine action programme. Colonel Mehmet Zeki Eren 
was appointed as the Director of TURMAC in June 2018, but left 
his post in November after being appointed to a North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. Colonel Mesut Ekren, 
Chief of TURMAC’s Quality Management Department, served 
as acting Director,18 and in July 2019 a new Director, Colonel 
Yıldırım Özerkan, was appointed by presidential decree.19








TURMAC’s capacity-development efforts are being 
implemented in partnership with UNDP and the GICHD, as 
well as national partners.20 A needs assessment by UNDP and 
the GICHD in October 2016 highlighted several capacity gaps 
in TURMAC.21 Responding to the fi ndings of the assessment, 
Turkey subsequently claimed signifi cant progress in 
improving the structure of TURMAC, taking steps to better 
coordinate with other state institutions, and conducting 
recruitment of qualifi ed personnel and intensive training to 
strengthen capacity.22 TURMAC organised various trainings 
in 2018 to improve the capacity of its own personnel and that 
of the Military Demining Unit.23
TURMAC is entirely funded by national funding,24 as are the 
Turkish Armed Forces demining units.25 Turkey reported 
investing around 50 million Turkish Lira (approx. US$8.6 
million) to procure new equipment to establish additional 
demining companies, and pledged that support for personnel, 
training, deployment, maintenance of equipment and other 
costs will be increased.26
In addition, Turkey reported providing some €10 million 
(approx. US$11.4 million) to the Eastern Borders Mine 
Clearance Project, which is implemented by UNDP and funded 
by the EU and the UN.27
GENDER
According to TURMAC, the importance of gender diversity 
is included in Turkey’s (draft) national mine action strategy 
while its national standards closely follow the international 
mine action standards (IMAS) on gender. Survey and 
community liaison teams include female personnel to 
facilitate access and participation by all groups, including 
women and children. Gender is not, however, taken into 
consideration in strategic planning and prioritisation.28
Women are reported to have equal access to survey and 
QA/QC positions and make up 40% of TURMAC personnel 
in non-operations positions, including holding the position 
of department chiefs within TURMAC. However, due to the 
regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces, no women are in 
the military demining units. However, civilian contractors 
are encouraged and advised to deploy female personnel.29
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since TURMAC’s establishment in 2015, UNDP and the GICHD 
have supported it to establish a functioning information 
management (IM) system, IMSMA.30 IMSMA was established 
in 201731 and has been fully operational since the beginning of 
the demining season in 2018. Personnel from both TURMAC 
and the military have been trained on IMSMA, and it has been 
used by the military demining teams and in Phase 2 of the 
Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project since the beginning 
of 2018.32
Prior to the creation of the IMSMA database, UNDP 
maintained a project database to record all operational
 data related to Phase 1 of the Eastern Border Mine 
Clearance Project.33
Turkey has been submitting comprehensive, accurate, and 
timely annual Article 7 transparency reports. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Turkey has still to publish a national mine action strategy, 
despite national authorities assertions for several years that 
a multi-year strategic mine action plan had been drafted and 
was expected to be adopted shortly.34 Signifi cant changes 
in governmental regulations, legislation, processes, and 
structures in Turkey have delayed approval of the draft 
national strategic mine action plan for 2019–21, which as at 
July 2019 was waiting approval by the MoD.35 The three-year 
plan reportedly covers national capacity development, survey 
and clearance of mined areas, the provision of mine risk 
education, and assistance to mine victims.36
There is a workplan in place for 2019. MECHEM are planned 
to clear around 0.5km2, under the Eastern Border Mine 
Clearance Project.37 The military demining teams task plan 
was as follows:
■ Doğubeyazıt (Eastern Border) 4 teams (gendarmerie)
■ Ardahan Göle (non border) 2 teams
■ Syrian Border in Hatay (8 teams) Kilis (4 teams) 
■ Hakkari (4 teams
■ Diyarbakır (2 teams) 
■ Şırnak (2 teams).38
To date, prioritisation of clearance appears to have been 
infl uenced more by where permission is granted for 
operations and for which funding can be secured than by 
humanitarian impact. For example, areas currently being 
cleared as part of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance 
Project will remain as restricted areas (due to their location) 
even after completion of mine clearance. TURMAC has 
claimed that survey and clearance for the EU Eastern Border 
Project, are conducted geographically from north to south 
in order to improve cost, time, and labour effi ciency; but that 
clearance of other areas was prioritised according to impact.39
According to the draft national mine action plan, demining is 
prioritised according to:40
■ National political priorities
■ Border management system
■ Socio-economic projects
■ Requests from citizens
■ Non-border areas and military heavy weapons ranges.
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SYRIAN BORDER
Mined areas of the Syrian border are estimated to account 
for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining 
mined area in the country. Offi cials observed it is also the 
easiest border to clear because the terrain is fl at and there 
has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors 
such as land erosion.41 Minefi elds in this region are clearly 
mapped, marked, fenced, and reported to be well known to 
the local population.42 
According to its 2013 Article 5 extension request, Turkey had 
expected to complete clearance of mines along the Syria 
border by the end of 2019,43 but clearance efforts were delayed 
due to the armed confl ict in Syria.44 However, construction 
of the Border Security Surveillance System along Turkey’s 
border with Syria, which was completed in June 2018, is 
supposed to allow the demining of the Syrian border to begin.45 
During the construction of the Border Security Surveillance 
System, which consists of a 837km-long modular concrete 
wall and impoundment (supported by a fence), as well as 
roads, and surveillance system, military demining teams were 
deployed to clear mines to enable operations to proceed in 
safety.46 Demining efforts in support of the construction of 
the surveillance system also included survey and clearance 
of areas suspected or confi rmed to contain mines of an 
improvised nature and other explosive devices deployed by 
non-state armed groups.47 Planned clearance on the Syrian 
border (i.e. not part of clearance to support construction of the 
Border Surveillance System), began in early 2018, focusing on 
the provinces of Hatay and Kilis.48
EASTERN BORDERS
Turkey’s 2013 Article 5 extension request set out plans 
for clearance of its eastern borders, beginning with the 
Armenian border and continuing southwards to the borders 
with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq.49 It was forecast that 13.5km2 
would be cleared in Phase 1 of the project and 2.4km2 in 
Phase 2, as part of an EU project envisaged to start by the 
end of 2014.50
The two-phase EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance project 
is being carried out under the supervision of the Turkish 
authorities in a joint project with UNDP.51 Under the project, 
UNDP is managing the demining and assuring quality while 
also supporting capacity development of TURMAC.52 The 
demining tender for the project was awarded to Denel 
MECHEM (MECHEM), as part of a consortium in which national 
operators would be subcontracted by MECHEM.53 Clearance 
operations for Phase 1 of the project began in June 2016, and 
were completed by the end of 2017.54 A total of almost 3.3km2 
of mined area was released (0.64km2 cleared, under 0.1km2 
reduced, and almost 2.6km2 cancelled) with 25,667 mines 
were destroyed in 2016 and 2017.55 This was signifi cantly less 
than the 13.5km2 that Turkey forecast would be cleared under 
Phase 1 in its 2013 Article 5 extension request.
Phase 2 of the project commenced behind schedule in June 
2018, due to serious organisational issues in MECHEM in South 
Africa, which resulted in a change of senior management. 
MECHEM Turkey had to wait for these changes in order to sign 
the contract and start 2018 operations. In addition, personal 
protective equipment visors had to be changed, which also 
resulted in a delay to operations.56 A one-year extension to 
the project was approved, with Phase 2 now expected to be 
completed at the end of 2019.57
SOUTH-EASTERN/IRAQI BORDER 
In 2017, Turkey had planned for survey of suspected mined 
area in Sirnak Province (in parts of the province bordering 
Iraq) in 2018 and of confi rmed mined area in this province 
in 2019; and of suspected mined area in Hakkari Province 
in 2019.58 However, no mention of any survey in this region 
was made in Turkey’s latest Article 7 transparency report 
(for 2018).59
Clearance of the 969 mined areas, totalling just over 2.86km2, 
with the destruction of 79,017 anti-personnel mines, was 
scheduled to start after Phase 2 of the Eastern Border Mine 
Clearance Project is completed.60
TURMAC reported that the Syrian border was prioritised 
instead, to help the installation of the border management 
system and to reduce the fl ow of refugees through the border. 
According to TURMAC, under the EU project, €2.1 million 
will be allocated to non-technical survey across Turkey from 
national budget in 2020.61
NON-BORDER AREAS 
Non-border areas account for less than 2% of all 
contaminated areas in Turkey. In its 2013 Article 5 deadline 
extension request, Turkey reported that partial clearance in 
non-border areas would be conducted by the Turkish armed 
forces until the establishment of an operational NMAA and 
mine action centre and a subsequent tendering process. It 
was expected that clearance would be conducted in 2015–22. 
In 2015, Turkey estimated that all 873 mined areas in non-
border areas would be cleared by 2021, amounting to total 
clearance of 3.1km2, with the destruction of 34,410 anti-
personnel mines.62 
In this region, Turkey prioritises mine clearance based on 
areas used for military operations; areas with low or no risk 
of terrorist threat; and areas where the local population may 
benefi t from agriculture and livestock.63 
Due to ongoing capacity development efforts and 
prioritisation of clearance for the construction of the wall and 
customs area on the Syrian border, no clearance took place in 
non-border areas in 2016 or 2017.64 However, a small amount 
of clearance was conducted in 2018 at a former military range 
(see the “Land release output and Article 5 compliance” 
section below for details). 









STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
UNDP and the GICHD assisted TURMAC to formulate new national mine action standards based upon the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) and the provisional standards elaborated for the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.65
In April 2017, a set of national mine action standards were sent to the National Standards Institute of Turkey for approval.66
In February 2019, 44 national mine action standards, including on land release policy, were issued.67
As at July 2019, TURMAC’s SoPs had been completed and were available on its webpage. The SoPs of the military demining 
units and MECHEM have been in use since 2017.68
OPERATORS 
In 2018, mine clearance operations in Turkey were conducted 
by MECHEM, with Altay as a subcontractor, under the Eastern 
Border Mine Clearance Project; and by the Turkish Armed 
forces along the Syria border, to support construction of the 
Border Security Surveillance System and at a military base in 
a non-border area.69
MECHEM, a South African company, was awarded the 
tender for mine clearance under the EU Eastern Border 
Mine Clearance Project.70 In 2018, MECHEM deployed 30 
MDD teams, 11 clearance teams (approx. 100 deminers), 
and 1 Minewolf machine for Phase 2 of the EU project.71
RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, a United Kingdom-
based company, was contracted for quality assurance (QA) 
and quality control (QC).72 TURMAC also has oversight of 
operations on site.73 During 2018 operations, all deminers 
and team leaders of MECHEM and QA/QC personnel of RPS 
Explosive Engineering Services, were Turkish nationals.74
In 2019, MECHEM was no longer sub-contracting to Altay, and 
was instead employing Turkish nationals directly.75 As at July 
2019, MECHEM was deploying 15 MDD teams, 6 clearance 
teams (approx. 60 deminers), and 1 Minewolf machine.76
Military demining companies were accredited for manual 
demining in 2017.77 Turkey is in the process of signifi cantly 
expanding the number of military demining units, with 
approval for fi ve new demining companies granted in 2018. 
Three of the fi ve new demining companies (equivalent to 
twelve 9-person demining teams) were established in June 
2018 and have been accredited for manual demining.78 As at 
July 2019, procurement of equipment had been completed 
for two companies (eight demining teams), which were 
accredited in 2019 and tasked to several locations. The 
remaining companies were expected to become operational 
in 2020.79
As at July 2019, a total of 26 military demining teams 
operational: 20 from the army and 6 from the gendarmerie.80
The quality management of military demining troops is 
conducted by TURMAC personnel.81
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Both MECHEM and Turkish army demining teams conduct mechanical as well as manual demining, and also use MDDs.
DEMINING SAFETY
There was one demining accident in October 2018, during which a Gendarmerie deminer suffered injuries to his hands whilst 
removing a DM-11 anti-personnel mine. The incident was investigated and was found to be due to a mistake by the deminder, 
while removing the detonator. Demining operators were informed about the issue and additional trainings were conducted.82
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
According to its Article 7 report for 2018, more than 2km2 of mined area was cleared, with the destruction of 22,220 anti-
personnel mines. However, TURMAC subsequently advised Mine Action Review that the 2.08km2 reported as clearance in 2018 
in its Article 7 report unintentionally included 35,168m2 reduced through technical survey and 864,316m2 cancelled through 
non-technical survey. Therefore the correct clearance fi gure for 2018 is 1.18km2.83
In addition, according to Turkey’s Article 7 report, a further 4.7km2 of mined area was cancelled through non-technical survey.84
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SURVEY IN 2018
Nearly 5.54km2 of mined area was cancelled through non-technical survey in 2018: 864,316m2 cancelled through non-technical 
survey, but mistakenly reported as clearance (see above) and a further 4,672,000m2 on the Syrian Border.85 This is seemingly 
a decrease from the 7.5km2 reported cancelled through non-technical survey the previous year, though the fi gure for 2017 
includes land released for 2016 as well as 2017.86
Non-technical survey in 2018 was conducted by TURMAC in the Hatay Region of the Syrian border and revealed that suspected 
areas had been used as agricultural land for many decades and the area had been free of mines. Consequently, approximately 
4,672,000 m2 of land was cancelled.87 
As previously mentioned, TURMAC advised that the 2.08km2 reported as clearance in 2018 in Turkey’s Article 7 report, included 
over 0.03km2 reduced through technical survey. This compared to 0.08km2 the previous year (which included land released for 
both 2016 and 2017).
CLEARANCE IN 2018
In its Article 7 report for 2018, Turkey reported clearance of 2.1km2 of mined area: more than 1.4km2 on the eastern border 
with Iran, almost 0.4km2 on the Syrian border, and almost 0.3km2 in non-border areas (see Table 2).88 However, TURMAC 
subsequently informed Mine Action Review that the 2.1km2 reported as cleared in its Article 7 report, mistakenly included 
35,168m2 reduced through technical survey and 864,316m2 cancelled through non-technical survey, therefore putting correct 
clearance for 2018 at 1,183,986m2.89  
Furthermore, there is under-reporting of the area cleared on the Syrian border, as no area/m2 value was attributed to 
1,015 anti-personnel mines destroyed during armed forces clearance to support safe construction of the Border Security 
Surveillance System. This is reportedly because TURMAC does not consider that this clearance has undergone quality control, 
despite the fact the cleared land is largely built over as part of the construction.90
This is a signifi cant increase in clearance output compared to the 0.82km2 of mined area released through clearance the 
previous year, especially given that the 0.82km2 reported in 2017 included clearance for both 2016 and 2017.91










Iran border MECHEM 1,161,278 15,989 0 0
Army Demining Units 246,380 5,141 0 0
Syria border Army Demining Units 398,385* 1,090 14 0
Non-border areas Army Demining Units 277,427 0 0 665
Totals 2,083,470* 22,220 14 665
*TURMAC subsequently confi rmed to Mine Action Review that of the 2,083,470m2 reported as cleared in 2018, 35,168m2 was reduced through technical survey and 
864,316m2 cancelled through non-technical survey. Furthermore, no square metre output (only the number of mines destroyed) is reported for clearance along the Syria 
Border in support of the construction of the Border Security Surveillance System. The area reported on the Syria border is clearance in the Karkamiş and Elbeyli regions 
on the border, during which 75 mines were found and destroyed.   AV = Anti-vehicle 
On the Iranian border, a total of 1,407,658m2 of mined area was 
cleared in 2018, with the destruction of 21,130 anti-personnel 
mines. Of this 1,161,278m2 was cleared under the contract with 
MECHEM, with destruction of 15,989 anti-personnel mines. 
This was part of Phase 2 of EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance 
Project that began in June 2018. A further 246,380m2 was 
cleared by military demining units of the gendarmerie in Iğ dir 
and Doğ ubeyazit provinces.93 
On the Syrian border, a total of 1,090 anti-personnel mines 
and 14 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed in 2018, by 
Turkish army demining units.94 Clearance along the border 
was primarily as part of demining in support of the Border 
Security Surveillance System, as well as four demining teams 
that cleared 398,385m2 of mined area in the Karkamiş and 
Elbeyli regions on the border, during which 75 mines were 
found and destroyed,95 with the land handed to relevant 
authorities for use as customs areas.96 
In non-border areas, 277,427m2 of mined area was cleared 
by Turkish army demining units at a former military range 
in Muş (Malazgirt) province and handed over to the relevant 
authorities. During clearance, 665 items of UXO were found 
and destroyed, but no anti-personnel mines.97
In addition, Military Engineer/Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) teams conducted counter-IED operations in non-border 
areas within the scope of national security operations. A 
number of IEDs emplaced by terrorist organisations were 
found and destroyed, but are not refl ected in Turkey’s 
reporting under the APMBC.98 Turkey has not specifi ed if, or 
how many, of the IEDs destroyed, are victim-activated IEDs that 
meet the defi nition of an anti-personnel mine and therefore fall 
under Turkey’s APMBC Article 5 and 7 obligations.
No mine clearance was conducted in 2018 along Turkey’s 
borders with Armenia or Iraq.99








ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TURKEY: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), 
Turkey is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey will not 
meet this deadline. 
Turkey’s original Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014 and 
in March 2013 Turkey submitted a request for an eight-year 
extension to its deadline until 2022 to complete clearance of 
all mined areas. Turkey stated that the envisaged timeframe 
was subject to revision pending progress with tenders and 
clearance activities on the ground.100 Turkey also revealed in 
its 2013 extension request that since 1998 it had only cleared 
a total of 1.15km2 of mined area, close to three-quarters of 
which took place in one year (2011), with destruction of 760 
anti-personnel mines and 974 anti-vehicle mines. In addition, 
military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe 
movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.101
Since the Third Review Conference in Maputo in 2014, Turkey 
has made signifi cant progress in putting in place the systems 
and processes required to implement Article 5. The adoption 
in January 2015 of a mine action law, and the subsequent 
establishment of TURMAC were very positive developments 
and are central to Turkey’s national ownership of its mine 
action programme. With capacity development support 
from UNDP and the GICHD, TURMAC has made steady 
process towards becoming fully operational and assuming 
management and coordination of mine action in Turkey. 
Initiating clearance along its eastern borders in June 
2016, as part of the EU Project, funded by the EU (75% of 
funding), Turkey (24%), and the UN (1%), was also a welcome 
development.102 Phase 1 of the project was completed by the 
end of 2017, and Phase 2, which commenced in June 2018, 
was expected to be completed by the end of 2019. As at July 
2019, Turkey reported that funding had been secured for 
Phase 3 of the project, but the “procedures will continue” 
until 2020. TURMAC reported that the EU will dedicate €18.5 
million for clearance and Turkey will contribute €2.2 million 
for non-technical survey.103 The non-technical survey planned 
for 2020 will help give TURMAC a better idea of a predicted 
date for completion.104
Completion of the Border Security Surveillance System along 
all of Turkey’s border with Syria should allow survey and 
clearance to fi nally take place all along the border. This is 
signifi cant, as mined areas on the Syrian border, which are 
mapped, account for two thirds of the mines and more than 
85% of the remaining CHA in the country. 
In the fi ve-year period since 2014, Turkey has cleared 
only some 3.2km2 of mined area, albeit with 2018 seeing a 
signifi cant increase compared to previous years (see Table 3).
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







*Also included previously unreported clearance output relating to 2016.
Challenges in Article 5 implementation, as identifi ed 
by TURMAC, include funding, diffi cult terrain, weather 
conditions limiting the demining window each year, and 
challenges posed by the sensitive security situation in 
certain provinces.105 By far the main obstacle, though, has 
been lack of political will in Turkey to fulfi l its international 
legal obligations under the APMBC. Indeed, despite a marked 
increase in clearance output in 2018, Turkey’s total mine 
clearance to date still only amounts to a tiny fraction of its 
overall mine contamination, and more than 15 years after 
becoming a state party to the APMBC, Turkey has only made 
marginal progress in addressing mine contamination. Based 
on the current rate of clearance, Turkey will not complete 
implementation of Article 5 by its deadline in 2022 and is 
also not on track to complete by 2025, as per the APMBC 
Maputo+15 political declaration. 
That said, Turkey is planning commence systematic survey 
and clearance of the Syrian border, and to dramatically 
upscale non-technical survey. Turkey announced in May 
2019 that it plans to conduct non-technical survey on 20km2
of mined area in 2019, which would represent a dramatic 
increase in survey.106
Turkey’s updated workplan for Article 5 implementation, 
submitted in March 2015, only included plans to address 
a small portion (10%) of total mine contamination, and it is 
unclear how and when the remaining contamination will be 
addressed. It is therefore essential that TURMAC approves and 
publishes the national strategic mine action plan for 2019–21, 
without further delay, as this also reportedly includes plans 
for survey of SHA and CHA in the south-eastern/Iraqi border, 
the Syrian border, and non-border areas.107
Turkey should also report on plans for clearance of mined 
areas under its control in Northern Cyprus, in order to meet 
all of its APMBC Article 5 obligations.
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16,090 0.0 0.0 0.0
AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018
AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Ukraine sought and was granted a fi ve-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 
deadline, bringing it back into compliance with the Convention. Reports continue that all parties to the confl ict, including the 
national government forces, continue to use anti-personnel mines. While some survey and clearance did take place in 2018, 
the full extent of demining operations is not known as Ukraine has not reported with any detail. With the adoption of national 
mine action legislation, Ukraine is in a position to establish a properly functioning mine action programme. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Ukraine should cease all use of landmines.
 ■ Ukraine should formally establish a national mine action authority and a functioning national mine action centre to 
manage clearance of anti-personnel mines.
 ■ Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in areas to which it has 
effective access.
 ■ Ukraine should elaborate a national strategic plan for mine action.
 ■ Ukraine should systematically collect data on contamination from mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR) and 
other explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as progress in survey and clearance, and establish a centralised 
database for planning purposes.
 ■ Ukraine should consult with mine action stakeholders and elaborate standardised national criteria for the 
prioritisation of anti-personnel mine clearance.
 ■ Ukraine should establish a quality management system for demining operations.
 ■ Ukraine should elaborate a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action.
 ■ Ukraine should revise its recently adopted legislation, which imposes liability for released land directly on the 
clearance operator for a period of 10 years, rather than on the national authorities that have taken the decision 
to release it.
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): LOW
391,819M2
8 (including 3 destroyed during spot tasks)
MEDIUM, 
(ESTIMATED) 10KM2 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
UKRAINE
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(20% of overall score)
3 Exact extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Ukraine is not known and while 
some survey is being conducted it is not being systematically reported. Reports of new 





(10% of overall score)
5 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to have organisational control of mine action 
operations. The adoption of mine action legislation in late 2018 allows both a national 
mine action authority and a national mine action centre to be set up. The Ukrainian 
government and international donors are funding clearance of explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) and mines.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
2 Ukraine does not have a gender policy for mine action and does not report on whether 




(10% of overall score)
4 There are two mine action databases in Ukraine which a national mine action centre 
should consolidate into a national mine action information system. An online map has 
been published by the MoD with mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination. 
Ukraine submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2018 but does not report 
in a manner consistent with the international mine action standards (IMAS). 
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
3 There is no national strategic plan for mine action or standardised criteria for prioritising 




(20% of overall score)
5 National mine action standards were elaborated in 2018 but were still awaiting formal 
adoption by the government as of July 2019. External quality management is being introduced 





(20% of overall score)
5 Ukraine is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline. The Ukrainian government does not 
exercise effective control in all mined areas of the country, impeding access for demining. 
Clearance is restricted in areas on the government side due to the ongoing confl ict and 
mines continue to be emplaced in zones of confl ict. 
Average Score 4.0 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ No national mine action authority or mine action centre
■ Ministry of Defence (MoD)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
■ Security Service
■ State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
■ State Border Service
■ Demining Team of Ukraine
■ Demining Solutions
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■ The HALO Trust
■ Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Not active in demining 
in 2018
■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) – Operations 
suspended in 2019
OTHER ACTORS
■ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU)
■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mined area in Ukraine is not 
known. The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed 
to be inside the 15km buffer zone on either side of the Line 
of Contact between the warring parties within the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions, but access to this area for survey and 
clearance operations is severely limited.1 In 2017, Ukraine 
estimated, highly improbably, that total contamination 
by mines and ERW could extend over 7,000km2.2 The 
Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) accepted that this is a 
“rough” estimate.3 In its statement at the May 2019 APMBC 
Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine estimated, also improbably, 
that more than 8% of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have 
been contaminated by anti-personnel mines.4 Ukraine cannot 
reliably estimate the overall extent of mine contamination 
until surveys have been completed.5
In its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report, covering 
actions in 2018, Ukraine noted that technical survey had been 
conducted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the 
Popasnyansky district, Lugansk region and in the Slavic and 
Volnovansky districts, Donetsk region but no anti-personnel 
mines were found. Ukraine also reported that NGOs also 
conducted non-technical survey in the Limansky district of 
the Donetsk region.6 Since The HALO Trust began operations 
in Ukraine, it has confi rmed 6.6km2 as anti-personnel mined 
area. In 2018, The HALO Trust identifi ed 24 new mined 
areas with a total surface area of 1.4km2.7 The Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project 
Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) suggests that the national mine 
action centre, due to be established in 2019, initially focus on 
non-technical survey outside the 15km buffer zone in order to 
better defi ne the scale of the problem. Areas within the buffer 
zone will continue to be under the jurisdiction of the MoD and 
not within the direct remit of the national mine action centre.8
Ukraine is contaminated by anti-personnel mines as a result 
of the ongoing confl ict which broke out in 2014. In the fi rst 
half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian 
government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the 
Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the 
Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Firm evidence exists 
that mines have been used in the resultant armed confl icts,9 
including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature 
and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until 
an effective cessation of hostilities. Prior to the current 
confl icts, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination 
of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy 
fi ghting between German and Soviet forces in the Second 
World War, but also from combat in the First World War. 
MoD engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the 
mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the 
location and extent of any mine threat is not known. 
Ukraine is also contaminated with CMR, the extent of which 
is not known, and by considerable quantities of other ERW 
used during the current confl ict (see Mine Action Review’s 
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Ukraine 
for further information).
NEW CONTAMINATION
Over the last few years, the OSCE’s Special Monitoring 
Mission (SMM) in Ukraine has frequently reported on the 
use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.10 A December 
2017 report from the Offi ce of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), covering 16 
August to 15 September 2017, stated that: “The parties to 
the confl ict continued the practice of placement of IEDs and 
anti-personnel mines in populated areas and near objects 
of civilian infrastructure.”11 In 2018, the OHCHR called on 
all parties involved in hostilities to “cease the use of 
victim-activated devices”.12
At the May 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine 
claimed that it had not used, and is not planning to use, 
anti-personnel mines since it acceded to the APMBC in June 
2006 but accused Russia of having used anti-personnel 
mines in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine these 
mines have been planted by Russia-backed illegal armed 
groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Russia has 
also emplaced mines on the administrative border between 
Crimea and the rest of Ukraine’s territory.13 Ukraine stated 
that illegal armed groups had used different types of mines, 
including those banned by the APMBC and which Ukraine 
does not possess. The mines which Ukraine alleged have 
been used by the opposition groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, 
PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.14 
In the past, Ukraine has reiterated that its armed forces 
are authorised to use MON-series and OZM-72 mines only 
in command-detonated mode (through electrical initiation), 
which is not prohibited under the APMBC. According to 
Ukraine, all mines planted in command-detonated mode are 
recorded and secured, and access to the area is restricted.15 
In 2019, Ukraine reported that there were six registered 
cases of the use of PMN-2 mines, which had been supplied by 
Russia to these illegal armed groups. Eight members of the 
Ukrainian armed forces were wounded by these devices.16 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
All areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, 
including humanitarian demining operations, are currently 
planned, coordinated, and controlled by the MoD.17 Several 
other ministries are also involved in the sector, including 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which sits the State 
Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU); the Security 
Services; the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories 
and Internally Displaced Persons; the State Special Transport 
Services (STSS) of the MoD; the National Police; and the State 
Border Service.18
The MoD has organisational control of operations while 
SESU is generally responsible for conducting clearance. 
It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre” 
in 2015 in Kiev. The centre’s remit includes coordination of 
SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and 
non-technical survey, demining, internal quality control (QC) 
of SESU units, information management, and handover 
of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as 
risk education.19
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Ukraine’s national mine action legislation was adopted by 
parliament on 6 December 2018 and signed into law by the 
President on 22 January 2019. It establishes a framework 
for humanitarian demining, divides responsibilities among 
state institutions, and envisages the creation of a mine 
action authority and mine action centre. Members of the 
national mine action authority (NMAA) will be appointed 
by the Cabinet of Ministers. A national mine action centre 
(NMAC) will be responsible for survey and clearance outside 
the contact line and buffer zone, and once staffed, will 
prepare a strategic mine action plan. The MoD will maintain 
responsibility for demining of the contact line and buffer 
zone. According to the OSCE PCU, the NMAA and NMAC 
would be in place by the end of 2019, following presidential 
and parliamentary elections in September.20
The HALO Trust and Danish Demining Group (DDG) reported 
that they have actively participated in roundtables and public 
hearings on mine action legislation, organised by the MoD, 
the OSCE PCU, and the Verkhovna Rada (VR), the Ukrainian 
Parliament, Defence and Security Committee. During these 
meetings, The HALO Trust and DDG supported the adoption 
of national legislation and shared best practices and lessons 
learned from other countries.21
Once the mine action law is fully implemented, this should 
provide the mechanisms for government bodies to assist 
operators with visas and importation of equipment: issues 
that are currently handled by the operators themselves.22 In 
2018, The HALO Trust faced challenges, which it overcame, 
importing armoured machinery that was classed as military 
equipment and, as such, could not be imported by a civilian 
organisation without the support of an executive branch 
of government.23
National funding is provided for clearance of mines and 
ERW.24 Ukraine also receives support from foreign partners 
(OSCE and NATO) for demining equipment.25
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) has been working with the OSCE PCU to help 
foster mine action institutions, including legislation.26 The 
OSCE PCU, has received funding until October 2020 to 
support Ukraine in establishing the NMAA and the NMAC 
and adopting national standards (now that the mine action 
legislation has been passed).27 DDG is focusing on working 
with SESU to equip, train, and support their survey and 
clearance capacities as the mine action sector evolves and 
national standards come into force.28 In 2018, The HALO Trust 
organised or facilitated training courses and workshops 
for both state bodies and international operators in 
non-technical survey, land release, quality management, 
EOD, and geographic information systems (GIS).29
GENDER
As at July 2019, no information had been provided on whether 
there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan 
for mine action in Ukraine.
DDG has a gender and diversity policy and implementation 
plan. It ensures that all affected groups, including women 
and children, are consulted during survey and community 
liaison activities. However, DDG acknowledges its survey and 
community and liaison teams are not gender balanced, with 
only 15% of operational roles being fi lled by women, although 
38% of its managerial/supervisory positions are occupied 
by women.30
The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey 
and community liaison teams. HALO Trust began recruiting 
women for clearance roles in 2017, employing the fi rst female 
deminers in Ukraine. As at May 2019, 15% of operational 
survey and clearance staff were female while more than 
half of managerial/supervisory staff were women.31
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There are two functioning Information Management System 
for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases, one managed by SESU 
and the other by the MoD, which collects and analyses 
contamination and land release data from national operators 
and NGOs.32 The databases are claimed to be complementary, 
as they are separated based on region, thematic area, and 
operational purpose.33 It will be the task of NMAC to create 
a central national IMSMA database.34 An online map has 
been published by the MoD, with technical support from 
The HALO Trust, with areas of anti-personnel mine and UXO 
contamination surveyed by DDG, FSD, The HALO Trust, and 
a commercial company, Demining Solutions.35
Ukraine submits Article 7 transparency reports in a timely 
manner but does not report on its progress in a manner 
consistent with the international mine action standards 
(IMAS). According to its Article 7 obligation, Ukraine should 
report on “the types and quantities of all anti-personnel 
mines destroyed after … entry into force ... in accordance 
with Articles 4 and 5” but no survey or clearance data was 
provided in its latest Article 7 report. In 2018, Ukraine 
fi nally submitted, and was granted, a fi ve-year extension to 
its APMBC Article 5 deadline. Prior to the submission of its 
extension request, Ukraine had been in serious violation of 
the APMBC by not submitting a request following the new 
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PLANNING AND TASKING
In May 2019, Ukraine submitted its “Annual Action Plan for 
humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk and 
Luhansk” for 2019, as requested by the APMBC Seventeenth 
Meeting of States Parties.36 Annually, the MoD produces an 
operational plan for all operators, based on information 
provided by national agencies and international operators 
working in Ukraine.37 Planned activities for 2019 included 
development of information management systems for mine 
action, the creation of an EOD call-out response, improvement 
in quality management processes, as well as non-technical 
survey, technical survey, and clearance of populated areas, 
transport routes, and infrastructure.38 In the plan, Ukraine 
also stated that the MoD intends to publish information on its 
website every six months that details newly identifi ed SHAs, 
the progress of demining activities and the handover 
of cleared land.39
Following a 2015 order from the Prime Minister of Ukraine, 
the Department of Environmental Protection and Mine 
Action developed a draft order for the Cabinet of Ministers 
to approve the State Programme for Mine Action in Ukraine 
for 2017–2021. However, this was put on hold pending the 
approval and implementation of mine action legislation. As 
at July 2019, there was no national strategic plan for mine 
action in Ukraine.
There are currently no standardised criteria at national level 
for task prioritisation.40 Until the NMAC is established, all 
tasking of operators is managed by the MoD in line with its 
annual action plan.41 Local government have been helping 
the MoD prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria.42
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards (NMAS) were fi nalised by the 
MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from 
key stakeholders.43 The NMAS were published in April 2019 
but, in accordance with the new mine action law, are awaiting 
formal adoption by the government before they can become 
operational.44 In April 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers approved 
Resolution 372 on “Regulations on marking mine and ERW 
hazards”, which are said to follow the provisions in the IMAS.45
In May 2018, the GICHD, at the request of the OSCE PCU, 
aided a review of the national standards and also planned 
in-country training on standards quality management, and 
non-technical survey. These activities will be implemented in 
2019–20, depending on the progress in establishing the NMAA 
and NMAC, in accordance with the new law. GICHD will also 
be working with Ukrainian training centres, in standardising 
their demining and survey training packages. 46
OPERATORS 
The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units 
that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW. 
This includes engineer-sapper units of the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, which conducts clearance through SESU and 
also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the 
Security Service; the State Special Transport Service, which is 
responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State 
Border Service, which conducts demining in areas under its 
control on land and in the sea.47 As at June 2018, the Ukrainian 
authorities were deploying 55 demining teams (totalling 259 
personnel), of which 37 teams were deployed by the MoD.48
Three international demining organisations – DDG, FSD, and 
The HALO Trust – are operating in Ukraine.49 DDG did not 
conduct any survey or clearance of mined areas in 2018. 
FSD suspended operations in 2019 due to lack of funding, 
however, they are actively looking for opportunities to extend 
their programme.50
In addition, the Ukrainian organisations, Demining Team of 
Ukraine and Demining Solutions are active in demining in 
eastern Ukraine.51
As at June 2018, The HALO Trust had 244 staff of whom 
218 were engaged in survey, mine clearance, or battle area 
clearance (BAC). By September 2018, this had increased 
to a total of 360 staff.52 All HALO Trust teams are trained 
and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all 
expected threats in the confl ict zone, as non-technical survey 
has yet to determine the proportion of different types of 
hazard.53 HALO Trust expected the expansion of its operations 
to continue, as at June 2019, it had 418 staff including 25 
manual and 2 mechanical clearance teams, fi ve survey teams 
and two mechanical support teams.54
In 2018, DDG deployed four non-technical survey and fi ve 
technical survey personnel along with 28 clearance personnel 
for BAC tasks. DDG expected to expand both its survey and 
clearance capacity in 2019.55 FSD conducted training for 
additional non-technical survey personnel in 2018.56
It has been claimed that Emercom, Russia’s state agency for 
emergencies, has planned to begin clearance in areas under 
the control of separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.57
Currently operators conduct their own quality management 
but it is expected that the formal development of external 
quality management will take place in 2019 following the 
adoption of the mine action law.58 In August 2019, HALO 
Ukraine handed over its fi rst 11 cleared areas to local 
administrations in Luhansk oblast after successfully 
passing an external quality inspection by the MOD’s 
Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre.59
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, The HALO Trust deployed its fi rst mechanical 
clearance asset, the fi rst operator in Ukraine to do so.60 As 
at June 2019, HALO deployed three mechanical clearance 
assets, two armoured front end loaders and one armoured 
excavator.61
DDG plans to use drones to create high-resolution maps for 
their tasks but, as at June 2019, the mechanism for acquiring 
permission to fl y was not yet in place.62 DDG does not use any 
mechanical assets.63 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Ukraine did not report its clearance output for 2018. In its 
latest Article 7 report Ukraine stated that mine clearance 
work is underway by NGOs in Stanicho-Lugansk district, 
Lugansk region and Bakhmutsky district, Donetsk region 
but did not provide any clearance data. Of the international 
operators, The HALO Trust cleared 391,819m2 and destroyed 
fi ve anti-personnel mines. The HALO Trust also identifi ed 
24 new anti-personnel mined areas with a total surface 
area of 1.4km2.
CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, the HALO Trust cleared 391,819m2, destroying in 
the process fi ve anti-personnel mines. This is an increase 
from 2017 when the HALO Trust cleared 220,887m2, also 
destroying fi ve anti-personnel mines. According to HALO 
Trust, some confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are being 
cleared that prove not to contain anti-personnel mines. There 
have been incidents of local people removing the mines 
themselves, particularly in the case of above-ground threats 
such as directional fragmentation mines and tripwire-initiated 
hand grenades (which function as anti-personnel mines).64












Stanychno Luhanskyi/Krasna Talivka 9 241,271 3 40 1
Lymanskyi/Ozerne 2 57,348 0 0 8
Bakhmutskyi/Kodema 1 2,780 1 0 2
Bakhmutskyi/Novoluhanske 3 16,527 0 0 18
Lymanskyi/Kryva Luka 1 7,938 0 0 1
Slovianskyi/Andriivka 2 19,680 0 0 3
Stanychno-Luhanskyi/Shyrokyi 2 27,259 0 0 1
Volnovaskyi/Volnovakha 1 19,016 1 0 1
Totals 21 391,819 5 40 35
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
In addition, the HALO Trust destroyed three anti-personnel mines during EOD spot tasks in 2018.66
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UKRAINE: 1 JUNE 2006
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016 
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







N/R = Not Reported
The area inside the 15km buffer zone is believed to be heavily 
contaminated with mines and ERW, but access to the buffer 
zone for humanitarian survey and clearance operations is 
severely limited on the government side, and there is no 
access for humanitarian demining in areas not controlled by 
the government.67
Ukraine submitted and was granted its Article 5 extension 
request in 2018 bringing it back to compliance with Article 
5 of the APMBC. However, Ukraine provided very little 
information on outstanding mine contamination or the 
outputs from ongoing survey and clearance activities making 
it very diffi cult to know the true extent of mine contamination 
in Ukraine or track progress in survey and clearance 
efforts. Within government-controlled areas, there is limited 
demining close to the contact line as mined areas are deemed 
to serve a tactical purpose and will not be demined until 
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Clearance data is not available from areas outside of 
government control although it is understood that 
pro-Russian rebels are conducting some clearance 
operations.68 While Russia is not a state party or signatory 
to the APMBC it has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by 
virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person 
under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it 
exercises effective control.
The long-awaited adoption of national mine action legislation 
at the end of 2018 is a positive step forward for Ukraine. 
This provides the framework for humanitarian demining in 
Ukraine and should lead to the establishment of the NMAA 
and the NMAC, the implementation of national standards, and 
development of a national strategy with concrete milestones 
in place for survey and clearance outside of the buffer zone 
in Ukraine. However, the MoD will continue to be responsible 
for demining within the buffer zone and it is diffi cult to see 
how Ukraine will achieve completion of anti-personnel mine 
clearance during an ongoing confl ict when there are reports 
that both sides are continuing to emplace mines.
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In 2018, the United Kingdom requested and was granted a further fi ve-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline until 1 March 2024. The United Kingdom again made good progress in 2018, releasing 
nearly 1.5km2 of mined area on the Falkland Islands,1 in addition to conducting technical survey of the eight mined areas that 
will remain as at the end of the current phase of demining in March 2020. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ In both its reporting and planning, the United Kingdom should disaggregate data on the extent of mined area 
released (or planned for future release) through type of survey and through clearance.
 ■ The United Kingdom should update APMBC states parties on the results of technical survey of the remaining 
eight mined areas in Yorke Bay and on the planned timeline for contracting and completing clearance of this 
fi nal phase of demining.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2024
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(20% of overall score)
7 The United Kingdom has established a reasonably accurate baseline of remaining 
anti-personnel mine contamination, though past assessments, based on the best 





(10% of overall score)
9 There is strong national ownership of mine action on the Falkland Islands, with oversight 
from a National Mine Action Authority and a Demining Project Offi ce, and 100% national 
funding for all survey and clearance. The United Kingdom is now making good progress 
in implementing its obligations under APMBC Article 5.
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 Good gender policies and procedures are in place to cover mine action in the Falkland 
Islands, including at the level of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO), the 
National Mine Action Authority, the land release contractor (currently SafeLane Global), 
and the Demining Project Offi ce (currently Fenix Insight). While one third of management 
positions in SafeLane Global in the Falkland Islands are held by women, none of the 




(10% of overall score)
6 The United Kingdom has a well-functioning information management system in place, to 
record and monitor progress in land release operations on the Islands. However, land 
released through technical survey is not disaggregated from release through clearance 
in the United Kingdom’s reporting.
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 The United Kingdom has a clear workplan in place to address remaining mined areas on 
the Islands, as well as measures in place to address residual risk, post completion.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine action standards, but survey 
and clearance operations on the Islands are said to meet or exceed the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). While the land release methodology could potentially be viewed 
as overly risk-adverse, based on full clearance of 11 uncontaminated areas, despite the 
conduct of technical survey prior to clearance, the United Kingdom maintains clearance 






(20% of overall score)
8 The United Kingdom released nearly 1.5km2 of mined area in 2018 and conducted 
technical survey of the eight mined areas which will remain as at the end of the current 
phase of demining in March 2020. The United Kingdom has committed to fulfi l its Article 5 
obligations by March 2024.
Average Score 7.1 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ National Mine Action Authority (chaired by the United 
Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO) and 
comprising representatives from the Ministry of Defence, 
the Falkland Islands government, and a strategic advisor)
■ Fenix Insight (current Demining Project Offi ce)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The only mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the 
United Kingdom are on the Falkland Islands in the South 
Atlantic, the result of armed confl ict with Argentina in 1982.2
 
As at the end of Phase 5(a) of clearance, in March 2018, only 
35 mined areas remained to be cleared, totalling over 6.1km2.3 
As at the end of December 2018, contamination had been 
reduced to 22 mined areas, totalling 3.9km2 (see Table 1).4 
The United Kingdom has a fully funded programme in place 
(Phase (b) clearance) to reduce contamination by 31 March 
2020, to only eight remaining mined areas in Yorke Bay, 
totalling 0.16km2.5
Table 1: Contamination by province (at end 2018)6
Area Mined areas Area (m2)
Fox Bay 6 2,017,912
Port Howard 1 1,021,979
Darwin and Goose Green 0 0
Murrell Peninsula 5 582,287
Stanley Area 2 2 89,861
Stanley Area 3 0 0
Yorke Bay 8 205,800
Totals 22 3,917,839
Some clearance was undertaken in the early 1980s 
immediately following the Falklands confl ict, during which 
1,855 mines were removed and destroyed from mined areas.7 
However, between the date the United Kingdom became a 
state party to the APMBC (1 March 1999) and the submission 
of its fi rst Article 5 deadline extension request in 2008, no 
clearance took place.8
In its 2008 Article 5 extension request, the United Kingdom 
reported that 117 mined areas remained over an estimated 
total area of 13km2, and containing some 20,000 anti-personnel 
and anti-vehicle mines.9
 
On the basis of additional information 
obtained during demining operations, the estimate for the 
total contaminated area was increased to 13.5km2.10
 
The total 
number of mined areas was subsequently revised upwards, 
from 117 to 122, as the earlier feasibility study had combined 
a small number of separately numbered mined areas.11 
During the fi rst four phases of clearance (from October 2009 
to March 2016), 35 mined areas were released, totalling 
just over 2km2, with the destruction of 4,083 anti-personnel 
mines, 927 anti-vehicle mines, and 74 items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), including 21 submunitions. A further 52 
mined areas, totalling over 2km2 were cleared during Phase 
5(a) clearance (from November 2016 to March 2018, with 
operations stood down for the Austral winter), during which 
a further 4,223 anti-personnel mines, 245 anti-vehicle mines, 
and 43 items of UXO were cleared.12
Phase 5(b) began in April 2018 and was expected to conclude 
at the end of March 2020.13 At the end of this Phase, it is 
expected that only eight mined areas will remain, covering 
an estimated 163,460m2, all located in Yorke Bay.14 
There are two further areas, Don Carlos Bay and Beatrice 
Cove, which have never been considered as mined, and 
which were not included in the 122 mined areas established 
in the feasibility study in 2007, but which are located behind 
the long Murrell Peninsula fence. This area has been out of 
bounds to all persons on the Islands since 1982, so it has not 
been possible to check whether these two areas were mined. 
If these two areas are found to require clearance, they will 
be added to the list of mined areas, and the United Kingdom 
expects they could be cleared within the fi ve-year extension 
period.15 Two further tasks, BAC 1, which was suspected to 
contain booby-traps based on anecdotal evidence, and BAC 2, 
a building suspected of being booby trapped, were completed 
in December 2018.16
The United Kingdom has reported that no civilian has ever 
been killed or injured by mines on the islands.17
 
Over the 
years, very few civilians have deliberately or inadvertently 
entered a minefi eld. It is a criminal offence on the Falkland 
Islands to enter a minefi eld.18 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 
2009 to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action on the 
Falkland Islands.
 
The NMAA is chaired by United Kingdom 
Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO) and comprises 
representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falkland 
Islands government, and a strategic advisor. It meets “as 
required” (at least once every six months), and the land 
release contractor (SafeLane Global; formerly, Dynasafe 
BACTEC) and the Demining Project Offi ce (currently Fenix 
Insight), are invited “where appropriate”.19
In addition, there is a Suspect Hazardous Area Land 
Release Committee (SHALARC), which is a body based in 
the Falkland Islands, composed of a range of local offi cials 
and a representative of the United Kingdom military. 
SHALARC provides a forum for the contractors to discuss 
issues of concern or interest to the committee, and includes 
explanation of the land release process, including when land 
has been released for public use.20
Survey and clearance operations in the Falkland Islands are 
entirely funded by the UK Government.21
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GENDER 
The NMAA requires SafeLane Global and Fenix Insight 
to meet contractual conditions to prevent unlawful 
discrimination either directly or indirectly on protected 
characteristics such as race, colour, ethnic or national origin, 
disability, sex or sexual orientation, religion or belief, or age. 
The provisions also set out that the Contractor shall adhere 
to the current relevant codes of practice or recommendations 
published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission.22
Fenix Insight has an organisational gender policy which it 
applies to its demining, though there is limited opportunity 
to pursue it on the Falklands given the deployed “team” is 
composed of only one (male) person. SafeLane Global has an 
equal opportunities policy and selects employees based on 
qualifi cation and experience, without gender restrictions. Of 
management level positions employed by SafeLane Global in 
the Falkland Islands, one is occupied by a woman, but none of 
the survey or clearance staff is female.23
In 2018, the UK Government wrote to suppliers setting out 
safeguarding policies and procedures in light of sexual 
exploitation and abuse in the aid sector, which raised 
questions regarding the ethical behaviour of organisations 
being funded by UK taxpayers’ money and the safeguarding 
of the communities across the world that it is intended 
to support. The contractors working to deliver the UK’s 
Falkland Islands Demining Programme were contacted as 
part of this wider engagement.24
Women are involved in key positions at the FCO: Senior 
Responsible Offi cer, Deputy Senior Responsible Offi cer, and 
Project Manager.25
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The information management system is managed at two 
levels. The Strategic Advisor maintains the public statement 
of progress through a “Cumulative Totals” spreadsheet (as 
demonstrated in the attached annex to the United Kingdom’s 
2018 Article 5 deadline extension request). This forms the 
basis of the declarations to the APMBC Meetings of States 
Parties. Also, the Demining Project Offi ce and the Land Release 
Contractor use an operational-level planning and information 
management tool which guides the work and ultimately leads 
to the Handover Certifi cate at the conclusion of each task.26
Historically, the United Kingdom has not collated data on area 
cancelled and on area reduced,27 and does not disaggregate 
land released through technical survey from land released 
through clearance in its reporting.28
The United Kingdom submits annual Article 7 transparency 
reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 
implementation at the APMBC intersessional meetings and 
meetings of states parties.
PLANNING AND TASKING
At present, the United Kingdom is undertaking the fi fth 
phase of demining operations in the Falkland Islands. The 
government has committed to spend more than £27 million 
on this phase (2016–20), which aims to release 79 mined 
areas covering an estimated total of just under 10.86km2.29
Phase 5(a) commenced in November 2016 and concluded 
in March 2018.30 During this phase operators cleared more 
mined areas for which there were no minefi eld records than 
previously. The prior technical survey included cutting lanes 
into suspected minefi elds in order to establish the position of 
any remaining mines.31 Following the conclusion of Phase 5(a), 
the United Kingdom believes it has a more accurate picture 
of the remaining mine clearance challenge, which has helped 
inform its strategic planning and the drafting of its second 
Article 5 deadline extension request, which was submitted 
on 29 March 2018 for consideration by states parties to 
the APMBC.32
The current stage of demining, Phase 5(b), which began 
in April 2018, is due to conclude on schedule by the end of 
March 2020.33 At the end of this Phase, it is expected that 
only eight mined areas will remain, covering an estimated 
163,460m2, and located in the environmentally sensitive 
beach and sand dune area known as Yorke Bay.34 As part of 
Phase 5(b), technical survey of these eight mined areas has 
been completed, enabling the United Kingdom to plan, cost, 
and contract the fi nal phase of demining operations.35
To date, the United Kingdom has prioritised clearance of 
areas closest to settlements and civilian infrastructure, 
resulting in release of areas closest to Port Stanley and the 
roads leading in and out of the Islands’ capital. In early 2016, 
the Ministry of Defence and the FCO commissioned the United 
Kingdom’s Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory to 
carry out a study to help prioritise clearance of the remaining 
minefi elds in a Phase 5 of demining. The resultant priority list 
formed the basis of the UK Government’s invitation to tender 
for the contract for Phase 5 demining.36
The land release contract sets out a task list (the workplan), 
which must be completed within the two-year window (1 April 
2018 to 31 March 2020).37 The Demining Project Offi ce (Fenix 
Insight) monitors the Land Release Contractor (now SafeLane 
Global) to ensure that it completes the task list according to 
the contract standards and completion date. Fenix Insight 
reports regularly to the FCO, and both Fenix Insight and 
SafeLane Global report to the National Mine Action Authority 
on progress made against timescales.38
Full and accessible records of all survey and clearance 
undertaken will be retained by national authorities in the 
Falkland Islands and the United Kingdom. The enduring 
UK military presence on the Falkland Islands includes an 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team from the Royal Air 
Force Armament Engineering Flight. They hold responsibility 
for EOD activity on the Falkland Islands. The team will deal 
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine 
action standards, but survey and clearance operations on 
the Falkland Islands are reported to meet or exceed the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), by adapting IMAS 
to meet the specifi cs of the situation on the Falkland Islands.40 
Each project’s Statement of Requirement contains the 
standards specifi c to the tasks being addressed.41 Applicable 
environmental standards are agreed on in coordination with 
the Falkland Islands Government Environmental Planning 
Department to minimise damage to the fragile environment 
and to aid remediation.42
However, it is possible that the land release methodology 
adopted in the Falkland Islands might be overly risk adverse, 
based on the fact that eleven mined areas in 2018 were 
technically surveyed, but were then fully cleared, and found 
to contain no anti-personnel mines. According to the United 
Kingdom, full clearance was undertaken of these areas 
(which were included in the original 122 fenced and marked 
areas) for “full assurance”, because of the lack of minefi eld 
records, and to ensure all reasonable effort was taken.43
OPERATORS 
The Land Release Contractor in the Falkland Islands is 
selected by international competitive tender prior to each 
phase, as required by the European Union. SafeLane Global 
(formerly Dynasafe BACTEC), was awarded the land release 
contract for the current fi fth phase of demining operations 
in the Falkland Islands, as for the previous four phases.44 
Capacity for Phase 5 operations was increased from previous 
phases, with a total of 108 personnel. Mechanical equipment 
includes one anti-vehicle mine machine, three anti-personnel 
mine machines, and two armoured excavators, in addition to 
the required transportation equipment.45
The Demining Project Offi ce, which implements the policies 
of the NMAA and monitors the land release operations on 
the Falkland Islands, is also awarded through competitive 
tender. Fenix Insight has been awarded responsibility for the 
Demining Project Offi ce for all fi ve stages of demining so far.46
The United Kingdom has noted that the Falkland Islands has 
limited capacity in terms of accommodation and medical/
aerial casevac facilities. Current staffi ng levels have reached 
the maximum that can be safely deployed on the Islands, but 
work was claimed to be progressing “very well” with the 
current capacity.47
SafeLane Global undertakes its own internal Quality 
Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC). Fenix Insight 
monitors this quality management and can also conduct 
its external QA and QC.48 The size of the sampled areas at 
each task is decided by the quality contractor based on the 
guidance set out in IMAS 09.20.49
 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In addition to manual survey and clearance, mechanical 
assets are also deployed extensively as part of land release 
operations on the Falkland Islands.50 Flails and tillers are to 
aid technical survey while excavators, bulldozers, dumper 
trucks, and sand-sifting machines are deployed on sandy 
areas such as Yorke Bay. All mechanically prepared ground 
is subsequently processed by deminers using visual search, 
detector search, raking, or full manual excavation drills.51 
Drones have been used for reconnaissance over large areas 
not accessible behind minefi eld fences and for aerial mapping. 
Use of drones to overfl y suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) 
helps to identify mine “dump” locations, row markers, and 
other evidence that might have otherwise taken a manual team 
several days to locate. The United Kingdom deems the use of 
drones to be an excellent addition to the demining toolbox.52
 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 1.48km2 of mined area, across 24 SHAs, 
was released through clearance and technical survey in 
2018, with the destruction of 588 anti-personnel mines, 
31 anti-vehicle mines, and 26 items of UXO. No mined area 
was cancelled through non-technical survey.
In addition, technical survey was conducted in 2018 on the 
remaining areas, including at Yorke Bay and the Murrell 
Peninsular, but no results had been made available as at 
May 2019.
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, technical survey was conducted as part of land 
release operations, but no data was reported on the amount 
of mined area reduced through survey, which is instead 
included in reported clearance output (see Tables 2 and 
3 overleaf). 
In addition, a major focus in 2018 was on conducting technical 
survey on the remaining areas, including at Yorke Bay and 
the Murrell Peninsular (including Don Carlos Bay),53 to enable 
the United Kingdom to plan for the fi nal phase of clearance. 
As at May 2019, no results of the technical survey had been 
made public.54
No areas were cancelled through non-technical survey 
in 2018.55
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, of total of over 1.48km2 of mined area was released 
through clearance (0.58km2 during Phase 5(a) and 0.9km2
during Phase 5(b)) with the destruction of 588 anti-personnel 
mines,56 31 anti-vehicle mines, and 26 items of UXO. This 
comprised nearly 0.58km2 cleared between January and 
March, as part of Phase 5a of land release operations 
(see Table 2);57 and a further 0.9km2 cleared between April 
to December 2018, as part of Phase 5b of land release 
operations (see Table 3).58
Clearance Phase 5(b)
Phase 5(b) of clearance operations (April 2018 to March 
2020), which began on schedule in April 2018, is planned to 
cover more than 5.95km2 of mined area.59
Between April and December 2018, 0.9km2 of mined area was 
cleared, with the destruction of 249 anti-personnel mines and 
12 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 3).60
Table 2: Mine clearance Phase 5(a) (November 2016 to March 2018)61











November to December 2016 Stanley Area 2 and 3 7 426,346 1,314 19 1 
January to December 2017 
(including three month stand 
down during Austral winter)
Darwin and Goose 
Green, Stanley Area 
2, 3, and 4
34 1,050,080 2,557 207 17
January to March 2018 11 577,474 352 19 26
Totals 52 2,053,900 4,223 245 44
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle
Table 3: Mine clearance Phase 5(b) (April 2018 to December 2018)











April to December 2018 Cluster 3 1 14,844 28 11 0 
Cluster 2 12 887,653 221 1 0
Totals 13 902,497 249 12 0
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH
Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
second extension (of fi ve years) granted by states parties 
in 2018), the United Kingdom is required to destroy all 
anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or 
control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2024. 
The United Kingdom stated in April 2019 that it is strongly 
committed to meeting this deadline.62
The overwhelming majority of clearance activity (Phase 5) 
already has funding allocated and contracts in place, and is on 
schedule to complete by 31 March 2020, notwithstanding the 
general risks to timelines posed to all mine clearance in the 
Falkland Islands, such as poor weather forcing stand-downs.63
Phase 5(a) of survey and clearance operations fi nished as 
scheduled at the end of March 2018 and Phase 5(b) began 
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The United Kingdom expects that eight remaining mined 
areas, covering an estimated 163,460m2, will remain 
upon completion of Phase 5(b) in March 2020. The eight 
mined areas in question are all located in Yorke Bay, an 
environmentally sensitive beach and sand dune area, which 
is also the most challenging of mined areas.64 According to 
the United Kingdom, “It is possible that the work can be 
completed in a single further year, but that cannot be certain 
at this stage… Rather than request a three year extension 
which may prove insuffi cient, thus necessitating a further 
extension request, the UK requests a fi ve year extension 
until 1 March 2024”.65 
The United Kingdom “retains the strong intention that the 
clearance of Yorke Bay will be possible within the fi ve-year 
extension request”.66 It does, however, cite two risk factors 
to the realisation of the plan. The fi rst is a risk that, at 
Yorke Bay, some mines may have been displaced by sand 
movement and that technical survey cannot identify the 
bounds of that movement, which may lead to lengthier and 
more expensive clearance. Second, there could be a delay 
in securing further funding, which “will be weighed against 
competing priorities and subject to approval at senior levels”. 
This in turn could lead to a situation requiring demobilisation, 
and remobilisation of demining capacity, or retendering, after 
Phase 5, which would be timely and costly: hence the request 
to an extended deadline to 2024.67
In its 2018 extension request, the United Kingdom reported 
that “further funding will be sought once the cost of covering 
Yorke Bay is known based upon the results of technical 
survey conducted during the extension request period in 
Phase 5.”68 As at April 2019, technical survey of the eight 
mined areas in Yorke Bay had been completed as part 
of Phase 5(b). According to the United Kingdom, offi cials 
and contractors are working through the operational and 
commercial processes, and the national authorities planned 
to share further information with States Parties once 
available.69 The eight mined areas in Yorke Bay pose the 
greatest challenges to date and demining is expected to be 
complex due to the challenges of the sandy environment.70 
The United Kingdom conducted an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) in 2017, which was discussed with the 
Falkland Islands Government. The EIA identifi ed two 
particular issues: a) the penguins on the islands; and b) the 
area at Yorke Bay, which will be addressed in such a way as 
to ensure impact to the existing environment is limited to the 
minimum practically possible.71
Most of the remaining mined areas are said to be in extremely 
remote locations, exposed to adverse weather conditions 
that enforce an annual three-month stand-down in the 
winter months.72 The United Kingdom has also reported the 
following additional challenges to clearance in the Islands: 
incomplete Argentine minefi eld records; concerns about the 
environmental impact of demining; and limits on the capacity 
of the Falkland Islands to provide certain facilities for 
demining, such as accommodation for deminers and medical 
facilities, including for the evacuation of any casualties.73
 
The 
United Kingdom reports that these factors are becoming 
increasingly signifi cant as it tackles the more technically 
challenging and environmentally sensitive minefi elds in 
Phase 5 of demining. To address these considerations the 
United Kingdom increased its funding commitment for 
Phase 5.74
 
Demining on the Falkland Islands is conducted in phases, 
which cut across calendar years, though, based on the year 
in which demining tasks were completed, a total of over 
4km2 of mined area has been cleared in the last fi ve years 
(see Table 4).
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







* Based on the year in which clearance was completed
The United Kingdom government funds all mine-clearance 
operations in the Islands.75
 
The fi rst four stages of demining 
(2009 to March 2016) cost £11 million (approx. US$14.5 
million).76 The United Kingdom government has committed 
to spend more than £27 million (approx. US$35.5 million at 
current exchange rates) on Phase 5 through to March 2020. 
As at April 2019, the United Kingdom was to develop and 
costing a clearance plan for the release of the eight mined 
areas that will remain as at March 2020.77
The United Kingdom has committed to providing updated 
information on progress and next steps at subsequent 
meetings of the APMBC and in its treaty reporting.78
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Intensive confl ict continued between the Saudi Arabia-led Gulf coalition supporting the Aden-based internationally recognised 
government and Houthi rebels controlling Sana’a and much of the north. Houthi forces reportedly laid signifi cant numbers of 
mines, including those of an improvised nature during 2018 and 2019. Yemen submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request, 
seeking three years beyond March 2020 to determine the extent of contamination, after which it will submit a further request 
setting out a strategy for survey and clearance. Five SafeLane international staff died in a single incident in January 2019 
while transporting mines and seven other deminers were killed in a detonation at a storage area holding mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) in May 2019.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) should strengthen coordination between its operations in 
government-controlled and Houthi-controlled areas to ensure consistent application of national standards in 
management and operations.
 ■ YEMAC should conduct a nationwide survey to generate a baseline of mine contamination.
 ■ In the absence of a long-term plan, YEMAC should draw up an annual workplan for deployment of available 
assets on priority regions and tasks.
 ■ YEMAC should update national standards and expand them to cover survey and clearance of mines of an 
improvised nature. 
 ■ Yemen should facilitate access and deployment by international mine action operators to achieve a rapid 
expansion of capacity, raise standards, and accelerate survey and clearance. 
 ■ YEMAC should drastically improve data collection and reporting to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) transparency obligations providing comprehensive reports on the location, scope, 
and results of mine action operations, including disaggregated data detailing release of mined land through 
survey and clearance and items destroyed. 











































ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020
THREE-YEAR INTERIM EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 MARCH 2023
YEMEN
HEAVY, 50KM2at least (ESTIMATED)
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■ YEMAC should address the causes of the high level of fatalities among deminers in the course of operations in 
2018 and 2019. 






(20% of overall score)
4 The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) reports the level of contamination 
as unknown. Contamination data included hundreds of square kilometres of suspected 
mined areas before the onset of confl ict in 2015 which has resulted in signifi cant but 
unknown amounts of additional contamination, including from mines of an improvised 





(10% of overall score)
3 YEMAC is wholly dependent on international donor support. Confl ict has undermined 
nationwide management of mine action, leaving YEMAC with two programmes, one for 
areas controlled by the Aden-based government and the second for areas controlled by 
Houthi forces controlling Sana’a, with little ability to coordinate between them. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
3 The demands of Yemen’s mine action emergency have eclipsed the issue of gender, which 
is not mentioned in Yemen’s Article 5 extension request. UNDP support to YEMAC seeks 




(10% of overall score)
3 YEMAC said its mine action database was no longer fi t for purpose. No information was 
available to operators on areas surveyed or cleared and the sparse operating results 
available did not disaggregate clearance of mines from clearance of explosive remnants 
of war (ERW). 
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
5 Yemen does not have a national strategy or plan, but continued operations on an 
emergency basis focused on life-saving interventions. 
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
4 Yemen had national standards that YEMAC said were out of date. It also complained that 
its equipment is obsolete and levels of deminer training were inadequate, particularly for 





(20% of overall score)
5 YEMAC clearance of area and items appears to have fallen in 2018 but lack of 
comprehensive data disaggregating mine clearance from clearance of ERW prevents 
a clear determination of outputs.
Average Score 4.0 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■ Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
■ YEMAC
■ Yemen Army Engineers
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
■ SafeLane/Dynasafe
■ The HALO Trust (since 2019) 
■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) (due to start in 2019)
OTHER ACTORS
■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
YEMAC states that “the level of contamination and the 
subsequent impact by AP mines in Yemen is not known.”1
A Landmine Impact Survey in 2000 found mine contamination 
in 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates resulting from confl icts in 
1962–69 and 1970–83, as well as mines laid in border areas 
between North and South Yemen before they unifi ed in 1990, 
and mines from successive confl icts that erupted since 
1994. Operators have also encountered large quantities of 
abandoned explosive ordnance, including some stockpiles 
of mines. The continuing confl ict that fl ared in March 2015 
has “changed the extent and complexity of contamination 
dramatically.”2 
Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request 
submitted in 2014 identifi ed 107 confi rmed minefi elds 
covering a total of 8.1km2 but also an additional 438 
suspected hazardous areas covering 338km2. By 2017, 
YEMAC said it had 569 suspected mined areas affecting 
323.5km2.3 YEMAC believed a signifi cant proportion of this 
might be released or reduced through survey. However, 
Yemen’s continuing confl ict has largely halted survey of 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and resulted in the 
addition of new contamination by mines, including mines of 
an improvised nature, preventing a determination of the 
extent and the recontamination of previously cleared areas.4
NEW CONTAMINATION
Houthi offi cials have acknowledged using landmines5 
and Houthi forces reportedly laid mines in at least six 
governorates in 2016.6 Since 2017, Houthi and associated 
forces have laid large numbers of anti-personnel mines and 
anti-vehicle mines, including mines of an improvised nature, 
in particular along Yemen’s west coast, in a bid to stall the 
advance of pro-government Yemeni and Saudi coalition 
forces towards the strategic port town of Hodeida. Some 
anti-vehicle mines were reportedly modifi ed to detonate with 
the weight of a person,7 making them anti-personnel mines 
falling within the APMBC. 
Current confl icts have also resulted in increased 
contamination from mines of an improvised nature, such as 
devices initiated by a pressure plate or crushed necklace, 
as well as from improvised devices activated remotely or by 
photo-electric cells. Mines of an improvised nature as well 
as other improvised devices have been produced in Yemen 
“on an industrial scale” and laid along roads, inside buildings, 
and built into house walls, posing a serious hazard to 
displaced families returning to their property.8 
Independent investigators have documented three types 
of mine of an improvised nature used by Houthi forces on 
Yemen’s west coast that are identical to, or closely resemble, 
conventional mines. They include a Claymore-type mine almost 
identical to a Chinese-made directional mine (Type 150-A GLD), 
a larger directional mine similar to an Iranian-made mine 
(M18A2), and an anti-vehicle mine similar to Russian-made 
TM46 mines. Some of the mines of an improvised nature have 
serial numbers, indicating mass production.9 The UN reported 
the appearance of improvised sea mines in the Red Sea since 
2017. These were probably deployed by Houthi forces and pose 
an obvious threat to shipping.10
A panel of international experts reported to the UN Human 
Rights Council in August 2019 that it had confi rmed civilian 
casualties caused by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines 
emplaced by Houthi fi ghters in Aden, Hudayda, Lahej, and 
Taiz governorates.11 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Yemen’s inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee 
(NMAC), which formulated national mine action policy, 
was reported in 2019 to have disbanded leaving YEMAC as 
regulator and implementing agency with responsibility for 
setting policy, planning and coordinating mine action, and 
as the sole national operator.12 
YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as a 
national mine action agency. Since confl ict fl ared between the 
internationally-recognized government, based in the south, and 
the Houthi movement controlling much of the north, YEMAC 
has in practice split into two, centred round a headquarters 
in Aden running operations in government controlled areas 
and the Sana’a offi ce running operations in the north. YEMAC 
said its Aden headquarters issued quarterly task orders and 
maintained records of the work conducted. 
YEMAC is supported by Regional Executive Mine Action 
Branches (REMABs) in Aden, set up in 1999; al-Mukalla 
(Hadramout governorate), which opened in March 2004; and 
Saada (April 2016).13 The extent to which they are operational 
is not clear. In 2019, YEMAC planned to open new offi ces in 
Taiz to support operations around Hodeida and in Marib for 
operations in al-Jawf governorate.14
YEMAC planned to open a coordination centre in 2019 to 
separate its management and operational functions, a 
development which it expected would accelerate clearance. 
Among its responsibilities, the coordination offi ce would be 
responsible for accrediting operators. As at May 2019, YEMAC 
was identifying premises for the coordination offi ce and 
expected to have it operational before the end of the year.15
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The United Nations supported mine action in Yemen from 
1999 to 2003 through a programme implemented by the 
UN Offi ce for Project Services (UNOPS). From 2003, the 
programme came under full national management. The UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) deployed an international 
adviser to YEMAC at the end of 2014 to support planning 
and programme management. In 2018, its international 
staff included a chief technical adviser and a planning and 
reporting specialist in Sana’a and a technical advisor based 
in Aden. National staff included two posts in Sana’a and 
one in Aden. In 2019, UNDP planned to recruit up to eight 
additional international staff and three or more national staff 
to strengthen the programme capacity.16
Yemen’s mine action is funded by international donors. 
UNDP estimated total funding required for Phase V at $39.9 
million. Funding received in 2018 amounted to a little over 
$9 million in 2018, approximately the same level as in 2017.17
Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Fund agreed with 
Dynasafe Middle East Project Management in 2018 to fi nance 
a US$40 million demining project.18
GENDER
Mine action plans and priorities set out in Yemen’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request make no reference to gender. 
UNDP reported placing emphasis on mainstreaming gender principles into plans aiming for equal participation as benefi ciaries, 
employees, and decision-makers in mine action. This included ensuring survey information is collected by organisations 
representing women and girls as well as men and boys; that data collected is disaggregated by gender and age; and that risk 
education materials address the risks associated with all gender roles.19
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
YEMAC maintains an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but its Article 5 deadline extension 
request described it as “outdated” and “not usable.”20 UNDP observed that the system, although outdated, was becoming more 
reliable. In 2019, it added an international information management specialist to its Aden-based staff.21
PLANNING AND TASKING
Yemen does not have a strategic plan or annual workplans for tackling mines, improvised devices, or any ERW. Mine action in 
2018 continued to be conducted on an emergency basis. The priority set out in Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request 
in 2019 was to conduct nationwide survey to generate a baseline of contamination that would provide a basis for long-term 
planning. YEMAC reportedly intended to assign its planned coordination offi ce the task of drawing up a new planning system.22
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Yemen has national mine action standards which were based 
on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) when 
they were drawn up in 2007, but they have not been updated. 
YEMAC said they are out of date and that its deminers do 
not apply standing operating procedures (SoPs) based on 
the standards consistently. YEMAC has also said effi ciency 
was lowered by its deminers’ lack of training, particularly 
for coping with mines of an improvised nature, and by old or 
obsolete equipment.23
YEMAC had an unspecifi ed number of quality assurance (QA) 
teams that it said conduct regular fi eld visits and sampling of 
cleared land but it said QA/quality control (QC) had become 
“disjointed” as SoPs were not always followed and there was 
no systematic collection of QA/QC reports.24
OPERATORS 
YEMAC is the main operator, with about 900 deminers at 
the start of 2019, one half of them managed by YEMAC 
headquarters in the south and the other half by YEMAC’s 
Sana’a offi ce.25
SafeLane/Dynasafe operated with 304 staff and 32 demining 
teams. By early 2019, SafeLane reported the project 
employed 19 internationals, while national staff were mainly 
seconded from YEMAC. It expected the number of personnel 
to rise to around 400 in 2019.26
Danish Demining Group (DDG) had a staff of 16 by the end 
of 2018, including two internationals and fi ve national staff 
in Aden; six national staff in Mokha, Taiz; and three other 
national staff in Ataq, Shabwah. Activities have focused on 
risk education but a three-person non-technical survey team 
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Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was due to start a two-year 
programme supporting YEMAC’s mine detection dog (MDD) 
programme in the last quarter of 2018 but after delays 
obtaining the necessary visas was expected to start work 
in 2019. The project calls for NPA to provide training for 
mine dog instructors, veterinarians, fi eld supervisors, and 
three MDD groups to improve operational effi ciency and 
expertise in survey and land release. It was also due to 
boost YEMAC’s existing MDD capacity of 15 active dogs and 5 
puppies and to look at improving its dog breeding capacity.28 
An NPA assessment mission visited Aden in June 2019 but 
as at August 2019, delays in issuing visas prevented it from 
deploying staff full time. NPA had selected 12 MDDs for the 
programme but they remained at NPA’s Global Training 
Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina.29
YEMAC was preparing for increasing its engagement with 
international operators. HALO Trust received approval to 
operate in Yemen in May 2019 and opened an offi ce in Aden 
in June. It planned to run courses on explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) and survey for YEMAC and to have teams 
mentored by HALO Trust international staff deployed in the 
fi eld in the last quarter of 2019. YEMAC was also in discussion 
with the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) on the 
possibilities of establishing a presence in Yemen.30 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
YEMAC conducted manual mine clearance in 2018 with limited 
support from mine detection dogs, focusing on emergency 
clearance of high-impact spot tasks rather than large area 
clearance, giving priority to civilian and social infrastructure.31 
YEMAC said land release through survey had decreased but 
was “sometimes used in specifi c cases.” Through greater 
engagement with international operators, YEMAC planned to 
build up capacity for survey and increase the possibilities for 
land release by means other than manual clearance.32 
DEMINER SAFETY
YEMAC sustained heavy casualties in the course of clearing 
mines and improvised devices, reporting 14 deaths in 2018.33 
Disaggregated data on casualties and devices causing them 
was not available. A YEMAC deminer was also reportedly 
shot dead by a sniper in Taiz.34
SafeLane/Dynasafe sustained 12 fatalities in the fi rst half 
of 2019. Five international staff were killed in January 2019. 
KSrelief said they died in an accidental explosion as they 
were transporting mines from the project headquarters 
to a remote location for demolition.35 SafeLane said later 
that ordnance in the truck contributed to the scale of the 
explosion but initial detonation was caused by an improvised 
explosive device (IED) placed under the passenger seat of 
their vehicle.36 YEMAC said two government investigations 
into the incident found no evidence that SafeLane had been 
targeted by any armed group.37 Six SafeLane deminers were 
killed in April in an explosion in a depot holding mines and 
ERW for destruction in the port city of Mokha. A seventh 
operator died of his injuries a day later. The nationality of 
those killed was not reported.38
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Yemen’s progress towards compliance with the APMBC continued to be overshadowed by the confl ict between the 
internationally recognised government, backed by the Saudi-led coalition, and Houthi forces controlling the capital which 
added new contamination and obstructed clearance. YEMAC has a clear position that the humanitarian imperative to 
mitigate the immediate threat to civilians posed by all types of explosive threats takes precedence over deadlines set 
under the APMBC.39
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
YEMAC was able to conduct fi eld operations in 81 districts of 16 governorates in 2018 and UNDP reported it released a total 
of 6,661,954m2 through clearance, but this included all types of explosive items and only a small amount of mined area.40 Mine 
Action Review has conservatively estimated clearance in 2018 to be of 0.1km2. YEMAC was previously experienced mainly in 
clearing legacy minefi elds but these have become a low priority since the upsurge in confl ict in 2015 when it increasingly had 
to tackle mines of an improvised nature and a wide range of ERW.
UNDP attributed the fall-off in productivity in 2018 to a number of factors, including stricter regulations on counting ERW; 
a minor cash fl ow issue in the second quarter of the year; and the transfer of staff from YEMAC to the Dynasafe/SafeLane 
operation funded by Saudi Arabia.41 
SURVEY IN 2018
No data were available on land released through survey. UNDP said YEMAC conducted desk assessments, non-technical 
survey, and technical survey on a total area of over 825,000m2 in nine different governorates.42 
mineactionreview.org   273
STATES PARTIES
CLEARANCE IN 2018
YEMAC did not release mine clearance results for 2018 but its Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2019 reported 
that in 2016–18 it cleared a total of 646,455m2 of mined area, and destroyed 14,021 anti-personnel mines, of which 1,576 were 
destroyed in 2017 and 988 in 2018.43 The high number reported destroyed in 2016 is believed to have included large numbers of 
mines found in warehouses and stockpiles.44 UNDP recorded clearance by YEMAC in 2018 of 680 anti-personnel mines together 
with 8,047 anti-vehicle mines, 1,163 IEDs, and 106,019 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).45
Table 1: YEMAC clearance in 201846
Area cleared (m2) AP mines AV mines UXO IED
YEMAC 6,661,954 680 8,047 106,019 1,163
Dynasafe/SafeLane did not report to YEMAC but separately reported clearing 2,523,500m2 in 10 governorates in 2018, more 
than half of it in Taiz governorate, and destroying 1,011 anti-personnel mines.
Table 2: Dynasafe/SafeLane clearance operations 201847
Area cleared (m2) AP mines AV mines UXO IED
Dynasafe/SafeLane 2,523,500 1,011 27,314 21,980 2,793
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR YEMEN: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2020
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (3-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): LOW
Systematic mine clearance in Yemen has largely stalled in 
the past fi ve years due to the upsurge in confl ict in 2015 and 
a persistent shortage of funding and other resources. YEMAC 
reported total mine clearance of only 0.65km2 for 2016−18. 
YEMAC was able to carry out emergency operations in 16 of 
Yemen’s 21 governorates in 2018 but clearance in the last 
three years has mostly targeted UXO and improvised devices. 
The data in Table 3 below should be treated with caution.
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)
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AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018
AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Zimbabwe remained on track to meet its end-2025 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 mine clearance 
deadline, exceeding its annual target for land release in 2018. The primary challenges facing Zimbabwe’s mine action 
programme are chiefl y fi nancial. Major survey operations have been completed, and remaining mine contamination, while 
extensive, is well quantifi ed and defi ned. The national mine action programme is well managed and coordinated by the 
Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), with clear strategic direction, annual targets, and transparent budget forecasts in its 
National Mine Action Strategy and revised Article 5 workplan, which were offi cially launched in March 2018 and in April 2019, 
respectively. The main challenge is to ensure suffi cient fi nancial support to enable Zimbabwe to expand mine action capacity 
and achieve completion by its end-2025 deadline. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Zimbabwe should meet the revised annual mine clearance targets published in April 2019 and continue 
implementing its National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25.
 ■ Zimbabwe should expand its use of integrated demining methodologies fi rst introduced in 2017, including 
mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs), and offi cially incorporate their use into the national mine 
action standards. 
 ■ Increased resources should be allocated to ZIMAC to enable it to effectively manage a fast-growing national 
mine action programme. 
 ■ The Government of Zimbabwe should help ZIMAC to procure additional resources to enable its relocation to 
outside restricted-access military facilities. 
 ■ ZIMAC should increase efforts to secure additional national and international funding in order to meet its 2025 
clearance completion deadline. Greater linkages between mine action and national development, along with 
enhanced cooperation among government ministries, would assist this endeavour. 












































(including 126 destroyed during spot tasks)
MEDIUM, 
(NATIONAL ESTIMATE) 13KM2 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
ZIMBABWE
276   Clearing the Mines 2019 






(20% of overall score)
8 Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination. Nationwide 
non-technical survey was completed in 2016 leaving only confi rmed hazardous areas 





(10% of overall score)
8 Zimbabwe’s mine action programme is entirely nationally owned, with a consistent 
amount of government support. The sum of US$500,000 has been provided by the 
government annually for the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) and the National Mine 
Clearance Unit (NMCU) since 2010, while the army contributes to the demining unit and 
staff salaries. The mine action programme is well managed by ZIMAC, with a high degree 
of consultation and collaboration with operators. 
GENDER
(10% of overall score)
6 The importance of gender is acknowledged in the National Mine Action Strategy. 
The National Mine Action Standards do not contain a specifi c standard on gender 
mainstreaming, though they do refer to the importance of gender, for example in the 
deployment of mixed community liaison teams. ZIMAC is considering developing an 




(10% of overall score)
8 Improvements in information management continued to be evident in 2018, with ZIMAC 
fully transitioning to the use of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), 
with assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD). ZIMAC’s National Mine Action Strategy, subsequent revised Article 5 workplan, 
and Article 7 report for 2018 all continued to demonstrate consistently accurate and 
detailed reporting, which was once a weak point for the national mine action programme. 
PLANNING 
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 Zimbabwe’s fi rst ever National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25 was offi cially launched 
by the government in March 2018 following two years of support from the GICHD. The 
Strategy, and a subsequent revised workplan published in 2019, accompany Zimbabwe’s 
Article 5 extension through to 2025, and present a realistic estimate of remaining 
contamination and annual milestones for land release, identifying the resources, time, 
and funding needed to complete clearance.
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 Zimbabwe made signifi cant strides to increase effi ciency of land release, with better use 
of mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDD) in 2018. Further efforts were made 
to refi ne clearance methodology for ploughshare mine belts. With ongoing improvements 
in land release and increasing capacity, and the nature of Zimbabwe’s densely laid 
minefi elds, operators continue to clear tens of thousands of anti-personnel mines 





(20% of overall score)
8 A total of nearly 9.4km2 of land was released in 2018, notably surpassing Zimbabwe’s 
2018 target for land release under its National Mine Action Strategy and revised Article 
5 extension workplan, and a sizeable increase on land release in 2017. With limited 
additional funding and capacity, Zimbabwe can meet its Article 5 deadline of end 2025, 
which will be a considerable achievement for one of the world’s most heavily mined 
countries in a particularly challenging political and economic context. 
Average Score 7.8 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
 ■ Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Unit 
(NMCU) 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ APOPO (not operational as at August 2019)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)









UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Zimbabwe reported a total of just over 
52.6km2 of confi rmed mined area remaining (see Table 1).1
This is a decrease from the nearly 62km2 reported as at the 
end of 2017.2 According to the operators, this is a “very well 
defi ned” understanding of the problem.3 In fact, as ZIMAC 
explained to Mine Action Review in October 2019, of the total 
confi rmed mined area, only about one quarter (some 13km2) 
is thought to be actually contaminated with considerable area 
between mine lines that can be released through survey.4
Zimbabwe’s mine contamination, the overwhelming majority 
of which is of anti-personnel mines, originates from the 
laying of minefi elds in the late 1970s during a confl ict of 
decolonisation. At the time of its independence in 1980, 
Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along 
its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland 
minefi eld laid by the Rhodesian Army.5 Initially, anti-personnel 
mines were laid in very dense belts (on average 2,500 mines 
per kilometre of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire”, with 
up to 5,500 mines per kilometre in some places. Over time, 
this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In 
response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” 
directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel 
mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire.6 Anti-vehicle 
mines were used extensively by armed groups but most were 
detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.7
All areas remaining to be addressed are CHAs and no 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remain in Zimbabwe 
following the completion of signifi cant re-survey in 2016.8
While this remained the case in 2018, according to ZIMAC, 
a total of close to 295,700m2 was added to the total estimate 
of contamination due to expansion of existing CHAs during 
pre-clearance re-surveys.9
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at end 2018)10
Location Area of CHA (m2)
Manicaland (Rusitu to Muzite Mission and Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill) 11,912,371
Mashonaland East (Mazowe to Rwenya) 11,391,037
Mashonaland Central (Musengezi to Mazowe) 9,750,767
Matabeleland North (Lusulu) 56,000
Masvingo (Crooks Corner to Sango Border Post) 19,527,360
Total 52,637,535
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) 
is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine 
action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within 
the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination 
centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated 
to report to NAMAAZ.11
As at August 2019, ZIMAC’s offi ce remained located inside of a 
military cantonment, which limited civilian access. Zimbabwe 
has pledged to relocate the ZIMAC offi ce many times, once 
the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.12
According to ZIMAC’s most recent 2019 projections, a 
total of close to US$130 million is required to meet its 
extended Article 5 deadline by 2025, with, on average, 
close to US$16.2 million per year.13 ZIMAC confi rmed that in 
2018, the Government of Zimbabwe provided US$500,000 
towards the operational and administrative costs of both 
the National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) and ZIMAC. The 
salaries and allowances and transport expenses of staff 
were covered by the army. ZIMAC informed Mine Action 
Review that the economic downturn in 2018 was likely to 
limit the government’s potential to increase any funding 
for mine action; though it expected existing funding levels 
to be maintained.14 According to ZIMAC, the Government of 
Zimbabwe has committed US$500,000 to the NMCU and for 
the operational costs of ZIMAC every year since 2010.15
As part of its focus for 2019, ZIMAC reported comprehensive 
resource mobilisation efforts will include building 
parliamentary awareness of the national mine action 
programme and encouraging greater engagement from 
relevant government ministries with a role to play in mine 
action, including the Ministry of Health and Child Care and 
the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare.16
With assistance from the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ZIMAC developed a 
Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy in 2018, 
which was fi nalised in the fi rst half of 2019. As at August 
2019, the Strategy had received government approval and 
was awaiting an offi cial launch. ZIMAC informed Mine Action 
Review that top priorities for which it hoped to procure 
additional resources included funding for a planned national 
mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victim survey, 
website hosting, relocating the offi ce outside of the military 
cantonment, equipping the NMCU better, and additional 
funding for the international demining operators to expand.17
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GENDER 
Zimbabwe’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 
includes reference to the importance of addressing gender 
and diversity considerations.18 While there is not a specifi c 
standard on gender mainstreaming in the National Mine 
Action Standards (NMAS), reference to gender is contained 
within the standards, such as NMAS 07 (Management of 
Demining Operations) which requires that “special efforts 
should be made to ensure gender balance and diversity of 
background for Community Liaison Offi cers”.19
In July 2019, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that while 
at present, ZIMAC did not have a separate internal gender 
and diversity policy in place, the issue had been discussed 
and efforts will be made to develop one. ZIMAC confi rmed 
that all community groups are routinely consulted in survey 
and community liaison activities, with efforts undertaken 
to ensure that all age and gender groups are consulted. 
Survey and community liaison teams are gender-balanced 
and also make use of school teachers and children to further 
their outreach. All mine action data is also collected on a 
disaggregated basis by sex and age.20 
ZIMAC reported that gender is taken into account during the 
planning and prioritisation of minefi elds for clearance, such as 
consideration of the risks taken usually by women and girls to 
cross minefi elds to fetch water and that of men and boys who 
often heard cattle or plough near to mined areas.21 However, 
given the nature of the minefi elds, which are essentially one 
long and continuous line, operational access constraints often 
dictate clearance priorities as much as other factors.22 At 
the same time, according to The HALO Trust, post-clearance 
surveys refl ect the gendered impact of clearance, such as 
women and children who often are reportedly the major 
benefi ciaries of clearance, as they are responsible for more 
than 80% of water collection, with clearance providing safer 
and more direct access to water sources.23
According to ZIMAC, women are specifi cally encouraged 
to apply for operational positions in job advertisements, 
and 30% of operational roles in the national mine action 
programme were held by women in 2018, while 35% of 
managerial roles were held by women. Yet ZIMAC stated 
that this fell short of “required” levels, and noted that 
Zimbabwean women were somewhat reluctant to work 
in mine action. More effort is to be placed on raising 
awareness among women and ensuring equal opportunities 
to employment, regardless of gender. The NMCU, however, 
had the lowest level of female employment, with less than 
5% women members. This was due to the fact that the NMCU 
staff are recruited from the corps of military engineers, 
where very few women are engaged.24
International operators confi rmed that each organisation had 
gender policies in place for their programme staff, with a focus 
on achieving equal access to employment, gender-balanced 
survey and clearance teams, gender-focused community liaison 
outreach, disaggregated data collection, and a gender focus to 
be employed during pre- and post-clearance assessments.25 
All operational organisations reported increasing efforts 
to encourage women to apply for operational, as well as 
managerial positions, and positive trends in the increasing 
number of women employed in programmes as a result.26
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Over the past few years, ZIMAC’s information management 
capabilities have increased signifi cantly, with clear evidence 
of improvement in the quality and accuracy of its reporting, 
including in its most recent Article 5 deadline extension 
request, which established an accurate picture of remaining 
contamination and set, for the fi rst time, a date for the 
completion of mine clearance. ZIMAC’s National Mine Action 
Strategy, subsequent revised Article 5 workplan, and 
most recent Article 7 report all continued to demonstrate 
consistently good quality reporting, something which was 
once a weak point for the national mine action programme. 
In 2018, ZIMAC fully transitioned to the use of the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. 
A GICHD information management advisor convened a 
workshop in the start of 2018 to ensure that the IMSMA 
database was accurate and that ZIMAC personnel were able 
to retrieve all the information it contained. ZIMAC noted that 
workshops, trainings, and international expert support for 
information management had produced signifi cant results 
and remained important to ensure the ZIMAC database is up 
to date and accurate.27 
Operators likewise confi rmed that using IMSMA in 2018 
had improved the quality of data management.28 Quarterly 
meetings with ZIMAC and all operators also enhanced 
coordination and communication.29 The HALO Trust 
highlighted that monthly meetings with ZIMAC were also 
held to cross-reference data, which it said was extremely 
positive.30 ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that work was 
ongoing in 2019 to import data on mine and ERW victims led 
by the ZIMAC IMSMA focal point.31
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Zimbabwe’s fi rst ever national mine action strategy, National 
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, developed by ZIMAC 
with support from the GICHD and input from government 
ministries, the NMCU, and international mine action 
organisations, was offi cially launched on 9 March 2018 by 
the Vice President and Minister of Defence and War Veterans 
Affairs in a public event.32 The strategic plan complements 
Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline extension request, approved 
in December 2017, for a period of eight years, until the 
end of 2025. Operators have lauded the Strategy for its 
comprehensiveness and its realistic outlook on delivery, 
which it is hoped will encourage donor funding in its clarity 
on the resources and efforts needed to make the 2025 
deadline a feasible achievement.33
In April 2019, Zimbabwe published an updated workplan 
to support compliance with its Article 5 deadline of 31 
December 2025. The workplan was based on revised 
estimates of remaining contamination and, accounting 
for progress during 2018, updated annual targets for the 
remainder of the extension period. These included 8.2km2 to 
be addressed in 2019; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2020; 8.1km2
to be addressed in 2021; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2022; 
8.3km2 to be addressed in 2023; 6.9km2 to be addressed in 
2024; and the remaining 4.6km2 to be addressed in 2025.34
Two strategy workshops and one information management 
workshop were convened by ZIMAC, supported and facilitated 
by the GICHD, with all operators invited to participate. On 
the matter of potential “residual” contamination that might 
be found after completion of major clearance operations, 
ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that plans are in place. 
It will fall to ZIMAC, the NMCU, and the army engineers, who 
are stationed in all provinces, to deal with any new explosive 
devices discovered.35
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national legislation specifi c to mine action 
in Zimbabwe. 
In July 2019, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that following 
the successful pilot projects to introduce the use of MDDs and 
mechanical assets by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and The 
HALO Trust, revisions to the national mine action standards in 
these areas were underway, in consultation with operators, 
and would be completed during the year.36 Expanded use of 
mechanical and MDD methodologies with other operators was 
also being explored.37
During 2018, operators and ZIMAC continued to work 
together on refi ning clearance techniques on ploughshare 
mine belts in order to focus narrowly on individual mine rows 
and maximise area reduction between the rows. An ongoing 
challenge for operators and ZIMAC continued to be the search 
for technical solutions to decrease the time spent on “missing 
mine drills” when gaps in the mine pattern are found.38
The HALO Trust reported that its dual-sensor Handheld 
Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) detectors were 
adding signifi cant value in effi ciency, with up to 16,000 rapid 
excavations being conducted per month, saving the equivalent 
of three additional mine clearance teams per month.39
Regarding quality management, ZIMAC quality assurance 
(QA) monitors were present on site at operations on a daily 
basis during 2018.40 An independent quality control (QC) team 
was regularly sent to conduct QC by sampling a minimum 
of 10% of completed tasks.41 Operators confi rmed that the 
ZIMAC QA/QC process was rigorous, with well trained and 
experienced staff. The HALO Trust noted that the combination 
of a separate sampling team and a highly accessible 
monitoring team worked especially well, with the former 
providing thorough external oversight and the latter helping 
teams to work through any problems.42
OPERATORS 
The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ NMCU and, since 2013, 
The HALO Trust and NPA, all conduct land release in 
Zimbabwe. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) became operational 
in December 2017, and APOPO, while accredited in 2017, was 
yet to commence operations as at August 2019.43
According to ZIMAC, the total deminers deployed by the 
NMCU rose by 12 in 2018, from 135 in 2017 to 147 in 2018, 
with additional deminers employed to start re-survey of 
the Lusulu minefi eld to verify the size of contamination 
prior to clearance.44
NPA reported that as a result of lost funding at the end of 
2017, the number of manual clearance teams deployed was 
reduced from seven to three; however, capacity was later 
increased to fi ve manual clearance teams from September 
2018 when additional funding was secured.45
In 2018, The HALO Trust deployed 25 manual demining teams 
and 2 mechanical teams to conduct combined clearance and 
technical survey. In addition, one community outreach team 
was also deployed to conduct risk education and community 
liaison. A total of 375 people were employed as part of 
HALO’s operations during the year.46
At the start of 2018, MAG deployed one manual clearance 
team, which increased to three teams during the year with 
additional funding, for a total of 35 deminers and requisite 
fi eld and support staff.47
Despite its accreditation to start mine action operations in 
2017, as at August 2019, APOPO still had not managed to 
secure the funding required to start operations. APOPO 
reported it is tasked to survey and clear a 7km2 area along 
the course of a 37km-long stretch of minefi eld along the 
border with Mozambique. The minefi eld begins in Chiredzi 
district, Masvingo province, in south-eastern Zimbabwe, in 
a conservation area just outside Gonarezhou national park 
in an area known as the Sengwe Wildlife Corridor. In July 
2019, APOPO informed Mine Action Review that its priorities 
were to secure funding for one or more manual teams to be 
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OPERATIONAL TOOLS
While the majority of clearance in Zimbabwe continued to 
be manual in 2018, mechanical assets and MDDs were being 
actively integrated into the national mine action programme. 
As at end 2018, however, the use of MDDs was limited to 
technical survey and clearance of soil with a high metallic 
content and the use of mechanical assets limited to clearance 
of areas with deeply buried mines and also areas with a high 
metallic content.49
MAG did not deploy any mechanical assets or MDDs in 2018, 
but reported that discussions with ZIMAC were ongoing in 
2019 to explore their potential use in future operations.50 
DEMINING SAFETY
The HALO Trust reported that a demining accident occurred 
during clearance of a dense R2M2 minefi eld after a deminer 
excavated a signal in an unauthorised manner, initiating 
an R2M2 mine, resulting in the loss of two fi ngers. The 
incident was investigated by a team comprising HALO Trust 
personnel, ZIMAC, and an external consultant and fi ndings 
were shared with ZIMAC for wider distribution in the mine 
action sector.51
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of nearly 9.4km2 of land was released in 2018, with close to 8.7km2 of mined area released through clearance and 
technical survey and just under 0.7km2 cancelled through non-technical survey.52 Notably, this surpassed Zimbabwe’s 
2018 target for land release of 7.16km2 under its National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 and mine action workplan.53
SURVEY IN 2018
Just over 7.3km2 of land was released through survey in 
2018: nearly 0.7km2 was cancelled through non-technical 
survey while close to 6.6km2 was reduced through technical 
survey.54 In 2017, nearly 4.6km2 of land was released through 
survey (just under 1.8km2 cancelled and 2.8km2 reduced).55
Since the cancellation of huge amounts of land during survey 
in 2014–16, no new signifi cant survey has been undertaken or 
required. According to ZIMAC, the few areas of cancellation in 
2018 were the result of pre-clearance re-survey of a number 
of polygons carried out to confi rm previous data of surveyed 
areas or where stretches of polygons were found not to 
contain mines.56
Positively, area reduced through technical survey more than 
doubled in 2018, due to an increase in area reduced by the 
NMCU as they moved further down the Mwenezi to Sango 
Border Post minefi eld and the perimeter fencing of the area 
and corresponding polygon widened but the three mine rows 
maintained the same width, enabling greater area reduction 
between the mine rows and perimeter fencing.57 The 
comprehensive use of MDDs by NPA in technical survey also 
proved effective, resulting in larger outputs of land reduced.58 
ZIMAC reported that the NMCU likewise had high reduction 
output through technical survey due to distinct mine lines 
within a well-marked minefi eld in its areas of operations.59





Rushinga HALO Trust 125,533
Gozi MAG 16,932
Muzite to Rusitu NPA 354,985
Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest NPA 196,073
Total 693,523





Musengezi to Mazowe HALO Trust 947,617
Mazowe to Rwenya MAG 274,828
Mwenezi to Sango 
Border Post
NMCU 3,984,435
Rusitu to Muzite NPA 672,756
Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill NPA 766,621
Total 6,646,257
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
Clearance of anti-personnel mined area increased in 2018 
to 2.1km2 up from 1.7km2 cleared in 2017. The number of 
anti-personnel mines destroyed fell, however, from nearly 
30,500 in 2017 to just over 22,000 in 2018. This was primarily 
caused by a sharp decrease in the number of anti-personnel 
mines destroyed by NPA during the year, which fell from 
nearly 13,500 in 2017 to just over 600 in 2018. According to 
NPA, this signifi cant decrease was due to the fact that the 
sectors of minefi eld it was working on in 2018 contained only 
one mine row, while in 2017 its teams were deployed to parts 
of the minefi eld that contained six mine rows at a time.62
In addition, a total of 126 anti-personnel mines were 
destroyed during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot 
tasks in 2018: 95 anti-personnel mines destroyed by The 
HALO Trust, 25 anti-personnel mines destroyed by NPA, 
and 6 mines destroyed by MAG.63
Table 4: Mine clearance in 201864
Area Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed
Musengezi to Mazowe HALO Trust 1,245,435 19,137
Mazowe to Rwenya MAG 130,208 211
Mwenezi NMCU 192,831 2,060
Rusitu NPA 311,351 8
Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill NPA 232,605 597
Totals 2,112,430 22,013
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ZIMBABWE: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST TO THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINES (COMBINED 5-YEAR, 10 MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018
FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (8-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (MAPUTO +15 POLITICAL DECLARATION ASPIRATION): HIGH
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 
eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required 
to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 
31 December 2025. It is broadly on track to meet this deadline.
ZIMAC confi rmed in July 2019 that the 31 December 2025 
deadline is achievable, provided that some additional funding 
is secured. The revised targets for land release in 2019 were 
on track to be met, with some organisations surpassing their 
targets. This, it is hoped, will offset the fact that APOPO has 
yet to start operations or fulfi l any of its land release targets. 
ZIMAC was optimistic that, with the approval and offi cial 
launch of the Communications and Resource Mobilisation 
Strategy in 2019, the additional funding required to meet the 
2025 deadline will be secured.65
All international mine action operators were in agreement 
that based on existing capacity alone, it will be challenging 
for Zimbabwe to meet its 2025 target, but optimistically also 
concurred that, with relatively small additions in funding 
and capacity, it is still possible.66 This is hard to sustain if 
the current estimate of mined area is robust. With less than 
seven years to go and some 50km2 to release, this would 
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The HALO Trust emphasised that the more teams that can 
be put on the ground now will save additional costs and 
expenditure on equipment needed in the future. It also 
reiterated that if Mozambique could be persuaded to release 
the demining equipment it was holding, three and a half 
years after declaring itself mine free, the equipment could be 
transferred across the border and would be a great help to 
demining efforts in Zimbabwe.67 
MAG echoed these concerns about funding, emphasising that 
the challenges presented by the internal economic situation 
and external funding perceptions were considerable. The 
chronic failings of the national economy have led to continuing 
shortages of basic goods, lengthy fuel queues, inconsistent 
supplies, and infl ation levels at nearly 200%. These economic 
limitations, combined with changes in currency regulations 
and the rising cost of fuel, is putting a strain on already fi nite 
funding sources for all operators, it said.68
A further concern as noted above, the revised workplan 
and budget also include projections for APOPO as an 
implementing partner, and, as at August 2019, as they were 
yet to be operational, other operators will either need to 
increase their land release output or Zimbabwe risks falling 
short of its targets. 
At the same time, there are many, clearly positive aspects of 
Zimbabwe’s mine action programme, such as having a strong, 
nationally-owned mine action centre led by experienced 
and dedicated staff members; a realistic estimate of the 
remaining problem and national mine action strategy; and a 
collaborative working environment in which operators can 
quickly ramp up capacity and output, putting additional funds 
immediately to use towards an achievable goal.
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ARMENIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Armenia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Armenia has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination, including in military restricted zones.
 ■ Armenia should mobilise the necessary resources to fi nish mine clearance and set a deadline for the 
completion of operations.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Armenia had more than 5.7km2 of confi rmed mined area and a further 3.8km2 of suspected mined area, 
as set out in Table 1. The mined areas contained anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, or a combination of both, as well 
as unexploded ordnance (UXO).1 Of 96 confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs), 56 contain anti-personnel mines, totalling just 
over 2.9km2. Three of the six suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), totalling just over 0.1km2, may also be contaminated by 
anti-personnel mines.2 Territory seized from Azerbaijan during the confl ict is believed to be signifi cantly contaminated by 
mines and ERW, including unexploded submunitions.3 However, the precise extent of contamination in those districts 
is unknown. 
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2018)4
Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
AP mines 42 2,192,049 3 105,500
AV mines 40 2,807,879 3 3,728,442
AP and AV mines 11 706,046 0 0
AP mines and UXO 2 12,769 0 0
AP and AV mines and UXO 1 4,842 0 0
Totals 96 5,723,585 6 3,833,942
AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle
Four of Armenia’s eleven provinces still contain mined areas. Three are contaminated with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle 
mines, while the fourth – Vayots Dzor – is contaminated solely with anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 2.5 The difference in 
total mine contamination between the end of 2017 and end of 2018 cannot be explained or reconciled by the total area released 
during the intervening 12 months.








Table 2: Mined area by province (at end 2018)6
Province Type of contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Gegharqunik AP mines 3 584,022 2 105,123
AV mines 5 2,428,128 3 3,728,442
Syunik AP mines 33 1,440,476 1 377
AV mines 22 296,696 0 0
AP and AV mines 8 676,617 0 0
AP mines and UXO 2 12,769 0 0
AP and AV mines and UXO 1 4,842 0 0
Tavush AP mines 6 167,551 0 0
AV mines 10 15,603 0 0
AP and AV mines 3 29,429 0 0
Vayots Dzor AV mines 3 67,452 0 0
Totals 96 5,723,585 6 3,833,942
A Landmine Impact Survey was conducted in Armenia in 
2005, followed by partial survey of 17 sites by The HALO 
Trust in 2012, and then again, in 2012–13, by the Swiss 
Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). FSD found 17 SHAs 
estimated to cover 26km2 and 114 CHAs that covered 21km2 in 
four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas, 
totalling 1.8km2, contained only UXO and not mines.7 In 2018, 
the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) 
stated that it planned to conduct non-technical survey in 
Gegharkunik province but that the military-restricted zones 
continued to be off limits for survey and clearance.8
Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination 
in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed confl ict 
with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, in which both sides used mines. 
The heaviest contamination is along the borders and 
confrontation lines with Azerbaijan, including the area in and 
around Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories controlled 
by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Forces. Armenia’s 
border with Georgia has been cleared of mines, whereas the 
border with Turkey, also mined during the Soviet era, is still 
contaminated.9 While non-technical survey in 2012–13 by the 
FSD did not fi nd evidence of mines outside the buffer zones in 
Ararat province, which borders Turkey, certain areas on that 
border remain unsurveyed because they are controlled by 
Russian border troops.10
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CHDE was established by the Armenian government in 
2011 as a civilian, non-commercial state body responsible 
for conducting survey and clearance and identifying 
contaminated areas. In 2013, the CHDE was made Armenia’s 
national mine action centre.11 The CHDE can negotiate with 
international demining organisations, accept international 
funding, sign contracts, and receive international 
assistance.12 The CHDE has an advisory board, composed of 
representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Emergency 
Situations, Territorial Administration, Education, and Justice.13
In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, the CHDE 
began developing national mine action legislation. The CHDE 
began drafting the law in 201514 with the support of the OSCE 
offi ce in Yerevan.15 As at April 2019, the CHDE expected to 
submit the draft mine action law to the new Parliament of 
Armenia for discussion before the end of the year following 
which it will need to receive government approval and be 
adopted by parliament.16
In 2018, the Armenian government allocated AMD212 million 
(approx. US$433,000) to cover the costs of the CHDE. No 
separate funding was provided for survey and/or clearance 
operations. In 2019, the government allocated AMD339 million 
(approx. $691,000) of which AMD110 million was for survey 
and clearance operations. Armenia does not receive any 
donor funding for mine action.17
The CHDE receives capacity development support from the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). CHDE staff have been trained in land release, risk 
education, and information management.18
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GENDER
The CHDE does not have a gender policy and implementation plan but has reported that gender has been mainstreamed in 
Armenia’s draft national mine action strategy. During community liaison activities, all groups affected by mine contamination 
are consulted, including women and children. The CHDE is said to offer equal employment opportunities for both men and 
women. Two the department heads within the CHDE are female and out of a total of 47 employees 15 are women (32%), 
most of whom occupy senior or specialist roles. However, there are no women working in the survey or clearance teams.19
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
With FSD’s support, the CHDE set up and manages the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database.20 In 2018, the CHDE had planned to install IMSMA Core but this was deferred to 2019.21
PLANNING AND TASKING
The draft National Strategic Plan on Mine Action was 
approved by the Armenian government in 2018 and it 
was expected that it would be adopted in 2019. The main 
objectives of the draft Plan are to address, as a priority, 
anti-personnel mines in CHAs that have a humanitarian 
impact, increasing community safety in support of the 
achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.22 
Priority for clearance is based on CHDE criteria. Priority is 
given fi rst to contaminated areas that are up to 1km away 
from a population centre, then to those near agricultural land, 
and fi nally to contaminated areas that negatively affect the 
environment. These are mostly located in the mountains. To 
optimise effi cient deployment of resources, clearance plans 
are typically drawn up on a community-by-community basis.23
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In 2013, with the assistance of FSD, the CHDE developed 
the Armenian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) 
and submitted them for government approval. The NMAS 
were approved by the government in April 2014.24 In 2018, 
amendments were made to the NMAS for mine risk education, 
accreditation of demining organisations, and mine detection 
dogs (MDDs). According to CHDE, reviews of the NMAS are 
conducted following the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) and international best practice.25
The CHDE will further develop its standing operating 
procedures (SoPs) once the draft law on mine action has 
been adopted.26 SoPs on manual mine clearance and battle 
area clearance (BAC) have already been elaborated.27
OPERATORS 
All demining in Armenia is conducted by the Armenian 
Peacekeeping Engineering Brigade (PKEB) and the CHDE. 
In 2018, the PKEB deployed three teams of seven clearance 
personnel. In addition, the CHDE deployed one technical 
survey team. In 2019, both technical survey and clearance 
capacity were planned to be increased.28
Quality management is conducted in accordance with IMAS and 
the NMAS. Quality assurance (QA) is conducted by dedicated 
offi cers who make regular fi eld visits to inspect cleared land.29 
Quality control (QC) is conducted once clearance of the land 
has been completed, but prior to handover.30
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Six MDDs were introduced in Armenia but failed their 
accreditation in 2017 and were returned so could not be 
involved in demining operations as planned.31 As at April 2019, 
there were no plans to bring back MDDs to Armenia although 
the CHDE is open to discuss the possibility of involving MDDs 
in its operations in the future.32
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No anti-personnel mined area was cancelled or reduced 
through survey in 2018. A total of 46,881m2 of ERW-
contaminated area was reduced in the Chambarak locality 
in Gegharkunik province.
In 2018, a total of 9,237m2 of anti-personnel mined area was 
cleared from Davit Bek CHA in the Kapan locality in Syunik 
province. During clearance, only one anti-personnel mine 
was found. In addition, in 2018, the CHDE implemented the 
following clearance activities: clearance of 3,128m2 of anti-
vehicle mined area in Tegh in Syunik province and clearance 
of 6,676m2 of ERW in Kornidzor in Syunik province.
No target date has been set for the completion of mine 
clearance in Armenia, due to the uncertainty over future 
capacity and funding.33 Moreover, over the past fi ve years, 
demining in Armenia has been slow and productivity rates 
paltry, as Table 3 illustrates. In 2018, very little demining 
took place. Armenia claims that challenges in its mine and 
ERW clearance include the low level of contamination and 
the random distribution of mines.34
Operational capacity was expected to increase in 2019 with 
clearance continuing of the Davit Bek CHA. This is near a 
highway directly affecting people’s safety and will be used 
for pasture once clearance is completed.35 Going forward 
Armenia will struggle to complete clearance without a 
signifi cant increase in funding and capacity.
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2014–18
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Azerbaijan has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Azerbaijan should complete the countrywide re-survey of anti-personnel mine contamination.
 ■ Azerbaijan should ensure that clearance is only conducted in areas where there is fi rm evidence 
of contamination.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of contamination from anti-personnel 
mines in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently 
occupy a signifi cant area of the country where considerable 
contamination exists. The Azerbaijan National Agency for 
Mine Action (ANAMA) has suggested that contamination in 
areas occupied by Armenia may cover between 350km2 and 
830km2, and contain between 50,000 and 100,000 mines.1 
At the end of 2018, Azerbaijan reported 33 mined areas in 
regions under its control totalling 4.1km2 (see Table 1). A more 
precise estimate of contamination will only be known after 
completion of a countrywide re-survey but as at April 2019, 
no such survey was planned. In 2018, however, an additional 
98,887m2 of mined area was added to the database.2
As at the end of 2018, Azerbaijan estimated that it had 14 
anti-personnel mined areas covering a total of more than 
1.6km2 (see Table 2). Before this latest estimate, the previous 
assessment of anti-personnel mine contamination provided 
by ANAMA was 69.9km2 in 2015.3
Table 1: Mined area by type (at end 2018)4
Contamination CHAs Area (m2) SHAs that may contain mines Area (m2)
Anti-personnel mines 6 1,142,486 7  503,000
Anti-vehicle mines 10 1,302,960 9 1,195,720
Totals 17 2,445,446 16 1,698,720
CHAs = Confi rmed hazardous areas   SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas 
Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2018)
Region CHAs Area(m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Jabrayil 1  98,887 2 250,000
Fizuli 3 815,462 2  85,000
Khojavend 1 226,500 0  50,000
Garadagh 1  1,637 1  48,000
Aghdam 0 0 1  70,000
Aghjabedi 0 0 1 0
Totals 6 1,142,486 7 503,000
AZERBAIJAN











Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in 
Azerbaijan is the consequence of the 1988–94 armed confl ict 
with Armenia – which saw landmines laid by both sides – 
and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. The 
most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders 
and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh (see 
the report on Nagorno-Karabakh in this report for further 
information). The adjoining districts of Gubadly, Jabrayil, 
Kelbajar, Lachin, and Zangilan, as well as parts of Aghdam, 
Fizuli, and Tartar, are under the control of Armenian forces, 
and are suspected to contain both mines and unexploded 
ordnance (UXO).5
Azerbaijan is also suspected to be contaminated with cluster 
munition remnants and other ERW: both UXO and abandoned 
explosive ordnance (AXO), the extent of which is not 
known (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants 2019 report on Azerbaijan for further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
ANAMA, the de facto national mine action authority and 
mine action centre, is tasked with planning, coordinating, 
managing, and monitoring mine action in the country. It 
also conducts demining operations, along with two national 
operators it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and 
the International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF). No commercial 
company is active in mine action in Azerbaijan.6
UNDP provides capacity development to ANAMA and will 
continue to do so until 2020. The fi ve main project activities 
are: maximising the socio-economic impact of clearance; 
supporting the institutional capacity of ANAMA for mine/
UXO clearance according to international and national mine 
action standards; promoting ANAMA as an international mine 
action centre; procurement and upgrading of equipment; 
and introducing a gender-sensitive approach to mine action 
to Azerbaijan.7 According to ANAMA, as at end April 2019, 
project outputs included improvements to ANAMA’s regional 
structure, enhanced international training services, better 
training equipment, and support for the training centre.8
As at April 2019, Azerbaijan was still in the process of 
adopting a national mine action law, with draft legislation 
under review by the Cabinet of Ministers.9 Once adopted, 
it will regulate mine action in Azerbaijan, governing issues 
such as licensing, accreditation, quality assurance (QA), and 
tender procedures.10
The Azerbaijani government funds 90% of ANAMA’s operating 
costs and 90% of all survey and clearance activities in 
Azerbaijan.11
GENDER
ANAMA does not have a gender policy. There are no women working in any operational roles in survey and clearance in 
Azerbaijan. However, women do participate in mine risk education sessions and are consulted during survey.12
One of the goals of the UNDP-ANAMA capacity strengthening project is to introduce a gender-sensitive approach to mine action 
to Azerbaijan.13 This is defi ned as delivering train the trainer sessions to mine action staff on a gender-sensitive approach to 
working with affected populations and the development of an accompanying training manual. No information on progress 
towards this goal has been provided by ANAMA or UNDP.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
ANAMA uses an old version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and is working with the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to upgrade this to the latest IMSMA Core during 2019–20.14
PLANNING AND TASKING
The existing mine action strategy was for 2013–18.15 Its main 
aims were said to be to continue mine and ERW clearance in 
support of government development projects and to provide 
safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.16
The strategy expired at the end of 2018 and has not yet 
been replaced.
ANAMA is integrated into the State Social and Economic 
Development programme and mine action is reported to be 
an integral part of the new state socio-economic development 
plan developed for 2019–22.17
ANAMA had annual workplans for both 2018 and 2019. In 
2019, ANAMA was intending to continue mine clearance in 
Aghdam and Aghjabedi, Fizuli, Heybet, Jabrayil, and Terter 
regions. In the absence of a new multi year strategic plan, 
tasks are prioritised according to the state development 
plan and instructions from the government.18
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Azerbaijan has its own National Mine Action Standards 
(NMAS), which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently 
revised in 2003, 2004, and 2010 in accordance with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and best 
practice.19 No major modifi cations to the standards were 
made in 2018.20
ANAMA also has standing operating procedures (SoPs) 
in place, which were reviewed in 2018.21
OPERATORS 
In 2018, ANAMA employed 613 operational and administrative 
staff across six regional centres (including the Regional Mine 
Action Resource and Training Centre).22
The Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division 
continued its quality management (QM)-related activities 
during 2018. There were both quality assurance (QA) and 
quality control (QC) sampling inspections. QA and QC were 
carried out on both ANAMA’s operations and the operations 
by the two national NGOs.23
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and mechanical assets are used 
to support reduction through technical survey and manual 
clearance operations.24 In 2018, Azerbaijan had 48 MDDs and 
6 machines.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
No anti-personnel mined area was cancelled or reduced through survey in 2018.25
In 2018, a total of 353,258m2 of mined area was cleared, as set out in Table 3. In Aghdam and Aghjabedi only two anti-personnel 
mines were found in clearance of 1,500m2 and 10,000m2, respectively. In Jabrayil, no anti-personnel mines were found during 
clearance but only ten items of UXO. This is a marked decrease from clearance in 2017 when 7.69km2 was cleared (or 4km2 if 
you exclude cleared areas with no anti-personnel mine contamination). In addition, two anti-personnel mines were found and 
destroyed during EOD spot tasks.












Fizuli ANAMA 3 238,396 25 1 2
Aghdam RA 0 1,500 1 0 0
Aghjabedi RA 0 10,000 1 0 0
Garadagh ANAMA 1 4,475 2 0 150
Jabrayil ANAMA 1 98,887 0 0 10
Totals 5 353,258 29 1 162
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
Azerbaijan submitted voluntary APMBC Article 7 
transparency reports in 2008 and 2009 but has not submitted 
an Article 7 report in the last nine years. Over the last fi ve 
years, 11.47km2 of mined area has been cleared in Azerbaijan. 
Mine clearance output fell dramatically in 2018 after a large 
increase in 2017 (see Table 4). Accuracy of reporting of 
contamination, survey and clearance data continues to be an 
issue in Azerbaijan as does effectiveness and effi ciency of 
land release methodology with many areas being cleared 
that prove to have little or no mine contamination. As at 
April 2019, no target date had been set for the completion 
of anti-personnel mine clearance in Azerbaijan.
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







* A further 3.7km2 was cleared but was found not to contain mines.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ China should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, China has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL 
MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of mine contamination remaining in China is 
not known. In the 1990s, the United States reported that 
China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, the 
Russian Federation, and Vietnam.1 China’s military estimated 
that around two million mines of a wide variety of types 
were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone.2 China has 
not reported on mine contamination along its borders with 
Russia and India or on operations to clear them. 
China conducted clearance operations along its border 
with Vietnam between 1992 and 1999,3 between 2005 and 
2009,4 and between 2015 and 2018.5 In 2009, China said it 
had completed demining along the Yunnan section of its 
border with Vietnam and that this “represents the completion 
of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s 
territory.”6 This was followed by a statement in 2011 when 
a Foreign Ministry offi cial reported that China maintains 
a small number of minefi elds “for national defence”.7 Two 
months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, China 
said that large-scale demining activities had “on the whole 
eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories”.8 At 
the Maputo Review Conference in 2014, China said it had 
“basically eradicated landmines on its own territory”.9
Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three 
‘campaigns’ in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region. The fi rst was in 1992–94 and the second 
in 1997–99.10 However, these two campaigns did not deal with 
minefi elds located in disputed areas of the border, where 
500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km2. After a technical 
survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance 
campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan 
province in 2005. China stated in 2009 that it had completed 
clearance of this border after clearing a total of 5.15km2.11 
In early November 2015, however, China embarked on a 
further demining operation along the border with Vietnam.12 
In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report 
submitted in March 2017, China reported that in November 
2015–February 2017, the Chinese army cleared 18.4km2 of 
minefi elds on the Yunnan border.13
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any 
mine clearance is conducted by the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) as a military activity.
LAND RELEASE 
Media accounts reported that mine clearance resumed in 
November 2017 in the Yunnan border area and in the Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region.14 Clearance was reportedly 
completed in November 2018, with 2,300 explosive items 
found and destroyed across 1.5km2 in Guangxi province.15 
In Yunnan province an estimated 200,000 explosive items 
were found and destroyed in over 50km2 of mined area 
between November 2015 and November 2018.16
CHINA
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Cuba should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Cuba has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Cuba’s mine contamination remains unchanged from previous years. Cuban authorities maintain minefi elds around the United 
States (US) naval base at Guantánamo in the south-east of Cuba. In 2007, Cuba said it carries out “a strict policy with regard 
to guaranteeing a responsible use of anti-personnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national 
security.”1 According to an earlier statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing minefi elds are duly “marked, fenced and 
guarded” in accordance with Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts.2 
According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate “at least once a month”,3 but it has not been 
possible to independently confi rm this claim. In February 2018, a fi re broke out in the 17-mile strip of land separating the 
Guantánamo base from Cuban territory which reportedly detonated 1,000 landmines and burned 1,700 acres over three days 
before being extinguished.4 
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no mine action programme in Cuba.
LAND RELEASE 
Cuba has not conducted clearance in its minefi elds around the US naval base at Guantánamo over the last ten years.
CUBA
 1 Statement by Rebeca Hernández Toledano, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Cuba to the UN, “Item 29: Assistance in mine action”, UN General Assembly, 
Fourth Committee, New York, 6 November 2007. 
 2 Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2000. 
 3 “The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fi res that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]… 
described a fi re that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding….” D. P. Erikson, Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, 
the United States, and the Next Revolution, Bloomsbury, United States, October 2008, pp. 196–97. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Egypt should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Egypt has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination 
in Egypt remains unknown and past estimates have been 
unreliable. Egypt is contaminated with mines in the Western 
Desert, which date from the Second World War, and in the 
Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert, which are a legacy of 
wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973. Some recent mine 
incidents in Sinai may have been caused by mines emplaced 
by anti-government jihadist groups.1 It was reported in 
August 2016 that Islamic State had been digging up Second 
World War-era landmines and re-using them.2 
Most of the Western Desert contamination occurred around 
the location of Second World War battles that took place 
between the Quattara depression and Alamein on the 
Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around the 
city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border. 
In November 2016, during a ceremony to mark the opening 
of a new prosthetic limb centre, the United Kingdom’s 
Ambassador to Egypt announced that all the maps of 
minefi elds laid by British and Allied forces during World War 
II had been handed over.3 According to the head of the military 
engineering department, though, the British minefi eld maps 
were “sketch maps” and most of the mines were buried 
randomly.4 Major General Mahrous Kilani, Head of the General 
Secretariat for Mine Clearance, reported that while the mine 
maps are an indication of possible mine locations many mines 
have been found in areas that are unmarked by the maps.5 
In January 2018, the British MP Daniel Kawczynski 
put a written question to the UK Secretary of State for 
International Development asking whether her Department 
was taking steps to assist with the mapping and disposal 
of Second World War mines in the Tobruk and El Alamein 
regions. The UK reiterated that maps of minefi eld locations 
had been provided to the Egyptian authorities and that, since 
2006, through multilateral funding along with other donors 
(including Germany, Japan, New Zealand, and the United 
States), the United Kingdom had funded clearance of 130,446 
acres of land around El Alamein.6 
The Egyptian government has claimed that some 17 million 
mines remained in the Western Desert and another 5.5 
million in Sinai and the Eastern Desert.7 In an April 2009 
assessment, though, the United Nations (UN) Mine Action 
Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid 
reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby 
misrepresenting the problem.8 In this regard, in October 2017, 
it was reported by the European Union (EU)’s ambassador 
to Egypt that 2,680km2 of land in the North West Coast was 
claimed to still be contaminated.9
In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining 
and Development of the North West Coast (Executive 
Secretariat) reported to donors that the army had destroyed 
2.9 million mines while clearing 38km² in fi ve areas, leaving 
“more than 16 million mines” covering an estimated area 
of 248km².10 Details of items cleared are not consistent with 
other available information.
In 2013, the army handed over to the Ministries of Housing 
and of Planning and International Cooperation an area of 
some 105km² in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly 
cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Details of 
clearance operations were not reported. Minister of Housing 
Tarek Wafi q was quoted as saying that with completion of the 
project one-fi fth of the Western Desert had been cleared.11
In August 2016, it was reported that Islamic State had been 
harvesting the explosives from Second World War mines 
still uncleared in Egypt. According to Ambassador Fathy 
el-Shazly, formerly the head of Egypt’s Executive Secretariat 
for Mine Clearance, “We’ve had at least 10 reports from the 
military of terrorists using old mines. Even now, these things 
trouble us in different ways.”12 These fi ndings were reiterated 
in June 2017 at a UN Security Council briefi ng when Egypt’s 
permanent representative to the UN Amr Abdel-Latif Abul 
Atta stated that “abandoned mines and explosive remnants of 
wars have become a source of access for armed movements 
and terrorists to fi nd materials for manufacturing improvised 
explosive devices”.13 It was reported in January 2018 that 
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), which pledged allegiance to 
Islamic State in 2014, has been using old mines and caches of 
explosives left in Sinai to produce different types of explosive 
devices. There were at least fi ve major attacks by terrorist 
groups using such devices in Egypt in 2017.14 This should 
serve as a wake-up call to Egypt to pursue mine clearance 
with far greater vigour than it has so far done so.
EGYPT
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
In 2018 as in previous years, the mine action programme in 
Egypt was not functioning effectively. 
A joint project between the Egyptian government and the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) “Support the North 
West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Programme: 
Mine Action” was conducted in two phases from 2007 to 
2014 and from 2015 to 2017. The project provided for the 
creation of an Executive Secretariat for Mine Clearance and 
the Development of the North West Coast within the Ministry 
of Planning to coordinate implementation of the North West 
Coast Development Plan through a partnership consisting 
of the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Defence, and 
UNDP.15 It was acknowledged in May 2015 by the Director 
of the Executive Secretariat that past results had been 
“disappointing”.16 It was reported that a total area of 1,096km² 
has been “cleared” since 2009 and that there were plans to 
establish an eco-oriented city, the “New City of Alamein”.17
Funding was also used for capacity building, establishing a 
quality management unit, and supporting the creation of 
the Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) database.
Clearance was conducted by the Mine Clearance Branch of 
the Egyptian Armed Forces Engineering Authority using both 
manual and mechanical demining techniques.18 The Executive 
Secretariat is said to have procured 461 mine detectors, 
355 demining suits and protective helmets, one Casspir 
armoured vehicle with the “Mine Lab” detecting device, and 
fi ve Armtrac vehicles.19 In August 2017, it was reported that 
negotiations had begun on a third phase of the project to 
allocate $5 million to clear the rest of the northern coast and 
the Sinai Peninsula.20
In May 2017, Kuwait granted Egypt an aid package of 
almost US$1 million for mine clearance in the North-West 
Coast area.21 In January 2019, Egypt called for renewed 
international support for mine clearance, especially around El 
Alamein. Parliament member Mohamed el-Ghoul resubmitted 
a 2017 motion demanding fi nancial compensation from the 
countries that laid mines in Egypt, mainly Germany and the 
United Kingdom.22
LAND RELEASE 
Egypt has not reported with any credibility on its release of mined areas in recent years and no target date has been set for the 
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GEORGIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Georgia has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the 
Red Bridge border minefi eld.
 ■ Georgia should grant access to The HALO Trust to complete survey and clearance of the remaining 
mined areas.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The full extent of mine contamination in Georgia is not known. According to estimates, as set out in Table 1, Georgia more 
than 2.3km2 of mined areas across nine minefi elds. Contamination comprises both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. 
The problem includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri municipality, and Vaziani village, in Gardabani municipality, both of which
 are in military zones. Khojali mountain, in Mestia municipality, is on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with Abkhazia, 
where the size of mined areas is not known.1






Kvemo Kartli Marneuli Kachagani (Red Bridge) AP and AV mines 1 2,282,852
Kvemo Kartli Gardabani Vaziani (Military zone) AP mines 1 N/K
Mtskheta-Mtianeti Dusheti Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2 AP mines 2 4,275
Mtskheta-Mtianeti Dusheti Kadoeti AP mines 1 23,783
Shida Kartli Kashuri Osiauri (Military zone) AP mines 1 N/K
Shida Kartli Gori Zemo Nikozi AP mines and UXO 1 3,233
Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti Mestia Khojali AP mines 1 N/K
Totals 8 2,314,143
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle   UXO = Unexploded ordnance   N/K = Not known
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine 
Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 
to January 2010, which identifi ed eight suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) and seven confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) 




Of the 15 SHAs and CHAs in total, ten 
contained mines and fi ve were contaminated with unexploded 
ordnance (UXO).4
 
Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO 
Trust cleared fi ve of the minefi elds that had a humanitarian 
impact.5 
The Red Bridge minefi eld is an unfenced 7km-long minefi eld 
consisting of densely packed lines of anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines at the “Red Bridge” border crossing 
between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan 
during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, it is Georgia’s largest 
minefi eld and the last major minefi eld not in the vicinity 
of a functioning military establishment. As at April 2019, 
there had been 88 accidents, 22 involving humans and 66 
involving livestock.6








Abkhazia was declared mine-impact free in 2011 after 14 
years of mine clearance. In 2017, there was an explosion 
at a local military ammunition store close to the village of 
Primorsky which scattered mines and UXO over a 4.5km2
area.7 There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a 
result of the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more 
recent 2008 confl ict with Russia. The HALO Trust has planned 
to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date, 
has not been granted access. South Ossetia is effectively 
subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both 
Georgian authorities and international non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) demining operators.
Georgia is believed to be free of cluster munition remnants 
(CMR), with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which 
is occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian 
authorities and international mine action NGOs (see Mine 
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019
report on Georgia for further information).8 Georgia remains 
contaminated by other UXO, likely in South Ossetia and also 
within Georgia in former fi ring ranges.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD), 
renamed after a reorganisation in January 2019, sits under 
the State Military Scientifi c Technical Centre, known as 
DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).9 The primary 
task of the HDCD is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, 
including overseeing the national mine action strategy and 
quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC), and facilitating 
the development and implementation of Georgian National 
Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).10
For all mine action-related issues, The HALO Trust 
communicates with DELTA.11 The Georgian authorities are 
supportive of the granting of visas for international staff 
and the importation of demining equipment. HALO Trust 
submitted several requests to the MoD seeking access to the 
remaining minefi elds, the last of which was submitted in April 
2018. As at May 2019, HALO Trust had received permission to 
begin clearing two of the fi ve remaining minefi elds at Khojali 
and Kadoeti, respectively. As at June 2019, permissions for 
the remaining three minefi elds had not been granted.12
The Georgian government funds the running costs of the 
HDCD as well as the Engineering Brigade, which carries out 
some battle area clearance (BAC).13
The national authority has received capacity development 
support from HALO Trust and the Geneva Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The HALO Trust has 
provided training on clearance and survey techniques and, in 
2018, donated a mine action vehicle to the HDCD.14 The GICHD 
has provided training for HDCD staff on the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, 
IMAS, and ammunition storage.15
GENDER
DELTA and The HALO Trust each have gender and diversity 
policies. HALO Trust supports use of mixed-gender teams to 
conduct survey, which allows for greater engagement with 
women and children.16 If HALO Trust is given permission 
to work in the remaining minefi elds in Tbilisi Administered 
Territories (TAT), community liaison and survey teams will 
be mixed gender and inclusive of ethnic minorities.17
There is equal access to employment for qualifi ed women 
and men in survey and clearance teams in Georgia, including 
for managerial level/supervisory positions although 
proportionately the number of women remains low. In 
Abkhazia, The HALO Trust worked with local women’s 
organisations during its July 2018 recruitment drive in an 
effort to achieve gender parity. As at April 2019, 30% of its 
operational and management staff were female.18
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HDCD uses the IMSMA database and, according to The 
HALO Trust, the data is accurate. Data archives go back 
to 2009 and are regularly updated, based on HALO Trust’s 
operations reports and on work by the Engineering Brigade.19
The IMSMA database is administered by a certifi ed specialist 
within the HDCD, trained by the GICHD, who receives regular 
refresher training in the latest procedures.20
The data in the national information management system 
is accessible to The HALO Trust.21 HALO Trust uses its own 
IMSMA-compatible data collection forms that DELTA have 
approved while the HDCD QA/QC team, also have their 
own forms.22
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Georgia has a national mine action strategy. Its main aims 
and targets are focused on the remaining clearance of anti-
personnel mines and other areas contaminated with ERW.23 
The annual workplans for 2018 and 2019 centred on battle 
area clearance (BAC) and minefi eld clearance within TAT.24
In April 2019, due to access not being granted to the 
remaining minefi elds, The HALO Trust had suspended 
all operations in Georgia, apart from one two-month 
task clearing abandoned ordnance at Chonto, near the 
Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia. The 
Abkhazia programme will continue operations at Primorsky 
and HALO will also respond to explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) call-outs.25
Georgia is said to have a long-term capacity to address 
anti-personnel mine contamination, with plans in place for 
dealing with residual risk and liability.26
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
As at April 2019, Georgian National Mine Action Standards 
and National Technical Standards and Guidelines were still 
under development. The IMAS and International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines are being translated into Georgian.27
The HALO Trust has standing operating procedures (SoPs) in 
place for all its activities, including survey, mine clearance, 
and EOD. No modifi cations or enhancements were made to 
these SoPs in 2018 or early 2019.28
OPERATORS 
The HALO Trust, which is the only international operator 
working in the country, conducts survey and both BAC and 
mine clearance.29 DELTA retains a small demining and EOD 
capacity in TAT. The Engineering Brigade has been carrying 
out BAC in Gonio, a former military polygon in the Adjara 
region, and also responds to EOD call-outs. The State 
Security Service of Georgia also carries out EOD spot tasks. 
In Abkhazia, the emergency services (EMERCOM) have a 
small EOD capacity, though HALO Trust is generally relied 
upon to deal with all items of UXO.30
Within The HALO Trust, operational staff deployed in 2018 
were responsible for both survey and clearance. In TAT, 
HALO’s operational staff decreased from 38 in 2017 to 18 
in 2018. In 2019, HALO made all operational staff in TAT 
redundant. In Abkhazia, the programme began 2018 with 28 
staff, which increased to 77 in July to cope with expanded 
operations at Primorsky. This was reduced to 35 staff at the 
beginning of 2019.31
In TAT, quality management (QM) is conducted by DELTA. 
In Abkhazia, The HALO Trust is responsible for its own QM.32
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2018, The HALO Trust had two mechanical assets deployed 
in Anaklia region in western Georgia, for UXO clearance. The 
Abkhazia programme also has two mechanical assets which 
it used for clearance at the Primorsky ammunition store 
explosion site. The HALO Trust also uses a drone to collect 
aerial footage of a task.33
Mine detection dogs (MDDs) were used by the Engineering 
Brigade during BAC in the Gonio former military polygon, 
Adjara region. The State Security Service of Georgia has 
several MDD teams which it uses for EOD spot tasks.34
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 415,604m2 of mine and ERW contaminated area 
was released in 2018, of which 377,846m2 was cleared, and 
37,758m2 was reduced through technical survey. A total of 
664 mines were destroyed, including those destroyed during 
EOD spot tasks.
SURVEY IN 2018
There was no non-technical survey undertaken in 2018. The 
HALO Trust reduced 37,758m2 through technical survey in 
Anaklia village in Samegrelo-Svaneti region.35 This is a slight 
reduction from the 39,568m2 reduced through technical 
survey in 2017.
CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, The HALO Trust cleared 389,204m2 and destroyed 
556 anti-personnel mines (see Table 2). In TAT, no mines 
were found in the areas cleared; only 33 items of UXO.36 This 
is a large increase from the 9,256m2 cleared at the Chognari 
minefi eld in 2017. The HALO Trust conducted BAC in 2018, 
focusing its mine clearance on Abkhazia.
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Shida Kartli, Dvani 1 102,551 0 0 11
Shida Kartli, Dzevera 1 5,600 0 0 22
Abkhazia, Primorsky 1 269,695 556 4 38,021
Totals 3 377,846 556 4 38,054
In addition, national operators destroyed nine anti-personnel 
mines in TAT while The HALO Trust destroyed 99 anti-
personnel mines in Abkhazia during EOD spot tasks in 2018. 
None of the mines found in Abkhazia had been laid; they were 
all either being stored in personal stockpiles or had been 
discarded in uninhabited areas.37
No target date has been set for completion of anti-personnel 
mine clearance in Georgia. Georgia has identifi ed clearance 
of the Red Bridge minefi eld as one of its key strategic mine 
action priorities.38 Georgia previously reported plans to start 
clearance of the Red Bridge minefi eld in 2015.39 Georgian 
and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss 
demining the minefi eld,40 but only survey was permitted. The 
HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 1 and 
3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. The 
following month, however, the Azerbaijani military demanded 
that technical survey operations be halted.41 Georgia reported 
discussing with Azerbaijan during 2018 regarding the 
clearance of Red Bridge minefi eld.42 However, as at April 2019 
The HALO Trust had not been granted permission to restart 
clearance there.43
In Abkhazia, the main priority is the clearance of Primorsky, 
where an unplanned explosion in 2017 contaminated the 
surrounding territory with mines and UXO. In 2018, HALO 
received funding from the European Union, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. With adequate funding, 
HALO Trust hopes to fi nish the clearance of Primorsky 
by 2021.44
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ India should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, India has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination is 
not known. Large-scale mine-laying was conducted by 
government forces on and near the Line of Control (LoC) 
separating India and Pakistan during the 1971 war and the 
2001–02 stand-off between the two states. Anti-personnel 
and anti-vehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and 
pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number 
of villages. 
Despite occasional offi cial claims that all the mines laid 
were subsequently cleared, reports of contamination and 
casualties have persisted. A media report in 2013 cited a 
government statement that about 20km2 of irrigated land 
was still mined in the Akhnoor sector of the LoC alone.1 In 
June 2016, India’s NDTV news reported that the Indian army 
was demining areas of the LoC in Rajouri district, Kashmir, 
in order to return land to communities for agricultural use 
as it vacated fi elds near the border that were reportedly 
taken over and mined during the Kargil Confl ict in 1999 and 
Operation Parakaram in 2001.2 
Landmine incidents continue to be reported, primarily 
involving Indian army personnel, but also civilians. According 
to a list compiled from media reports and police sources, 
from January to December 2018, 25 military personnel were 
injured by anti-personnel mines near the LoC. During the 
same period, nine civilians were injured by mines and one 
man was killed when he stepped on an anti-personnel mine 
near the LoC in the Poonch district.3
Security forces have also reported extensive use of mines and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Maoist fi ghters in the 
north-eastern states of Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand causing 
civilian and military casualties. In July 2018, it was reported 
that 15 anti-vehicle mines placed by Maoist rebels were 
neutralised by security forces in Garhwa district, Jharkhand 
state.4 However, mine types are usually not specifi ed and may 
include command-detonated explosive devices as well as 
mines (i.e. victim-activated explosive devices).5
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after 
receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.
LAND RELEASE 
There is no publicly available offi cial information on land 
release in 2018. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible 
for clearing mines placed by non-state armed groups.6 In July 
2017, for instance, according to a media account, the Indian 
Army was manually clearing mines in the border districts 
of Jammu and Kashmir and was procuring more advanced 
demining equipment with a view to improving safety and 
decreasing the number of deminer casualties.7 Media reports 
have indicated the police also play an active part in clearing 
mines and other explosive hazards on an ad hoc basis in 
states dealing with insurgency.8 
India has not reported that any mine clearance has occurred 
in its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency reports since 
2006.9 In August 2016, India stated that “mines used for 
military operations were laid within fenced and marked 
perimeters and were cleared after operations”.10
INDIA





 1 “Heavy rainfall worsening landmine peril for Kashmiri farmers”, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 5 November 2013, at: tmsnrt.rs/33xqBun. 
 2 “Farmers Hope to Return to Fields as Army Clears Landmines on Line of Control”, NDTV, 27 June 2016, at: bit.ly/2Z1AJIl. 
 3 “Death-traps along the border: Why are Indian landmines killing Indians?”, National Herald, 9 December 2018, at: bit.ly/2N1DZRF; “Elderly Man Dies In Mine Blast Near 
LoC In Poonch”, Kashmir Observer, 31 May 2018, at: bit.ly/33vlECc.  
 4 “Jawans unearth 15 landmines on rebel turf”, The Telegraph India, 6 July 2018, at: bit.ly/33ycUeu .
 5 See, e.g., “15 police, driver killed by suspected Maoist landmine in western India”, Daily Sabah, 1 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2yZgobW; “Jharkhand: Six Jaguar Force jawans 
killed in Maoist landmine blast”, The Indian Express, 27 June 2018, at: bit.ly/2Z1R6st; “Farmer hurt in blast”, The Telegraph India, 3 May 2018, at: bit.ly/303gBqv; and 
“Three killed in landmine blast triggered by Maoists in Chhattisgarh”, Hindustan Times, 19 January 2017, at: bit.ly/301Cvuk.  
 6 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2006), Form B.  
 7 “Advanced tech to help soldiers map minefi elds”, The Times of India, 10 July 2017, at: bit.ly/2KyoVt7. 
 8 “IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: Police”, The Indian Express, 24 July 2017, at: bit.ly/2MgNRrb.  
 9 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019), Form B. 
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IRAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Iran should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Iran has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance 
and destruction.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Iran is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle 
mines, mainly as a result of the 1980−88 war with Iraq. The 
extent of the remaining mined areas is unknown, but mine 
contamination is concentrated in fi ve western provinces 
bordering Iraq. 
Minister of Defence Hossein Dehghan said in 2014 that the 
4,500km2 of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
contamination left by the Iran-Iraq war in the fi ve western 
provinces had been reduced to 280km2.1 In February 2014, 
the Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC) reported that the fi ve 
Western provinces had remaining contamination totalling 
250km2.2 
According to online media sources, fl ooding that hit large 
parts of Iran in March and April 2019 exposed mines and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining in western provinces 
of Iran.3
However, two anti-vehicle mine incidents occurred in early 
2014 in the Lut desert spanning central and eastern Iran 
where police reportedly placed mines as a measure against 
drug traffi ckers, pointing to contamination outside the fi ve 
most affected provinces.4 Sources report that security forces 
continue to emplace mines in areas close to Iran’s borders 
in order to deter cross-border smugglers and infi ltration 
by anti-regime groups. There are also mined areas around 
military bases. 
A further complication for contamination estimates are 
reports of continuing casualties in areas that were supposed 
to have been cleared, calling into question to whether mine 
clearance has been conducted to international standards.
Iran also has cluster munition remnant contamination (see 
Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 
2019 report on Iran for further information).
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
IRMAC was established as the national mine action centre 
in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee within 
the Ministry of Defence. IRMAC is responsible for planning, 
data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of 
demining operators. It also sets standards, provides training 
for clearance operators, concludes contracts with demining 
operators, and ensures monitoring of their operations. It 
coordinates mine action with the General Staff of the Armed 
Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning 
Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and 
organisations, and handles international relations.5 Several 
IRMAC staff are believed to be serving or former military 
personnel, including its Director, while others are civilians 
employed by the Ministry of Defence.
IRMAC has a branch in every affected province. Available 
demining assets, such as mechanical assets, vary from 
province to province.
In March 2019, Iran hosted a three-day international 
roundtable on “humanitarian mine action: challenges and 
best practices”, attended by representatives from other 
states, national and international demining organisations, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The aim of the 
roundtable was to share knowledge and experience on mine 
action, challenges, and best practices.6 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
IRMAC actively maintains a national mine action database but it is not known if it is comprehensive.





 1 Ministry of Defence, “Commander Dehghan in the ceremony of World Mine Awareness Day: In Iran 28,000 hectares of land are landmine-contaminated”, 8 April 2014. 
 2 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation at IRMAC headquarters, Tehran, 9 February 2014. 
 3 “Unexploded Ordnance Threatening Iranian Lives in Flood-Hit Areas”, IFP News, 5 April 2019, at: bit.ly/33Tsp0K; and “Nationwide Flood Alert In Iran As Emergency 
Declared In Oil-Producing Province”, Radio Farda, 31 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2zjb3MJ. 
 4 “Mine Explosion Killed a Desert Explorer in Birjand”, Islamic Republic News Agency, 4 January 2014; and “Four tourists hit a landmine in Lut: one was killed”, Iranian 
Students’ News Agency, 25 March 2014. 
 5 IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, “Presentation of IRMAC”. 
 6 “Tehran hosts international roundtable on humanitarian mine action”, Mehr news agency, 12 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2Z4LslE; and ICRC, “International roundtable on 
“humanitarian mine action: challenges and best practices”, 15 March 2019, at: bit.ly/2QH3cR6. 
 7 Information provided by mine action expert on condition of anonymity. 
 8 Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for development without borders, September 2019. 
 9 Ibid. 
 10 Information provided by mine action expert on condition of anonymity. 
 11 Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for development without borders, September 2019. 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS
IRMAC combines the roles of regulator and operator, with 
demining teams and support staff deployed in fi ve affected 
provinces.7 In Kurdistan province, IRMAC is conducting 
verifi cation, mainly through mechanical clearance. IRMAC 
also responds to calls from the local community reporting 
landmines or items of UXO. Demining capacity in Kurdistan 
province is believed to stand at around 12 personnel, a 
downsize compared to previous capacity.8
Commercial operators include AOM, Immen Sazan Omran 
Pars International, Immen Zamin Espadana, and Solh 
Afarinan-e Bedoun-e Marz (SABM). Three other companies, 
Imen Gostaran Mohit (IGM), Moshaver Omran Iran, and ZPP 
International, undertake quality assurance/quality control 
(QA/QC).9
Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC), 
the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators 
conducting clearance of Iran’s oil and gas producing areas 
which are concentrated in mine-affected areas of south 
western Iran bordering Iraq.10
The Iranian Army and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
assisted demining efforts to support the response to the fl ash 
fl ooding which affected Iran in March and April 2019.11
International operators are not believed to have been active 
in Iran since 2008.
There is no available information on quality management 
procedures. In the past, very high levels of casualties were 
recorded during demining in Iran.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS 
No data was available on any mine survey or clearance in 2018, as was the case in the previous year.
Iran is believed to have dedicated signifi cant resources and effort to clearing mined areas on its territory, but the results 
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ISRAEL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Israel has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) should consider conducting external quality assurance 
and quality control (QA/QC) itself, rather than outsourcing it to commercial companies, which proves costly for 
international donors to fund.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
The exact extent of mine contamination in Israel is not known. 
Israel reported 41.58km2 of confi rmed mined area and a 
further 48.51km2 of suspected mined area, as at the end of 
2017,1 but did not report the amount of mined area as at the 
end of 2018. The combined 90km2 as at end 2017, represents 
only the area affected by mines that are not deemed essential 
to Israel’s security. The size of other mined areas is not made 
public. The total fi gure includes 18.38km2 of mined area in 
the Jordan Valley (11.84km2 of anti-personnel mined area, 
6.19km2 of anti-vehicle mined area, and 0.35km2 of mixed 
mined area) and the West Bank2 (see the report on Palestine 
in this work for further information). 
Israel’s mine problem dates back to the Second World War. 
Subsequently, Israel laid signifi cant numbers of mines along 
its borders, near military camps and training areas, and 
near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel’s military 
reported planting new mines to reinforce minefi elds and 
other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the 
Golan Heights.3 
In the Golan Heights the mines laid by Syrian forces remain 
largely unknown and areas have been fenced off by the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF). However, according to an online 
media report, fencing is not always properly maintained with 
warning signs, and civilians occasionally cross into minefi elds 
looking for edible plants.4
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2017)5
Type of contamination CHAs Area (km2) SHAs Area (km2)
AP mines only 201 19.93 5 39.54
AV mines only 29 17.00 8 1.17
AP and AV mines 2 4.65 9 7.80
Totals 232 41.58 22 48.51
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle   CHA = Confi rmed hazardous area   SHA = Suspected hazardous area
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
A March 2011 law on minefi eld clearance established the 
INMAA to undertake a “comprehensive programme of mine 
clearing projects inside Israel”.6 The law’s aim was “to create 
a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefi elds 
that are not essential to national security, and to declare 
them as free from landmines with the highest degree of 
safety to civilians, in accordance with the international 
obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest 
period of time possible.”7 
In February 2019, the Director of INMAA reported that new 
legislation had been passed, in the form of a regional law, 
giving the INMAA responsibility for former military bases 
and for addressing abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), and anti-vehicle mines. Prior to 
this, the INMAA had only had responsibility for addressing 
anti-personnel mines, and for mixed mined areas.8 







The INMAA, which has 10 staff, was established in the 
Ministry of Defence, with ministry staff responsible for 
planning mine action.9 As a result of the new law, staffi ng 
at the INMAA was expected to expand by at least 50%, but 
as at February 2019 it was unclear if the budget would be 
increased to enable this to occur.10
The INMAA manages a “minefi eld information bank” that 
is open for public queries concerning demining plans 
and programmes.11
In 2017, the annual mine action budget for Israel was NIS41.7 
million (approx. US$11.5 million), of which NIS27 million was 
from the INMAA’s budget and the remaining NIS14.7 million 
from additional external funding by various infrastructure 
development companies and state authorities.12 The size of 
the 2018 budget is not known.
A number of development projects funded by local electricity, 
water, and infrastructure companies and authorities also pay 
for mine clearance.13
PLANNING AND TASKING
The INMAA has an approved annual mine clearance plan14 and 
a multi-year clearance plan for 2017−20 that plans to focus on 
technical survey and clearance in northern Israel (the Golan 
Heights) in the spring/summer/autumn, and in southern 
Israel (the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain) in the winter,15
executed by civilian local operators.16
In addition, the INMAA continues to oversee HALO Trust 
clearance projects in Area C of the West Bank, funded by the 
European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, and the United 
States (via ITF Enhancing Human Security).17
Furthermore, at the start of 2017, the INMAA began surveying 
the Jordan Valley minefi elds in the West Bank, using 
national budget and operating through Israeli companies. 
The INMAA sees signifi cant potential for cancellation and 
reduction of mined area in the Jordan Valley, and is using 
various technologies and scientifi c tools to assess mine 
drift possibilities. The INMAA has planned to invest around 
NIS 900,000 (approximately US$250,000) in this project in 
2017–1918. Progress in non-technical survey continued in 2018.19
The INMAA, “defi nes clearance policies, sets the national 
priorities and implements them in coordination with 
other relevant governmental ministries, the IDF, and local 
authorities.”20 Clearance tasks are assigned according 
to a classifi cation formula laid down by the INMAA, and 
prioritisation is set nationally every three years. The criteria 
used for the formula are largely based on the risk level and 
development potential of the affected areas.21 The INMAA 
has been studying the social and economic impacts of land 
released over the last four years, as well as on the potential 
impact for future clearance sites.22
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
National mine action standards, which concern rules and regulations concerning clearance methods, quality management, 
legislation, and insurance, are contained on the INMAA website.23
OPERATORS 
Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance 
as well as QA and QC. In 2017, clearance was contracted to 
four national companies: 4M, the Israeli Mine Action Group 
(IMAG), Maavarim, and Safeland. In addition, Ecolog conducted 
geomorphological and hydrological surveys in 2017, together 
with the INMAA, to assist with cancellation of previously 
fl ooded SHAs that could potentially contain mines.24
In 2017, 106 demining personnel and 36 machines were 
deployed for clearance operations.25 The clearance companies 
contracted in 2018, and their demining capacity, is not known.
The IDF also conduct mine clearance according to their 
own mine action plans “that are executed by their military 
methods and techniques”. They have an annual programme 
that includes demining, monitoring, and maintenance of 
mined area protection.26 During wintertime, the IDF give 
special attention to minefi elds that are close to farms, 
residential areas, or hiker routes, as mines may be carried 
into these areas by fl oods.27
In addition, the INMAA reported that it had secured the 
continuation of HALO Trust’s clearance programme in 
Area C of the West Bank until the end of 2019.28 The HALO 
Trust works under the auspices of both the INMAA and the 
Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC), primarily with funding 
from international donors29 (see the report on Palestine in the 
current work for further information).
Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA 
supervisor, a QA/QC contractor, and a clearance operator. 
Five QA/QC contractors were formally registered for 2018: 
4CI Security, Dexagon, Ga-man, Israteam, and Zeev Levanon.30
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Israel uses several kinds of machines in its mine clearance 
operations for ground preparation, survey, and clearance. 
They are said to include, as and where appropriate, screening 
and crushing systems, bucket loaders, excavators, sifters, 
and fl ails/tillers.31 Some of these operations are conducted by 
Israel directly, while others are performed by contractors.32
Throughout 2018, the INMAA continued to be supported by 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) in developing its animal detection system capacity.33
A pilot project using mine detection dogs (MDDs) conducted 
in 201734 found that dogs would not be a valuable tool.35
However, after investigating and conducting further research 
into animal detection and behaviour, the INMAA planned to 
conduct further trials.36
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
Under CCW Amended Protocol II, Israel reported that the 
INMAA had overseen clearance of approximately 1.2km2 
in 2018, destroying 1,350 mines and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW). In addition, 0.7km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey,37 in areas south of the Dead Sea.38 
However, no details were provided on what proportion of 
1.2km2 cleared and 0.7km2 cancelled was release of mined 
area (as opposed to battle area) or whether the area cleared 
also included clearance in Palestinian territory in the 
West Bank. 
The INMAA typically plans for mine clearance at a targeted 
rate of 1.5km2 per year (including in the West Bank), based on 
its current budget.39 
IDF demining is implemented independently of the INMAA, 
using military methods and techniques.40 The area cleared or 
otherwise released by the IDF is unknown. 
In addition, The HALO Trust continued its clearance of 
minefi elds in Area C of the West Bank in 2018, working under 
the auspices of both the INMAA and PMAC, primarily with 
international funding (see the report on Palestine in this work 
for further information). 
Based on the clearance rates of the past few years and the 
INMAA’s forecasted clearance rate of 1.5km2 per year, it 
will take many years to clear remaining contamination. The 
INMAA is seeking additional funding and assistance to speed 
up operations.41 
 1 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly Director of Technology and Knowledge 
Management, Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), 26 May 2018. 
 2 Ibid. 
 3 “Israel army plants new mines along Syria border”, Associated Press, 
13 August 2011. 
 4 “New Golan mine-clearing project to begin this summer”, The Jerusalem Post, 
16 March 2017, at: bit.ly/2MyEKBc.  
 5 Ibid. 
 6 Minefi eld Clearance Law 5771-2011 of March 2011, unoffi cial translation 
at: bit.ly/2GDOQgJ; Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2010), Form A. Form A refers to 
details provided in Form D, but information in Form D has been deleted. 
 7 Minefi eld Clearance Law 2011 (MCL 5771-2011). 
 8 Interview with Marcel Aviv, Director, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019. 
 9 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018. 
 10 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, Geneva, 7 February 2019. 
 11 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form A. 
 12 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018. 
 13 Email from Michael Heiman, then INMAA, 19 September 2016. 
 14 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form B. 
 15 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018. 
 16 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form B. 
 17 Interviews with Tim Porter, Regional Director, HALO Trust, in Geneva, 
15 February 2018 and 6 February 2019. 
 18 Emails from Michael Heiman, then INMAA, 23 July and 10 August 2017. 
 19 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019. 
 20 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2017), Form B. 
 21 Email from Michael Heiman, then INMAA, 23 July 2017. 
 22 Email from Michael Heiman, then INMAA, 19 September 2016. 
 23 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form B. 
 24 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018. 
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014; and 
CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2017), Form B. 
 27 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2017), Form B. 
 28 Email from Michael Heiman, then INMAA, 23 July 2017. 
 29 HALO Trust, “West Bank”, accessed 17 July 2018. 
 30 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form G. 
 31 Ibid., Form C. 
 32 Email from Michael Heiman, then INMAA, 23 July 2017. 
 33 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form E. 
 34 Email from Michael Heiman, then INMAA, 23 July 2017. 
 35 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018. 
 36 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, Geneva, 7 February 2019. 
 37 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2018), Form B. 
 38 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019. 
 39 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018. 
 40 Ibid.; and email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014. 
 41 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2017), Form B. 





RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Kyrgyzstan has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or 
control and, if not, report on the extent and location of its remaining mined areas and clearance operations.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though 
the precise location and extent of any mined areas is not 
known. According to the Minister of Defence, contamination 
in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, the result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military 
between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 
2005.1 It was reported, however, that rainfall and landslides 
had caused some mines to shift.2
In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces had 
also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and 
Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports 
have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory 
around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely 
cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.3 
In October 2017, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, and 
his Kyrgyz counterpart, Almazbek Atambaev, signed an 
agreement to demarcate some 85% of the countries’ nearly 
1,300km-long border and began discussing options for the 
36 disputed sectors.4
Kyrgyzstan has admitted using anti-personnel mines in 1999 
and 2000 to prevent infi ltration across its borders, but has 
claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and 
destroyed.5 In June 2011, a government offi cial confi rmed: “We 
do not have any minefi elds on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.”6
In October 2011, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Defence conducted a mine action 
assessment mission. The assessment confi rmed that poor 
ammunition storage conditions as well as obsolete ammunition 
posed a serious threat to human security. Agreement on 
cooperation was reached on 25 July 2013, when the ITF signed 
a Protocol on Cooperation with the Ministry of Defense of 
the Kyrgyz Republic.7 The ITF has reported that in 2014 it 
continued to implement activities agreed on in the Protocol on 
Cooperation. This includes technical checks on anti-personnel 
mines and other ammunition in three storage warehouses, 
procurement of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment, 
and support for disposal of ammunition surpluses.8
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme.
LAND RELEASE 
There are no reports of any survey or clearance of mined areas occurring in 2018.
KYRGYZSTAN
 1 Fax from Abibilla Kudaiberdiev, Minister of Defence, 4 April 2011. 
 2 See, e.g., Y. Yegorov, “Uzbekistan agrees to remove minefi elds along its border with Kyrgyzstan”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1, Issue 41, 29 June 2004. 
 3 S. Zhimagulov and O. Borisova, “Kyrgyzstan Tries to Defend Itself from Uzbek Mines”, Navigator (Kazakhstan), 14 March 2003; and “Borders are becoming clear”, 
Blog post, at: bit.ly/2z0s7qU. 
 4 “Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute”, Radio Free Europe, 14 December 2017, at: bit.ly/2yXsrXt. 
 5 Statement of Kyrgyzstan, Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention), Geneva, 8 May 2006; and Letter 
011-14/809 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2010. 
 6 Letter from Amb. G. Isakova, Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the UN in Geneva, 29 June 2011. 
 7 ITF, “Kyrgyz Republic”, accessed 10 October 2015, at: bit.ly/31Fwd44. 
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LAO PDR
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) Lao PDR should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Lao PDR has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear landmines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
While by far the greatest contamination in Lao PDR is from 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), in particular cluster 
munition remnants (CMR) (see the Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants report on Lao PDR for further information), Lao PDR 
is also contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, 
but the extent is not known. During the Indochina confl ict of the 
1960s and 1970s, all sides in the war laid anti-personnel mines, 
particularly around military installations and patrol bases. 
Mined areas also exist in some border regions as a legacy of 
disputes or tensions with or within neighbouring countries.1 
A Handicap International survey in 1997 found mines in all 15 
provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages.2 
The remote location of many of these areas means that mines 
have little impact and are not a clearance priority. Of 91,468 
items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) destroyed by operators 
in 2018, only 28 (0.03%) were mines.3 The National Regulatory 
Authority (NRA), however, has stated that anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines were “used in abundance” and observed 
that “with a steady expansion of land use “mined areas” will 
become areas for growing concern.”4
The NRA reports that “gravel mines” had all degraded 
but remaining mine types included United States (US)-
manufactured M14 anti-personnel blast mines, M16 bounding 
fragmentation mines, M18 claymore mines, and M15 and M19 
anti-vehicle mines, Soviet or Chinese PMN anti-personnel 
blast mines, POMZ fragmentation stake mines, and TM41, 
TM46, and TM57 anti-vehicle mines.5 
According to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 12 of Lao PDR’s 
17 provinces are believed to contain landmines, but the 
details and nature of the contamination are unknown.6
In July 2019, HALO Trust’s EOD team leader responded to a 
call-out in Phalanxai district in Savannakhet province, near 
the site of an old US military base, during which a cache of 
M-16 mines, a couple of other laid M-16 mines, and a PMN 
mine were discovered. Villagers told HALO Trust that there 
had been accidents in the immediate area in the 1980s, but 
that the PMN had been discovered last year while ploughing 
the land and was moved to its current position.7
As at August 2019, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) had 
discovered the presence of M-16, M-14, MBV-78A1, and POMZ 
anti-personnel landmines in sixteen villages in Houamuang 
district, in Houaphanh province, in which it had conducted 
non-technical survey.8 This will have a signifi cant impact 
on the methodology HI employs and will impede CMR land 
release operations. As at March 2019, HI planned to try to 
better determine the probable location of landmines to help 
reduce the probability of its teams operating in unknown 
mined areas. HI also planned to suggest a new standing 
operating procedure (SoP) to the NRA for a combined 
technical survey/area clearance.9
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active 
since mid 2006, has an interministerial board composed of 
representatives from government ministries and is chaired by 
the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare.10 The Prime Minister 
of Lao PDR approved a new decree, “On the Organisation and 
Operations of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO in 
Lao PDR”, in February 2018. The decree defi nes the position, 
role, duties, rights, organisational structure, and the working 
principles and methods of the NRA.11 
The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and 
international clearance operators and serves as the national 
focal point for the sector. This includes overall management 
and consideration of policy, planning, projects, and 
coordination of land release operations nationwide, as well as 
NRA planning and coordination functions at the provincial and 
district levels.12 While the NRA has the central role of UXO 
Sector coordination, increased coordination and collaboration 
between all stakeholders, including line ministries, local 
authorities, UXO operators, development partners, and 
others are essential for the NRA to fulfi l its coordination role.13 








The Lao Government’s national strategy, “Safe Path Forward 
II, 2011–20”, was reviewed in June 2015, when the NRA set a 
number of specifi c targets for the remaining fi ve years up to 
2020.14 There is a corresponding multi-year workplan 2016–20 
for implementation of the Safe Path Forward II strategy,15 but 
both Safe Path Forward II and the corresponding workplan 
predominantly focus on CMR, and do not include a strategy or 
plans for addressing mined areas.
According to the NRA, responsibility for clearance of mined 
areas in Lao PDR predominantly falls under the remit of the 
Lao armed forces.16
UNDP provides programmatic and technical support to 
the NRA and UXO Lao, including with regard to information 
sharing and coordination, albeit at a reduced capacity 
compared to previous years.17 In 2018, further capacity 
development in information management, quality 
management, and operations support, was provided 
primarily to UXO Lao, and to a lesser extent the NRA, through 
a US-funded grant manager, Janus Global Operations. As part 
of its work in 2018, Janus supported UXO Lao with survey 
and data analysis and correction as a follow-on to training 
they conducted in 2017.18 Effective 31 December 2018, Tetra 
Tech replaced Janus as the US-funded grant manager in 
Lao PDR.19
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
Lao PDR’s national standards make a clear distinction 
between UXO clearance (including CMR) and mine clearance, 
and for the purposes of the national standards, “UXO does 
not include hand laid mines but it may include disposal of 
‘one off’ mines located during EOD roving tasks.”20 As such, 
the National Standard on UXO clearance only relates to UXO 
clearance operations and not to mine clearance operations.21
If a mine is located during UXO clearance, work is immediately 
ceased and “the clearance supervisor should then assess the 
situation and determine if the mine is a random one or part of 
a mined area. If the mine is assessed as being part of a mined 
area, work on the site is to cease and the matter reported to 
the tasking authority. Details of mined areas are to be reported 
by the clearance organisation concerned to the NRA head offi ce 
and the NRA provincial offi ce.”22
According to Lao PDR’s national standard on Mine Clearance 
Operations, “the systematic locating and clearing of hand 
laid mines in known or suspected mined areas … are not 
commonly conducted in Lao PDR. However, it is known that 
mined areas exist in Lao PDR and at some stage in the future 
these areas will have to be cleared.” 23 However, in practice, 
determining whether a mine is part of a bigger mined area 
can prove challenging, especially if fi eld-based personnel are 
not trained to address anti-personnel mine contamination. 
Therefore, at the July 2019 technical working group meeting 
on clearance, HI proposed an addendum to the standard to 
help address this.24
The standards also note that, “Some relatively small-scale 
mine clearance has been carried out by UXO LAO and 
by commercial operators in the past but mine clearance 
operations are not regularly carried out as a deliberate 
mine action activity in Lao PDR.”25
According to the National Standards, “Mine clearance 
operations are considerably more dangerous than UXO area 
clearance operations and the requirements and procedures 
for mine clearance are more stringent. When mine clearance 
operations are necessary they are only to be carried out by 
accredited mine clearance organisations with personnel with 
the appropriate training and equipment and specifi c mine 
clearance operating procedures.”26
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
No planned or systematic mine clearance was conducted 
during 2018, though 28 mines of 91,468 items of UXO were 
reported to have been destroyed by operators in 2018, 
according to Lao PDR’s transparency reporting under the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).27
UXO Lao reported destroying fi ve anti-personnel mines and 
one anti-vehicle mine during its operations in 2018.28 The 
HALO Trust, HI, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and NPA did 
not report destroying any mines in 2018.29
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In March 2018, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) released its revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which 
incorporated signifi cant and welcome improvements to its accepted methodology for survey and clearance of anti-personnel 
mines. These included, among others, reduction of the required clearance depth from 20cm to 15cm and adjustments to the 
fade-out specifi cations for clearance in pattern minefi elds. Furthermore, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People’s 
Aid (NPA) were tasked to conduct non-technical survey in 2018, which previously had been executed mainly by the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF). 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Lebanon should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the APMBC, Lebanon has obligations under international human rights 
law to clearance landmines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Wherever possible, non-technical survey and technical survey should be used to more accurately defi ne 
areas of actual mine contamination. This would help to more accurately establish a national baseline of 
mine contamination.
 ■ LMAC should review empirical data from clearance operations on the Blue Line, and, in consultation with 
operators and partners, assess whether the required fade-out distance on the Blue Line can be further 
reduced to enhance effi ciency.
 ■ Where appropriate, LMAC should consider using demining machinery and mine detection dogs (MDDs) as 
primary as well as secondary clearance assets.
 ■ The integration and consolidation of the LMAC and Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) databases and 
servers should be completed as soon as possible.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, Lebanon had more than 19.6km2 of confi rmed 
mined area, including the Blue Line, across 1,399 confi rmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) (see Table 1).1 This includes 27,197m2 of 
confi rmed mined area recorded in Jroud Arsal, in the north-east 
of Lebanon, which is new contamination resulting from fi ghting 
that spilled over from the Syrian confl ict.2 
At the end of 2017, Lebanon reported a little over 20km2 
of confi rmed mined area, including the Blue Line, across 
1,415 CHAs.3 
Table 1: Mined area by province (at end 2018)4
Province CHAs Area (m2)
Al Beqaa 46 967,267






Al Shimal (north Lebanon) 51 254,438
Totals 1,399 19,615,961
Lebanon is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) (see Mine 
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 
report on Lebanon for further information).
In addition, “Dangerous Areas” totalling nearly 15km2 
are suspected to contain nuisance mines, booby-traps, or 
other ERW other than CMR.5 The “Dangerous Areas” relate 
predominantly to rapid response or explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) spot tasks and are often the result of accidents 
having been reported to LMAC by the local community,6 for 
which further investigation/survey is required in order to 
confi rm the type and extent of suspected contamination.7 
Lebanon’s mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of 
earlier civil confl ict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon 
(in 1978 and 1982) and subsequent occupations that ended 
in May 2000, and there is a small amount of new mine 
contamination on the north-east border with Syria, resulting 
from spill-over of the Syrian confl ict onto Lebanese territory 
in 2014–17 (see New mine contamination section below).8 
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Mines affect the north and south of the country, and the 
Mount Lebanon governorate in the middle, though most are 
in the south. The minefi elds in north Lebanon and Mount 
Lebanon are typically “militia” minefi elds (i.e. were laid 
without a pattern and for which minefi eld records and maps 
do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors during the civil 
war. The minefi elds in the south are typically conventional 
minefi elds, laid in a pattern and where the location of the 
mines is identifi ed on minefi eld maps.9
 
NEW MINE CONTAMINATION
A total of 27,197m2 of new/previously unrecorded confi rmed 
mined area was recorded through survey by MAG and NPA in 
“Jroud Arsal” in the north-east along the border with Syria, 
as a result of spill-over in fi ghting from the Syrian confl ict 
in 2014–17.10 The Lebanese territory in question was fully 
regained by the LAF in August 2017 and was assigned to 
LMAC for survey and clearance. Contamination also includes 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), CMR, and other ERW.11 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers, the Lebanon 
Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence. 
The LMAA has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine 
action programme. In 2007, a national mine action policy 
outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the 
programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate 
the programme on behalf of the LMAA.12
LMAC, part of the LAF,
 
is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the 
RMAC-N, based in Nabatiyeh, which is a part of LMAC, has 
overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa, 
under LMAC supervision.13
 
At the end of 2018, a new regional 
centre, RMAC-RB, was established in the north-east of 
Lebanon in the village of Ras Baalbek, to oversee the mine 
action operations in this region.14 The Director of LMAC is 
typically rotated every couple of years, and in recent years 
there has been a high turnover of the colonels who have 
run the RMAC. Both factors have the potential to negatively 
affect the management of the two mine action centres. The 
current director of LMAC started in March 2019, replacing his 
predecessor who had served as director for two years.15
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, 
funded by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to 
LMAC, providing support for capacity building, including 
transparency reporting, strategic reviews, Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database entry, 
community liaison, and quality assurance (QA). UNDP does 
not provide technical assistance on operational decisions.16 
However, EU funding for UNDP institutional support to LMAC 
was due to fi nish at the end of 2019, which will result in a gap 
in capacity development.17 
A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in 
close partnership between LMAC and Norway, providing 
an informal platform for LMAC to continue dialogue and 
collaboration with donors, clearance operators, and partner 
organisations, and to discuss priorities and needs in cluster 
munition and landmine survey and clearance at the national 
level. The forum meets twice a year, with UNDP designated 
as the secretariat to follow up and develop progress 
reports.18 It is an example of what a “Country Coalition” under 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) could look like, 
but in the case of Lebanon it was agreed the forum should be 
broadened to include landmines. 
The Mine Action Forum in Lebanon has resulted in better 
coordination and greater transparency and enhancements 
to land release methodology (enshrined in the revised 
NMAS). These measures have all served to strengthen donor 
confi dence and mobilise additional resources.19 Lebanon 
secured an additional 43% of funding for mine action in 
2018 compared to the previous year, for both mine- and 
CMR-related work.20
There is good coordination and collaboration between 
LMAC/the RMACs and clearance operators, with the 
operators consulted before key decisions are taken.21 
International clearance operators reported that an enabling 
environment exists for mine action in Lebanon, with no 
obstacles regarding visas for international staff, approval 
of MoUs, or the importation of equipment.22 
A technical working group (TWG) was established in March 
2018, under the auspices of LMAC, following the release of 
the revised NMAS. The TWG, which meets quarterly, provides 
a useful forum for LMAC/the RMACs to meet collectively 
with clearance operators to review and discuss fi eld issues, 
including implementation of revisions to the NMAS, and 
potential ways to improve operational effi ciencies.23
As in the previous year, Lebanon reported contributing US$9 
million annually in 2018 towards mine action in Lebanon 
(for both mine and CMR-related work), to support costs 
associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and staff); the 
LAF Engineering Regiment companies working in demining; 
risk education; and victim assistance.24 
A Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon 
(RSHDL) has been established in partnership between 
Lebanon and France, with technical mine action support 
provided by a French military offi cer, to support the 
development of the curriculum on EOD disposal (EOD levels 
1, 2, and 3) in compliance with the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS).25 The Regional School became operational 
in 2017, enabling civilian and military personnel from Arab 
and other countries to benefi t from an array of courses and 
workshops on demining.26 










LMAC reported that it has taken several actions to 
mainstream gender in its implementation plan, including 
through inclusive policies, data disaggregation in risk 
education and victim assistance, and participation in courses 
at the RSHDL.27 In August 2019, LMAC reported that it had 
appointed a new gender focal point who will help mainstream 
gender-sensitive policies and procedures, and monitor their 
implementation across the mine action centre.28 Women 
and children are consulted during survey and community 
liaison activities.29 According to LMAC, within the overall 
humanitarian clearance operators in Lebanon, approximately 
20% of survey and clearance staff are women and 15% of 
managerial level/supervisory positions.30
Lebanon hosted a workshop on gender in mine action at 
the RSHDL in July 2018, attended by Iraq, Libya, Palestine, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, as part of the ARCP.31
HI, MAG, and NPA all reported having gender policies 
in place.32
HI disaggregates relevant mine action data by sex and age. 
HI also ensures that all population groups, including women 
and children, are consulted during its survey and community 
liaison activities. However, while up to 60% of HI managerial/
supervisory positions are held by women, only 2% of its survey 
and clearance staff are women, with one female community 
liaison offi cer out of a total of 50 operational personnel.33
MAG reported that it consults women during survey and 
community liaison activities; that all its community liaison 
teams are mixed; and that its data is disaggregated by sex 
and age. Overall, women account for 15% of operational roles 
in MAG’s survey and clearance teams in Lebanon, and 30% of 
managerial level/supervisory positions.34
As at April 2019, NPA was in the process of developing an 
implementation plan for its organisational gender policy for 
Lebanon, with support from the Geneva-based Gender and 
Mine Action Programme (GMAP, a programme of the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)), 
which was due to be fi nalised in 2019. NPA reported that its 
survey and community liaison teams are gender balanced, 
and 15% of employees in operational roles in NPA’s survey 
and clearance team are women; 9% in managerial level/
supervisory positions. NPA disaggregates data by sex 
and age.35
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
IMSMA is used by LMAC and RMAC to record contamination 
and land release in Lebanon. As at April 2019, efforts were 
underway to integrate RMAC’s information management 
database with the LMAC server.36 As at end 2018, there was a 
single IMSMA database and a synchronisation procedure in 
place between the two LMAC and RMAC databases, pending 
a hardware upgrade to establish a direct connection.37 Full 
harmonisation and consolidation of the servers was expected 
to be achieved in the course of 2019, which will facilitate 
synchronisation, as IMSMA reports will be sent directly to 
LMAC for approval, improving the accuracy and effi ciency of 
the process. The integration will also help better protect data 
while decreasing maintenance costs.38
Furthermore, LMAC is migrating from its current version 
of IMSMA (IMSMA New Generation) to IMSMA Core, which it 
hopes will help facilitate the production of clearer reports 
that can be translated into dashboards for stakeholders, 
including donors, to monitor and follow.39 Migration to IMSMA 
Core requires regular IMSMA back-ups and corrections to 
data. Migration is forecast to be achieved only in 2020.40
Some clearance tasks result in a clearance output in excess 
of the task size originally recorded in IMSMA, often due to 
fade-out. LMAC has reported that the system for database 
entry now more accurately refl ects operational data.41 Now, 
any area cleared in excess of the original task size is no 
longer recorded as additional tasks in the database, but 
as “productivity”.42
In 2018, LMAC changed requirements for clearance operators 
to report operational data monthly in favour of daily and 
weekly reporting instead. According to NPA, this has resulted 
in closer and more regular checks of data by LMAC and RMAC 
QA offi cers.43
PLANNING AND TASKING
In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action 
plan for 2011–20.44 The plan called for clearance of all CMR 
by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance outside the 
Blue Line by 2020. Both goals are dependent on capacity, but 
progress has fallen well short of planning targets,45 which 
will not be met.
A fi rst interim review of the strategy was conducted in 
January–March 2014 to assess progress towards the 2013 
milestone, and to adjust the 2016 and 2020 milestones 
accordingly. The review revealed that in 2011–13 mine 
clearance was slow and suffered from underfunding (with 
consequently fewer operating teams).46
A second interim assessment, this time for 2014–16, was 
undertaken in 2016, but the results were only released in 
March 2018. The results similarly highlighted the huge gap 
between actual mine clearance output and planned output 
(when compared to the original strategic plan). This second 
milestone assessment also refl ected on the achievements, 
challenges, and lessons learned, offering recommendations 
that refl ected available resources (fi nancial and human), as 
well as a qualitative roadmap towards completion.47
Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel had been 
said to depend on “political developments”,48 but the Lebanese 
government subsequently took the decision to initiate larger-
scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line49 and clearance by 
humanitarian demining operators began in November 2016.50
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LMAC is now preparing a new strategic mine action 
strategy, planned by the end of 2019, through which a more 
accurate estimate for completion of mine clearance will be 
available, taking into consideration the updated NMAS and 
new methodologies. LMAC is also developing a long term 
clearance plan for each region, with yearly benchmarks.51 
Lebanon has set four levels of priority for its land release. 
The fi rst is to address infrastructure (e.g. housing, roads, 
hospitals, and schools); the second is to address utilities 
(e.g. water, electricity, drainage, and telephone lines); the 
third is to release agricultural land and grazing areas for 
livestock; and the fourth is to release land for other activities 
(e.g. nature reserves or areas used by wildlife).52 In some 
instances, task prioritisation is also infl uenced by requested 
specifi cations from donors, for example based on the 
geographical location.53 
LMAC selects and assigns tasks for clearance based on the 
priorities set according to the initial survey, while updated 
information may lead to a change in priority for some areas. 
LMAC planned to survey all designated high-priority sites, 
to obtain accurate information, before tasking them for 
clearance.54 
Clearance operators in Lebanon believe that reprioritisation 
is needed, as all of the current tasks fall between priorities 2 
and 3, and reprioritisation has not occurred for some time.55
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Lebanon developed its fi rst NMAS in 2010.56 Over the last 
two years, LMAC worked with UNDP and other partners, 
under a project funded by the EU, to revise the standards.57 
The aim of the revision has been to enhance effi ciency by 
harmonising national standards with IMAS, as well as to add 
new modules not present in the original Standards.58 LMAC 
adopted a consultative and constructive approach to the 
revision process.59 The revised NMAS, formally approved in 
March 2018, have a solid focus on land release and evidence-
based decision-making, in line with the IMAS, and based on 
recommendations and analysis of operational data. Notable 
enhancements include reduction of the required clearance 
depth from 20cm to 15cm; revision of fadeout specifi cations 
for pattern minefi elds, and enhancements in how rapid 
response tasks are addressed and recorded.60 These changes 
should improve the effi ciency of land release in Lebanon.61 
In March 2018, the new NMAS were presented to 
operators during a workshop at the RSHDL, during which 
LMAC discussed next steps in operationalising the new 
standards.62 Demining NGOs have updated their standing 
operating procedures (SoPs) according to the new NMAS.63 
Furthermore, operators now have an opportunity to discuss 
specifi c land release considerations with LMAC for assigned 
clearance tasks, which arise during the pre-clearance 
assessment stage of operations. Such discussions might 
result in the refi ning of the task size or approved land 
release specifi cations (e.g. use of technical survey, for 
all or part of the task, rather than full clearance).64 
Mined areas in pattern minefi elds/along the Blue Line 
have been reclassifi ed into high-threat hazardous area 
(HTHA) and low-threat hazardous area (LTHA). The use of 
technical survey, instead of full clearance, is permitted for 
some parts of the CHA based on discussion and agreement 
between LMAC operations offi cers and clearance operators.65 
Previously, full clearance had been required for 15 metres 
from the mine rows, but in the revised NMAS this has been 
changed to a required fade-out of fi ve metres from the 
mine rows, and technical survey (with a minimum of 30% 
area covered by technical assets, including mechanical 
assets) from the edge of the 5-metre fadeout up to the 
minefi eld fence, for minefi elds in which the lanes have not 
been disrupted. Following discussions in the TWG, the 30% 
technical survey requirement was subsequently reduced to 
10%.66 If there is no fence, 10 metres of technical survey is 
required from the edge of the 5-metre fade-out. Fade-out for 
anti-vehicle mines has been reduced from 20 metres to 10.67 
Previously, operators have been required to fully clear the 
area between the mine rows and the minefi eld fence, plus an 
additional two metres outside the fence, with one asset.68 
MAG and NPA also noted that to further enhance effi ciencies, 
fade-out requirements at the Blue Line could be further 
assessed based on empirical evidence. Evidence from 
clearance operations on the Blue Line to date reveals that no 
mines have been found outside of fi ve metres from the outer 
mine row, in minefi elds in which the lanes have not been 
disturbed. In the operators’ opinion, technical survey beyond 
the fi ve-metre fadeout (up to the minefi eld fence or for ten 
metres in the absence of a fence) should only be required if 
there is suffi cient evidence to suggest mines have migrated 
from the mine rows.69 As mentioned above, it has been agreed 
that, on the Blue Line, technical survey beyond fade-out can 
be reduced to 10%, on a case-by-case basis, targeted to areas 
where there were missed mines in the mine rows.70 MAG 
believes the fi ve-metre fade-out could even be reduced to 
three metres, or double the distance of the mine row.71
Anti-vehicle minefi elds represent another challenge on the 
Blue Line because of their proximity to the fence. As at April 
2019, LMAC was discussing the best way to render safe the 
anti-vehicle mines and move them away, in order to save time 
on anti-personnel mine clearance. LMAC and MAG were due to 
start various destruction trials in August/September 2019.72
Four new HSTAMIDS detectors were planned to be introduced 
for use on Blue Line operations in 2019, which were expected 
to increase effi ciency. A training area prepared by MAG at 
the Hammana school, was completed in August 2019 and the 
detectors were due to arrive in late 2019 or early 2020.73 
Since the release and implementation of the revised NMAS, 
national authorities in Lebanon have actively promoted the 
use of non-technical survey and technical survey, in order 
to defi ne the presence or absence of an explosive threat.74 
This is evidenced by deployment of MAG and NPA teams to 
conduct non-technical survey of new contamination in the 
north-east region of Lebanon, bordering Syria.75 Prior to 2018, 
the only non-technical survey capacity that was permitted 
was that of the LAF.76 In 2019, LMAC was discussing with the 
NGO operators the option for each to have a non-technical 
survey team to re-survey for each new task prior to starting 
clearance, in addition to conducting survey of other mined 
areas.77 As at August 2019, MAG was deploying fi ve 
non-technical survey teams and NPA was deploying, one 
team, while HI had submitted a proposal for two teams.78
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STATES NOT PARTY
OPERATORS 
In 2018, manual mine clearance was conducted by 
international operators DanChurchAid (DCA) (one team), 
Humanity and Inclusion (HI) (four teams), MAG (nine teams), 
NPA (two teams), and by the Engineering Regiment of the 
LAF (two teams).79 In addition, four mechanical teams were 
operated by the Engineering Regiment of the LAF and one 
by MAG; and seven MDD teams operated by the Engineering 
Regiment.80 All LAF engineering companies have two teams 
of EOD-qualifi ed personnel.81 In addition, UNIFIL also has 
suffi cient demining capacity to enable it to conduct its 
operations on the Blue Line.82
Non-technical survey capacity in 2018 consisted of 12 
personnel from the LAF and 9 from MAG, plus the MAG 
and NPA non-technical survey teams deployed to the new 
contamination in “Jroud Arsal” in the north-east of the 
country along the border with Syria. Technical survey 
capacity in 2018 consisted of just one team, at one site, but 
clearance teams can also be deployed for technical survey.83
In 2019, LMAC intends to have specifi c plans for technical 
survey for all sites which non-technical survey recommends 
for reduction.84
In 2018, DCA deployed only one manual mine clearance 
team, as its other team moved to conduct battle area 
clearance (BAC).85
HI deployed four mine clearance teams in north Lebanon 
in 2018, totalling 28 deminers, plus supervisors, team 
leaders, and support staff.86 This represents the same 
capacity as the previous year. HI’s prioritisation of tasks is 
based on proximity to populated area, but mine clearance 
operations in north Lebanon and the Mount Lebanon area 
are also determined by seasonal factors: clearance of low 
altitude minefi elds during winter (October to April), and 
then clearance tasks above 2,000 metres begin in April and 
continue through the summer, depending on snow.87 Most 
of the remaining demining tasks in the area in which HI has 
been operating since 2011 are in contaminated cedar forests 
at high altitude.88 According to LMAC, HI has expressed an 
interest in deploying a non-technical survey team in 2019.89
LAMINDA began mine clearance in 2018, having moved two 
BAC teams to manual mine clearance instead.90
MAG deployed nine manual clearance teams in 2019 (an 
increase of six teams compared to 2017), in addition to 
one mechanical team.91 As at August 2019, MAG had seven 
multi-task teams operating in the “Jroud Arsal” area in the 
north-east along the border with Syria, clearing conventional 
and improvised munitions.92
NPA deployed two manual mine clearance teams totalling 18 
personnel, including 2 medics, from January to September 
2018, with capacity then increasing to 26 personnel from 
October 2018.93 In addition, NPA deployed fi ve non-technical 
survey personnel in 2018 in the “Jroud Arsal” area and will 
deploy non-technical survey staff in southern Lebanon in 
2019.94 NPA clearance capacity in the “Jroud Arsal” increased 
to four multi-task teams in June 2019, with the teams 
becoming operational from August.95
The 2018 capacity of the Engineering Regiment (for combined 
mine and CMR operations) was said to comprise two mine 
clearance teams, four mechanical demining teams, and seven 
MDD teams.96
UNIFIL was established in 197897 to confi rm withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred in 
2000); restore international peace and security; and assist 
the Government of Lebanon to re-establish its authority in 
the area.98 The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams 
has been to clear access lanes through minefi elds in order 
to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does 
not conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian 
purposes but only to facilitate placement of markers by 
clearing three-metre-wide lanes into mined areas,99 and also 
to clear mines close to UNIFIL posts or which pose a danger 
to UNIFIL patrols. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
continues to engage with UNIFIL regarding the possibility 
of UNIFIL re-engaging in humanitarian mine action.100 LMAC 
is in ongoing discussions with UNIFIL to discuss an MoU for 
cooperation on humanitarian mine clearance.101
In 2018, operational assets were provided by two UNIFIL 
Troop Contributing Countries: Cambodia and China. 
Operational capacities and capabilities of UNIFIL are 
determined by operational need, and capacity as at August 
2019 remained the same as the previous year and comprised 
fi ve manual clearance teams, two EOD teams, and one 
mechanical team.102
UNMAS carries out confi rmatory training with UNIFIL 
demining units when they rotate into the country.103
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The LAF uses MDDs for technical survey and as a secondary 
asset. The LAF also uses mechanical assets, and in addition, 
MAG has a demining machine. In Lebanon, machines are 
mostly used as secondary assets to support clearance teams 
(e.g. ground preparation, rubble removal etc. or for fadeout); 
in areas where manual clearance is diffi cult; and for technical 
survey and LTHA.104 MAG, however, believes that mechanical 
assets could also usefully be deployed as a primary asset 
in South Lebanon, when the terrain permits.105 In 2017, MAG 
was given permission by LMAC to use mechanical assets 
for missing mine excavations, which is saving considerable 
time.106 Often, however, the terrain is not suitable for MDDs 
or machines.
DEMINER SAFETY
There were three demining accidents in 2018. A MAG site 
supervisor was injured when an uncontrolled demolition 
occurred during demolition of Israeli No. 4 mines.107 An 
NPA deminer was injured in June 2018 during clearance 
of an Israeli No. 4 mine,108 and in October 2018, an NPA site 
supervisor was injured from the explosion of an Israeli No. 
4 mine fuze.109 All accidents were investigated internally by 
the two respective NGOS, and by the LMAC Board of Inquiry, 
typically formed by QA, quality control, and operations 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of more than 0.4km2 of mined area (i.e. area suspected or confi rmed to contain anti-personnel mines) was released in 
2018, of which nearly 0.39km2 was cleared, nearly 0.03km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey, and a small amount 
(7,646m2) was reduced through technical survey. Nearly 0.03km2 of new mined area was added to the database in 2018, 
following non-technical survey in Arsal, in the north-east of Lebanon bordering Syria.
SURVEY IN 2018
In 2018, 28,633m2 of land classifi ed as being minefi eld (MF), 
was cancelled through non-technical survey and 7,646m2 was 
reduced by MAG through technical survey.111 This compared 
to the 1.2km2 of mined area cancelled through non-technical 
survey in 2017 and a decrease on the 99,694m2 reduced 
through technical survey.112
A further 2,817,200m2 of “Mined Area” was cancelled in 
2018, but strangely, in Lebanon the term “Mined Area” is 
used to denote dangerous areas entered into the database 
when the fi rst impact survey was executed, which were not 
accessible, and where the type of hazard was not identifi ed. 
Therefore, these areas are not the same as those suspected 
or confi rmed to contain anti-personnel mines. According 
to LMAC, in 2019, all mined area in the database has been 
cancelled because access to all these areas is now possible.113
In addition, the fi rst stage of non-technical survey by MAG 
and NPA of “Jroud Arsal” in the north-east114 began in July 
2018 and was completed in October, with immediate 
follow-on clearance.115 The survey resulted in 27,197m2 of 
new/previously unrecorded confi rmed mined area.116 An 
additional 410,329m2 was identifi ed as containing “IEDs”,117 
many of which are also anti-personnel mines of 
an improvised nature. NPA confi rmed discovering 70 
anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature during the 
survey, including tripwire-activated devices.118
Information for the survey was based on information 
available from LAF units present in the area and from locals, 
in particular shepherds. There are, however, still areas 
where no information is available, and these will constitute 
the second phase of survey, which began in March 2019.119
In 2019, the focus for the “Jroud Arsal” operations is technical 
survey and clearance, however non-technical survey will be 
an ongoing process according to needs and priorities.120
CLEARANCE IN 2018
Lebanon reported clearing just under 0.39km2 of mined area in 2018, destroying in the process 13,074 anti-personnel mines 
and 90 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 2).121 Clearance in 2018 was down compared to the 0.51km2 of mined area cleared in 2017.122
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2018123
Operator Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed
DCA 1,003 1 0 0
HI 116,578 2,409 1 133
MAG 68,825 7,242 21 0
NPA 26,675 2,775 0 0
LAMINDA 1,735 71 0 0
LAF 180,070 576 68 *11,097
Totals 394,886 13,074 90 11,230
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle   *destroyed during BAC and mine clearance
Table 2 above includes the destruction of 442 anti-personnel 
mines during spot tasks in 2018: 408 anti-personnel mines 
destroyed by the Engineering Regiment and 34 by the Combat 
Engineer companies in the Brigades.124
Furthermore, UNIFIL found and destroyed 2,372 anti-
personnel mines during its 2018 operations along the UNIFIL 
patrol road, in the far south of Lebanon near the Blue Line.125 
HI’s clearance output decreased slightly in 2018, compared 
to the previous year, due to having to conduct full excavation 
for undetectable anti-personnel mines, and also working in 
narrow polygons which restricted deployment of full capacity 
due to required safety distances.126
HI reported that of the 16 tasks it cleared in 2018, 4 were 
found not to contain anti-personnel mines, representing 
7% of HI’s total clearance output.127 Due to the nature of the 
militia minefi elds in north Lebanon, there is sometimes a 
lack of clearly defi ned CHAs. Accordingly, in certain areas, 
additional non-technical survey and technical survey could 
help to more accurately defi ne areas of actual contamination. 
Unfortunately, deployment of MDDs or demining machinery 
to help facilitate survey and clearance in north Lebanon is 
limited in scope, due to the climate and terrain of many of 
the tasks in the region.128
The CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not 
include obligatory fade-out distances, which can considerably 
increase the overall size of the task.129 
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PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
It has been stated that “While Lebanon is not signatory to 
the Ottawa Convention, LMAC works in spirit of the treaty”,130
and that LMAC adheres to its noble causes and tries to work 
along with the Maputo Action Plan.131
Clearance of mined areas was originally expected to be 
completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–20 
national strategy, but meeting the target was contingent on 
deployment of considerable resources: 125 manual clearance 
teams (45 for minefi elds excluding the Blue Line and 80 for 
the Blue Line), 2 mechanical teams, and 9 two-strong MDD 
teams.132 Current mine clearance capacity is far lower. The 
second mid-term review, conducted in 2016, and fi nally 
released in March 2018, confi rmed that progress against the 
strategy has fallen well behind schedule, and that signifi cant 
increased capacity would be required to bridge the gap. 
LMAC reported that in addition to a lack of funding, rocky and 
forested terrain continued to pose a challenge to demining 
operations, in addition to lack of minefi eld records for much 
of the contamination (especially in the North).133
Lebanon has cleared less than 4km2 of mined area in the last 
fi ve years, as detailed in Table 3. Based on almost 20km2 of 
total mined area as at the end of 2018, and average clearance 
rates of less than 1km2 per year, it will take many years for 
Lebanon to become mine-free. However, progress in land 
release is expected to be accelerated by adoption of better 
land release procedures in 2018, as enshrined in the revised 
NMAS. Crucially, LMAC’s demonstrated commitment to 
enhance the use of non-technical and technical survey will 
help to cancel or reduce areas more effi ciently.134
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







 1 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 2 Ibid.; and LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 14. 
 3 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, 27 April 2018; and LMAC, 
“Annual Report 2017”, p. 12. 
 4 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. There is a slight discrepancy 
with the 19,473,287m2 baseline of mine contamination, as per LMAC’s “Annual 
Report 2018”, p. 14.  
 5 LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 13; and email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 
31 May 2019. 
 6 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif then Director, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, 
then Head of Operations, LMAC, Beirut, 18 April 2016. 
 7 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 
18 April 2016. 
 8 Emails from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; David Willey, Programme 
Manager, MAG, 7 March 2019; and Emile Ollivier, Grants Coordinator, NPA, 
19 March 2019. 
 9 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 
11 April 2016. 
 10 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019, and presentation in Beirut, 
8 April 2018; and LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 14. 
 11 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019 and presentation in Beirut, 
8 April 2018; and LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 14. 
 12 LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013”, August 
2014, pp. 4–5. 
 13 LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020”, September 2011, p. 4. 
 14 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019. 
 15 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 26 March 2019. 
 16 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 
11 April 2016; and LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy. Second Milestone 
Review 2014–2016”, March 2018; and “Mine Action Forum: Action Points 1st 
Quarter Progress Report, March 2018”. 
 17 LMAC, “2018 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, p. 36; interview 
with Brig.-Gen. Jihad Bechelany, LMAC Director, Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, and 
Ariane Elmas, UNDP, Beirut, 16 April 2019; and email from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 
19 March 2019. 
 18 LMAC, “2018 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, p. 23. 
 19 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; and LMAC, “Annual Report 
2018”, p. 23. 
 20 LMAC, LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 17. 
 21 Emails from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019; David Willey, MAG, 7 March 
2019; and Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019. 
 22 Emails from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019; and David Willey, MAG, 
7 March 2019. 
 23 LMAC, “2018 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, pp. 4, 7, and 17; and 
emails from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; and Emile Ollivier, NPA, 
19 March 2019. 
 24 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 31 May 2019. 
 25 LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy. Second Milestone Review 2014–2016”, 
March 2018. 
 26 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; CCM Article 7 Report 
(for 2018), Form A; and Statement of Lebanon on International Cooperation 
and Assistance, CCM Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4–6 
September 2017. 
 27 LMAC, LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 5; and email from Major Fadi Wazen, 
LMAC, 7 March 2019; 
 28 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019. 
 29 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 30 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019. 
 31  LMAC, LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, pp. 5 and 19. 
 32 Emails from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019; David Willey, MAG, 7 March 
2019; and David Ligneau, HI, 23 August 2019. 








320   Clearing the Mines 2019 
 34 Email from David Willey, MAG, 7 March 2019. 
 35 Email from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019. 
 36 LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 15. 
 37 Email from Rana Elias, GICHD, 17 June 2019. 
 38 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; and interview with Maj. 
Ali Makki, Information Management Section Head, LMAC, and Ariane Elmas, 
UNDP, Beirut, 16 April 2019. 
 39 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; email from LMAC 
Operations Department, 28 June 2018; “Mine Action Forum: Action Points 
1st Quarter Progress Report, March 2018”; and LMAC, “2018 Annual Report 
Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, p. 14. 
 40 Email from Rana Elias, GICHD, 17 June 2019. 
 41 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 
11 April 2016. 
 42 LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 14; and interview with Maj. Ali Makki, LMAC, 
Beirut, 16 April 2019. 
 43 Email from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019. 
 44 LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020”, September 2011, p. 4. 
 45 Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Brig.-Gen. Imad 
Odiemi, LMAC, 2 May 2014. 
 46 LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013”, 
August 2014. 
 47 LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy. Second Milestone Review 2014–2016”, 
March 2018; LMAC, “2017 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, 
undated; and email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018. 
 48 Presentation by Maj. Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiye, 4 May 2012; and response 
to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Programme Manager, 
UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST), 7 May 2014. 
 49 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 
11 April 2016. 
 50 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017. 
 51 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019; and interview, Beirut, 
16 April 2019. 
 52 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 53 Interview with Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, Beirut, 16 April 2019 and email, 
5 April 2019. 
 54 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018. 
 55 Email from Dave Wiley, MAG, 19 August 2019. 
 56 Email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 17 June 2015. 
 57 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 7 July 2015; and Rory Logan, 
Programme Manager, NPA, 20 April 2015; Statement of Lebanon, First CCM 
Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7–11 September 2015; and email from Brig.-
Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018. 
 58 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 7 July 2015; and Rory Logan, NPA, 
20 April 2015. 
 59 Emails from Dave Wiley, MAG, 27 April 2018 and 7 March 2019; and Craig 
McDiarmid, NPA, 17 April 2018 and 19 March 2019. 
 60 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
17 April 2018; and Dave Wiley, MAG, 27 April 2018; and LMAC, “Annual Report 
2018”, p. 17. 
 61 “Mine Action Forum: Action Points 1st Quarter Progress Report, March 2018”; 
LMAC, “2017 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, undated; and 
emails from Dave Wiley, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
17 April 2018. 
 62 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; Craig McDiarmid, 
NPA, 17 April 2018; and Dave Wiley, MAG, 27 April 2018. 
 63 Emails from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019; David Willey, MAG, 7 March 
2019; and Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019. 
 64 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 
11 April 2016; and with Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, Beirut, 16 April 2019. 
 65 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018. 
 66 Email from Dave Wiley, MAG, 19 August 2019.  
 67 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
17 April 2018; and Ali Nasreddine, MAG, 24 July 2018. 
 68 Email from Ali Nasreddine, MAG, 24 July 2018. 
 69 Emails from Ali Nasreddine, MAG, 24 July 2018; and Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
17 April 2018 and 8 April 2019. 
 70 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 71 Emails from Ali Nasreddine, MAG, 24 July 2018; and Dave Wiley, MAG, 
19 August 2019. 
 72 Emails from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April and 21 August 2019; and Dave 
Wiley, MAG, 19 August 2019. 
 73 Ibid. 
 74 Emails from Dave Wiley, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
17 April 2018. 
 75 Emails from David Willey, MAG, 7 March 2019; and Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
8 April 2019; and LMAC, “2018 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, 
p. 14. 
 76 Telephone interview with Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 15 June 2018; emails from 
David Willey, MAG, 7 March 2019; Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019, and Maj. 
Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 77 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 78 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019. 
 79 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 80 LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 12. 
 81 Email from LMAC Operations Department, 28 June 2018; and email from Maj. 
Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019. 
 82 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 83 Ibid. 
 84 Ibid. 
 85 Ibid. 
 86 Email from David Ligneau, HI, 9 April 2019. 
 87 Emails from Chris Chenavier, HI, 7 April 2016 and David Ligneau, HI, 
9 April 2019. 
 88 Email from David Ligneau, HI, 29 August 2018. 
 89 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 90 Ibid. 
 91 Ibid. 
 92 Email from Dave Wiley, MAG, 19 August 2019. 
 93 Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 8 April 2019. 
 94 Emails from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019; and Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
8 April 2019. 
 95 Email from Jon Jensen, Interim Programme Manager, NPA, 20 August 2019. 
 96 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017 and 14 September 
2018; and LMAC, “Annual Report 2017”, p. 11. 
 97 UN Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). 
 98 UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Mandate”, at: bit.ly/2YpCwuD. 
 99 Presentation by Maj. Pierre Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiye, 4 May 2012; 
and emails from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 2 October 2015 and 
18 September 2017. 
 100 Emails from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 18 September 2017; and 
Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018. 
 101 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 102 Email from Hassan Noureddine, UNMAS, 16 August 2019. 
 103 Email from Alan Macdonald, UNMAS, 15 August 2019. 
 104 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; Samuel Devaux, HI, 
4 April 2017; Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017; and Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 
5 April 2019. 
 105 Interview with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016. 
 106 Email from Ali Nasreddine, MAG, 24 July 2018. 
 107 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 108 Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 8 April 2019. 
 109 Emails from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019, and Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 
8 April 2019. 
 110 Ibid. 
 111 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019; and LMAC, “Annual Report 
2018”, pp. 11 and 12. 
 112 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; and LMAC, “Annual 
Report 2017”, p. 13. 
 113 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019. 
 114 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019, and presentation in Beirut, 
8 April 2018; and LMAC, “2018 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre”, 
p. 14. 
 115 Emails from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 8 April 2019; and Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 
5 April 2019. 
 116 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019, and presentation in Beirut, 
8 April 2018; and LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 14. 
mineactionreview.org   321
STATES NOT PARTY
 117 LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, p. 14. 
 118 Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 8 April 2019. 
 119 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 120 Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 8 April 2019. 
 121 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 122 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018. 
 123 LMAC, “Annual Report 2018”, pp. 10 and 11; and emails from Maj. Fadi Wazen, 
LMAC, 5 April 2019; Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 8 April 2019; David Ligneau, Mine 
Action Programme Manager, HI, 9 April 2019, and Hiba Ghandour, Programme 
Offi cer, MAG, 27 August 2019. There were some discrepancies between data 
reported by LMAC and what was reported by HI, MAG, and NPA. HI reported 
destroying 2,419 (rather than 2,409) anti-personnel mines and 144 (rather 
than 133) other items of UXO during mine clearance in 2018. MAG reported 
clearing 102,890m2 of mined areas and destroying 62 items of UXO, in addition 
to the 7,242 anti-personnel mines and 21 anti-vehicle mines. NPA reported 
destroying two items of UXO, in addition to 2,775 anti-personnel mines. DCA 
did not provide clearance data to Mine Action Review, so cross-verifi cation 
was not possible.  
 124 Email from Maj. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019. 
 125 Email from Hassan Noureddine, UNMAS, 16 August 2019.  
 126 Email from David Ligneau, HI, 9 April 2019. 
 127 Ibid. 
 128 Interview with Chris Chenavier, HI, Toula, 18 April 2016. 
 129 Ibid. 
 130 LMAC, “Annual Report 2017”, Foreword. 
 131 Statement of Lebanon, APMBC Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 
20 December 2018. 
 132 LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020”, September 2011, pp. 16 
and 17. 
 133 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018. 
 134 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 27 April 2018; and emails from Craig 











322   Clearing the Mines 2019 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Libya has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ All parties to the confl ict in Libya should ensure that forces loyal to them do not use anti-personnel mines.
 ■ As soon as political conditions permit, Libya should enact mine action legislation, establish an interministerial 
national mine action authority, and adopt a national mine action strategy.
 ■ Libya should, at the earliest opportunity possible and as soon the security situation permits, conduct a baseline 
survey to identify the extent of contamination from anti-personnel mines and begin systematic clearance.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Mine contamination in Libya is a legacy of the Second 
World War (mainly in the east and mostly anti-vehicle mine 
contamination), as well as subsequent armed confl ict with 
Egypt in 1977 (pattern minefi elds mapped, fenced and 
marked), and with Chad in 1980−87, which resulted in mines 
being laid on Libya’s borders with these two neighbours.1 The 
border with Tunisia is also believed to be affected. During 
Colonel Muammur Qaddafi ’s four decades in power, mines 
were emplaced around a number of locations, including 
military facilities and key infrastructure.
Mines were used by both the government and the opposition 
forces during the 2011 confl ict leading to Colonel Qaddafi ’s 
overthrow. According to the Libyan Mine Action Centre 
(LibMAC) around 30,000−35,000 mines were laid in fi ve 
regions and cities, including Misrata, but were “largely 
cleared” after the downfall of the Gaddafi  regime by 
volunteers with previous military experience.2
The only confi rmed instance of landmine use by rebels occurred 
in Ajdabiya, but other locations where pro-government 
elements laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the 
Nafusa Mountains.3 The escalation of confl ict in Libya in 2014 
brought new reports of mine use by armed groups fi ghting 
around Tripoli airport.4 There were also allegations of landmine 
use by non-state armed groups between 2016 and 2018.5 
Contamination since 2015 is believed to be mainly in Benghazi, 
Derna (in the east of Libya), and Sirte.6
Mines of an improvised nature are suspected to have been 
laid during 2016 by Islamic State in areas that they controlled, 
such as in Sirte.7 In July 2017, the engineering divisions of 
Operation Dignity8 continued to clear mines and booby-traps 
left by Islamic State fi ghters from Benghazi, but also warned 
civilians from attempting to return to their homes before 
clearance work was fi nished.9
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of anti-personnel 
mine contamination across Libya, as many suspected 
hazardous areas (SHAs) have not been surveyed. As at 
February 2017, national contamination data from the LibMAC 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database, reported six confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) 
four in Sirte and two in Misrata, totalling almost 41.5km2, 
contaminated by anti-personnel mines, while a seventh CHA, in 
Sirte, of some 7.5km2, was contaminated by anti-vehicle mines. 
A massive single SHA, of almost 223km2, was suspected to 
contain only anti-vehicle mines.10 It is likely that further survey 
will drastically reduce these fi gures, but at the same time 
many further suspected areas have not been surveyed.
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
advocates for survey to help quantify the scale and type 
of contamination, but the ongoing security situation poses 
major challenges to operationalising the necessary survey.11 
According to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), 
the presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) poses a persistent 
threat to the Libyan population and also hinders the safe 
return of internally displaced people and restricts access for 
humanitarian workers.12 
Libya is also contaminated by cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants 2019 report on Libya for further information), 
and ongoing confl ict has left signifi cant quantities of other 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) in cities across Libya.13
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Mine action exists in a fragmented and violent political 
context. Following years of armed confl ict, a new United 
Nations-backed “unity” government, the Government of 
National Accord, was formally installed in a naval base in 
Tripoli in early 2016. It has subsequently faced opposition 
from two rival governments and a host of militia forces. In 
April 2019, Khalifa Haftar, a military commander based in the 
west of the country, launched an offensive to take control of 
Tripoli and topple the Government of National Accord. As at 
July 2019, the offensive was ongoing, with combat in part of 
the city.14
LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defense to 
coordinate mine action in December 2011.15 As at May 2019, it 
was operating under the UN-backed Government of National 
Accord. LibMAC’s headquarters are in Tripoli, in the west of 
the country, and it also has offi ces in Benghazi16 and Misrata.17
The operating costs and salaries for the LibMAC are funded 
by the United States Department of State and administered 
by ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF).18
GENDER 
LibMAC is not thought to have a gender policy for mine action in place. 
HI reported that it has a gender policy in place and that it planned to elaborate an implementation plan in 2019.19 It also 
reported that it disaggregates data by sex and age. HI’s risk education team, which also conducts community liaison, is gender 
balanced. While two of its project managers and two project offi cers are female, HI reported that unfortunately women are not 
currently employed in survey and clearance, as it is deemed culturally unacceptable for now.20
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
LibMAC receives technical support for IMSMA from the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNMAS. In 
March 2019, HI reported that LibMAC had recently announced details of a new effort to bring the IMSMA database up to date 
and ensure the data are reliable.21 IMSMA is accessible to clearance organisations and data collection forms are reported to be 
consistent and enable collection of necessary data.22
PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy for Libya.
LibMAC does, however, prioritise survey and clearance operations and is responsible for issuing task orders. Prioritisation 
is, in part, informed by data collected and reported to LibMAC by operators such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG), during 
non-technical survey or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and by reports from the local community.23 According to an 
international clearance operator, LibMAC generally tasks according to geographic area and the nearest available assets.24
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Libya, but National Mine Action Standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English, have 
been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the Government of National Accord in 
August 2017. The LibMAS are available on the LibMAC website.25 According to an international clearance operator, the national 
mine action standards are aligned to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).26
HI has updated its standing operating procedures (SoPs) for mine action in Libya in line with the LibMAS.27
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OPERATORS 
Mine action operations have been conducted by the army 
engineers, a police unit, and the Ministry of Interior’s National 
Safety Authority (NSA), also known as Civil Defence.28 
The NSA is mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.29 
These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or 
accredited by them, nor do they provide clearance reports 
to the Centre. 
The deteriorating security situation resulted in the 
withdrawal of UNMAS and international mine action 
operators from Libya in mid 2014. As at February 2019, 
international clearance operators active in Libya included 
DanChurchAid (DCA), DDG, HALO Trust, HI, and GCS.30 
National NGO operator, Free Fields Foundation (3F), was 
also operational and another national operator, the Libyan 
Demining Group (LDG) was in the process of becoming 
established as at February 2019.31 Local organisations, Peace 
Organization from Zintan and World Without War (3W) from 
Misrata, which had been trained by HI in 2016 and received 
accreditation for non-technical survey,32 subsequently had 
their operations suspended for not fully following standards 
and in addition, neither organisation had secured funding.33
UNMAS has been operating from Tunis since November 
2014, from where it provides institutional and operational 
capacity-building, training, including in EOD, and support and 
advice to LibMAC, including in establishing processes for the 
accreditation and activities of mine action actors in Libya.34 
Despite the relocation of the programme to Tunisia due to 
poor security in 2014, UNMAS Libya continues to coordinate 
with national authorities and implementing partners and to 
carry out mine action activities and provide technical advice 
and advisory support on arms and ammunition management. 
The UNMAS Libya Programme is an integral part of UNSMIL.35
Since 2015, UNMAS has trained more than 70 Civil Defence 
operators and military engineers in advanced EOD, 30 
offi cers from eastern Libya in non-technical survey, and 
provided advanced medical fi rst-responder training to 72 EOD 
operators from Benghazi and several operators addressing 
the threat from explosive ordnance in Sirte.36 Military 
engineers reportedly lack mine detectors and are working 
with basic tools.37
DCA is operational in Libya clearing ERW and providing risk 
education. Now in its eighth year of working in Libya, DCA has 
offi ces in Benghazi, Misrata, and Tripoli38 And is operational in 
three areas of Libya: Benghazi; Sabha, in the south-west; and 
Tripoli.39 DDG set up in Benghazi in December 2017 and spent 
the fi rst quarter of 2018 obtaining accreditation and putting 
in place necessary policies and procedures before becoming 
operational. DDG hoped to expand non-technical survey and 
EOD capacity in Benghazi from the late summer of 2018. In 
Sabha, DDG had one non-technical survey team and one EOD 
team, which it was managing remotely. Security issues in the 
south continue to disrupt mine action operations and prevent 
continuous operations. In Tripoli, DDG works through its 
national implementing partner, 3F. 3F operates under DDG’s 
accreditation and SoPs, and has an operational personnel 
of 37, composed in three EOD teams and one non-technical 
survey team.40
GCS is working in partnership with Libyan NGO, 3F, to clear 
ERW from an ammunition storage area on a military airbase 
in Misrata. The area comprises 37 bunkers destroyed by 
NATO airstrikes in 2011.41
The HALO Trust has been present in Libya since November 
2018, and, as at June 2019, had offi ces in Misrata and Sirte, 
in addition to a small administrative offi ce in Tripoli. The 
HALO Trust is working in partnership with DCA in Sirte, with 
HALO leading on mechanical clearance and DCA providing 
the supporting EOD capacity, along with a joint non-technical 
survey team and mine risk education (MRE) team. HALO Trust 
and DCA have conducted a socio-economic assessment of 
Sirte and a fi eld assessment for areas of possible mine and 
ERW contamination which potentially require mechanical 
clearance.42 
As at June 2019, HALO Trust was in the process of armouring 
two machines for mechanical clearance and was set to begin 
training of two mechanical teams and one non-technical 
survey team. Ongoing confl ict in Tripoli and delays in 
registration prevented HALO from becoming operational in 
June, as planned, but it expected to begin clearance activities 
over the summer. HALO also planned to begin training of 
a further two mechanical teams later in 2019; to introduce 
additional technical assets; and to work with LibMAC to 
expand operations to other parts of Libya and to conduct 
all humanitarian mine action activities, including manual 
clearance and battle area clearance (BAC).43
As at March 2019, HI’s main offi ce for Libya was in Tripoli, 
with operational offi ces in Misrata and Benghazi, and an 
administrative base being maintained by HI in Tunis.44 In 2018, 
HI deployed six manual clearance personnel in Libya, and 
an existing EOD team planned to also conduct non-technical 
survey in 2019.45 As at March 2019, HI was operational in 
Benghazi, Misrata, and Tripoli, but security issues had 
temporarily hindered its 2019 operations in Tawerga, in 
Misrata, forcing teams to deploy elsewhere.46 As at March 2019, 
HI had no implementing partners in mine action in Libya.47 
A number of other Libyan civil society organisations are also 
reported to carry out mine action operations, but they are not 
accredited by LibMAC. 
mineactionreview.org   325
STATES NOT PARTY
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
There were no reports of planned mine clearance during 
2018 although several operators engaged in EOD operations. 
No mined area was reported to have been released through 
survey in 2018 either.
SURVEY IN 2018
There were no other known reports of anti-personnel survey 
during 2018, although data from LibMAC and some clearance 
operators was not made available.
CLEARANCE IN 2018
There were no known reports of anti-personnel clearance 
during 2018, although data from LibMAC and some clearance 
operators were not made available.
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LibMAC describes the following challenges to implementation 
of mine action operations: the high level of contamination; 
ongoing confl ict and the continued presence of Islamic State; 
the diffi culty in convincing internally displaced persons to 
delay their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security 
and access to priority areas; the limited ERW and EOD 
capacity in Libya; the vast geographical area; and limited 
governmental and international support.48 Security conditions 
continued to pose a challenge to mine action in Libya.
In his February 2018 report on the work of UNSMIL, the UN 
Secretary-General stated that explosive ordnance “continue 
to pose a signifi cant, indiscriminate threat to the civilian 
population” and urged UN Member States “to expand their 
funding to activities in priority areas equipment”.49
 1 Interview with Col. Turjoman, Director, LibMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019. 
 2 Ibid. 
 3 Human Rights Watch, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefi ng Note”, 
19 July 2011, at: bit.ly/1lPLaFE. 
 4 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: New evidence of landmine use”, 5 November 
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 7 “Libya forces de-mine and clear Sirte after liberation from Isis militants”, 
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 8 Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity to take Benghazi under his forces’ 
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Benghazi”, Libyan Express, 5 July 2017, at: bit.ly/2tXKhJb. 
 9 Landmines in Africa blog, July 2017, at: bit.ly/2YoeCAw. 
 10 Emails from Abdullatif Abujarida, LibMAC, 20 February and 9 March 2017. 
 11 Email from Lance Malin, Chief, UNMAS Libya, 11 September 2018. 
 12 “Lives and Limbs Shattered by Libya Mines”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 5 April 2018. 
 13 UNMAS, “Programmes: Libya”, accessed 16 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2WMTzTk. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Morocco should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Morocco should continue to submit voluntary APMBC Article 7 reports. It should clarify in greater detail 
the extent of contamination remaining to be addressed and implement and report on progress according to 
international standards for land release methodology.
 ■ Morocco should establish a timeline for completion of clearance of all mined areas on territory under its 
jurisdiction or control. 
 ■ Morocco should ensure freedom of access and unhindered movement of all civilian UN Mission for the Referendum 
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) staff and take all necessary measures to facilitate the conduct of demining. 
 ■ Morocco is strongly encouraged to provide any minefi eld records to other relevant stakeholders to facilitate 
survey and clearance of affected areas.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of contamination from mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) in the area of Western Sahara 
controlled by Morocco, on the west side of the Berm,1 is not 
known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that 
a total of 120,000km² of area was contaminated,2 although the 
threat is undoubtedly signifi cant. 
Morocco’s contamination is a result of the confl ict between the 
Royal Moroccan Army and Polisario Front forces over Western 
Sahara. Morocco has reported having registered and mapped 
the minefi elds it has laid, and has pledged to clear them as 
soon as the confl ict over Western Sahara is over.3 
At the end of 2018, Morocco continued to report 10 localities 
as containing mines: Bir Anzarane, Douiek, Gerret Auchfaght, 
Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf 
Mhkinza. It claims these contain contamination as the result 
of “haphazard” mine laying across the south of Morocco by 
the Polisario Front in 1975–91.4 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a 
mine action centre. The Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) carries 
out demining, which it reports are conducted in collaboration 
with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara (MINURSO) observers.5 
In 2018, the RMA continued to receive training from the 
United States (US) Marines on demining and explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques, along with continued 
support from the National Guard of the US state of Utah 
through the State Partnership Programme, and additionally 
reported participating in a number of regional mine action 
trainings and workshops during the year.6
GENDER
Morocco is not believed to have a gender policy in place for its demining operations. 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Morocco does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action.
PLANNING AND TASKING
It is not known how Morocco plans its demining operations. Operations are carried out in collaboration with MINURSO.
MOROCCO









 1 The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure 
the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls 
some three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west 
side of the Berm.  
 2 Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 25 May 2009. 
 3 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C. 
 4 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. Idiriya is spelled “Jdiriya” 
in the 2018 report. From 2015, the area of Glibat Jadiane, which had been 
listed as contaminated in earlier years, was no longer included on the list 
of mined areas. 
 5 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form D. 
 6 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form H; and AFRICOM, “Humanitarian 
Mine Action increases demining capacity in Morocco”, 2 May 2019, at: 
bit.ly/2LltXKS. 
 7 Voluntary Article 7 Report, (for 2018), Form D. 
 8 Statement of Morocco, APMBC 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 
21 December 2017. 
 9 Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2010. 
 10 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C. 
 11 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form C. 
 12 “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western 
Sahara”, UN doc. S/2018/889, 3 October 2018, para. 48. 
 13 “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western 
Sahara”, UN doc. S/2018/277, 29 March 2018, para. 43. 
 14 Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 24 June 2019. 
 15 “Morocco to Deploy Highly Qualifi ed Team to Remove Sahara Landmines”, 
Sahara Question, 25 March 2016, at: bit.ly/2Llu9d4. 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
Morocco appears to use only manual demining techniques, which is not effi cient given the size and type of terrain being released.
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation 
or standards, but has reported that “normal safety and 
environmental protection standards have been followed” 
in clearance of mines and ERW.7
OPERATORS 
All mine clearance in Morocco is conducted by the RMA. 
In 2017, it reported that 16 demining modules and 89 
demining detachments were operational and responded to 
175 interventions during the year.8 Morocco did not provide 
further detail and did not report on the RMA’s demining 
capacity in 2018. 
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Previously, in 2010, Morocco declared it had employed 10,000 
deminers, though only 400 detectors were at their disposal 
at that time.9 This raised serious questions both about the 
procedures being used and the accuracy of clearance fi gures 
being reported.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Morocco has not reported in detail on its release of 
mined areas in recent years, nor given any indication of 
implementing land release methodology. The fi gures it does 
provide are not credible and should be taken as an indication 
of land released or declared as clear of contamination rather 
than land physically cleared.
In a voluntary Article 7 report for 2018, Morocco reported 
“clearance” of a total area of 313.4km2, with the destruction 
of 232 anti-personnel mines, 18 anti-vehicle mines, and 
574 items of ERW.10 This compares to 2017, when Morocco 
reported “clearance” of 232km2, with the destruction of 69 
anti-personnel mines, 82 anti-vehicle mines, and 595 items 
of ERW.11
In his October 2018 report to the UN Security Council, the UN 
Secretary-General reported that, since April of that year, the 
RMA claimed to have cleared more than 84km2 of land west 
of the berm, with the destruction of 344 items, consisting of 
268 items of unexploded ordnance, 74 anti-personnel mines, 
and 2 anti-vehicle mines.12 Previously, in his April 2018 report, 
the UN Secretary-General noted that the RMA had reported 
“clearing” nearly 145km2 of land to the west of the Berm 
with the destruction of 1,121 items, including 1,008 items of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), as well as 57 anti-vehicle and 
56 anti-personnel mines during the period 10 April 2017 to 29 
March 2018.13 No further details were provided.
Morocco has reported that since 1975, as at end April 2019, a 
total of 96,704 mines, including 49,316 anti-personnel mines, 
and a further 20,132 items of ERW had been destroyed and 
a total of almost 5,440km2 was cleared during demining 
operations.14
Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following 
an increase in the number of incidents. In April 2016, 
Morocco was reportedly planning a new effort to clear 
mines from the Berm that divides Western Sahara into the 
Moroccan-controlled area and the Polisario-controlled area. 
The units to be deployed were reportedly those trained by 
the US Marines.15
Morocco is not a state party to the APMBC, but nonetheless 
has obligations under international human rights law to 
clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or 
control as soon as possible. Morocco has stated on numerous 
occasions its determination to voluntarily comply with the 
provisions of the APMBC, including completion of stockpile 
destruction of anti-personnel mines and demining. It has 
provided annual voluntary Article 7 reports to the APMBC 
regularly over the past decade. It has not, however, indicated 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Myanmar has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ The Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) and armed groups should stop all use of anti-personnel mines.
 ■ Myanmar should accelerate non-technical survey, authorise international marking of hazardous areas, and 
permit accredited operators to conduct clearance and explosive ordnance disposal.
 ■ Myanmar should establish a national mine action authority to plan and coordinate comprehensive 
humanitarian mine action.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of confl icts 
between the Tatmadaw and numerous non-state armed 
groups affi liated with ethnic minorities. There is no estimate 
of the extent of mine contamination but some 55 townships 
(out of a total of 325) in 10 states and regions are believed 
to suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily 
anti-personnel mines. While there is no systematic collection 
of landmine casualty data in Myanmar, of the recorded 
incidents in recent years, Kachin and Shan States have 
among the highest number of landmine casualties, and 
numbers are increasing.1 
In 2018, MAG identifi ed 671,244m2 of anti-personnel mined 
area across 42 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and 
21,126m2 across 9 confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) across 
Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states and the Tanintharyi region 
(see Table 1).2
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by township or state (at end 2018)3
Township/ State CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Bawlakhae/Kayah 0 0 1 16,482
Hpasawng/Kayah 0 0 2 27,065
Hpruso/Kayah 1 14,819 14 28,428
Loikaw/Kayah 0 0 15 19,059
Mese/Kayah 0 0 1 27,028
Kawkareik/Kayin 1 2,400 0 0
Langkho/Shan(South) 0 0 1 500,000
Mongkaung/Shan(South) 0 0 3 51,225
Pekon/Shan(South) 7 3,907 5 1,957
Totals 9 21,126 42 671,244
In 2018, DDG conducted non-technical survey in Kayah state 
(in Hpruso and Hpasawng townships) visiting a total of 
102 villages. A total of nine CHAs totalling 613,366m² were 
identifi ed in nine contaminated villages.4
In addition, in 2018, The HALO Trust identifi ed 163,832m2 
across 58 hazardous areas by non-technical survey in 
Kayin and Shan States. In 2019, as at August, a further 25 
hazardous areas had been identifi ed covering 550,287m2. 
These contaminated areas indicate the presence of both 
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).5
The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on Myanmar established by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council reported in September 2018 that “despite 
the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefi re Agreement in 
October 2015, which committed all parties to end the use 
of landmines and cooperate on mine-clearance operations, 
new landmines continue to be laid.” It cited credible reports 
that the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups had laid mines 
and observed that “Tatmadaw soldiers lay landmines in 
villages they have attacked or after civilians have fl ed, or on 
roads frequently used by civilians. Civilians have also laid 
landmines in order to protect their property.”6
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It was also reported that mines had been laid by the 
Tatmadaw soldiers along the border with Bangladesh in the 
lead up to and following the “clearance operations” intended 
to target fl eeing Rohingya civilians and to prevent those who 
had already left from returning. In April 2017, it was reported 
that the Myanmar and Bangladesh governments had agreed 
to remove mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
from the border area. By August, however, the Tatmadaw 
was laying mines along the border, not removing them, and 
in September Bangladesh made a formal complaint with 
Myanmar regarding its use of mines.7
In September 2019, the Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on Myanmar reported that Northern 
Myanmar is “heavily contaminated with landmines” and that 
the parties to the confl ict, including the Tatmadaw, the KIA, 
the SSA-S , and the SSA-N, all continue to lay landmines and 
use IEDs.8
The Tatmadaw uses anti-personnel mines most of which are 
produced in state-owned factories.9 Ethnic armed groups 
acknowledge use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised 
nature as well as a number of anti-vehicle mines, but 
unconfi rmed reports have suggested groups in the 
north have also obtained Chinese factory-made Type 72 
anti-vehicle mines.10
The violence in Myanmar started after the country’s 
independence in 1948. Mined areas are located in areas 
of Myanmar adjacent to borders with Bangladesh, China, 
and Thailand, and pose a particular threat in northern and 
eastern parts of the country.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Myanmar has no functioning national mine action programme. 
The government set up a Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC) 
under the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 2012 with NPA’s 
support, but the centre was never fully staffed. The MPC 
was dissolved at the end of March 2016 and replaced by a 
National Reconciliation and Peace Centre that reports to the 
head of government, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.11
The Nationwide Ceasefi re Agreement signed in October 2015 
included a dedicated article on demining, but as at August 2019, 
the government had not formulated a clear direction for mine 
action or established a centre to coordinate it.12
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement and 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) co-chair the 
Mine Risks Working Group (MRWG), which was set up in 
2012 and comprises 10 ministries, 41 international and 
national organisations, and four state-level coordination 
agencies (in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin and Shahn states).13 In 
2018–19, the MRWG was guided by a strategic workplan 
whose six main priorities are: inter-ministerial and inter-
agency coordination mechanisms; mine risk education 
(MRE); victim assistance; data collection and information 
management; advocacy; and land release operations, 
including non-technical survey.14 UNICEF hosts quarterly 
MRWG meetings at union and state level.15
MAG and NPA both reported that the Government of 
Myanmar, including the military, became more engaged 
with mine issues at state and union level in 2018.16 There 
is a regular and well attended MRE working group, with 
active participation from state and union level government 
representatives. As at August 2019, the development of a 
non-technical survey working group was under discussion.17
The Government of Myanmar drafted a countrywide 
internally displaced person (IDP) camp closure strategy, 
which has identifi ed a need for landmine clearance to enable 
IDPs to return to their villages of origin. While this strategy 
does not provide any further details of how and when such 
clearance will take place it has allowed mine action partners 
to engage in further discussions about clearance with 
key stakeholders such as the Minister for Social Welfare, 
Relief and Resettlement. Although further permissions 
are still needed from the Ministry of Defence before such 
humanitarian clearance can begin, this marks a positive 
change in engagement.18
In 2018, operators facilitated workshops and cooperative 
visits between government delegates from Myanmar 
and neighbouring countries. This included a study tour to 
Cambodia in collaboration with the ASEAN Regional Mine 
Action Centre (ARMAC) and the Cambodian Mine Action and 
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) where delegates learned 
about land release, national standards, Standing Operating 
Procedures (SoPs) and information management, as well 
as about Cambodia’s experience in adhering to the APMBC. 
A similar trip to Thailand was planned for 2019.19
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Myanmar does not have standards and therefore operators have followed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
and their own SoPs.
In 2018, operators successfully advocated for the Government of Myanmar to include physical marking (with warning signs)
 of SHAs and CHAs as part of the non-technical survey process. The government now approves marking of polygons on a 
case-by-case basis dependent on approval from local authorities.20 The HALO Trust has since marked two hazardous areas 
in Kayin state with the agreement of the authorities and local community.21
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OPERATORS 
Six international demining organisations have offi ces in 
Yangon and some provincial locations: DanChurchAid (DCA), 
Danish Demining Group (DDG), The HALO Trust, Humanity and 
Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA). Tatmadaw engineers have reportedly 
conducted some mine clearance but operations are not 
systematic or recorded.
In 2018, MAG deployed a total of 12 community liaison 
teams and 44 community liaison staff. MAG also deployed 
a Community Liaison Manager, four Community Liaison 
Supervisors and three Community Liaison Team Leaders 
during 2018. In 2019, this was reduced by two community 
liaison teams and one Community Liaison Team Leader.22
DDG employed three international staff and forty-two national 
staff in 2018 (four in their Yangon offi ce, sixteen in Kayah for 
non-technical survey and MRE and twenty-two in Shan and 
Kachin for MRE). In 2019, DDG increased capacity in its Kayah 
offi ce by relocating staff from Yangon and hiring an additional 
staff member.23
In 2018, NPA supported its local civil society partners in the 
activities of one non-technical survey team and two MRE/
community liaison teams. In 2019, NPA plans to support the 
deployment of three non-technical survey teams with its civil 
society partners, which will conduct non-technical survey 
and MRE primarily in the south-east of the country where 
there are ceasefi res in effect.24
The HALO Trust employed 49 staff in 2018 based between 
Yangon, Hpa-An (Kayin), and Lashio (Shan) states, deploying 
seven teams to deliver MRE, conduct survey, and assist 
victims in Kayin and Shan states. In addition, HALO Trust 
operates with two local partners in Shan state, which 
increases access to ethnic Kachin and Shan communities.25
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
No land release has occurred in Myanmar as humanitarian 
mine action operators are not permitted to conduct clearance 
by either the government or ethnic minority authorities. 
Operators have conducted risk education and community 
liaison activities, which in recent years have included limited 
community mapping of hazardous areas in some locations. 
Operators were authorised to conduct non-technical survey in 
some locations in 2018. They have so far been unable to carry 
out surveys across an entire state (province) which would 
enable them to determine a baseline level of contamination.
In 2018, MAG submitted a concept note for clearance of a 
small number of tasks in Kayah state. The sites selected were 
not of military strategic importance and clearance will bring 
signifi cant benefi ts for community safety and tourism. During 
2019, MAG will continue to push for state and union level 
approval for this initiative. MAG has secured permission to 
conduct non-technical survey in Thaninthyari and Kayin state, 
which began in 2019.26
DDG continued non-technical survey in 2018 and as well as 
identifying CHAs the survey teams also identifi ed 26 items of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) across 26 villages. In 2019, DDG 
was invited by the Kayah Government to seek authorisation 
to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) but before any 
such authorisation could be granted, the military stopped 
the process and asserted their responsibility over EOD. 
DDG provided the military with information about all the 
dangerous items identifi ed during the survey process and 
encouraged the military to take action to remove and destroy 
those items.27
NPA supported its civil society partners for the activities of 
one non-technical survey team in November 2018 in Mon state, 
but no CHAs or SHAs were discovered between November 
and December 2018. In 2019, NPA was focusing on three 
areas of work: national ownership and capacity development, 
non-technical survey and MRE with civil society partners, and 
emergency response by local and national partners.28
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ North Korea should cease all use of anti-personnel mines.
 ■ North Korea should clear all mines from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as possible.
 ■ North Korea should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, North Korea has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL 
MINE CONTAMINATION 
The extent of North Korea’s mine problem is not known. 
North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid mines in the 
DMZ, a 1,000km2 strip of land between the north and south 
of the peninsula believed to be one of the most densely 
contaminated areas in the world. Mined areas are reported 
to be marked and fenced but mines are also believed to have 
shifted as a result of fl ooding and landslides.1 In early 2006, 
offi cials commented to the APMBC Implementation Support 
Unit (ISU) that North Korea had not laid mines elsewhere in 
the country,2 despite fears that, among others, sections of the 
east coast were also mined. 
Under an agreement on measures to ease tensions, North 
and South Korea completed clearance of the Joint Security 
Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom in October 2018. Additional 
clearance was conducted around Arrowhead Hill (also known 
as Hill 281) in Cheolwon, Gangwon Province.3
In 2016, South Korean offi cials alleged new use of mines by 
North Korea near the village of Panmunjom inside the DMZ, 
which is jointly administered by North Korea and the United 
Nations (UN) Command. South Korea said North Korean 
soldiers were observed laying several mines on the North’s 
side of the “Bridge of No Return”, which spans the military 
demarcation line.4 North Korean forces were also reported 
to have used anti-personnel mines along the DMZ border in 
2015 and 2016, apparently to prevent North Korean soldiers 
from fl eeing to South Korea.5 
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
North Korea has no functioning mine action programme. 
In September 2018, the North Korean and South Korean 
Ministers of Defence signed a military agreement, the 
Panmunjom declaration, which mandated North Korea, South 
Korea, and the United Nations Command (UNC) to “remove all 
mines in the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom 
within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018”.6 
LAND RELEASE 
South Korean offi cials confi rmed on 22 October 2018 that 
clearance of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom by North 
and South Korea had been completed.7 They reported North 
Korea had cleared 636 mines while South Korea found none.8 
The north also reportedly cleared a 1.3km-long mine belt in 
the Arrowhead Hill region.9 No other land release is known to 
have occurred.
NORTH KOREA
 1 Statement of North Korea, United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 
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“Koreas start clearing landmines at DMZ in effort to ease tensions,” 
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 3 Song Young-moo and No Kwang Chol, Agreement on the Implementation 
of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain, National 
Committee on North Korea, 19 September 2018, Annex 2, p. 7, at: bit.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Pakistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Pakistan has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL 
MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Pakistan 
is not known. Pakistan remains affected by mines and other 
explosive ordnance resulting from the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India, as 
well as from more recent and continuing confl icts in areas 
bordering Afghanistan, including, in particular, the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
In 2018, Pakistan reiterated past statements that it “faces 
no problem of uncleared mines”. It again acknowledged that 
the army laid mines on its eastern border with India during 
an escalation of tensions in 2001–02, but stated those mines 
were all cleared and that no mines have since been laid.1 
In 2018, Pakistan stated that non-state armed groups 
(NSAGs) have employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
including mines during attacks.2 In fact, according to media 
reports across Pakistan in 2018–19, civilian mine casualties 
were from mines of an improvised nature laid by NSAGs, 
from mines laid by troops along the Line of Control (LoC) 
between India and Pakistan, and from mines and other 
explosive hazards in South Waziristan (in an area that had 
been cleared and declared safe by the military).3 According 
to Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), in 2018, of the 1,538 
deaths and injuries from explosive violence in Pakistan, 2% 
were caused by landmines.4 In 2017, according to a report 
from Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), Pakistan had the world’s highest number of 
recorded casualties from anti-vehicle mines, amounting 
to 28% of the global total.5
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme. 
Pakistani military engineering units are believed to be 
responsible for mine clearance in confl ict zones, while the 
Frontier Constabulary has said it conducts mine clearance in 
contaminated areas of Baluchistan, FATA, and other confl ict 
zones in the North-West Frontier Province.6
LAND RELEASE 
There are no reports of formal survey or clearance of mined 
area in 2018. Pakistan reported a total of 232 attacks causing 
casualties due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs, which 
include anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, although the 
fi gures are not disaggregated) “all over the country”.7
According to a media report, on 15 December 2018 an 
unnamed senior security offi cial said that 22 demining teams 
were being formed by the Pakistani Army to defuse and 
remove IEDs and mines in the North Waziristan District of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA. These deminers would 
be in addition to the reported 43 teams already working in 
the seven former tribal districts.8
PAKISTAN
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Russia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Russia has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine 
contamination but Russia is heavily contaminated with mines 
and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the 
Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 
1999–2009), and armed confl icts in the Caucasian republics 
of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used extensively 
in the two major confl icts in Chechnya. Estimates of the 
extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic 
effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact 
of the problem.1 In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister 
and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr 
Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km2 of land and 
posed a major obstacle to development.2 In contrast, Chechen 
offi cials and human rights organisations have previously 
estimated that 245km2 of land was mined, including 165km2 
of farmland and 73km2 of woodland.3
In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces 
reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km2 
of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 
20km2 in neighbouring Ingushetia.4 According to the online 
media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in 
lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more 
mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.5 
As at 2011, according to UNICEF, 3,132 civilians, including 772 
children, had been killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines 
and ERW in Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was 
conducted by a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
partner Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January 
2011, due to lack of funding.6 
ALLEGED USE OF MINES IN CRIMEA IN 2014
Reports of minefi elds emplaced to demarcate border areas 
after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, appear to have 
concerned either “phoney minefi elds” or areas containing 
trip-fl ares. Trip-fl ares are not covered by the APMBC.7
On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper Harts reported that 
“Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in 
the land bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the 
mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake 
Crimea.”8 The photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian 
publication Novaya Gazeta photographed an apparent 
minefi eld laid near a road leading into Crimea and close to the 
villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka, in Kherson province of 
Ukraine. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in 
a fi eld and ‘Danger Mines’ warning signs.9 Other photographs, 
shared with Human Rights Watch by a photo-journalist, 
showed an area near Chongar marked with “Danger Mines” 
signs and evidence of stake-mounted, tripwire-initiated fl ares 
in the ground, also known as “signal mines”.10
Members of the local population informed Ukrainian partners 
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that 
Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson province had 
laid mines, but it was not possible to confi rm the reports, 
including whether any mines laid were anti-personnel or 
anti-vehicle.11 On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported 
that the Russian military had laid mines around the main 
gas line into Crimea, but this allegation has not been 
independently verifi ed.12
At a meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) in April 2014, Ukraine alleged Russian use 
of TM-62 anti-vehicle mines and unidentifi ed anti-personnel 
mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea.13 At the same 
CCW meeting, Russia denied using anti-personnel mines, 
asserting “the Self Defence forces of Crimea, before the 
referendum, placed the minefi elds with relevant markings, 
around Chongar”. Russia said “they placed only signal mines 
and put proper signage around the fi elds”.14
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia 
and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance 
is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, 
demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 
by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its 
specialised demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the 
“Leader” Centre for Special Tasks).15
Russia reported that its armed forces established an 
International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre 
serves as a base for specialist training in detection and 
clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation 
of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine 
action centre (MAC) as the term is generally understood 
in mine action.16
In 2018, Russia reported that 6,135 military personnel were 
involved in clearance operations in 136 demining teams. 
Clearance was carried out by the Air and Space Forces, by 
the Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Region Military 
Forces, by the North Navy Forces, by the Strategic Rocket 
Forces and by the Military Engineers.17
LAND RELEASE 
In 2018, Russia reported that it cleared 657.8km2 of ERW-contaminated area across the Russian Federation and abroad with 
129,818 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) found and destroyed.18





RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Republic of South Korea (South Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, South Korea has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. In 
particular, South Korea should clear all anti-personnel mines within the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as 
possible.
 ■ South Korea should enact long-awaited legislation permitting mine clearance by accredited civilian demining 
organisations.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately 
adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among 
the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive 
mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, 
and in 1988. 
In 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines 
were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 
mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites 
that cover an area of about 3km2 in the northern parts of 
Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.1 A 
National Defence Committee report in 2010 said that South 
Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km2 
and some 209 unconfi rmed mined areas covering almost 
98km2.2 A report presented to a side event at the 2019 APMBC 
Intersessional Meetings showed the number of mined areas 
as almost unchanged at 1,308 but provided no estimate of the 
size of the affected areas.3 
An investigation by the United States (US)-led United Nations 
(UN) Command Military Armistice Commission into a 2015 
mine incident that wounded two South Korean soldiers 
concluded that North Korean soldiers had planted box mines 
in the southern half of the DMZ along a known patrol route 
used by the South Korean army. Investigators concluded the 
mines were recently emplaced, and ruled out the possibility 
that these were legacy landmines that had drifted from their 
original placements due to rain or shifting soil”.4 North Korea 
rejected the allegation, stating it would make “no sense” for it 
to use mines south of the border and that it only used mines 
in self-defence.5
Table 1: Mined area in South Korea6
Total mined areas DMZ North of CCL South of CCL Rear areas
1,308 786 433 22 67
CCL = Civilian Control Line
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no national mine action authority or mine action 
centre in South Korea. Demining is conducted by the South 
Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of 
the DMZ and CCZ, and has concentrated mostly on demining 
military bases in rear areas. In September 2018, it was 
reported that the South Korean army had called for the 
establishment of an agency dedicated to removing mines 
in the DMZ. The agency would be tasked with planning and 
executing the removal process.7
South and North Korea agreed in the Panmunjeom 
Declaration of April 2018 to transform the DMZ into a peace 
zone. Under the Pyongyang Joint Declaration signed in 
September 2018 the two countries agreed to expand the 
cessation of hostilities into the removal of the danger of war 
across the peninsula. They also signed an Agreement on 
the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration, 
which provided for clearance of all mines and other explosive 
devices from agreed areas with a view to the joint recovery of 
remains of soldiers killed in the Korean War. The agreement 
specifi ed clearance operations would be conducted for four 
hours a day in designated times using agreed equipment and 
that the perimeter of cleared areas would be marked.8 
South Korea’s Ministry of Defence submitted a bill to 
parliament in 2013 that would allow civilian organisations to 
remove mines laid during the Korean War.9 As at September 
2019, South Korea’s National Assembly had not passed the bill.
SOUTH KOREA
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LAND RELEASE 
South Korean army engineers cleared the southern part of 
the Joint Security Area of the DMZ in October 2018. The North 
informed the South that it had cleared 636 mines; the South 
said it did not destroy any.10 South Korean engineers also 
cleared areas round Arrowhead Hill in Cheolwon, Gangwon 
province to facilitate exhumation of soldiers killed in action 
during the war. South Korea said it destroyed 27 mines and 
1,479 items of unexploded ordnance.11 
Additionally, 635 army engineers cleared 151,738m2 between 
March and December 2018, destroying 240 landmines (232 
anti-personnel mines and 8 anti-vehicle mines), an increase 
on the 102,828m2 cleared and 142 mines destroyed in 2017.12





RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Syria has obligations under international human rights law 
to clear mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Syria should establish a mine action authority and facilitate access for international demining organisations to 
facilitate development of a credible humanitarian demining programme.
 ■ Syria should initiate a programme of mine survey and clearance as soon as possible and take other measures 
to reduce the risk to civilians of mines and explosive remnants of war.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION 
Syria is heavily contaminated by mines and mines of an 
improvised nature used extensively by parties to the 
country’s eight-year old confl ict. It also has mined areas 
left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948. 
Landmines, whether commercial or of an improvised 
nature, affect all regions and vary according to the armed 
groups active there, but contamination appears to be 
particularly dense in areas that were occupied by Islamic 
State. Continuing hostilities and persistent use of mines have 
prevented a determination of the extent of contamination.1 
Mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) make up only 
part of Syria’s massive contamination by explosive remnants 
of war (ERW).
The Syrian government reportedly laid mines along borders 
with Turkey and Lebanon in 2012 and Turkish authorities 
claimed fi ve years ago that between 613,000 and 715,000 
mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border, 
making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces.2 In 
Manbij, close to the Turkish border, heavy casualties from 
mines, including those of an improvised nature, occurred 
after Kurdish forces pushed out Islamic State in mid-August 
2016 and were still occurring as a result of continuing 
confl icts in 2019.3 Islamic State heavily mined the approaches 
to Manbij and around the Tishreen dam to the east of it, using 
young boys disguised as shepherds to lay the mines, the 
United Nations Commission of Inquiry monitoring the confl ict 
in Syria reported in March 2017.4 
In Aleppo and neighbouring Idlib governorates, volunteers 
similarly report mines and other explosive devices planted 
in agricultural fi elds, next to roads, inside villages, and 
around schools and hospitals.5 Rebel forces which subjected 
the towns of Foua and Kfraya to years of siege are said to 
have left hundreds of mines in surrounding fi elds as well as 
individual explosive devices in many homes.6 
Further south in Hama and Homs governorates, 
open-source reports of mine casualties, although 
unconfi rmed, are suggestive of signifi cant contamination 
left by all sides during years of confl ict.7 The Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights said that between 24 February 
and 17 March 2019 it documented the death of 44 people 
in mine and IED explosions in Homs, Hama and Deir Ezzour. 
It also documented casualties from mines, including those of 
an improvised nature, around towns in the southern province 
of Dara.8 
From Raqqa, former capital of the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State caliphate, to Hassakeh governorate in the north-east, 
and south to Deir ez-Zor and Barghuz (the last remaining 
Islamic State stronghold overrun in May 2019), retreating 
Islamic State forces left massive contamination by mines 
of an improvised nature and other improvised devices that 
have taken a heavy toll on civilians returning in their wake. 
Medical non-governmental organisation (NGO) Médecins 
sans Frontières reported that the number of victims of mines 
and other explosive devices it treated in north-east Syria 
doubled between November 2017 and March 2018. Half of 
them were children. Its patients reported discovering mines 
and booby-traps on roads, alongside fi elds, on rooftops, and 
under staircases, as well as rigged in common household 
items from refrigerators and air conditioners to televisions 
and cooking pots.9 
SYRIA
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a 
national programme for survey and clearance. Mine action 
has been conducted by a wide range of organisations. 
In areas under government control, these have included 
Russian and Syrian military engineers, other parties to the 
confl ict, and civil defence organisations. 
Russia deployed several hundred military deminers from the 
Armed Forces Demining Centre from 2017 and conducted 
clearance with manual teams supported by mine detection 
dogs and Uran-6 mine detection robots. Russian troops also 
provided training courses for Syrian army engineers 
at Hmeimim air base and at training centres established 
in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of January 2018, 
Russian armed forces reported they had trained 900 
Syrian engineers.10 
In 2018, Russia started to withdraw troops, including 
deminers, from Syria and appealed to other countries 
to provide support. Armenia became the fi rst country to 
respond to the appeal, sending an 83-man team to Syria in 
February 2019, planning to focus its work on the northern 
governorate of Aleppo.11 Armenia rotated a new team to 
replace the fi rst after four months.12
National operators included Syrian Civil Defence (SCD), 
which, at the start of 2018, was working in fi ve governorates 
(Dar’a, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Quneitra) with the support 
of Mayday. SCD’s three teams in Dar’a and two teams in 
Quneitra operated until early July 2018 when operations were 
halted and the teams disbanded. SCD also had one clearance 
team working in Hama governorate and another in Idlib in 
2018. By mid-2019, SCD had fi ve clearance teams working in 
three provinces: Hama (1 team), Idlib (2 teams) and Aleppo 
(2 teams). It also planned to deploy two non-technical survey 
teams, one each in Hama and Idlib.13 AFAK, a Syrian NGO 
working in partnership with The HALO Trust, conducted 
clearance in the southern provinces of Dar’a and Quneitra in 
the early part of 2019 until a Syrian army drive took control 
of the area.14 
In areas outside government control in the north east, 
humanitarian demining organisations and commercial 
companies, including Tetra Tech, have conducted large-scale 
clearance in areas recaptured from Islamic State. A small 
national organisation, Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO), 
was conducting clearance in north and north-east Syria but 
reportedly sustained heavy casualties among its deminers 
attempting clearance of improvised devices.15
Tetra Tech, started work in northern Syria in October 2016 
but since 2017, worked in the north east operating in Raqqa, 
Deir Ezzour and, after its recapture in 2019, in Barguz. 
Funded by the US Department of States, Tetra Tech focused 
on critical infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, water 
pumping stations, and electricity generating plants. By 
2018, Tetra Tech had approximately 400 personnel but after 
President Trump’s December 2018 announcement of the 
US intention to withdraw from Syria it reduced capacity 
from seven multi-task teams to two, working with two risk 
education teams. Three international staff have been killed 
during clearance operations in Syria.16 
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Syrian 
government in July 2018 under which it deployed two staff to 
Damascus. In January 2019, it started a fi rst risk education 
training course for 26 Syrian personnel, of whom 16 were 
women.17 Russia announced in March 2019 it would provide 
funding of US$1 million to support UNMAS’s activities in 
Syria.18 In April 2019, UNMAS announced a “Humanitarian 
Mine Action Support to Syria (31 March 2019–31 March 2020)” 
project, supported by a $1.4 million grant from Japan, which 
is expected to deliver risk education to 43,000 people and 
conduct contamination impact surveys in 85 communities, 
as well as marking and fencing off explosive hazards.19
LAND RELEASE 
Continuing confl ict prevented a coordinated national 
programme of mine action in 2018 and 2019. Mine action 
interventions reportedly gathered signifi cant momentum, 
albeit at levels that varied in different regions according to 
the level of security. International operators have conducted 
signifi cant amounts of clearance of land and buildings in 
the north east but did not release details. No coordinated 
and comprehensive information on outcomes of survey and 
clearance in other areas was available. 
Syrian deminers were reported to have conducted clearance 
of mines and explosive devices in the Damascus suburbs of 
Eastern Ghouta and Douma after government forces and their 
allies retook control in April 2018.20 As government forces 
extended their control in southern governorates in 2018, 
Syrian army deminers were reported clearing mines and 
ERW in Dar’a.21
Armenia’s Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise 
reported that the Armenian army engineers sent to Syria in 
February 2019 had cleared around 35,000m2 by July, tackling 
29 landmines and explosive devices. An Armenian deminer 
was injured in the explosion of a mine or IED in March 
resulting in amputation of a foot.22 They planned to clear fi ve 
minefi elds near Aleppo covering a total area of about 1.3km2 
in operations coordinated with Russian and Syrian military 
engineers.23 Between 8 June and 22 July 2019, the deminers 
reportedly cleared 8,534m2.24 Demolitions of cleared items 
are conducted by the Syrian military.25 
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UZBEKISTAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Uzbekistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Uzbekistan has obligations under international human rights 
law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Uzbekistan should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance 
operations.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION
Uzbek forces have laid mines along its international borders 
at various times, including on its borders with Afghanistan 
in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 
2000. While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 
1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, certain areas have not yet been delineated and 
therefore the exact location of mined areas is not known.1 
In 2010, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), 
Ban Ki-moon, criticised as “unacceptable” Uzbekistan’s 
emplacing of mines along parts of its border that have not 
been delineated.2
Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border. 
Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the minefi elds 
along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining 
operations conducted by Uzbek army deminers 
in cooperation with Tajik border troops.3 
The fi rst ever state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to 
Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements 
were signed between the two countries, including one on 
demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek 
border. Any demining operations will require agreement and 
cooperation between the two nations; as at July 2019, the 
Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) was reported to be 
in negotiation with the Uzbek MoFA regarding survey of the 
Tajik-Uzbek border (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the 
Mines report on Tajikistan for further information).4 
In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz offi cials in Batken 
province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked 
previously mined areas of the border around the settlements 
of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared 
by Uzbek deminers, and confi rmed that they were free of 
contamination.5 According to the most recent information 
available (2005), Uzbekistan has no plans to clear mines laid 
on its 150km border with Afghanistan.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.
LAND RELEASE 
There are no reports of any survey or clearance occurring in 2018.
 1 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 25 April 2018. 
 2 “Ban calls Uzbekistan land mines ‘unacceptable’”, The Hindu, 6 April 2010, at: bit.ly/2Z3WYgN. 
 3 Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), 16 February 2009; Tajikistan Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention Article 7 Report, 
“General situation”, 3 February 2008, p. 3; and “Uzbekistan started demining on Tajik border”, Spy.kz, 23 October 2007. 
 4 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 27 April 2018 and 25 July 2019. 
 5 IRIN, “Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Landmine threat along Uzbek border removed”, at: www.irinnews.org. 






RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a state party to the APMBC, Vietnam has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Vietnam should prepare and publish a detailed assessment of remaining mined areas.
 ■ The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) should draw up a strategic plan for completing 
mine clearance.
 ■ VNMAC should provide regular detailed reporting on the progress of demining.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Vietnam’s mine problem is certainly small compared with its 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, though its 
full extent is unknown. A survey conducted between 2010 
and 2014 reported anti-personnel mines in 26 of 63 cities and 
provinces but gave no further details.1 Between 2014 and 
2019, Danish Demining Group (DDG) identifi ed 13 previously 
unrecorded minefi elds in four districts in Quang Nam 
province and one district in Thua Thien Hue province. In 2018, 
DDG identifi ed three anti-personnel mined areas of 12,652m2 
in A Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue province. Local residents 
were aware of the presence of mines and reported to DDG 
that they tended to avoid these areas.2 
Most mines were left by confl icts in the 1970s with 
neighbouring Cambodia and China, and affect areas close 
to its borders with those countries.3 Clearance had been 
reported by Vietnam along its northern border with China in 
the 1990s and from 2004 onwards, but mined areas further 
inland are believed to persist.4 It was reported in 2013 by the 
Engineering Command that clearance had been completed 
in the Cambodia border areas.5 Many ports and river deltas 
were mined extensively during the armed confl ict with the 
United States and were not completely cleared when it 
ended. A number of sea mines have been found on the coast.6 
Some mines have also been found around former United 
States (US) military installations.7
Vietnam also has extensive contamination from cluster 
munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) (“See Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster 
Munition Remnants 2019 report on Vietnam for further 
information”).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Vietnam’s mine action programme is restructuring, but 
management and operations continue to depend largely 
on the armed forces. According to the Decree on the 
Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities, 
issued in February 2019 (hereafter, the 2019 Decree), the 
Ministry of National Defence (MoD) will continue to elaborate 
and preside over the national mine action programme, as the 
lead authority, in coordination with other relevant ministries 
and sectors.8 It also designates the MoD as the focal point for 
international cooperation in mine action.9
The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) was 
established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decision (No. 738 of 
2013) to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide 
a focal point for mine action operations. The 2019 Decree 
instructed VNMAC, “under the direction of the Prime Minister 
and managed by Ministry of Defense, to monitor, coordinate 
and implement mine action tasks.”10 Although the VMAC is 
not yet fully functional, 2019 is a crucial year as the national 
programme develops its legal framework, structure, policies, 
and standards.11
Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
Golden West all provide capacity development support 
in Vietnam.12 
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GENDER
As at August 2019, Vietnam has not provided information on whether it has a gender policy and implementation plan for 
mine action. 
International operators DDG, MAG, and NPA all report having organisational gender and diversity policies and state that 
they consult both women and children during community liaison activities with male and female members of community 
liaison/survey teams. They say they provide equal opportunities during the recruitment process and are working towards 
gender-balanced employment.13
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Data quality and accessibility continues to be a major 
challenge in Vietnam. VNMAC is responsible for national 
information management and uses the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). However, with 
the exception of the UNDP Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project 
(KV-MAP) project data, information is not shared with mine 
action operators.14 The ERW impact survey report released in 
2018 noted that “regulations on reporting demining activities 
have not been strictly followed” and authorities had received 
clearance data for only two provinces, Ha Tinh and Quang Tri, 
where international donors have supported operations.15
The VNMAC information management unit intends to 
consolidate mine action data from the Technology Centre 
for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICEN), the UNDP KV-MAP 
project, and Quang Tri province into the national information 
management system. With support from NPA, VNMAC is 
equipped with the necessary technical capabilities and 
knowledge, but legislation governing the collection and 
sharing of mine action data was lacking.16 However, the 
forthcoming guiding Circular, which as at June 2019 was 
being elaborated, is expected to provide clarity on the 
collection and sharing of mine action data, including data 
the military allow to be made public.17 
Vietnam has a National Mine Action Standard, a Technical 
Mine Action Regulation, and various mine action-related 
procedures, each of which have their own data collection 
forms. These data collection forms are not consistent, nor 
are they used in a standard manner. However, this issue 
is expected to be addressed by the legal framework 
being developed.18
Mine action data collected by the provincial information 
management system in Quang Tri, also using IMSMA, is 
accessible to all mine action stakeholders. The database 
holds survey and clearance results, providing a basis for 
planning and tasking, as well as victim data. It has also 
received some data on clearance activity undertaken by the 
Provincial Military Command for 2000 to 2013.19 The data, 
which are believed to be accurate, up to date, and reliable, 
have been the catalyst for greater coordination across all 
stakeholders within the province.20 Live operations data 
can be accessed via QTMAC’s website, while the other 
Vietnamese provinces with active mine action programmes 
do not have databases, and operators maintain their own.21
Development of information management is an aim of the 
KV-MAP project, the goal of which is to improve available 
information for the UXO/mine action sector to support 
informed policy making and task prioritisation.22 In 2018, 
Coordination Offi ces and Database Centres for Mine Action 
were established in Quang Binh and Binh Dinh provinces with 
training provided to provincial staff. As at June 2019, these 
centres manage the data from the KV-MAP project which 
is then fed into the VNMAC database but the aim is for the 
centres to be sustainable and in the future manage the mine 
action data for the province.23
PLANNING AND TASKING
Decision 504, approved by the Prime Minister in April 2010, 
set out a National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. The plan 
aimed to “mobilize domestic and international resources in 
making efforts to minimize and fi nally create impact-free 
environment for social economic development.” It called for 
ERW contamination clearance of 8,000km2 between 2016 
and 2025.24
A VNMAC action plan for 2018 included three main targets25:
 ■ Finalise legislation, decrees, and guidelines for the mine 
action sector in order to provide a unifi ed framework for 
the sector country-wide
 ■ Clarify contamination estimates through the release of the 
landmine impact survey and develop risk education
 ■ Clearance of some 300km2 of ERW-affected land.
It is evident that at least partially these targets have 
been achieved: legislation has been introduced; clarifying 
guidelines are being developed; and the results of the ERW 
impact survey were released. As at May 2019, however, no 
information had been formally provided by VNMAC on the 
realisation of its 2018 goals or on its goals for 2019.
As at May 2019, there was no national prioritisation system 
for mine clearance. The prioritisation processes implemented 
in Quang Tri and Quang Binh are predominantly for CMR 
contamination. In Quang Tri province, there is a prioritisation 
plan in place and an effective system for task allocation.26 
The prioritisation processes and accompanying forms were 
piloted in 2018 and were rolled out in May 2019, with QTMAC 
now managing the province-wide clearance task prioritization 
process.27 The criteria are established based on consultation 
and agreement between QTMAC and operators. In Quang 
Binh province, MAG has been applying its own procedures 
and process to prioritise clearance tasks based on scores of 
consent, hazard assessment, and community benefi ts.28 While 
DDG uses a consultative approach at the province, district and 
village level to prioritise its clearance tasks.29
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Vietnam has both National Technical Regulations (QCVNs), 
which are legally binding and similar in content to standing 
operating procedures (SoPs), and National Mine Action 
Standards (TCVN), closely aligned with the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS), but considered optional by VNMAC 
and the MoD.30
OPERATORS 
Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army 
Engineering Corps and military-owned commercial 
companies. Outside the central provinces its current strength 
and deployment are unknown. Offi cials have previously 
reported that it had 250 mine clearance and battle area 
clearance (BAC) teams nationally. The three Provincial 
Military Command (PMC) teams in the aforementioned 
provinces all conducted BAC throughout 2018. Vietnam 
reportedly has more than 70 military-owned companies 
undertaking clearance related to infrastructure and 
commercial and development projects.31
International operators active in 2018 included DDG, working 
in Quang Nam and Thua Tien Hue provinces; MAG, working in 
Quang Binh and Quang Tri provinces; NPA, working in Quang 
Tri and Thua Thien Hue provinces; and PeaceTrees Vietnam, 
which has been working in Quang Tri province since 1995.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
VNMAC has not shared any data on mine clearance activities 
in Vietnam in 2018 and operators did not report any 
anti-personnel mined area reduced or cancelled through 
survey or cleared in 2018.
In 2018, DDG identifi ed 12,652m2 of anti-personnel mined area 
in A Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue province.32 During explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, fi ve anti-personnel mines 
were destroyed: one by DDG, one by MAG, and three by NPA.33
Vietnam has not set a deadline for completion of anti-personnel 
mine clearance. In 2013–17, the Legacy of War Coordination 
Centre (renamed the Quang Tri Mine Action Centre in 2018), 
recorded clearance of 497 mines, 4% of the total number of 
items cleared, but the number of mines cleared annually has 
fallen steadily.34 In Quang Tri province, from 2000 to 2018, 7.5% 
of the 635 incidents from explosive ordnance were due to 
landmines and of the 295,671 items of ordnance found through 
clearance during this time 6,866 (2.3%) were landmines.35
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KOSOVO
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ While formal accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is not currently possible for 
Kosovo, as it is not yet recognised as a state by the depository to the Convention, Kosovo should submit a 
letter to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis, 
with the APMBC. 
 ■ This should include the submission of a voluntary Article 7 transparency report on an annual basis, as Kosovo 
has proposed in its Mine Action Strategy 2019–24.
 ■ The Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) should continue its efforts to ensure timely and effi cient clearance of 
anti-personnel mines, in line with the objectives in its latest mine action strategy and complete clearance by 
the end of 2024.
 ■ KMAC and international mine action operators should increase their collaboration to seek additional funding 
and greater fi nancial stability for mine action. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Kosovo is contaminated by mines, cluster munition remnants 
(CMR), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily 
as a result of the confl ict between the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 
1990s, and between Yugoslavia and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) member states in 1999.1 At the end 
of 2018, 44 confi rmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remained, 
covering almost 1.2km2 in total.2 
Both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used during 
the confl ict, in fi xed-pattern minefi elds as well as more 
randomly in “nuisance” minefi elds. Many anti-personnel 
mines had minimal metal content.3 Although the total number 
of mines emplaced during the confl ict is not known, the UN 
Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) reported, as at 31 
May 2000, a total of 7,232 mines cleared in the preceding year 
(3,448 anti-personnel mines and 3,784 anti-vehicle mines).4 
The UN reported in 2002 that “the problems associated with 
landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded 
ordnance [UXO] in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated”,5 
but further investigation revealed that considerably more 
contamination remained to be addressed.6 
Mines are found mainly on Kosovo’s borders with Albania 
and the then former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (now 
the Republic of North Macedonia), but also in the area of 
Dulie Pass in south-central Kosovo.7 Kosovo has gained 
an accurate assessment of remaining anti-personnel mine 
contamination on its territory as a result of 20 years of mine 
action operations, including surveys in 2013 and 2015.8
The 2013 survey of mined areas and cluster munition strikes 
across Kosovo, carried out by The HALO Trust and KMAC, 
confi rmed 130 hazardous areas: 79 mined areas covering an 
estimated 2.76km2 and 51 cluster munition strikes covering 
an estimated 7.63km2.9 The total of 79 mined areas was a 
considerable increase on the 48 mined areas that had been 
identifi ed at the end of 2012.10 By the end of 2014, KMAC 
reported the number of confi rmed mined areas had fallen 
slightly, to 77 covering 2.75km2.11 During 2018, two areas of 
previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination 
were added to the database with a total size of 55,166m2.12
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER 
MUNITION REMNANTS 
In addition to contamination from mines, Kosovo is 
contaminated with CMR (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing 
Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Kosovo for further 
information) as well as other ERW. Kosovo Protection 
Force (KFOR) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) explosive 
ordnance disposal EOD teams regularly dispose of ERW in 
response to information provided by the public and demining 
organisations.13 
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In January 2011, the EOD Coordination Management Section 
became KMAC, responsible for managing survey and clearance 
of mines and ERW. KMAC prepares an annual workplan in 
cooperation with international demining NGOs and coordinates 
their operations along with the national demining teams of 
the KSF. It also coordinates survey, quality assurance, risk 
education, public information, and victim assistance activities.14
KMAC’s role and responsibilities as head of the national mine 
action programme under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Defence were established and institutionalised by Kosovo’s 
2012 Law on Humanitarian Demining.15
In 2018, KMAC had fi ve permanent staff: a Director, a Senior 
Quality Assurance (QA) Offi cer, a QA Inspector, a Mine Risk 
Education (MRE) Offi cer, and a Public Information Offi cer.16
Kosovo’s mine action programme is fully nationally owned, 
with a strong, longstanding commitment from the national 
government. The dedicated team of permanent national staff 
have been employed with KMAC since its creation. This has 
benefi tted the programme with the retention of experience 
and institutional memory.17
The Kosovo government provided approximately €135,000 in 
fi nancial support to KMAC in 2018, consistent with the amount 
of funding for KMAC’s operations provided the previous year. 
The KSF received €980,000 for mine and ERW clearance in 
2018, also consistent with the funding it received from the 
Kosovo government the previous year.18 KMAC expected to 
receive similar levels of funding in 2019.19
Kosovo’s current Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 sets out the 
objective of intensifying resource mobilisation efforts in order 
to gain greater fi nancial stability.20 While a specifi c strategy 
did not exist in 2018, operators reported that coordinated 
approaches with KMAC were made to potential donors such 
as the United States and the European Union.21
Unfortunately, the misperception that mine, CMR, and ERW 
clearance in Kosovo was completed in 2001 persists, whereas 
the reality is that signifi cant contamination remains. Kosovo 
remains a poor country and needs economic assistance to 
help it complete clearance in a timely manner, possibly in less 
than fi ve years if suffi cient support is provided. In 2019, KMAC 
identifi ed funding and logistical support as the two primary 
areas where it could most benefi t from assistance from 
international donors and mine action operators.22
GENDER 
Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 refl ects the commitment 
of the mine action programme to ensure that gender is taken into 
consideration in the planning, implementation, and monitoring 
of all mine action projects, with a view to promoting equality and 
quality.23 The Strategy stipulates that all mine action activities and 
assistance must refl ect the needs of different ages and gender in 
a targeted and non-discriminatory manner, and that mine action 
and community liaison data is also to be collected systematically 
disaggregated according to sex and age.24
Both KMAC and KSF had gender policies in place in 2018. 
KMAC reported that the KSF’s gender policy aims to facilitate 
the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW, 
expressly women and children. In 2018, a total of 8% of KSF 
staff employed in operational mine action roles were women, 
along with 5% of staff in managerial or supervisory positions. 
Within KMAC, one of its fi ve staff was a woman.25
Kosovo’s mine action strategy recognises the barriers that 
exist against equal employment in Kosovo society, including 
signifi cant differences in employment levels between men and 
women, despite the number of men and women of working 
age being broadly similar. The Strategy notes that, as at 2019, 
more than four-fi fths of women of working age were not 
employed in Kosovo’s labour market, and less than one in eight 
women of working age have been employed annually over 
the past fi ve years. The primary reasons given by women for 
unemployment are child and family care obligations, which 
traditionally fall on women in Kosovo society. The Strategy 
notes the efforts of mine action operators to overcome 
these challenges and barriers to employment, such as 
through child care and parental leave, and gender-sensitive 
recruitment practices that encourage women to apply for 
positions traditionally seen as jobs for men. It further recalls 
the importance of employment of not only multi-gender, 
but also multi-ethnic, survey and clearance teams and the 
particular benefi ts of recruitment in areas affected by high 
unemployment and poor socio-economic conditions.26
In 2018, The HALO Trust developed a gender policy in 
consultation with the Kosovo Women’s Network, an advocacy 
network of more than 140 member organisations, including 
women’s organisations of all ethnic backgrounds from 
throughout Kosovo, which was adopted in February. The 
policy aims both at increasing the recruitment of women, as 
well as retention of existing female employees through the 
provision of extra maternity leave and child care allowances. 
Recognising the signifi cant deterrents to women’s 
employment of affordable child care and traditional gender 
roles as family caregivers, The HALO Trust’s gender policy 
provides female employees and single parents of either sex 
with stipends covering 75% of child care costs and increased 
the paternity leave allowance from four days as stipulated by 
national law, to two weeks of paternity leave.27 By the end of 
2018, the number of women working for The HALO Trust in 
Kosovo increased to close to 15%, up from 3% at the start of 
the year.28
In 2018, The HALO Trust’s dedicated Community Liaison 
Offi cer was female and the programme deployed a gender-
balanced survey team, which tried to reach male and 
female respondents equally, including girls and boys 
with permission of their parents. As men are most often 
the primary respondents of the household, added effort 
was placed on access to, and inclusion of, women and 
girls in all project phases. The HALO Trust expected that 
with increasing community liaison and a stronger female 
presence within demining teams, further progress would 
be made to overcome the challenge of reaching women and 
encouraging women to take a greater interest in mine action 
in their communities. Data collected post-clearance is also 
disaggregated to ensure the understanding and analysis 
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While The HALO Trust reported that it did not have any 
women in operational management positions in 2018, it 
stated that it was a priority for the programme address 
upward mobility for women within the organisation and was 
partnering with the Gender and Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP) in 2019 to this end. Additionally, in 2019, the 
programme planned to train more women in the use of 
Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) mine 
detectors and to introduce new junior management positions 
into which women will have the opportunity to be promoted.30
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported that a target of 25% 
female staff was in place, and in 2018, 23% of its staff were 
women, including one of four team leaders, two of six medics, 
and one of four staff in the management team. Women 
were especially encouraged to apply for staff positions, and 
given priority over male applicants with equivalent skills 
and experience. NPA confi rmed its survey and community 
liaison teams were gender balanced and ensured that the 
participation of all relevant social groups is always taken into 
account when conducting activities in local communities.31 
NPA’s efforts to recruit and train multi-ethnic survey and 
clearance teams was also been a critical factor in allowing 
the deployment of teams in areas of particular ethnic and 
political sensitivities, extending the reach of mine action 
operations in north Kosovo, while also building bridges 
and friendships between the individual staff members and 
through their community liaison activities.32
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine 
action database. Data is disaggregated between mines, CMR, 
and ERW.33 Operators were positive in their assessments of 
the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database 
and of KMAC’s information management systems in general. 
Notably, operators report to KMAC on a weekly basis.34
Both NPA and The HALO Trust also emphasised the 
constructive and proactive working relationship with KMAC. 
Beyond weekly KMAC visits to operational sites, regular 
senior management coordination meetings between KMAC 
and mine action operators were held on a monthly basis 
in 2018, or more frequently when required, and quarterly 
meetings were also convened for operational planning.35
According to its most recent mine action strategy, KMAC 
intends, as a means to show its commitment to the APMBC, 
to submit voluntary Article 7 transparency reports on an 
annual basis.36
PLANNING AND TASKING
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) supported the development of Kosovo’s new Mine 
Action Strategy 2019–24, bringing together a wide range 
of national and international stakeholders in a strategy 
stakeholder workshop in Pristina in October 2018. The 
strategy, formally approved in January 2019 and launched 
by the Ministry of Kosovo Security Services on 4 April 2019, 
has three goals:
 ■ Mine/ERW threats managed and reduced 
 ■ Communication and awareness raising 
 ■ Management of residual contamination. 
The strategy declares that all known mined and 
CMR-contaminated areas will be addressed by the end of 
2024, leaving only residual contamination to be managed 
accordingly. It contains annual projections for anti-personnel 
mine clearance, including:
 ■ all high priority anti-personnel mine tasks 
(8 as at October 2018) will be cleared by 2020 
 ■ all medium-priority anti-personnel mine tasks 
(25 as at October 2018) will be cleared by 2022; and 
 ■ all low-priority anti-personnel mine tasks 
(15 as at October 2018) will be completed by 2024.37
The strategy states it is based on a number of assumptions, 
including that the necessary funding will be secured and that 
no new mined or CMR-contaminated areas are identifi ed. It 
notes, however, that “so far each year 3–4 different affected 
areas have been reported” and that should this trend 
continue, capacity and progress will need to be reassessed 
with regards to the 2024 deadline.38 
As per the strategy, KMAC will develop annual operational 
workplans to implement the strategy’s goals.39 KMAC will 
also request an external mid-term review of the strategy 
in 2022 to evaluate progress and make any adaptations 
according to contextual changes if required.40 According to 
the strategy, a separate national strategy on the management 
of residual contamination will be developed by KMAC by 
2023, in collaboration with other national actors, to clarify 
roles and responsibilities in order to manage a long-term 
residual contamination problem.41
In 2019, KMAC confi rmed that it had developed annual 
operational workplans to target anti-personnel mined areas, 
according to impact-based criteria, including risk reduction, 
development priorities, and poverty reduction, along with 
the fi ndings of a nationwide baseline socio-economic impact 
assessment carried out in 2018 by KMAC, with the support 
of The HALO Trust.42 The mine action strategy for 2019–24 
also is in alignment with the objectives of Kosovo’s National 
Development Strategy 2016–2021.43
The HALO Trust reported prioritising in its areas of 
operations was based on impact, land use, seasonal access, 
and risk and contamination levels.44 While NPA confi rmed 
that its operations in northern Kosovo continued to focus on 
high-impacted areas, it noted that it was also important for 
NPA to ensure both Serbian and Albanian-populated areas 
are prioritised equally, with sensitivity towards political, 
cultural, and ethnic affi liations.45
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards for land release are in place 
in Kosovo, which according to KMAC are in accord with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).46
KMAC deployed two QA offi cers in 2018 who visited sites at 
least once a week to ensure compliance with the national 
standards and standing operating procedures (SoPs).47 NPA 
reported increasing its internal QA/quality control (QC) 
capacity during the year and confi rmed that KMAC made 
frequent visits to its tasks, which it said provided highly 
valued input for QA.48 The HALO Trust confi rmed that KMAC 
made weekly QA visits to its operations and reported it was 
exploring opportunities to restructure team management 
with the aim of enabling more effective QA/QC.49
A 2014 evaluation of Kosovo’s mine action programme, 
conducted on behalf of the International Trust Fund (ITF) 
Enhancing Human Security, concluded that an increase in 
capacity and improvements to land release methodology 
and equipment deployed would be necessary if Kosovo were 
to complete clearance operations by 2024. Since the 2014 
evaluation, a number of signifi cant improvements have been 
introduced to the mine action programme, including the use 
of HSTAMID detectors by The HALO Trust and large-loop 
detectors on certain tasks.50
OPERATORS 
In 2018, Kosovo’s national mine action programme’s capacity 
consisted of two international operators, The HALO Trust and 
NPA, and national operator, the KSF. KFOR supports the KSF 
and Kosovo Police with EOD response tasks and organising 
mine and ERW demolitions in Mitrovica and the north of 
Kosovo, including NPA’s areas of operations.51 The demining 
season is from the end of March to the end of November, due 
to weather conditions.52
In 2018, The HALO Trust maintained a 10-team-strong 
capacity to conduct both mine and CMR clearance. It reported 
that operational personnel are cross-trained and can move 
between activities, but generally the programme is split, 
with seven teams dedicated to mine clearance and three 
dedicated to cluster munition clearance. At the end of 2018, 
the programme employed 97 operations personnel, of whom 
14% were women.53
KSF operated four platoons in 2018: three for demining and 
one for EOD. The demining platoons are divided into fi ve 
teams with a total of 75 staff, and the EOD platoon consists 
of six teams of fi ve persons each. Of these, three teams are 
on standby for EOD call-outs in Prizren and three teams 
in Pomozotin.54 In 2018, KSF units conducted demining 
operations in fi ve locations: Babaj i Bokës, Ferizaj, Ferizaj/
Urosevac Park, Harilaq, and Paldenica.55
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Signifi cant advances in operational productivity have been 
achieved by the use of tools such as HSTAMID detectors. NPA 
sought to introduce the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) 
for a three-month pilot project to conduct targeted technical 
survey in areas contaminated with CMR, but as their use 
in CMR operations was not formally approved by KMAC in 
2018 they were deployed for survey and clearance of mines 
instead. The presence of anti-personnel mines was not found 
in any of the suspected mined areas and NPA discontinued 
plans to use MDDs in its areas of operations in north Kosovo.56
In 2019, KMAC informed Mine Action Review that the use of 
MDDs could, however, be considered for KSF operations in 
remaining minefi eld tasks along the Kosovo-Albanian border.57
According to The HALO Trust, there were plans to increase 
HSTAMID operator capacity and the number of HSTAMIDs in 
use per team in 2019.58
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of 0.33km2 of mined area was released in 2018, 
including 0.22km2 through clearance and a further 0.11km2
reduced through technical survey.
SURVEY IN 2018
Non-technical survey of suspected mined areas was not 
carried out in 2018.59A total of close to 114,000m2 was reduced 
through technical survey during the year.60 This is a slight 
increase from 2017, when just under 89,000m2 was reduced 
through technical survey, all by The HALO Trust.61
Table 1: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201862
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CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, a total of just over 0.22km2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared, with 46 anti-personnel mines found and 
destroyed. This was close to results in 2017, when the KSF and HALO Trust cleared more than 0.23km2.63
Table 2: Mine clearance in 201864
Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
 HALO Trust 9 195,382 42 2
 KSF 2 18,845 4 8
 NPA 1 8,573 0 0
Total 12 220,800 46 10
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle 
A further six anti-personnel mines were destroyed by the 
KSF in EOD response tasks during the year.65 As Kosovo has 
strict national procedures for the management of explosives, 
the KSF, with support from KFOR in northern Kosovo, carries 
out the destruction of mines, CMR, and other ERW found by 
The HALO Trust and NPA.66
NPA deployed two MDDs in 2018 to verify information 
regarding landmines suspected to be inside cluster munition 
strikes in northern Kosovo. The dogs were deployed to 
Jerebinje, in Zubin Potok municipality, and Belo Brdo, in 
Leposavic municipality to investigate information about 
mine belts inside the strike areas. The tasks are located on 
the border with Serbia, where mines were alleged to have 
been laid by the Yugoslav National Army to protect military 
installations from the KLA and NATO. NPA stated that since 
cluster munition clearance uses less sensitive detectors 
than does mine clearance, it was not possible to deploy a 
BAC team in an area with mine contamination. In Jerebinje, it 
was determined that the mines had likely been removed, and 
in Belo Brdo, NPA found fi ve ‘training’ mines which did not 
contain explosives.67
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the APMBC and therefore 
does not have a specifi c clearance deadline under Article 5. 
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. 
As stated in Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, which 
sets completion of mine and cluster munition clearance by the 
end of 2024, completion will only be achievable if sustained 
funding is secured.68 Specifi c concerns are elaborated in the 
strategy about the need to upgrade old equipment, including 
vehicles to proceed without unnecessary stand-downs or 
costly repairs.69
With adequate funding, KMAC and The HALO Trust predict 
that anti-personnel mine and cluster munition clearance will 
be completed by the end of 2024.70 This would be 25 years 
after the end of the confl ict between the FRY forces and NATO 
and more than 20 years after the UN claimed that clearance 
was largely complete.
In 2019, The HALO Trust reported that it could complete 
clearance of remaining mined areas within its areas of 
responsibility with existing capacity by the end of 2024. It 
cautioned, however, that sustaining capacity over the strategy 
period will prove a challenge, and any reductions in funding 
could impede progress towards meeting the 2024 target.71
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)







* Mine and CMR clearance
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NAGORNO-
KARABAKH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Nagorno-Karabakh should make a commitment to respect the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 
and set a deadline for the clearance all anti-personnel mines.
 ■ Despite not being a state party to the APMBC, Nagorno-Karabakh has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should commit to never use anti-personnel mines and provide resources 
for mine survey and clearance.
 ■ Information management should be improved as inaccuracies in reported anti-personnel mine contamination, 
survey, and clearance data continue to occur.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2018, anti-personnel mine contamination 
throughout the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh, including 
both within the Soviet-era boundaries and in the adjacent 
territories, was estimated to cover just over 3.78km2 across 
70 mined areas (see Table 1).1 Since 2017, the number of 
confi rmed hazardous area (CHAs) has decreased (from 73 
to 70), while total mined area has increased (from 3.56km2 
to 3.78km2).2 The difference in total mine contamination 
between the end of 2017 and end of 2018 cannot be 
explained or reconciled by the total area released during the 
intervening 12 months. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine 
contamination covered a total of 82 areas over 5.1km2 as at 
the end of 2018.3
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province 
(at end 2018)4
Region CHAs Area (km2)
Askeran 7  0.33 
Hadrut 20 1.90 
Lachin 19  0.67 
Martakert 18 0.54 
Martuni 2  0.17 
Shaumyan 4  0.17 
Totals 70 3.78
The HALO Trust is currently conducting survey with a 
view to more accurately quantifying the mined area in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, covering areas that had not been 
surveyed in the past. In 2019, The HALO Trust doubled its 
survey capacity in order to try and complete the survey by 
the end of the year. In 2018, three CHAs were added to the 
database with an estimated area of 62,567m2.5
All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by 
mines and unexploded submunitions as a result of the 
1988–94 confl ict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and 
subsequent fi ghting. Mines were laid by both the Azeri and 
pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high 
proportion of anti-vehicle mines being used in some regions.6
 
The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due 
to the nature of the confl ict certain areas were mined several 
times.7
 
In 2013, new anti-personnel mines were laid along the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani “line of contact” east and north of the 
disputed territory. At the time the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Nagorno-Karabakh stated that “due to the ongoing confl ict 
with Azerbaijan ... today we are not in a position to refrain 
from using AP [anti-personnel] mines for defensive purposes 
along the line of contact.” He noted further that, “these 
mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the 
extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances 
and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”8
 
Nagorno-Karabakh is also contaminated with submunitions, 
estimated at 71.62km2 at the end of 2018, and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing 
Cluster Munition Remnants 2019 report on Nagorno-Karabakh 
for further information).
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In 2000, The HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Mine Action Centre (NKMAC), which is now moribund. In 
theory, its role was to consolidate all mine action-related 
information and to respond to requests from the government 
ministries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local 
communities. In reality, there is no viable or tangible mine 
action centre in Nagorno-Karabakh.9
A mine action coordination committee was responsible for 
liaising between the local authorities and The HALO Trust.10
Regular coordination committee meetings were held between 
the local authorities, The HALO Trust, and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) until 2018 when the head 
of the committee was moved to a new post. The position 
remains vacant, with HALO Trust continuing to lobby for a 
suitable candidate to fi ll the role.11
The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities do not provide The HALO 
Trust with any funding to clear mined areas.12
GENDER
The HALO Trust has an organisational gender and diversity 
policy which is incorporated into HALO’s Nagorno-Karabakh 
programme. In addition to fully briefi ng new recruits, HALO 
also conducts regular refresher training on all its policies, 
including its gender and diversity policy, for both national 
and international staff.13
All groups affected by anti-personnel mines, including 
women and children are said to be consulted during survey 
and community liaison activities. However, the non-technical 
survey teams have been predominantly male with the fi rst 
female team member only recruited in 2019. The HALO trust 
aims to recruit more female non-technical survey team 
members.14
Relevant mine action data is disaggregated by sex and 
age.15 Gender is not taken into account in the prioritisation, 
planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities.16
The HALO Trust is one of the largest civilian employers in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, with 270 Karabakhi Armenian staff.17
And while there is equal access to employment for qualifi ed 
women and men in survey and clearance, the number of 
women employed in operational roles is still quite low. In 
2018, out of the total of 210 deminers only 15 were women of 
whom 2 were team leaders. In addition, three women were 
employed in managerial level/supervisory positions, and six 
of the support staff were women.18
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There is no national information management system in 
place. However, The HALO Trust operates its own country 
mine action database and is working to better tailor 
the database to its operations. For example, new fi elds 
were added to the database in 2018 to allow for further 
disaggregation of data. HALO Nagorno-Karabakh also 
continues to be supported by its United Kingdom-based 
specialist data management staff.19
The Nagorno-Karabakh Army Liaison Offi cer shares 
information with HALO Trust on items found, incidents, CHAs, 
and clearance on a regular basis. HALO is not authorised to 
share this data with others.20
PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy currently in place in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.21
The HALO Trust prioritised clearance of minefi elds in 
Nagorno-Karabakh that have confi rmed accidents and 
which will be used immediately following clearance. In 2018, 
most mined areas remaining were only accessible during 
the dry summer months of May to October, and HALO Trust 
expanded its clearance capacity over this period. Clearance 
outside of the Traditional Oblast was focused on high- and 
medium-priority tasks in the Lachin corridor, with private 
funding; with clearance of the remaining minefi elds within the 
Traditional Oblast boundary conducted using USAID funding. 
This approach continued into 2019.22
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
No local mine action standards exist in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
As at April 2019, however, the Nagorno-Karabakh police 
were planning to lobby the government to develop standards 
and The HALO Trust was planning to work closely with the 
authorities to support the process.23
The HALO Trust follows its own standing operating 
procedures (SoPs) for demining and battle area clearance.24
As at April 2019, HALO’s survey and anti-personnel 
mine clearance SoPs were under review, with a view to 
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OPERATORS 
Since 2000, The HALO Trust has been the main organisation 
conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Nagorno-
Karabakh Rescue Service conducts explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) spot tasks and one Nagorno-Karabakh army 
unit conducts limited demining. Since the April 2016 confl ict, 
The HALO Trust has collaborated with the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Rescue Services when gathering information about mines 
and other ERW, and part of its quality assurance (QA) process 
involves participation in the offi cial handover ceremony with 
community representatives.26
The HALO Trust does not fi eld separate teams dedicated 
solely to either mine or ERW clearance. Operational staff are 
trained and experienced in working in both tasks.27 HALO 
is currently working to increase its non-technical survey 
capacity in support of its mine clearance operations, while 
decreasing its technical survey capacity. HALO recruited 
30 new deminers in 2018. It had hoped to recruit more but 
a demining accident in March 2018 (see below) is thought to 
have deterred many potential applicants.28
OPERATIONAL TOOLS
HALO conducts both manual and mechanical clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh. Machines are used to clear roads with 
a plastic anti-vehicle mine threat and in areas with high levels of metal contamination which makes manual clearance 
extremely ineffi cient.29
DEMINER SAFETY
In March 2018, a HALO vehicle with a technical survey team 
on board detonated an anti-vehicle mine on their way to an 
anti-personnel mine clearance task, killing three staff and 
injuring two others. 
The accident was internally investigated by The HALO Trust, 
which also commissioned an external expert investigation. 
A further investigation by the Nagorno-Karabakh police 
was ongoing as at 1 May 2019. As a result of the internal 
investigation prodding was halted as a safety precaution 
until the exact causes of the accident were understood. 
Mechanical clearance and clearance with detectors have 
since superseded its use. Copies of HALO Trust’s internal 
and external reports will be available once the police 
investigation is fi nalised.30
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of almost 0.26km2 of mined area was released in 2018, of which 0.25km2 was cleared, and 3,148m2 was reduced through 
technical survey.
In addition, three CHAs were added to the database with an estimated area of 62,567m2.31
SURVEY IN 2018
No anti-personnel mined area was cancelled through 
non-technical survey in 2018 but a total of 3.148m2 was 
reduced through technical survey (see Table 2).32 This is a 
massive reduction from the 0.29km2 of mined area cancelled 
through non-technical survey and 0.27km2 reduced through 
technical survey in 2017.33
CLEARANCE IN 2018
In 2018, a total of 253,804m2 was cleared across 26 areas 
with 96 anti-personnel mines and 40 items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) destroyed (see Table 3).34 This is a drop from 
the 292,176m2 cleared in 2017 and 188 anti-personnel mines 
found and destroyed.35 In 2017, The HALO Trust found one 
mine for every 1,974m2 of land cleared while in 2018 it was 
one mine for every 2,644m2 cleared. 
Table 2: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201836
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Table 3: Mine clearance in 201837
Province Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
Askeran 2 8,849 3 0 4
Hadrut 9 116,306 23 0 13
Lachin 6 48,599 27 0 14
Martakert 7 69,398 43 0 8
Martuni 2 10,652 0 0 1
Totals 26 253,804 96 0 40
In addition, the HALO Trust destroyed 27 anti-personnel 
mines during 13 EOD spot tasks in 2018.38
Progress in mine clearance has fl uctuated over the last 
fi ve years, as shown in Table 4, but with clearance output 
averaging below 0.5km2 annually. As at 2014, 95% of mine 
contamination in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh had been 
addressed, and this fi gure had risen to 97% by April 2017.39
Following a commitment from the United States to fund the 
completion of clearance of all known remaining minefi elds 
within Soviet-era boundaries, the HALO Trust had previously 
reported that this could be achieved by the end of 2019.40
However, in April 2019, the HALO Trust stated that it does 
not anticipate clearing the minefi elds within the Soviet-era 
boundaries by the end of 2019 or in the foreseeable future. 
The HALO Trust had based the original completion date 
on a rate of clearance it is no longer able to achieve due 
to diffi culties in access, challenging terrain, high levels of 
contamination which in some cases can only be cleared using 
full excavation, and diffi culties with staff recruitment and 
retention as a result of the March 2018 accident.41
In addition, there is signifi cant mine contamination outside 
of the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh but the 
HALO Trust fi nds it diffi cult to secure funding for these areas. 
Since 2015, clearance has been conducted through private 
sources of funding.42
Table 4: Five-year summary of mine clearance (2014–18)







* Figures for clearance in 2014–17 include both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel 
mines. 
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WESTERN
SAHARA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) should reaffi rm its written commitment to respect and 
implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including clearance of all anti-personnel mines 
east of the Berm, consonant with its human rights obligations.
 ■ Facing signifi cant challenges due to a decrease in operational capacity and funding for 2019, Western Sahara’s 
mine action strategy targets for completing mine survey and clearance should be reassessed, and a revised 
mine action strategy developed.
 ■ A resource mobilisation plan should be developed with the aim of attracting international donor support. 
 ■ Greater support should be provided to the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Offi ce (SMACO) to enable it 
to continue to coordinate mine action in Western Sahara and ensure that capacity development efforts are 
not lost. 
 ■ Mine action in Western Sahara must not become forgotten or overlooked by the international mine action 
community. Support must still be given to address remaining mine, cluster munition, and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) contamination.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of mine contamination across Western 
Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm1 are 
thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination 
in the world.2 The contamination is a result of fi ghting in 
previous decades between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) 
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra 
and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces. 
According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the 
primary mine threat in Western Sahara east of the Berm, 
excluding both the Berm itself and the buffer strip, is from 
anti-vehicle rather than anti-personnel mines; cluster 
munition remnants (CMR) are also a major hazard.3 As at 
end 2018, no areas suspected or confi rmed to contain solely 
anti-personnel mines remained to the east of the Berm, and 
the majority of mine contamination identifi ed during ongoing 
and historical clearance efforts was from anti-vehicle mines.4 
However, UNMAS reported that, during the year, as a result 
of non-technical survey conducted in the Agwanit Area of 
Responsibility, a number of large minefi elds previously 
thought to contain only anti-vehicle mines were found to 
also contain anti-personnel mines.5
At the end of 2018, land in Western Sahara to the east of the 
Berm contained a total of 26 areas confi rmed and suspected 
to contain mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine 
contamination covering a total of nearly 216.3km2, as set out 
in Table 1.6 This is an overall decrease of one area with a size 
of approximately 1.85km2 from that remaining at the end 
of 2017.7 
In September 2018, UNMAS reported that following 
non-technical survey efforts, 10 of the then 27 mined areas, 
were reported to remain covering an estimated total of 
almost 120km2, and are located within the 5km-wide buffer 
strip and are inaccessible for clearance.8 Clearance of the 
buffer strip of mines and ERW is not foreseen in United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) mission agreements, which, according to the 
UN, considerably limits the ability of MINURSO military 
observers to patrol and verify developments.9
Table 1: Mined area east of the Berm (at end 2018)10
Type of contamination CHAs Area (km2) SHAs Area (km2) Total CHAs and SHAs Total area (km2)
AP mines 0 0 0 0 0 0
AV mines 2 0.11 0 0 2 0.11
AP/AV mines 14 90.19 10 125.96 24 216.15
Totals 16 90.30 10 125.96 26 216.26
AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle   CHA = Confi rmed hazardous area   SHA = Suspected hazardous area















Both the north and south of Western Sahara are known or 
suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, with 24 areas 
confi rmed or suspected areas with a total size of almost 
216.3km2 remaining to be addressed at the end of 2018, as set 
out in Table 2.11 This is compared to the end of the previous 
year, when a total of 11 areas confi rmed or suspected to 
contain anti-personnel mines were reported to remain with a 
total size of more than 169.5km2.12
According to UNMAS, a total of six additional mined areas 
with a size of just over 367,200m2 were added to the database 
in 2018.13
Table 2: Mined area containing anti-personnel mines by province east of the Berm (at end 2018)14
Province CHAs Area (km2) SHAs Area (km2) Total CHAs and SHAs Total area (km2)
North Region 4 0.50 3 4.10 7 4.60
South Region 10 89.79 7 121.86 17 211.65
Totals 14 90.29 10 125.96 24 216.25
A survey in 2006–08 by an international non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), Landmine Action, later renamed Action 
on Armed Violence (AOAV), identifi ed 37 mined areas east of 
the Berm, nearly half of which were in Bir Lahlou, followed 
by Tifariti, Mehaires, and Agwanit.15
Neither survey nor clearance has been conducted in the 
5km-wide buffer strip to the east of the Berm. The extent 
of contamination west of the Berm remains unknown, 
and as of 2019, no survey had been carried out there.16
UNMAS reported in 2018 that there were areas of known 
contamination in the buffer strip that remained inaccessible 
for clearance due to military agreements.17 The RMA 
controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been 
conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, the 
RMA cooperates with the MINURSO mine action component 
and submits regular monthly reports, helping to build a 
clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across 
Western Sahara.18
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
Western Sahara also has a signifi cant problem from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition 
Remnants 2019 report on Western Sahara for further information).19
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action 
Coordination Centre (MACC), manages and supports mine 
action activities, of which, survey and clearance activities 
were implemented by commercial contractor SafeLane 
Global (formerly Dynasafe MineTech Limited, DML) and 
humanitarian NGO Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2018. 
On 30 April 2019, MINURSO’s mandate was extended for an 
additional six months until 30 October 2019 under Security 
Council Resolution 2468 (2019). UNMAS Western Sahara 
serves as the UN focal point for mine action activities within 
the MINURSO area of operations. Its contracted teams work 
in areas east of the Berm only. 
The Royal Moroccan Army operates its own demining 
operations in areas west of the Berm.
In 2013–14, the Polisario Front, with UN support, established 
the SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action 
activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm, excluding the 
buffer strip.20
In 2018, UNMAS continued to implement an ongoing capacity 
development project with SMACO, with funding from 
the German Federal Foreign Offi ce, which concluded in 
October after 28 months.21 Emphasis was placed on building 
the programme’s capacity to translate local mine action 
requirements into proposals and budgets with the aim of 
ensuring that SMACO can independently seek funds and 
report on progress in the future.22 UNMAS stated that efforts 
were also aimed at regularly raising the profi le of SMACO 
within the local and wider international communities.23
NPA also reported continuing its efforts in partnership with 
SMACO to develop the local staff capacity through on-the-job 
trainings in the support offi ce as well as operationally.24 It 
stated that SMACO’s ability to coordinate operations improved 
signifi cantly in 2018, but raised serious concerns about 
the cessation of funding from the German government for 
capacity development activities, noting that SMACO’s running 
costs and ability to pay staff salaries were at risk.25 UNMAS 
informed Mine Action Review, however, that it had allocated 
non-earmarked funding to cover SMACO’s operating costs for 
2019, and to include the development of a communications and 
resource mobilisation strategy during that year.26
GENDER
UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented 
in accordance with UNMAS, the UN Offi ce for Project 
Services (UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as 
with direction from the Polisario.27 NPA reported that 
gender mainstreaming considerations were included in 
its Memorandum of Understanding with SMACO, in NPA’s 
internal strategy documents, and taken into account during 
recruitment. Additionally, during survey, efforts are made to 
ensure the needs of men, women, girls, and boys are taken 
into consideration for more effective and effi cient operations, 
despite challenges presented by conducting survey activities 
targeting Bedouin populations.28
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In 2018, NPA reported that, during recruitment, the 
programme actively selected female candidates for interviews 
wherever possible. NPA has encouraged local journalists 
to highlight the work of female deminers and their ability 
to work equally well in a highly challenging environment, 
with the aim of overcoming widely held perceptions in local 
communities that demining is a job only for men. It stated 
that six women were employed in operational roles in 2018, 
or just over 18% of the total operational staff. Two women 
held managerial roles, including Head of Finance and Head of 
Human Resources, making up 40% of NPA’s management staff 
in Western Sahara.29
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to UNMAS, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara improved as 
a result of an ongoing data audit initiated at the end of 2015.30 Routine database clean-up was conducted throughout 2018.31 The 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has also provided ongoing support to correct database errors, 
and an upgrade to the latest database software version, IMSMA Core, was scheduled to take place in August 2019.32
PLANNING AND TASKING
In July 2019, UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that a new 
mine action strategy specifi c to Western Sahara was under 
development and would be completed in 2019, in line with the 
newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023.33
The previous mine action strategy for Western Sahara 
foresaw the completion of non-technical survey in 2017 or 
2018 and a 50% reduction in the total number of recorded 
SHAs and CHAs remaining on the territory of Western 
Sahara by the end of 2022.34 In May 2019, UNMAS informed 
Mine Action Review that these targets were not met due to 
“changing priorities” for mine action. It reported that the 
new end state for completing the clearance of all known 
hazards to the east of the Berm would be the end of 2023 in 
the forthcoming revised strategy, given enough funding and 
enabling political and security conditions.35
UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both 
minefi elds and cluster munition strikes to the east of the 
Berm in conjunction with MINURSO. Priorities are identifi ed 
based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of 
movement of local populations, while UNMAS ensures that 
observation patrol routes are safe for military observers 
and the transport of logistical supplies.36
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Local mine action standards were in place and implemented in 
2018.37 The standards were developed and fi nalised in 2016 by 
UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with mine 
action partners. NPA has reported that operators duly updated 
their standing operating procedures (SoPs), and that the local 
mine action standards set realistic benchmarks for effi cient 
operations.38 A fi rst annual review of the standards was 
completed in November 2018 with a review board consisting of 
representatives from UNMAS, SMACO, and all implementing 
partners. No signifi cant changes were made, and UNMAS 
reported in June 2019 that translation of the standards into 
Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO.39
An external quality management system was in place in 2018 
and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of the 
Berm.40 NPA confi rmed a considerable increase in quality 
assurance (QA) activities in 2018, which it said was due to 
the relocation of UNMAS to Tindouf, Algeria, with easier 
access to territory under Polisario control. NPA confi rmed 
that SMACO and UNMAS QA offi cers conducted many QA site 
visits in 2018, conducted accreditation for new NPA staff, 
monitored progress on tasks, and conducted quality control 
of completed areas.41 
OPERATORS 
SafeLane Global (formerly DML) and NPA were the 
implementing operators conducting survey and clearance 
in Western Sahara in 2018. UNMAS reported no change in 
operational capacity during the year. The overall mine action 
capacity in Western Sahara in 2018 consisted of nine multi-
task teams (MTTs) and one community liaison/survey team, 
with a total of 116 operational staff in the fi eld. This included 
six DML teams and one community liaison/survey team. The 
total number of MTTs was reduced by one in July 2018.42 
In 2018, NPA continued to deploy one team to clear mined 
areas and two manual teams to address CMR in Bir 
Lahlou, along with fi ve risk education teams operating in 
the Saharawi refugee camps in southern Algeria. The risk 
education project, funded by Germany and supervised 
by UNMAS/SMACO, ended in April 2018.43 NPA made the 
“diffi cult decision” to close down its programme, effective on 
1 January 2019, after releasing the last known contaminated 
areas in Bir Lehlou province in August 2018.44 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018
A total of nearly 3.71km2 of mixed mined area was released 
in 2018: more than 2.38km2 through clearance and 1.32km2
through survey.45
SURVEY IN 2018
According to UNMAS, of the 1.32km2 released through 
survey in 2018, more than 0.87km2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey (see Table 3) and 0.45km2 reduced 
through technical survey.46
Table 3: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical 
survey in 201847





Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey 
in 201848





In 2018, according to UNMAS, a total of just over 2.38km2 of 
areas thought to contain mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle 
mine contamination was cleared, with the destruction of 
37 anti-personnel mines, 35 anti-vehicle mines, and three 
items of UXO (see Table 5).49 This was a substantial increase 
from 2017, when close to 0.28km2 of area thought to contain 
anti-personnel mines contamination was cleared; however 
no anti-personnel mines were found. Thirty-two anti-vehicle 
mines and ten items of UXO were destroyed.50
Western Sahara is not a state party to the APMBC. In June 
2014, however, the SADR submitted a voluntary APMBC 
Article 7 transparency report to the UN “as a sign of the 
support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty”.51
In July 2019, UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that a new 
mine action strategy specifi c to Western Sahara was under 
development and would be completed by the end of year, in 
line with the newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy 
2019–2023.52
The previous mine action strategy for Western Sahara 
foresaw the completion of non-technical survey before 
the end of 2018 and a 50% reduction in the total number of 
recorded SHAs and CHAs remaining in Western Sahara by 
the end of 2022.53 In May 2019, UNMAS reported that the 
new end state for clearance of all known mine and ERW 
contamination to the east of the Berm would be set at the 
end of 2023.54
This is almost two years earlier than UNMAS’ previous 
estimate, which had sought to release all high and medium 
hazardous areas in Western Sahara east of the Berm by 
2025.55 UNMAS has reported that delays to clearing mined 
areas continued as a result of restrictions on accessing 
certain areas of the buffer strip established by various 
MINURSO mission agreements.56 NPA has cited other 
challenges to operations, including working in a remote 
desert environment allied to serious diffi culties with 
the procurement of certain equipment and materials.57
Temperatures of up to 60 degrees Celsius, strong winds, 
sandstorms, and heavy rain during the wet season can also 
cause mine action activities to be suspended.58
In 2019, with the loss of NPA as a key mine action implementer, 
along with the cessation of both German and Norwegian 
funding for mine clearance activities, the future of Western 
Sahara’s mine action programme remained uncertain. 
Additional resources and capacity, along with support to 
SMACO, needed to be secured urgently. In July 2019, UNMAS 
informed Mine Action Review that mine action capacity had 
reduced by more than 50% and there was no indication of 
funding available to maintain capacity going forward.59
Table 5: Mine clearance in 201860
Region Operator Areas cleared Area cleared (m²) AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed 
North NPA 2 1,040,387 37 5 2
North SLG 3 508,228 0 8 0
South DML 2 834,911 0 22 1
Totals 7 2,383,526 37 35 3
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AIM Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan)
AP Anti-personnel
AV Anti-vehicle
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CHA  Confi rmed hazardous area
DDG Danish Demining Group
ERW  Explosive remnants of war
FSD Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
GICHD  Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS  Geographic information system
HI Humanity and Inclusion
IMAS  International Mine Action Standards
IP Implementing Partner
MAG Mines Advisory Group
MAPA Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan
MDD Mine detection dog
NMAS  National Mine Action Standards
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid
QA  Quality assurance
QC  Quality control
SHA  Suspected hazardous area 
SoP Standing (or Standard) Operating Procedure
UNMAS  United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO Unexploded ordnance
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